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War in Ancient India c9: Chapter VI: Strategy and Tactics in War

War in Ancient India c9

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Contents

Chapter VI: Strategy and Tactics in War

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INTRODUCTORY

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We have already seen that ancient Hindu wars were generally of two kinds—Dharmayuddha and Kūṭayuddha, just and unjust wars. This is an arbitrary division from both the moral and religious standpoints. Another division, we have noticed, was three-fold—dharmavijaya, asuravijaya and lobhavijaya. Yet another division was daiva, mānuṣa and āsura, according to the weapons used. Here daiva and āsura seem to some extent to belong to the realm of mythology. The devāsura wars come under this head. Men of the epic age indulged to some extent in the asura modes of war; and one chief feature of this asura war was the larger use of machines or mechanical contrivances which resulted in wholesale slaughter. The mānuṣa kind of war was the only accepted one. Yet another division of wars is seen in the Mānavadharmaśāstra—land fights, hill and forest fights, and sea fights.¹

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¹ Mānavadharmaśāstra, VII, 192.

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We shall, for the purpose of our present study, bring all wars under three heads. These are land warfare, naval warfare, and aerial warfare. Some may feel sceptic about aerial wars in ancient India; but the scepticism vanishes into thin air if the material available is properly analysed and studied. This may be regarded as the āsura element in the mānuṣa war; but we shall see more of this in the sequel.

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Land fights, then, occupy our foremost attention. Before the beginning of the Christian era, land fights were the rule, and sea and aerial fights were the exception. Land fights generally included wars in the plain country, forests and hill regions, though it is to be noticed that the law-giver, Manu, makes a distinction between battles on the plains and those on the hills and forests. There is yet another recommendation of the law-giver, that as far as possible wars should be fought away from cities and villages, and on the edge of forest regions. This was due to two reasons. One was not to disturb normal civilian life. The other was the strategic advantage of scoring a victory without much fighting and shedding of blood. Hill wars were not frequent. Wherever the capital city was a citadel, it was besieged and taken by storm. Siege warfare was a land fight. The Dasarājya yuddha of the Ṛg Veda is an example of a war on the plains in very early times. In the later heroic age, the battle at Kurukṣetra between the Pāṇḍavas and the Kauravas was a land fight where strategy and tactics were used to the utmost degree on both sides and which well deserves to be called an example of a tactical war. Alexander’s battle with the Indian king, Porus, may be cited as an instance of a land battle where strategic skill was employed in a large measure.

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We do not propose to go into the details of these wars, but shall proceed to an examination of the employment of strategy and tactics in them. Henderson says that strategy, according to the official text-book of the British Infantry, is the art of bringing the enemy to battle, while tactics are the methods by which a commander endeavours to over-reach the enemy when battle is joined.² He holds that the end of strategy is the pitched battle. In fact every battle that was fought in ancient India was a pitched battle in the sense that it was elaborately arranged for by both the contending parties. If an invader resolved on an invasion of a neighbouring state and made satisfactory arrangements to that effect, he dispatched an ambassador to the enemy king, giving due notice of his resolution and thus giving him time to make his own arrangements for defence. Rāma sent Angada to Rāvaṇa on this account. The arrangements on either side consisted of repairs of fortifications, if necessary, storing of foodstuffs and arms and their accessories, and securing that the food supplies should never fail.³ The function of spies and scouts in warfare was to gather correct information on the strength of the enemy, to win over his people and officials by bribes, and to bring about dissensions between him and his feudatories; and is discussed in a subsequent chapter. This is the use of artifice, stratagem, or finesse in carrying out any project. With these preliminaries and with particular care about his transport and the commissariat, the invader lay in wait for an opportunity to attack the enemy.⁴

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² Science of War, Ch. II.

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³ Ar. Śās. XII, 3; Śānti, 120, 25.

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⁴ Ibid., Bk. III, 4.

Section II: Strategical Considerations

The March

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The actual march of the enemy is regulated by short and long halts, well provided with commissariat, supplies and transport and communication facilities. There are two kinds of march. It may be a slow march when the invader feels that his offensive equipment is not strong enough to break up the enemy, or again when the enemy is making negotiations for peace. Otherwise he may make a quick or even a forced march.⁵ In the expeditions undertaken the element of time played a prominent part. The month of Mārgaśīrṣa (December) is generally recommended for long marches and Caitra (March-April) for short distances.⁶ But though this was the rule, there were exceptions. In case the conquering monarch found it advantageous to lead an expedition irrespective of the season, then he should do so.⁷ But it is the prescription of the Arthaśāstra, corroborated by the Kāmandakīya and the Agnipurāṇa, that during the hot season only asses, camels, and horses were to be used,⁸ in preference to elephants. The dewy season alone was fit for the use of elephants in marching. But a wise king is asked to avoid battle during the summer and rainy seasons.⁹

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⁵ Agni. Ch. 242.

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⁶ Mhb. v, 83, 7.

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⁷ Ibid., xii, 100, 9; Manu, vii, 182.

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⁸ Ar. Śās. p. 365; Kāma. p. 287; Agni. p. 377.

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⁹ Śukra. p. 238. For a description of the Mahratta army on the move see Broughton: Letters from a Maratha Camp, describing Scindhia's army on the march.

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The Nāyaka led the army while the Senāpati guarded the rear. If the road on the route of the march was sufficiently broad, it was recommended that the front ranks should march in a crocodile-like (makara) order, and the rear in a cart-like order, both flanks marching in a diamond-like array. But if the march lay through a narrow path, the army was to move in pin-like (sūci) order. These, in modern literature, are explained as perpendicular and parallel or flank marches. The march was undertaken only after the roads had been examined and cleared of thorns and shrubs.¹⁰ Conditions then were quite different from what they are to-day. Even on the march the army went arranged in battle order. This was undoubtedly in order to meet a sudden attack. It might be that the enemy would make a surprise attack on the route; and if the army marched with no order or in an irregular order, it would not be possible to face the enemy effectively.

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¹⁰ Ar. Śās. Bk. x, 2. 11 Ep. Ind. 19, 133-34.

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If, during the course of the march (daṇḍamārga, as it was known in later Vijayanagar),¹¹ rivers and canals were to be crossed, this was ordinarily done with the help of elephants which, being heavy animals, would withstand the current. Or they were forded over by boats and canoes. Or again wooden and other bridges were thrown over with the aid of skilled engineers. But if in fording the enemy placed obstruction by throwing missiles from the other side, the invader should withdraw from the place and seek another favourable fording point to cross without the enemy’s knowledge. Yet another regulation was that the army must not be made to feel fatigue or irksomeness during the journey. Above all, attention was drawn to the base of operations, for much of the success depended on maintaining communication with it. A river or mountain fortress was regarded as the best base.¹²

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How an army marched with its different units is described in detail in the *Agnipurāṇa*.¹³ First came the vanguard forces with their leader known as the Nāyaka. The purpose of an advance guard was to gather intelligence as regards the movements of the enemy. European History furnishes us with examples of generals who used and sometimes did not use this section of the army. Its use depended on the size of the army. Generals like Napoleon who took forces numerically strong made use of these, while those like Frederick the Great who commanded smaller numbers, did not find much use for it. In the middle of the line, besides the treasury and the women, were the king riding on a chariot or an elephant and also the front ranks of the army composed of picked men, well trained in all branches of warfare. The less brave and the less trained were placed behind in the rear. The flanks of the army in march were protected by horsemen, charioteers and elephant-men in successive order, so that they would not be attacked from the sides. And beyond the elephants marched the forest tribes recruited for the campaign. In the rear went the Commander-in-Chief. Whenever the troops retired for rest, sentinels and scouts were posted as picket guards in different directions to raise alarm at any surprise attack by the enemy.

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¹³ Ch. 242, 1-18.

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With favourable omens and in the Uttara Phalguni Naksatra auspicious for the march, Rāma set out with his forces towards the citadel of Laṅkā. Nila was the Nāyaka leading the vanguard and surveying the route, which lay through an undulating tract of land and which required the boldness and talents of a tried general to march through it. The march was through a region affording supplies of fruit, water and foodstuffs. Strong and well-disciplined monkey soldiers like Gaya, Gavaya, and Gavākṣa occupied the front ranks. Ṛṣabha took up the right wing, whilst Gandha and Gandhamādana held the left wing, and Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa marched in the middle. Powerful commanders like Jāmbavan and Suṣeṇa took up the command of the rear guard. Crossing rivers and marching up hill and down dale, the forces reached the shores of the ocean and encamped in three divisions. Bold and faithful monkey warriors like Mainda and Dvida served as pickets so as to give cover to the troops by patrolling, reminding us of Frederick the Great’s campaign of 1760,¹⁴ celebrated for its fine marches and manœuvres.

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¹⁴ Carlyle: *Frederick the Great*.

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THE CAMP

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The next strategical point to be considered by the commander was the encampment. It is called in the Purāṇas and epics *Skandāvāra*,¹⁵ and in the inscriptions of Vijayanagar *Kandācāra*.¹⁶ Generally thickly wooded spots were selected for the disposition of the troops. The best ground¹⁷ for entrenching horses is a level plain with no rocks and covered only with a few trees, and not muddy; for chariots, a well-laid road, devoid of sand or mud, trees, shrubs, etc.; for elephants, one without mud or having a layer of sharp gravel; and for infantry and others, one free from all defects, but with available supplies of drinking water. It should be broad and free from thorns. The camp¹⁸ was usually quadrangular in shape, furnished with four entrances, six roads and nine divisions and with walls, towers and ditches thrown round so as to afford a defence in times of danger. This is illustrated from Bharata’s camp on the banks of the Ganges on the eve of his meeting Rāma and from those of the Pāṇḍavas and the Kurus on the eve of the Great War. There were separate grounds for the drill and exercise of soldiers. Every division of the army was housed comfortably in inner apartments erected for the purpose. Honest and loyal men were posted to watch the movements of the enemy. It is said that eighteen divisions of sentinels should daily change their watches in turn. Outside the camp and at a distance from it, forest men should be posted in circular arrays. Even during the hours of the rest the king must be armed, always ready for action. Around the camp, again, secret pits were dug up and covered with thorns, nails, pikes and such other things as would cause hurt to those entering the camp from outside. The cavalry soldiers were generally selected as scouts and as pickets to protect the supply department, and to guard depots of stores of all kinds. It is recommended that other available camping grounds should be such as to place the enemy at a disadvantage. In the camps, drinking, gambling and other social enjoyments were prohibited, and for men coming in and going out of the camp a system of passports¹⁹ was maintained in order to distinguish them from the enemy’s spies who might enter in disguise and unobserved.

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¹⁵ *Br. Pur.* III. 49.9; *Rāma.* VI. 42.22.

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¹⁶ Rice: *Mysore Gaz.* I, p. 579; *Ep. Car.* XI, 24. But the *Hariharacaturanga*, a work of this period, mentions the term *Skandāvāra* for a camp (Bk. VI).

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¹⁷ *Mhb.* *Udyoga*: 152, 1, 2; *Ar. Śās.* Bk. X. 4; *S.T.R.* v. 14.25.9.

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¹⁸ Kāma. 16, 6-13; Mhb. Bhīṣma, I, 1-15.

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¹⁹ *Ar. Śās.* Bk. X, 1 and 2; *Kāma.* 19.45-50; *Śukra.* IV. 7.260-63.

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The camp was generally a self-sufficient unit. It was a miniature town. There were minstrels and women of lower and higher ranks. For instance, Draupadī and Subhadrā, in the Pāṇḍava camp of the Mahābhārata war, lamented the death of Abhimanyu. They were escorted back home by aged men.²⁰ All the four varṇas were found in it. The storing of arms as wells as of food-stuffs was ample. Physicians and surgeons were available for the treatment of the sick and the wounded.²¹ The army retired to rest after the day’s labour. On waking up their first business was to offer prayers.²² In this connexion Kauṭalya remarks: “Kings and allies, in order to secure their triumph should observe in their encampment, the strict rules of self-denial, liberality and religion.”²³

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²⁰ *Mhb.* IX, 29, 65 and 73.

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²¹ *Ibid.* *Udyogaparva*, 151, 58. 152, 13; 155, 5.

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²² *Ibid.* VI, 19. 36-39.

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²³ *Kauṭalya*, Bk. IV, p. 306.

Section IV: Site for the Battle-Field

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Another strategical consideration which engaged the general’s mind was the choice of a proper site for the operations of war. It is thus laid down in the Śivavyāsadhanurveda:²⁴ “That battle-field which is damp, hard, full of gravel and water and contains granite and shrubs ought not to be chosen. But one without inundations, but expansive, covered with a little dust or an uninhabited plain, is the best theatre of war.” In the battle of the Hydaspes, it is said that Porus fixed that “site where there was no clay but that the ground from its nature was all flat and firm, and suited for the movements of cavalry whether charging or falling back”, and that he drew up his army in order of battle, the elephants being posted in the front lines at intervals of not less than 100 feet and before the whole body of his infantry, so as to strike terror into Alexander’s soldiers. The infantry was arranged in two lines, one behind the other, and also on the wings beyond the elephants. On both sides of the infantry the cavalry were posted, with chariots in front. According to the *Agnipurāṇa*,²⁵ again, strategic warfare must be conducted in forests, on rivers and on rainy days, for attacks on open grounds are always difficult. In the battle-field the commander should aim at the strategical position of the army in its various divisions. It was then the time for him to show his mettle. Śukrācārya says²⁶ that both small and big guns are to be stationed in front, and behind them the foot-soldiers. The wings are to be occupied by elephants and chargers. With regard to the general arrangement of the army in the field, the *Agnipurāṇa*,²⁷ says that the various divisions should stand neither too close nor too far apart, so that the soldiers can exercise their weapons freely and without obstruction of any sort. In the forefront, the flower of the army are to be stationed, of course after keeping some as a reserve for an emergency. The most important portion that should not be neglected on any account, is the rear. Bold warriors armed with swords must occupy the front. Behind should stand the archers with bows and darts, then the horsemen, the charioteers and the elephant-men in order. Before the vanguard the leader of the army should stand holding firmly the flag-staff. The front is to be an extensive field so as to allow flanking movements without the least difficulty. This is evident from the fact that the war-wise leaders of Hindu India were accustomed to all kinds of strategical movements. As for the king himself, he was not to take an active part in the actual operations of the field. For if he should happen to fall, that would decide the battle instantaneously. Therefore he should continue to encourage the army only from the rear.

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²⁴ Śārangadhara, 1681-82.

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²⁵ Ch. 236, 59-60.

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²⁶ IV. 7. 343-5.

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²⁷ Ch. 236, 28-37.

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In this connexion we may invite attention to an important prescription of the *Agnipurāṇa*.²⁸ It says that a competent general should attack the rear of the enemy if he should find the ground in front and on the sides undulating. In such a situation it was not possible for the enemy to escape.²⁹ Kauṭalya recommends entangling the enemy in an ambuscade by fording the river elsewhere if they guarded a particular ford.³⁰ This can be illustrated from the battle of the Ten Kings explained in the *Ṛg Veda Saṃhita*.³¹ Here the contending parties were the Tritsus and the Bharatas. Both planned to the Roman world, and the most important events of the reign of Constantine are thus represented as the immediate consequences of his conversion. But the historian, who must be content with the evidence of the times, will not be easily persuaded that the zeal of Constantine was not stimulated by the hope of political advantage, or that the conversion of the empire was not the result of a long and gradual process of change.

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²⁸ *Ibid.*

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²⁹ Compare Oman's remarks on the Byzantine general of the 10th Century A.D. (*op. cit.* pp. 208 ff.).

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³⁰ *Ar. Śās.* p. 365.

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³¹ III, 53.

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The conversion of Constantine is a subject which has been discussed with great warmth by the historians of the church, and it is not surprising that their opinions should be divided. The panegyrists of the emperor, who were eager to celebrate his piety and his zeal, have represented his conversion as a miraculous event, which was confirmed by the appearance of a cross in the sky, and by the victory which he obtained over his rival Maxentius. The critics, on the other hand, who are less disposed to believe in the supernatural, have sought to explain the conversion of Constantine by the influence of his mother Helena, or by the political necessity of securing the support of the Christians, who were already a powerful and influential body in the empire.

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It is probable that the truth lies between these two extremes, and that the conversion of Constantine was the result of a combination of motives, in which the influence of his mother, the political advantages of the Christian religion, and the genuine conviction of his own mind, all played a part. The character of Constantine was complex and contradictory, and it is not easy to determine the precise nature of his religious beliefs. He was a man of great ambition and of great ability, and he was always ready to adapt his conduct to the circumstances of the time.

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The conversion of Constantine was a turning point in the history of the Roman empire, and it had a profound influence on the development of the Christian church. The emperor, who had once been the persecutor of the Christians, became their protector and their patron, and he used his power to promote the interests of the church and to suppress the pagan religion. The conversion of Constantine was the beginning of a new era in the history of the world, and it is a subject which will continue to be discussed by historians for many years to come.

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to recognise friend from foe.³⁰ Two things are clear. One is that there was no national flag as we have to-day, and secondly that these standards and flags were the rallying points of the belligerents in the battle. Strategy, then, is the science, as distinguished from the art, of war.

Section V: Construction and Siege of Forts

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One kind of land fight was siege warfare. The ancient kings attached very great importance to fortresses, for they served as the main base to defend the kingdom against the invasions of the enemy. The capital city of every ruling chief was surrounded by fortifications either natural or artificial.³⁷ The natural ones were water-fortifications, mountain-fortifications, desert-fortifications, and forest-fortifications.³⁸ Of these forms more value was attached to the water and mountain-fortifications as affording ampler protection for people and serving as impassable and insurmountable barriers to the invading enemy. The treasury was located in the citadel itself. Artificial fortifications like the Maginot Line in France were those which were specially constructed with a view to defend the capital from an invading enemy. Every fort town was surrounded by a deep and wide ditch closely touching the lofty rampart walls thrown around. Here in these ramparts usually poisonous and thorny plants were allowed to grow.

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³⁶ VII, 171, 12: See also Hopkins, *op. cit.*, pp. 255-56.

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³⁷ For a description of the six forts see the *Auśanasa Dhanurveda* quoted in the *Lakṣaṇaprakāśa*, pp. 239-41; also *Viṣṇusmṛti*, ib, p. 242; See also *Siddhāntaśekhara*, *Ibid.*, pp. 242-45.

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³⁸ *Mhb. Śānti.* 86.5-15; *Viṣṇu.* ch. iii; *Agni.* 106.

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Going back to the *Rg Veda Samhitā*, we find tribes living in fortifications known by the name ‘pūr’, an earth-work strengthened by a palisade or, possibly, occasionally by a stone wall.³⁹ There are numerous references to such kinds of fortress buildings which were besieged and destroyed by the invading hosts. In the later Brāhmaṇa literature also there is a distinct reference to the existence of forts. In the annual sacrifice portion of the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* the three Agnis or fires are described as forming three forts to prevent the Asuras from disturbing the sacrifice.⁴⁰ These, being afraid of these fires, with Agni in front and behind, took to flight. Thus the Asuras and the Rākṣasas were exterminated. Here, even the idea of setting fire to the buildings as a last resort receives emphasis. In the *Kauṣitaki Brāhmaṇa* the Upāsadas are described as the citadel of the Asuras, the enemies of the Devas.⁴¹ Here, these take refuge against the gods. They make citadels of iron⁴² in this world, of silver in the atmospheric regions, and of gold in the sky beyond. It may therefore be said without any fear of contradiction that the use of forts was well known to the people of the Vedic age.

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³⁹ *The Cambridge History of India*, Vol. I, p. 86.

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⁴⁰ ii, II (vii, I)—(A. B. Keith).

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⁴¹ VIII, 8 (*Ibid.*)

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⁴² *RV.* Bk. II, 20; III, 12; Cf. *Manu.* VII, 74.

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Coming to the epoch of the *Arthaśāstra*, Kautalya says: “In the construction of the rampart care should be had that on the outer portions there should be no space whatsoever for movement of any sort and the few openings allowed should be covered with invisible obstructions: on the inner side of these ramparts there must be two platforms on opposite sides, a big hall, two upper-stories provided with an ascending and a descending staircase, iron bolts, massive beams, and turrets being thrown over the huge gates. What were known as Aṭṭālakas were places for locating both movable and immovable defensive weapons. Hanumān speaks of the imposing appearance of the Aṭṭālakas of the Laṅkā fortress. The fort was furnished with a lotus pool which should never dry up. There was a special place for the worship of the goddess Kumarī. Perhaps this refers to the caitya, usually a feature of the palace. Here the guardian deities were housed and prayers offered for the welfare of the kingdom in general. This expression also occurs in the Rāmāyaṇa in connexion with Rāvaṇa’s palace. Between these towers or turrets broad streets were laid out with storied buildings on either side. There was a separate road for the gods. Perhaps the processions on festival occasions passed through this pathway. According to the Arthaśāstra the fortress was to be furnished with twelve gateways with passages, open and secret, both through land and water. From this different roads of various dimensions branched off, one leading to the neighbouring forests, and others to the country parts.⁴³

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⁴³ Ar. Śās. II, 3.

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Kauṭalya then speaks of the construction of the royal palace inside the fort. This occupied one-ninth of the whole area of the fort. To the north-east of the palace lived the priests, ministers and other higher officials, while to the south-east were situated the kitchen and stables. On the western side the merchants, artisans, and kṣatriyas had their residences. Near these were located the offices and the treasury, while opposite were the store-house and the arsenal. To the southern side of the palace lived musicians, prostitutes, and superintendents of the city, of commerce, and of other departments. To the west lay the residences of the Śūdra classes and those engaged in small industries. In the north-west were the bazaar-streets and hospitals with clusters of guilds and groups of workmen of various trades and manufacturers. In the heart of the city were a number of temples devoted to different cults. In the northern and eastern directions were situated burial grounds for the lower castes and in the south those for higher castes. Heretics and the Caṇḍāla community had their quarters beyond these grounds. Flower, fruit and vegetable gardens, side by side with rice fields, lay scattered throughout, both within and without the city. A well with good drinking water was dug at a distance of every ten houses. All the essential articles of daily use, such as food-stuffs, oil, and salt, were stored inside the fort so as to suffice for long periods of siege.⁴⁴ From this it appears that forts were systematically designed.

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⁴⁴ *Ar. Śās.* II, ch. 3.

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Some of the *Dharmaśāstras* also throw light on the kind and use of fortresses in general. Manu,⁴⁵ says, “that the king should find his residence in a well guarded fort either surrounded by deserts, forests or water.” The best is, indeed, the hill-fortress.⁴⁶ The importance of citadels is well brought out by Manu in the succeeding stanzas. Standing behind the battlements of the citadel one bowman could easily withstand one hundred bowmen and one hundred bowmen ten thousand bowmen.⁴⁷ A king was thus enabled to defend his capital against great odds with the aid of a few able archers and warriors. As a source of great defence, fortifications were a valuable feature of ancient states. But the existence of mere fortresses would not produce the intended effect. So Manu ordains that they should be garrisoned with a large equipment of soldiers, engines and water-supply. Without an ample provision of these things any amount of defence would be neither adequate nor efficient.

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⁴⁵ *Manu.* 7. 70-71.

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⁴⁶ *Agni.* ch. 222.5.

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⁴⁷ Manu. 7. 74-6.

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When the enemy attacked, the defender should take refuge in a fort, removing all the inhabitants of the villages into it and gathering in quantities of all sorts of grain available.⁴⁸ If this were not possible he might destroy the bridges and minor forts in his own territory and set fire to the grain stores, etc., so that they might not be used by the invading king. Fresh ramparts should be thrown round his own fort on the outside. The moats must be filled up with creepers and with sharks and crocodiles. Pointed and sharp spikes of various kinds must be fixed in the bottom of the moats, thus obstructing their crossing by the enemy. The walls of the fort should be defended with fire-implements and guns and the gateways with death-dealing engines. Śataghnis or cannon and other weapons should be furnished on the impenetrable ramparts, so that an effective defence might be offered even against a powerful invader. Thus in Bhīṣma’s learned opinion a fort surrounded by a huge wall and a ditch full of water and furnished with only one entrance is the best.⁴⁹ It is again seen that the number of gates for the fort seems in no way to have been restricted. For example, if we may believe the testimony of Megasthenes, Pāṭaliputra was encompassed by a moat six *plethrons*49a broad and 30 cubits deep, and the ramparts were furnished with 572 towers and above all 64 gates.⁵⁰

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⁴⁸ Mhb. Śānti. 59, 35-37; Ibid. 41-45.

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⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 100, 15.

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49a Plethron was a Greek unit of measurement about 101 English feet.

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⁵⁰ *The Indica of Arrian* (McCrindle).

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Kāmandaka belongs to the Kauṭalīyan school. He speaks of only five kinds of fortresses, water, (e.g. the modern water defences of the Meuse), hill, forest, (e.g. the present Ardennes Forest affording natural obstacles), barren plain, or desert.⁵¹ The recommendations made for providing defence and safety are the same as in Kauṭalīya. As a typical illustration of a fort as gathered from literary sources, the castle of Laṅkā figures prominently in the *Rāmāyaṇa*. Hanumān describes the city as he saw it.⁵² The doors were huge and massive and fastened with iron bolts. Above them were stationed several kinds of arms and machines to guard them from invaders. Hundreds of Śataghnis were found arranged in order at the entrance. The walls were unscalable, and their sides were decorated with numerous precious stones of high value. Surrounding these there was a deep and wide moat filled with pure water and containing several wild aquatic animals. There were four bridges over the moat, protected on both sides with huge destructive engines. The citadel was further defended by water, hill, and other artificial fortifications. It was fully garrisoned with horses, elephants, and hundreds of brave Rākṣasa warriors.

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⁵¹ *Kāmandaka*, IV, 55-59.

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⁵² *Yuddha.* ch. 3.

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There is also an interesting description of Ayodhyā in the same work. It was twelve yojanas in length and ten in breadth.⁵³ Broad and spacious roads were laid throughout. Everything was kept in order. It had strong gates with massive doors. By the side of the wall was a fathomless moat. In the city were numerous artisans, merchants, soldiers and other classes of people. Corn-fields and gardens met the eye everywhere.

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⁵³ Bālakāṇḍa, ch. 5.

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The conception of fortresses in medieval India was not very different from that in ancient India. It would be interesting to study here how the Mānasāraśilpaśāstra, an important work on Indian architecture,⁵⁴ defines the Padmaka type of a fortress city having eight, twelve or sixteen gates and the whole surrounded by a huge wall and a moat. It is said that suitable sites for a fort are those where water can be got in all seasons and hence either near a sea-shore, or by the river-side or in a forest-plain. The gateways are to have huge double-doors, securely fastened by strong bolts. Above them are to be placed firing guns and other destructive war-machines with soldiers stationed near them.

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⁵⁴ Indian Architecture (Ananthalwar) Vol. III, Bk. i, ch. 9. (Text and Trans. by P. K. Acharya—Oxford Press, 1933).

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Besides the Padmaka type, which has the plan of a circle or a square, other plans recommended are the svastika type, more or less rectangular in form, and the *kārmuka* or bow-like type. Over these towers are to fly flags with guardsmen near them and here music is to be played.⁵⁵ Just near the main gateway are to be built the royal palace and the residences of the principal officers. Behind was the harem. Between them the kitchens and store-rooms were located. In the south we have the arsenal and the pleasure gardens and in the north the fourfold forces. Separate quarters for all classes in the interior and separate tanks for men and beasts are a speciality. The guardian deity is to be worshipped in a separate apartment. Streets of different dimensions were laid out and equipped with lamp-posts. The suburbs of the castle-palace led to the country.

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⁵⁵ *Indian Architecture*, Vol. III, ch. xi.

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There is another equally important work on architecture, attributed to king Bhoja, *Samarāṅgana-sūtradhara*, in which mention is made of four kinds of fortresses. Surrounded by a chain of lofty hills difficult to scale is the mountain castle. Full of thorns, shrubs and trees and interspersed with pieces of water on every side and with secret passages leading to and from it, is the *mūladurga* or forest castle. Surrounded by deep waters on all the four sides and presenting a beautiful physical appearance, it became a water-fortified castle. The last is the desert-fortification.⁵⁶ This classification, it may be observed, is the same as Manu’s. But a later work like the *Hariharacaturanga* gives the traditional classification of six forts, and one of the names is worth noting, Dharmadurga (Bk. VI).

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⁵⁶ Vol. I, ch. viii, 36-39.

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There are also several other literary references to the fortresses which are both interesting and valuable. According to the *Agnipurāṇa*, the fore-part of a city should be in the form of a bow.⁵⁷ Goldsmiths and other artisans were to occupy the south-east portions; actors and dancers the south, and the minor artisans and fishermen the south-west, the arsenal department in the west, public offices in the north-west, Brahmans and monks in the north, merchant guilds in the south-east; the Kṣatriyas, the army and its commanders in the east, the Śūdras in the west, and the Mlecchas on the outer fringe. Temples for the gods and other guardian deities were to be built in any direction; the harem and the palace of the king were to be in the east, while the royal kitchen and the store-room were in the south-east and the north.

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⁵⁷ *Agnipurāṇa*, I, 106.

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The *Śivatattvaratnākara* has an interesting chapter on the use and construction of a fortress.⁵⁸ A king without a fort is compared to a snake without poison and an elephant without a rut. Here nine kinds of fortresses are mentioned. To the classical six of the *Mahābhārata*, three more are added. This only shows that as time went on, the types of fortresses increased in number. According to this late authority, the best are the mountain and the water-fortifications, while the Darudurga and Naradurga belong to the inferior kind. Secret ways with machines and weapons guarding them are mentioned, besides the collection of articles for daily use.

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⁵⁸ Kalola, 5, Taranga, 6.

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The fort must be garrisoned with all classes. But the artisans ought to be greater in number, since they are required for manufacturing war materials. Smaller in number may be the Brahmans, for their services are required only for propitiating the deities and performing the necessary rites to ensure victory. Otherwise they are not of much value for purposes of warfare. The Śukranītisāra⁵⁹ has the significant statement that to live in a fortress not furnished with food and weapons is to live only in imprisonment.

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⁵⁹ Śukra, I, 237-57.

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Again, in the Tamil classic, Maduraikkāñji, of the early centuries of the Christian era, there is an excellent description of the fortification of Madura,⁶⁰ the capital city of the Pāṇḍiyan king. It was intersected by grand streets with palatial buildings on both sides. A forest dense with the trees and shrubs difficult for the enemy to march through surrounded it and served as a sort of protection. It was succeeded in turn by a very deep moat of pure and clear water. There were huge gates, lofty towers above, and massive walls around, one of which was full of ornamental paintings. The palace stood high above these, with its numerous storied buildings and crowned with flags of various hues. There were two extensive bazaar streets attracting all classes of people throughout the day. Women decked with ornaments and well dressed were seen standing in the front verandahs of their houses. Here the Brahmans, the Buddhists, and the Jains lived side by side and in harmony. There were merchants and artisans of various trades and professions.

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⁶⁰ Ind. Ant., Vol. 40, p. 227.

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Taking a general view of the different descriptions of fortresses, some of these formations appear to be fantastic and recall those of China. Still the real military value of some forms of fortresses cannot be underrated. The mere possession of a fort would not by itself be of strength and value.

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The *Agnipurāṇa* specifies five defects as seriously impairing the strength and value of fortresses in general.⁶¹ These are (1) the drying and silting up of the ditch with sand and mud; (2) the bad and neglected condition of the ramparts and towers; (3) the continuance in use of old, worn-out and inefficient instruments and machines of warfare; (4) a neglected arsenal and (5) an insufficient garrison of soldiers. So it was the duty of a king to see that a fortress was properly maintained to stand an effective siege.

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⁶¹ *Agnipurāṇa*, Ch. 241, sl. 28.

Siege Operations

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How the siege operations were conducted and what devices and tactics were adopted to get possession of the enemy’s fortresses may next engage our attention. Five methods seem to have been employed in capturing a fort.⁶² They were intrigue, *apasarpan* or pretending to retreat, *vamanam* or winning over the people, *paryu-vasanam* or actual siege, and *avamartha* or taking by assault. In Kauṭalya’s opinion, an invading king should not, all at once, commence the siege of the enemy’s fortress, for such a procedure would ultimately land him in trouble. So a regular siege must be preceded by a considerable reduction of the enemy’s forces. This alone would easily lead him to victory in the struggle.

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⁶² *Ar. Śās.* pp. 407-08.

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Employing means, whether fair or foul, the would-be conqueror should prepare the way for a well-laid siege.

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A messenger should speak highly of his omniscient and supernatural powers and of his close association with several deities, and thus evoke a sort of awe and reverence in the enemy towards him. Again, heretics and jugglers may be specially employed to seduce the enemy's subjects from their loyalty to their lord by playing upon their humour through the display of various kinds of magical tricks. Or again, officials in the employ of the invader should pretend to have been dismissed by their master and seek employment with the defending sovereign. And after they gained his confidence they were to aim at his life. Further, the would-be conqueror, to ensure eventual success, should win over guilds of merchants and other public corporations, and thus weaken the enemy. These and other methods prescribed by Kauṭalya may appear to laymen as unscrupulous, but they could be justified on the ground that his work is a treatise of expediency, and therefore these various means recommended for winning over the enemy's subjects or reducing his strength have indeed an ethical character, for it is the svadharma of a kṣatriya king to conquer the enemy though it might cost his life.

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With such preliminaries the invader might begin the siege if he found that everything else was in his favour and not in the enemy's.⁶³ The opportune moment to commence siege operations might be when the enemy was in distress or suffered from disease, when his officers were disloyal and given to bribery, or when he possessed inadequate or ill-equipped defences, or had no ally to support him. The invader should wait for some such opportunity, and when it presented itself should not let it go, for there is only one tide in the affairs of men. Again, if the invader could not effect his purpose satisfactorily and found the enemy's people and officers above corruption or bribery, then he must have recourse to other and more effective means. Particularly when the enemy's subjects assumed the offensive, the invader might destroy their crops, water sources and stores, cut off their communications and place all kinds of obstruction in their path. This is only the pratikriya of Indian political literature. It is not, therefore, considered a sin. For instance, Hanumān burnt down the whole city as his tail was set fire to. Thus by destroying their crops and depriving them of their cattle, an invading king prepared the ground for laying a siege to the enemy's fort.

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⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 404-05.

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During the actual operations of a siege, the ditch surrounding the ramparts of a fort if empty, should first be filled by the besiegers with water and with mud and sand if it contained water. Then reaching the outer walls of the parapet, and finding them strongly guarded with well-equipped warriors, machines, explosives, and other materials might be used to bring down the walls by assault. In the meantime, the cavalry troops would be employed in forcing a passage through the various gateways of the fortifications. If these endeavours should not bear fruit, then recourse might be had to the use of fire. This was the last alternative, for Kauṭalya himself says that it is immoral and should be used only in an extreme crisis. Arrows vomiting fire could be shot both at the defenders of the fortress and into its interior. But this would not be sufficient to set fire to the whole of the fortress inside. So it is suggested that the tails of birds could be tied with ‘agniyoga’ which, when deposited on the roofs of the houses, would ignite and reduce the whole building to ashes.⁶⁴ In a fragment of Megasthenes, mention is made also of a kind of boiling oil used in warfare and especially in sieges. It was extracted for the king, according to Ktesias, from a worm found in the Indus. The oil had the power to ignite everything. What exactly the worm referred to is, has not been finally settled, though Professor Wilson identified it with the alligator.

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⁶⁴ Even in modern wars, birds are not without use, (e.g. carrier pigeons are particularly useful in carrying messages).

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If, despite such methods,⁶⁵ the enemy would still not submit, and offer a defensive attack and there was no chance of bringing down the fortress, other methods were recommended as a last resort. One such method is to befriend the enemy, observe carefully his weak points, and suddenly strike him, thus depriving him of his citadel. If this should fail, the invader may feign defeat and exhaustion, and setting fire to his own camp, pretend to retreat, and thus induce the enemy to open his gates and come out. He should then turn back and take the fortress by storm without losing a single moment.

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⁶⁵ *Ar. Śās.* XIII, ch. 4.

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Another factor to be reckoned with was the use of elephants in siege warfare.⁶⁶ That these animals were used for demolishing the fort-walls is seen, beside other evidences, from the first fragment of the *Indika* of Ktesias. These animals were particularly trained for this purpose. At a given signal from their leader these animals rushed impetuously towards the walls and pressed themselves against them.

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⁶⁶ *Indika* of Ktesias (Fragments, *IV).

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We have a good description of the siege of the Lanka fortress in the *Rāmāyaṇa*. Hearing that Rāma was approaching with vast monkey hosts, Rāvaṇa stationed very brave men to defend the four gates of his citadel, himself defending the northern gate.⁶⁷ The monkey warriors with trees and rocks destroyed the upper portions of the great walls and filled the moat with trees, rocks and straw.⁶⁸ Several thousands of monkeys under their leaders made an onslaught against the gateways. But the Rākṣasas hurled incessantly innumerable darts and Bhindipālas from the walls. Gradually all the Rākṣasas were killed. Finding that the city had not fallen, Sugrīva ordered what we may call a mass attack.⁶⁹ Thereupon the monkey-warriors with fire-brands in their hands advanced towards the gates and set fire to them. Some of them entered the city and set fire to the highways and byways as well as the great storied buildings and even the palace. Enraged at this, Indrajit thought of vanquishing the enemy by the use of stratagem.⁷⁰ He brought in his car an illusory figure of Sītā and had her slain in the presence of these monkey-warriors. Then he performed some *homas* and sacrifices at Nikumbhala secretly in order to overwhelm the enemy’s forces and rout them thoroughly. But it was discovered, and he was soon killed by Lakṣmaṇa. It may be noted also that fire was resorted to only towards the end of the siege and that Rāma very dexterously allied himself with Vibhīṣaṇa who offered to help him. This alliance with an important member of the enemy’s party was, indeed, a clever move which ultimately paid very well. For but for his timely warning Indrajit might have finished his ceremonies at Nikumbhala and proved more than a match for the allies through his prowess and capacity for producing illusions. Lastly, the city was entered and Rāvaṇa was killed in a fierce battle. Thus did Rāma come into possession of the city.

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⁶⁷ *Rāmāyaṇa*, Yuddha kāṇḍa, ch. 36.

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⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, ch. 46.

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⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, ch. 75.

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⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, chh. 81-82.

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According to the *Agnipurāṇa* the invading monarch should carefully note that part of the citadel over which the crows came in and went out, and concentrate his attack on that quarter.⁷¹ If this were done, it was believed that the fort would be captured in the end. Before starting on a military expedition, Kālidāsa says that the king should see that the capital fortress as well as the frontier fortifications were well-fortified and defended.⁷² For the value of a fortress to the king is incalculable. Only after such precautions had been taken did Rāghu set out on his famous Digvijaya.

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⁷¹ *Agnipurāṇa*, ch. 232.

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⁷² *Raghuvamśā*, Canto IV, 26, 17, 52.

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Fear of foreign invasion is not the sole motive that necessitates the construction of these huge forts. Does not the lion, the king of animals, and a fierce destroyer of the gigantic elephant, have its abode in the mountain caves? So also there are advantages in a fortified palace.

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Having thus captured the enemy’s fortress, the invader should show mercy to the weak and the wounded. He must remove all his enemy’s soldiers and warriors and replace them with his own men, lest the former should do any mischief. Then he should make a triumphal entry into the palace with all the paraphernalia of a victor. After the fall of the citadel Laṅkā, Rāma with his hosts spent the night in the city adorned with his garland of victory. He generously granted the kingdom to Vibhīṣaṇa, the brother of the slain king.

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Let me conclude this section by referring to the attitude of modern military experts towards the use of fortifications. Most of them take the view that as conditions exist at present fortresses are unnecessary and dangerous. The men garrisoning them might be better employed in other places. Both the country and the army are either ruined by them or draw from them no tangible benefit. They entail enormous and wasteful expenditure for their building, maintenance, and garrisoning with troops. In fine, fortresses are seldom anything but an incubus. These remarks of a weighty authority must be respected, though we see a tinge of exaggeration in them. There is a wrong notion that is still current, namely, that these forts have lost their military value and are an anachronism since the invention of gun-powder.⁷³ But Dr. Oppert and some other scholars have demonstrated that gunpowder was in use in ancient India even in very early times, and still those strongholds were recommended as safe ones.

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⁷³ Clarke's *Mediaeval and Military Architecture*, Vol. I. *Operations of War*.

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No doubt they were costly defences and some of the soldiers mobilised in the forts could have played a useful part in the open field. But there is the other side of the shield. It was during the last Great War, as we all know, that the fortresses in Belgium offered a stubborn resistance to the Germans, but for which the latter might in all probability have overwhelmed the whole of France. In fact they were decisive in arresting the progress of Germany. Therefore to decry the value of a fort is to misjudge its merit. It was perhaps rightly said that the “fortifications of Paris assure more powerfully the independence of France against the attacks of all Europe than the acquisition of many provinces which would only so much the more extend the frontier.” It may be that the extensive use of gunpowder in recent times has facilitated their destruction much more quickly than before. But this is not a sufficient argument for condemning such a useful institution which has rendered glorious service through the ages. Even the use of heavy guns and shells has not thrown the dug-out trench out of its usefulness. Trench warfare is but one kind of defensive operation from the security of the fortified and protected underground trench.73a

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73a The trenches during the Great War of 1914-18 and the underground fortifications of the Maginot and Siegfried Lines may be noted in this connection. It may be recalled that the Barrier Fortress effectively checked Louis XIV's ambitious schemes of conquest of the Netherlands in his wars.

Section VI: Tactics

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In tactics we call a battle defensive if the enemy takes the initiative, and the defender awaits him from his own station. Among the six prescriptions of foreign relations we can roughly speak of *vigraha* as a war of offence and *āsana* as one of defence. In the great battle of Laṅkā it was Rāma who took the offensive, while Rāvaṇa adopted a defensive policy. It was a long and weary march from Kiṣkindhā to Laṅkā. Further, there was the sea to be crossed. This was possible only by a rough causeway which was specially constructed by the engineering skill of Nila at the instance of Rāma. This must certainly have lost Rāma much time; and Rāvaṇa, if he had wished, could have obstructed the building of the causeway. Common sense would have dictated that he should prevent the enemy from crossing the bridge by direct defence from the other shore. Apparently Rāvaṇa realised the advantage of the condition of the approaching enemy as well as of the ground on which he could reinforce his troops and draw them up in orderly array. Judged by the result, Rāvaṇa's adoption of this defensive policy was a tactical blunder.

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In dealing with the conduct of war from the point of view of tactics, the range and the effect of different weapons are important. In tactics, however, we are concerned with arms in a finished state and not with their construction.⁷⁴ At the outset it must be remarked that Indian literature is replete with a number of mystical weapons, which seem to have been used by superhuman heroes and which legitimately belong to the Daiva and Asura forms of combat.⁷⁵ They were chiefly fought with charms and spells. The Atharva Veda Samhitā is full of these. The object was to confuse the enemy and steal a march over him.⁷⁶ It is not to our purpose to mention these, as we are dealing with the mānuṣa form of battle, far from the realm of mythology.

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