History of Dharmashastra (Ancient and Mediaeval Religious and Civil Law in India) v6.c82.33

v6.c82.33

The Nyāyamañjarī⁶⁶⁶ of Jayantabhaṭṭa (K. S. S. 1936) has a long discussion on Kāla It first sets out the views of those who deny the very existence of Kāla as a separate entity. These latter say that Kāla is not perceptible like a jar &c and that the ideas of quickness or slowness depend merely on the observed effects. The same theorists raise the further objection that if Kāla is a *dravya* (substance) that is all-pervading and permanent, as the Vaiśeṣikas assert, then how is it that Kāla is spoken of as past, present and future. To these objections some reply: Kāla is directly perceived, since it appears to the mind as distinguishing the various perceptions of effects, that the several experiences such as 'these matters happened simultaneously, this happened after long, this happened quickly' cannot be perfectly explained if one denies the existence of Kāla and holds that these experiences depend solely on the perceived objects or actions Others hold that Kāla is really inferred and not directly perceived They argue merely because Kāla is not directly perceived it does not follow that it does not exist; to infer that Kāla exists is proper as it is proper to infer that the other side of the moon exists though we see only that face of the moon that is below the earth; therefore Kāla exists as a separate entity to which is due the common experience of simultaneity, quickness or slowness &c. The differing observations about persons being young or old cannot be well explained without admitting the existence of Kāla, which like *ākāśa* is one, all-pervading and permanent. To the objection how, if Kāla is one, all pervading and *nitya*, it is spoken of as having three divisions, the reply is: in reality there are no divisions in Kāla, but divisions are imagined in Kāla on account of the *upādhi* (a limiting or restrictive adjunct) viz. *kriyā* (activity). When we speak of a man as cooking rice in the present (*odanam pacati*), that is due to the distinguishing nature of the result (boiled rice) which is brought about by several activities (*kriyās*) beginning with the placing of the cooking pot on the fire up to its being taken down on the ground. Then we use the word 'present'. But when we bear in mind the series of activities that produced the boiled rice we use the expression 'he cooked' (in the past tense) for the activities that have ended. In this way we speak of time also as past on account of the distinguishing characteristic of the activities that have ended