Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

Administration and Social Life under Vijayanagar c8: Chapter IV

Administration and Social Life under Vijayanagar c8

Language
English

Contents

Chapter IV

c8.1

Law

c8.2

In the modern sense of the term law means a body of rules and regulations made by the sovereign authority for the guidance of the society over which it exercises control. But laws in India had a different character. They were so closely interwoven with religion and ethics that they were largely found in the religious literature of the country. The Vedas are the main source of such laws. Vyavahāra or law as a separate department is not treated of in them; but in as much as they try to regulate the life of the Hindus and prescribe for them punishments for lapses from their prescribed duties, they can be said to contain some portions dealing with law. The Dharma Śāstras also cannot be said to treat exclusively of law, for they are more in the nature of compilations and compositions based on the Vedas and written for the guidance of the Hindu society by jurists like Manu and Nārada. These jurists were, however, only codifiers of existing laws, and not makers of laws. To this class of literature also belong the Purāṇas and the epics like the Mahābhārata which are also considered to be authoritative works dealing with law.

c8.3

Custom was another source of law. Based as they are on the Vedas, the Dharma Śāstras are only codifications of the customary laws of the land. This custom is the sadācāra of the people. In determining the nature of the laws in India their codifiers took into consideration the immemorial customs prevalent among the people, the manners of particular countries and the observances of the different castes and tribes in their daily activities. Hindu society has developed with the advance of time and hence diversity is its principal feature. It comprises different types of social groups each with its own law to govern and guide its conduct. Since the codifications were based on the practices of the people, the codifiers had to recognise the various customary laws of the different social groups. But a customary law could have the sanction of law only when it does not conflict with the scriptural law or the sacred law of the land. Should there be a conflict, the latter is to prevail. That customs change among a people with the advance of time is indicated by new interpretations or applications given to written laws by later commentators. Such commentaries were necessary for the exposition of the fundamental laws in the light of the experience of the society. As Dr. Jolly remarks, “the latest stage of Indian legal literature is formed by the commentaries and systematic works which have been developed from the Smṛtis from the early mediaeval age. As the products of a new age and inspired by mighty princes and ministers these extensive compilations gradually drove the Smṛtis so completely out of vogue that at the time of the establishment of British rule in India the Mitākṣara, a law compendium of the eleventh century, was the standard work in the greater part of India.”¹ Another of such commentaries is the Parāśaramādhavīyam, a commentary on the Parāśarasmṛti by Mādhava, the value of which for an examination of the judicial organisation under the Vijayanagar kings we shall discuss subsequently.

c8.4

¹ Hindu Law and Custom, p. 3.

c8.5

Such were the sources of Hindu laws. Since they were not made by man, he could not change or alter them, but he was only to obey their behests. The state, which was the repository of all sovereign power, had only to enforce the laws. The Hindu king, who was the supreme head of the state, was himself no law-maker. He was as much subject to the laws as any other person. Besides he was their support. The duty of the king was to enforce the existing laws on his subjects.

c8.6

The importance of the application of daṇḍa or punishment has been brought out with remarkable force by Manu. He says: “It is daṇḍa that rules the subjects, it is only daṇḍa that protects all people; daṇḍa is awake when others sleep; hence according to the learned daṇḍa is Dharma itself.”² The value of daṇḍa was well understood by the Vijayanagar kings. They felt that punishment was an essential condition for the maintenance of law and order in society. Kṛṣṇadēva Rāya says in his Āmuktamālyada: “The wife’s attachment to her husband, the proper relations between men and women, the ascetic subduing his indriyas, the lower castes showing deference to the higher, the servant looking carefully to the interests of the master, you should know that all these are brought about (ultimately) by the fear of the king’s punishment."³ For enforcing the laws the king should possess enormous powers. The same royal author again says: "It is essential that a king should enforce his commands. Even the Ābhīras and the Bhillas of the forest are able to enforce their orders as by the sign of the arrow and the piece of thread. Much more therefore is it necessary that an emperor (Sārvabhauma) should be able to enforce his commands."⁴ Thus the sovereign authority should have the power to enforce the laws on the people.

c8.7

² Manu, vii, 18.

c8.8

³ Canto, IV, v. 277.

c8.9

⁴ Āmukta, canto IV, v. 206. It was the practice among the forest tribes to issue a pass without which it was difficult for them to go from one place to another.

c8.10

According to the Vijayanagar kings the primary duties of the state were the preservation of society and the prevention of the conflict of interests between the various castes and communities in the empire. These could be achieved by following the precept of Dharma. Kṛṣṇadēva Rāya explains how it is necessary that Dharma should be adhered to. He says: "A crowned king should always rule with an eye towards Dharma.....skilfully fulfilling your Dharma you get rid of your three-fold debt". And in another place he remarks: "If, when a king is bestowing equal attention to the vargas, dharma (religion), artha (wealth) and kāma (love), by chance he shows more attention to dharma, it would be like allowing surplus water intended to irrigate other fields to overflow and fertilize cornfields. It would only conduce to the enjoyment of the sovereign."⁵ Doubts may arise as to the sin involved in ruling an empire. But Kṛṣṇadēva Rāya has a ready answer to dispel this doubt, and he says that if a king acts in the public interests and in doing his work inflicts punishments on the offenders, he is only following the path of Dharma and not incurring any sin.⁶ The royal author also remarks: "Curiously enough a man is said to be a follower of Dharma though he kills (wrong-doers), one is called a bachelor, Brahmacāri, (though he takes a wife if he is moderate in his love); one is called a truthful man though he utters falsehood (in the special circumstances permitted by the Dharma); he is said to fast though he eats (if he is moderate); one is called a hero though he turns back (from those whom he ought not to fight); one is called rich though he spends money (for worthy objects)."⁷

c8.11

⁵ Ibid., IV, vv. 285 and 282.

c8.12

⁶ Ibid., v. 284.

c8.13

⁷ Ibid., v. 278.

c8.14

We get some idea of certain specific laws like the law of treason, the law of limitation and the law governing the enjoyment of service *ināms* in the Vijayanagar days. Firstly treason against the state or the king was considered a heinous offence,⁸ and more than that treason against associations (*sangha*) and the community as a whole (*samudāya*) was very much detested. This was accepted even by the ruling sovereigns. Bukka I, who brought about a compromise between the Jainas and the Vaiṣṇavas in A.D. 1368, declared: "He who transgresses this rule shall be a traitor to the king, a traitor to the *sangha* and the *samudāya*."⁹ The punishment for such treason was immediate execution. Kṛṣṇadēva Rāya insists upon men of a treasonous nature being immediately executed.¹⁰ This was the original idea of the law of treason.

c8.15

⁸ A record of the time of Kṛṣṇadēva Rāya states that he who violated the grant referred to in it was to be deemed a traitor to the feet of the king. (*M.A.R.*, 1918, para 110). According to another record of A.D. 1371 a person who did not pay for the expenses of worship in a particular temple was to be looked upon as a traitor conspiring to murder the king of the very *nāḍu* in which he was born. (*E.C.*, I, 2nd Edition, p. 55).

c8.16

⁹ *E.C.*, II, Sb. 344.

c8.17

¹⁰ *Amukta*, canto IV, v. 243.

c8.18

But the people at times formed themselves into associations to oppose the tyranny of the ruling sovereigns or their agents, and considered it treason against the country if the people submitted to "petty coercion and oppression" by the government. It has been noted that according to a record at Vṛddhācalam in the South Arcot district the Valangai and Iḍangai sects of the place met together and decided that since they were oppressed by the officers of the king and the owners of *jīvitas*, and taxes were demanded of them by the Brahmans and the Kāṇiyāḷan, they should not give shelter to them or write accounts for them, and also declared that one who acted against their agreement was a traitor to the country and hence was to be stabbed.¹¹ Reference has also been made earlier to another inscription from Peṇṇāḍam also in the same district according to which the ninety-eight subsections of the Valangai and Iḍangai classes living in certain districts reached an agreement not to submit to unjust taxation among other things, and to declare some acts as constituting *nāṭṭudrōham* and punish them accordingly.¹² Though *nāṭṭudrōham* is not defined here, it is implied that the doing of particular acts may be held to amount to treason against the country and may be punished accordingly. Thus the interpretation of the law of treason differed with the body or authority that had to do it. While the king and the government considered an act not conforming to a rule or not following a law as amounting to treason against the king and the people, the people who had certain grievances against the government were of opinion that to obey the government which did not care for the interests of the governed amounted to treason against the community, which according to them was of a graver nature than treason against the constituted authority.

c8.19

¹¹ 92 of 1918; *Rep.*, 1918, para 68.

c8.20

¹² *Ante*, pp. 93-4: 246 and 254 of 1928-29; *Rep.*, para 79.

c8.21

In the modern day, it is said that after a period of twelve years one's claim to a property, if it is in the possession of another, becomes debarred by the law of limitation. Almost the same law prevailed in the Vijayanagar days. Mortgaged lands could be in the name of the mortgagee only for a period of twelve years. In Ś. 1565, one Siddha Rāmappa Nāyaka, a subordinate of Śrī Raṅga III issued an order that the Kāpus, who had held any temple or Brahman lands on "mortgage by possession" (*bhōga-āyakam*), should restore the lands to the original owners after twelve years of enjoyment without demanding any money from them, giving them at the same time written deeds (*bhōga patra*) recording the reconveyance. The order was issued with the consent of the Reddis, Karṇams and the other people of the place (*sthala*). As the Government Epigraphist remarks, "the legislation appears evidently to have been made as a remedy against the conveyance by the owners of these lands for long periods to the Kāpus in consideration of the loans paid on such usufructory mortgages decidedly favourable to the mortgagee. Even now the temple lands in many cases are mortgaged under similar conditions to the great disadvantage and detriment of the charities intended by their original donors."¹³

c8.22

¹³ 691 of 1917: *Rep.* 1918, para 77.

c8.23

An epigraph at Tiruppukuli in the Chingleput district dated A.D. 1438-39 discloses certain interesting details about the law concerning the inalienable nature of service *ināms*. According to it lands granted as service *ināms* were neither to be sold nor mortgaged by the parties who received them, but if they should violate the law they would have to suffer the punishment that traitors to the king and the community would suffer, and in addition to this they were liable to be fined by the officers of the temple treasury.¹⁴

c8.24

¹⁴ 193 of 1916: *Rep.* 1916, para 60.

c8.25

Courts of Justice

c8.26

Having described the nature of the laws of the Hindus and how far the Vijayanagar kings adhered to their spirit, we may examine here the judicial organisation in the period. The first problem that presents itself to us is how far the courts and laws of the Hindus that were in existence in ancient India were allowed to continue during the Vijayanagar period. Wilson who examined this question came to the conclusion that the regulations that were made for and followed in the ancient Hindu courts could be assigned "to a period not long subsequent to the Code of Manu, if not contemporary."¹⁵ In this connection the views of Mountstuart Elphinstone are also of great interest. Speaking about the administration of justice in his own day he says: "The regular administration of justice by permanent courts which is provided for in Manu and of which the tribunals with their several powers are recorded by later writers, is hardly observed by any Hindu government. The place of those tribunals is in part taken by commissions appointed in a summary way by the prince, generally granted by motives of court favour and often composed of persons suited to the object of the protecting courtier. In part, the courts are replaced by bodies of arbitrators, called Panchayets........"¹⁶ But there are some who hold a different view on this question. They think that the ancient Hindu courts continued to remain in force during the Vijayanagar period as well. On this question a recent writer has certain interesting observations to make. Speaking about the Parāśaramādhavīyam of Mādhava, he says, that that treatise though purporting to be a part of Mādhava's commentaries on Parāśarasmṛti, is not really based on that Smṛti, for Parāśara did not treat of law at all; that Mādhava supplied the omission by collecting what was said on the subject in the other Smṛtis, and that his dissertation is a digest of jurisprudence based on those Smṛtis. He adds that Mādhavācārya had a great part in laying the foundations of the Vijayanagar empire at the commencement of the fourteenth century of the Christian era, and since at that time the Muhammadans had not yet succeeded in extending their rule to the south of the river Kṛṣṇā, we may fairly presume that the procedure which he describes in his work was in use in his time in South India at any rate.17

c8.27

¹⁵ Mill, History of India, Vol. I, p. 213 fn.

c8.28

¹⁶ History of India, 9th Edn., pp. 90-91; see also Colebrooke, Misc. Essays, Vol. II, pp. 490-500 for an interesting disquisition on the Hindu Courts of Justice.

c8.29

But it is difficult to accept these conclusions. It is true that the Parāśarasmṛti contains no section dealing with Vyavahāra and Mādhava supplied the omission by adding a section on Vyavahāra to his commentary, using for this supplement the works of ancient authors containing sections on law. But he does not seem to have drawn any inference from or made any use of the current practices of his day. The authors whom he largely quotes and makes use of are also ancient, though a few of them might have been posterior to Parāśara. It is a fact that the writing of this treatise coincided in point of time with the foundation of the Vijayanagar empire in which he had a large share. But Mādhava did not write this legal treatise on substantive and adjective law for the practical guidance of the Vijayanagar sovereigns. He was not the Kauṭalya of the Vijayanagar court.

c8.30

In dealing with adjective law Mādhava, on the authority of Bṛhaspati, divides for instance, regular courts as stationary and circuit, and courts presided over by the king, and courts presided over by judges appointed under the king's seal. Ramayya Pantulu thinks that the kings as a rule presided over the supreme courts in person, and that they appointed judges to preside over the provincial courts, over which they could not themselves preside.18 But these recommendations do not appear to have been followed in the Vijayanagar court. There is no evidence to show that there were circuit courts then. Further, we have good evidence to indicate that the provincial governors held their own courts in their respective areas and dispensed justice as the king did at the capital irrespective of the fact whether there was a judge holding his court in the same place or not.

c8.31

Mādhava, on the authority of Kātyāyana, divides the day into eight parts, and suggests that courts were to be held in the

c8.32

17. J. Ramayya Pantulu, Quarterly Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society, Vol. II, pp. 105-106

c8.33

प्रतिष्ठिताप्रतिष्ठिता मुदिता शक्षिता तथा ।
चतुर्विधासमोक्ता सम्याश्चैव तथाविधाः ॥
प्रतिष्ठिता पुरेग्रामे चला नामाप्रतिष्ठिता ।
मुद्रिताऽध्यक्षसंयुक्ता राजयुक्ताचशक्षिता ॥

c8.34

Parāśaramādhavīyam, Bibliotheca Indica, Vol. III, pp. 18-19 and Q.J.A.H.R.S., II, p. 108 second, third and fourth parts of the day.¹⁹ But Nuniz says that the king came to the public court only at about 10 or 11 a.m.²⁰ We have to infer that the courts were held at Vijayanagar in the noon time only and not in the morning hours as enjoined in the Parāśaramādhavīya.

c8.35

¹⁹ > दिवसस्याष्टमं भागम् मुक्ताकालत्रयञ्चयत् ।

c8.36

²⁰ Sewell, op. cit., p. 372.

c8.37

Thus the available evidence points to the fact that the system of judicial organisation that obtained at Vijayanagar was in many respects not the same as the one prescribed in Mādhava’s Vyavahārakāṇḍa. Certain changes may have crept into the system due to the progress of time. In the light of such difficulties we have to handle the Vyavahārakāṇḍa of the Parāśaramādhavīya with great caution.

c8.38

We have no reliable source to draw from for a detailed knowledge of the machinery of the Vijayanagar judicial administration. The inscriptions of the period refer to certain crimes committed by the people and record how they were punished. The chroniclers also are helpful only in ascertaining certain details with regard to the administration of criminal justice in the empire. We do not know exactly how civil suits involving the determination of law were decided. Civil cases seem to have largely been decided by arbitration though we hear also of special judges for deciding such cases as at the capital. On this subject the observations of Sir H. S. Maine are of some interest. He says: “Though the Brahminical written law assumes the existence of king and judge, yet at the present moment in some of the best governed semi-independent Native States, there are no institutions corresponding to our courts of justice. Disputes of a civil nature are adjusted by the elders of each village community, or occasionally when they relate to land, by the functionaries charged with the collection of the Prince’s revenue. Such criminal jurisdiction, as is found, consists in the interposition of the military power to punish breaches of the peace of more than ordinary gravity. What must be called criminal law is administered through the arm of the soldier.”²¹ But the latter part of this statement is open to question. Though it might have been true of the period in which he

c8.39

²¹ Village Communities in the East and West, p. 71.

c8.40

सकलोव्यवहाराणां शास्त्र दृष्ट: पर: स्मृत: ॥

c8.41

Ibid., p. 18; Q.J.A.H.S., II, p. 109.

c8.42

wrote his book, it cannot be applied to the Vijayanagar period; for in that period the soldier was not the administrator of criminal law, but only the king or some other body or person invested with administrative authority.

c8.43

As in all empires under a monarchical constitution, so in the Vijayanagar empire, the king was the chief judge. But it would appear that he did not dispense justice in all the cases that appeared before his court. There was a judge who administered justice on behalf of the king. It is about that officer that Abdur Razāk writes: "A eunuch called Danāik sits alone upon a raised platform, and presides over the administration; and below it the mace bearers stand, drawn up in a row on each side. Whoever has any business to transact advances between the lines of mace bearers, offers some trifling present, places his face upon the ground, and standing upon his legs again, represents his grievances. Upon this the Danāik issues orders founded upon the rules of justice prevalent in that country, and no other person has any power of remonstrance."²² This description by the Persian ambassador shows that there was a judge at the capital for dispensing justice. Commenting on this Saletore remarks: "The Danāik of 'Abdur Razzāk was evidently a daṇṇāyaka or military commander; and if we are to rely on the evidence of the Persian ambassador, the Vijayanagara monarchs entrusted the duty of administering justice to an officer of the army, or to one who had seen service as a general. If this were really the case, no graver error could have been committed by the Hindu rulers of Vijayanagara, since such a procedure would have meant the violation of one of the most important injunctions of the ancient lawgivers in regard to the administration of justice........A daṇḍanāyaka or military commander was in no sense a substitute for a Brahman learned in the Smṛtis. . . . The fact that 'Abdur Razzāk is positive about the name of the high dignitary who administered justice makes one suspect that the rulers of Vijayanagara had indeed acted, at least in the important question of the composition of what may be called the court of chief justice, contrary to the classical notions of daṇḍa."²³ But it must be noted here that the term Daṇḍanāyaka was not necessarily a military title. In the Hoyśāla and Vijayanagar empires that title was assumed by one who had certain important administrative functions to discharge, and it indicated a cadre to which a particular person belonged. The title was applied also to a military commander, but not all Daṇḍanāyakas were officers of the army, or those who had seen service as generals. From such similarity of titles it is not right to conclude that "the rulers of Vijayanagara had acted contrary to the classical notions of daṇḍa."

c8.44

²² Elliot, History of India, IV, p. 108.

c8.45

²³ Social and Political Life in the Vijayanagara Empire, Vol. I, p. 369.

c8.46

That it was the Pradhāni who was generally the chief judge is indicated by the following evidence. Abdur Razāk who describes the judge holding his court speaks of him also as the minister of the king. He says: "When the Daṇāik leaves the chamber several coloured umbrellas are borne before him........Before he reaches the king he has to pass through seven gates..........He reports upon the affairs of the state to the king and after remaining some time returns."²⁴ Unless the judge had certain ministerial functions, he would not have gone to the king "to report upon the affairs of the state." Sāḷuva Timma, the Prime Minister of Kṛṣṇadēva Rāya, took the title Dharmapratipālakaḥ²⁵ which would indicate that he had certain judicial functions, and was perhaps the chief judge at the capital. The judicial organisation at the Madura court as described in a Jesuit letter substantiates our position, for in the Vijayanagar days it was the imperial system that was generally followed both in the provinces and in the Nāyaka's territories. Proenza in his letter of A.D. 1665 writes: "The Pradhāni did not consider the rival plaints........The examination was public........He sent for the governor, judges and all the great personages to come to the palace immediately. He came in great pomp.....The governor intimidates the witnesses and compels them to depose according to his wishes........All the procedure was sent to Madura from where the judgment came soon."²⁶ This letter shows clearly that the Pradhāni had control over the judicial department. In another instance the Madura Nāyaka Virappa and his Pradhāni Ariyanātha Mudaliyār constituted a panel to decide a certain case.²⁷ From the above illustrations, two from the capital and two from Madura, we may assume that it was generally the Pradhāni who was the chief judge.

c8.47

²⁴ Elliot. op. cit., IV, p. 108

c8.48

²⁵ E.C., IX, Ma. 11.

c8.49

²⁶ Bertrand, La Mission Du Maduré, III, pp. 178-81, quoted by R. Satyanatha Ayyar in his Nāyaks of Madura, p. 242.

c8.50

²⁷ 582 of 1926, Rep., 1927, para 92.

c8.51

However, though the Persian ambassador affirms that there was only one judge at the capital, it is difficult to believe his statement completely. Speaking about the villages under the Madura Nāyaks, John Nieuhoff says that each village had two judges, who were much respected by the inhabitants.²⁸ If according to him each village had two judges, it is difficult to believe that there could have been only one judge at the capital of the vast empire of Vijayanagar.

c8.52

²⁸ Satyanatha Ayyar, op. cit., p. 241.

c8.53

But the existence of a separate court presided over by a judge or a panel of judges did not preclude the king from dispensing justice himself. The king also received complaints from his people and disposed of them. Kṛṣṇadēva Rāya’s views on the duties of the king with regard to the administration of justice are contained in his statement in the Āmuktamālyada where he says: “Be always intent upon protecting your subjects; when you hear complaints from people in distress, hear them and redress their sufferings. Do not entrust your affairs to mean persons.”²⁹ That emperor personally dispensed justice in a few cases. When he received complaints about certain irregularities of management in respect of daily worship in the Tiruvālūr temple, he ordered the dismissal of the culpable servants of the temple.³⁰ Sometimes the king asked the officers by his side to try the cases presented to him. Once when the Mahājanas made representations with regard to a dispute between two parties of residents of Koṇḍagai in the Rāmnād district to king Sadāśiva Rāya while he was camping at Toṇḍaimaṇḍalam in A.D. 1545-46, the king directed the matter to be settled by the arbitration of learned men in the presence of Sāḷuva Nāyaka as a result of which remissions of certain taxes were granted to the village of Tiruvēṅgaḍapuram.31 But in particular cases it appears the king could not be appealed to directly. An appeal to him could be made only through some officer. Thus it is stated in an inscription that the trustees in charge of the temple treasury of Tiruvāmāttūr petitioned to Kṛṣṇa-dēva Mahārāya through Karaṇikkam Maṅgaraśayyar and Sāḷuva Ariyava Nāyakkar.32 It is difficult to know exactly what the two officers did in the appeal. Perhaps as provincial governors they recommended the case for final appeal to the king; or it was simply an appeal from the provincial court to the imperial court.

c8.54

²⁹ Canto IV, v. 205.

c8.55

³⁰ S. K. Aiyangar, Sources, p. 155.
31. 2 of 1923: see also Sewell, op. cit., p. 380.

c8.56

Commenting on the system under which the king acted as the judge Saletore expresses the view that there must have been some confusion in the judicial organisation at Vijayanagar. He says: "According to the Persian ambassador it is the daṇṇāyaka who constituted the highest judicial official in the kingdom; in the opinion of Nuniz the king gave a sort of rough-and-ready dispensation of justice, independent of the daṇṇāyaka. Nothing but confusion would have resulted if this were really the case in Vijayanagara".³³ But this criticism is groundless, for it is not correct to assume that both the king and the judge would have had concurrent jurisdiction. The judge would have tried a particular set of cases, while the king would have tried another set of cases. At times the king in Council would have acted as a court of appeal, and at others as a court with original jurisdiction in certain cases. Further it is reasonable to assume that the king would have tried criminal cases and cases in which certain special interests like those of a temple or a high dignitary were involved, while the judge tried the other civil cases.

c8.57

³³ Social and Political Life in the Vijayanagara Empire, I. pp. 370-71.

c8.58

Nuniz condemns the laws that obtained in the Vijayanagar empire. He says: "No law is possible in the country where these pagodas are, save only the law of the Brahmans, which is that of the priests."34 But such a downright condemnation is quite unfair. Very often the kings had to consult the Brahmans who were the only men who had a correct knowledge of the law of the land. Small criminal cases might have been decided by the kings themselves "without much ado" on the spot. But in cases of a complicated nature they could not but have consulted the Brahmans. This however should not lead us to conclude that law was that of the Brahmans or was that of the priests, for there was nothing wrong in the kings' seeking the advice of the sacerdotal class which had a sound knowledge of law. Surely the remarks of Nuniz are unwarranted.

c8.59

Constituted on the same lines as the court of law at the capital where the kings dispensed justice personally, there were inferior courts of various grades in the empire, where justice was administered. The provincial courts were presided over by the king's agents or governors, who in the name and on behalf of the king decided cases that appeared before them. For instance according to a record from Āragaḷūr in the Salem District, one Tirumalai Nāyaka, who was the governor of the province in which the village was situated, made a decision regarding the right of worship in the temple of Tirukkāmīśvaram Uḍaiya Nāyanār.³⁵ Likewise when a dispute arose between the Agrahārikas and the Karṇams of the village of Avuḍūru in respect of the distribution of certain service inām lands, one Anuguṇḍa Veṅgaḷappa, most probably an officer of the imperial government, settled the question by redistributing the lands under dispute among the two parties, after classifying the lands into gocd, bad and medium.³⁶

c8.60

³⁵ 413 of 1913 : Rep.. 1914. para 26.

c8.61

³⁶ M.E.R.. Cp. 11 of 1912-13.

c8.62

In the outlying parts of the empire, besides these regular courts of justice there were certain popular courts which were empowered to dispense justice in the cases that arose within their jurisdiction. For instance the village assemblies, the temple trustees and the caste elders had courts of their own. The differences in the local customs of the people which only the local people could understand seem to have necessitated the existence of such courts. It is only the local courts that can decide cases of a local character with a good knowledge of the customs of the litigants and the circumstances under which the cause of action for a suit could have arisen. Thus it is that in the Viijayanagar period there were village courts, presided over by the village Mahājanas, caste courts presided over by the caste elders, courts presided over by the temple trustees and courts of the guilds presided over by their leading men. These courts had all the judicial and magisterial authority of the judge of a regular court.

c8.63

A record at Āvaḍaiyārkōyil in the Tanjore district shows how the village assemblies discharged their judicial functions. According to it the assembly of that village made a gift of two pieces of land as tirunāmattukkāṇi to the temple of Śōla Pāṇḍya Vinnaṅar Emberumāṇār at Tirupperundurai, which had been confiscated by them from a certain Aṇḍāṇ Piḷḷai of Tirupputtūr on account of some default or wrong on his part.³⁷ When the village assemblies decayed, the āyagārs as a body took their place and discharged their functions, and thus enjoyed some judicial powers. Thus when a dispute arose between one Annaḍāna Gauḍa and Ciga Mudhaiya regarding the role of gauḍika in a particular village in the Anantapur district, the case was presented before the Dharmāsana (village court), consisting of the chief men of the village and the twelve village servants (āyagār). They decided in favour of Ciga Mudhaiya. Their decision was accepted by Sarājayaparāja, the chief of Harati, and the gauḍika was conferred on Mudhaiya. The procedure adopted in this case shows that though the village officers were allowed to decide cases, it was the superior officer of the locality that had to give effect to the decision.³⁸ An undated inscription at Koṭṭaiyūr in the Pudukkōṭṭai State gives some details about the settlement of a dispute among certain castes. The epigraph is defaced, but we can learn from it that it records the settlement of a dispute between certain sects of the potters of Koṭṭaiyūr in Kāṇaṇāḍu alias Virudarājabhayaṅkara Vaḷanāḍu; the settlement was arrived at in an assembly which in addition to the blood relations of the disputants contained the residents of the district, the (temple) trustees, and the artisans of the place. It was a representative gathering.³⁹ That the temple authorities dispensed justice at times is indicated by an inscription at Neyvāśal also in the Pudukkōṭṭai State. It records that they sat in judgment over a case in which a temple jewel had been stolen away by a particular person, and punishment was imposed upon him. The temple authorities also ratified the sale of the lands of the culprit for paying off the price of the stolen jewel.⁴⁰

c8.64

³⁷ 509 of 1925.

c8.65

³⁸ M.E.R., C.P. 19 of 1916-1917.

c8.66

³⁹ I.P.S., 915.

c8.67

⁴⁰ Ibid., 867.

c8.68

In those days special officers were appointed to supervise the working of the temples, and whenever disputes arose in them these special officers enquired into such cases and decided them. One Viṭṭappar of Anegōṇḍi, when he was appointed as the king’s officer in the Tiruvorriyūr temple, had to decide a serious dispute in that temple. As soon as he took charge of his office “he found that the Padiyilār, the Iṣabhaṭṭaliyilār and the Dēvaraḍiyār had struck work in that temple and that two previous attempts at reconciling their differences made in the 5th year of Rājanārāyaṇan Śambuvarāyan by the Mudaliyār of Perumbarrapuliyūr (Cidambaram), and subsequently by the trustees, had proved abortive. Viṭṭappar now enquired of the Vīraśōla aṇukkar and the Kaikkōḷar for the cause of this strike, and having called together a meeting of the Śrīrudras, Śrīmahēśvaras, the Iṣbhaṭṭaliyilār and the Dēvaraḍiyār in the Vyākaraṇadānamaṇṭapa of the Tiruvorriyūr temple, settled the order to be followed by them in the matter of temple service. It, however, appears that the question was not finally settled; for three years later (in Ś. 1293) under orders of Kampaṇa Uḍaiyār, these had to meet again in the very same maṇṭapa presided over this time by the officer Tuṇaiyirunda nambi Koṅgarāyar. More representatives than on the previous occasion had gathered including the trustees and the district representatives (nāṭṭārs), and the question was decided not only as between the Iṣabhaṭṭaliyilār and the Dēvaraḍiyār, but concerned also indirectly the Śokkaṭṭaliyilār, Muṭṭukkārar, Viraṇukkar (Viraśōḷa aṇukkar mentioned already) and the Kaikkōḷar, all of whom must have been servants of the Tiruvorriyūr temple in one capacity or another. The points settled were many, and involved several details which it is unnecessary to repeat. In effect the Iṣabhaṭṭaliyilār were required to serve in the shrine of the God and the Devaraḍiyār in that of the Goddess on festive occasions celebrated within the temple, and when the Gods were carried in procession outside the temple through the streets, into maṇṭapas, into gardens, tanks and other sanctified spots, and when minor deities including the image of the sage Tiruvādavūr Nāyanār (Mānikkavāśagar) on the occasion of his hearing the Tiruvembāvai, was paraded, the procedure was to be somewhat different.⁴¹ This interesting epigraph clearly shows that the special officers appointed by the kings to supervise temples had also judicial functions.

c8.69

⁴¹ 196 of 1912; Rep., 1913, para 51.

c8.70

Questions affecting the social and religious practices of the people were decided by special officers called samayācāras or dāśaris who were appointed by the government as the censors of morals. The office was farmed out on contract in all the large towns, and credited to public accounts as samayācāra. No religious ceremony or marriage could be undertaken without the permission of these samayācāras. When a dispute arose between the Reḍḍis of Penugoṇḍa and Bodipet as regards inter-marriages among them, and when the matter was represented to Rāma Rāyal and Bukka Rāyal, they held an enquiry into the matter and sent for their guru Tātācārya to decide the question. Tātācārya went into the details of the case and invested the heads of Sujanakula with certain honours for which they promised to make certain specified payments on occasions of marriage. Then marriages were accordingly performed.⁴² Kṛṣnadēva Rāya authorised one Veṅkaṭa Tātayarāja of the Śatamarṣaṇa gotra to make enquiries into the conduct of all the castes owing allegiance to Rāmānuja and to punish delinquents in regard to religious and social matters.⁴³ Thus in the Vijayanagar days the religious teachers also decided certain cases which were of a social and religious character.

c8.71

⁴² E.C., XII, Pg. 82.

c8.72

⁴³ M.A.R., 1918, para 110.

c8.73

Lastly mention must be made of the Nāyakas of the Vijayanagar days who were semi-independent rulers in their own territories. They enjoyed complete powers of police and judicial administration. They held their own courts and decided cases that came before them.

c8.74

Judicial Procedure

c8.75

(a) Civil Cases: About the exact judicial procedure we are not able to get much information. The little that is available indicates that civil cases were generally decided by the popular courts more by arbitration than by a detailed and dispassionate examination of all the legal points involved in a case. Even such difficult and complicated cases like the right of succession to a property were decided by the local magnates by means of arbitration. For instance a copper-plate record dated A.D. 1533 from Madura registers the settlement of a dispute between two brothers as to who among them was the elder. The younger Śiṇṇa Vaḍāvāḍa Tummiśi Nāyakkar having been declared in an assembly consisting of eighteen Koḍangai Nāyakkars and Polygars to be the junior, the elder Rāma Rāya Tummuśi Nāyakkar granted him some lands.⁴⁴ Then again when in A.D. 1363 the people of Hedḍūrṇāḍ and the temple ācāryas had certain disputes with the śūris as to the boundaries of the lands belonging to the Pārśvadēva temple of Taḍatāḷa in Hedḍūrṇāḍ, the great minister Nāgaṇṇa, a few araśus and the Jaina Mallappa decided them by arbitration. They summoned the elders of the three cities and the eighteen Kampaṇas, and held an enquiry in the Āraga Cāvaḍi. They made the nāḍ agree that the lands belonged to the temple, fixed the boundaries according to former custom, and gave a śāsana to that effect.⁴⁵ According to an inscription in the Sira taluk in the Tumkūr district, it was ruled by the king as follows: “If a caste dispute arises in the country they will summon the parties before them and advise them. And as they have the power of punishment, the parties must act according to the advice given. This proceeding to be free of cost to them.”⁴⁶

c8.76

⁴⁴ Burgess, S.C.P., No. 20, pp. 107-08

c8.77

⁴⁵ E.C., VIII, Tl. 197.

c8.78

⁴⁶ E.C., XII, Si. 79.
47. 582 of 1926; Rep., 1927. para 92.

c8.79

But when the regular courts or the king tried the cases, they went into their merits, examined the documents, tried witnesses, and finally gave their decisions. A valuable record at Śrīvilliputtūr in the Rāmnāḍ district dated A.D. 1577 states that when a dispute arose with regard to the boundaries of the lands belonging to the temples of the Goddess Śūḍikoḍutta Nācciyār and the God Paḍikkāśuvaitta Nāyaṇār, it was decided by a committee consisting of Virappa Nāyakkar, Ariyanātha Mudaliyār and a few others. “Before the day appointed for settlement, orders to assemble were issued to the parties to the suit. They brought their accounts and jñāpakam (memos ?). The allegations of both the parties were enquired into, the lands were inspected and final orders were then passed that Iraṭṭai Karīśalkuḷam should belong to the Nācciyār temple and that the tank Mālaiyiḍāṇ should be added to the Aḍiyārkuḷam as belonging to the Śiva temple. Boundary stones were fixed at the proper places to mark off the holdings of the Nācciyār temple.”47

c8.80

In this connection an inscription from Tiruviḍaimarudūr is of special interest to us. According to it, two villages, Āvaṇam and Śirrāḍi, were originally granted to the temple at the place as a Marudappar tirunāmattukkāṇi, but were subsequently taken possession of by the government, and they became a paṇḍāravāḍai. When Rāma Rāja Viṭṭaladēva Mahārāja was in Tiruvaḍi (Travancore), Tiruccirrambala Bhaṭṭar and Maṅgamarkāttār, two of the temple servants, made petition to him many times about the villages being returned to the temple. Therefore he sent Tulināyaṇār and a Muttirai vāngi ilingayar (an examiner of the seals (?) analogous to the Revenue Inspectors of the modern day) to see if the boundary stones in the two villages contained the marks of Marudappar. He soon returned and deposed that they bore his marks. On their evidence Viṭṭaladēva decided that the villages belonged to the temple, and restored them to it.48 This inscription clearly shows how the royal officers enquired into cases to ascertain the truth.

c8.81

The value of documentary evidence was highly appreciated. The kings or chiefs did not fail to examine all relevant documents in connection with any suit that appeared before them. When for instance a case about a dispute between the Paḷḷars and the Paraivars of the villages comprised within Kānanāḍu and Amantūr Padaiparru in the modern Pudukkōṭṭai State came up before Raghunātha Rāya Toṇḍamānār, the local ruler, he went through the inscriptions bearing on the suit found in the temples of Tekkattūr, Virāccilai and Lambalakkuḍi, and gave his decision.⁴⁹

c8.82

⁴⁹ I.P.S., 976.

c8.83

Similarly when a quarrel between the Baḍugulavāru and the Palināṭivāru about the *birudas* to be carried during festival procession came up for decision before the Vaiṣṇavas, Voḍeyas, elders and the merchants of Kāñcī in A.D. 1576 “they granted on the authority of a previous document on stone a very long list of privileges including that of *Kuṅkuma vastram* to the Baḍugulavāru.”⁵⁰ The same procedure was adopted by Mahānāyakācārya Haraṭi Immaḍi Raṅgappa Nāyaka Ayya’s (son) Huṅgahati Nāyaka’s family, relatives, and others in the grant of a *gauḍa*-ship to a particular individual. By a copper-plate *śāsana* Vīra Ballāḷa Rāya had granted the *nāḍ gauḍika* to a certain person. But one Muḍi Gauḍa . . . of the two tanks said that the *nāḍ gauḍika* was his, and sent a few of his men to Tumkūr, where they prepared a false document (*vōle*), and produced it before Huṅgahati Nāyaka and others, to show that the *gauḍika* belonged to him, and claimed that he had proved his case. But the Mahānāyakācārya sent his men from his palace to test the genuineness of the *vōle*, who however returned the verdict that it was a false *vōle*, and hence the *gauḍika* did not return to him. Therefore the authorities decided that there should be no joint *gauḍika* or substitute, and in the presence of the chief priest of the God Melikuṇṭe Bālakṛṣṇa’s temple, set up a stone *śāsana*.⁵¹

c8.84

⁵⁰ M.E.R., 1912-13. Cp. 13: Pt. I. para 11.

c8.85

⁵¹ E.C., XII, Si. 84.

c8.86

The manner in which a temple dispute was decided by one Tirumaḷḷi Nāyaka deserves special mention here. The dispute under question was with regard to the right of worship in the temple of Tirukkāmīśvaram Uḍaiya Nāyaṇār at Āragaḷūr in the Salem district. A complaint was made by the managers of the temple before Tirumaḷḷi Nāyaka who in summing up and communicating his final orders to the managers (*sthānikas*) of that temple said: "(1) A has been enjoying for a long time the privilege of worshipping all the 30 days of the month in the temple, while actually only 15 days belong to him by right and 15 days belong to another person named B. (2) The privilege of B thus enjoyed by A without proper authority, requires settlement; (3) in support of the latter part of the statement made in (1) there are records in the temple to prove that the 15 days of B (now abandoned by him and enjoyed by A) have, under orders, been counted 'unclaimed' (iraṅgal); (4) of this privilege of 15 days so declared unclaimed, you have sold (on your own responsibility) 7½ days to a third person C, and given him a sale deed; (5) by so doing you have deprived the acquired right of A enjoyed by him for the last eight or ten generations; (6) at this stage the nāṭṭār appear to have volunteered to settle the question of enjoyment—A being found issueless (?)—and to have called the parties to present themselves before them together with A; (7) you—the managers—were also required (under my orders) to be present on the occasion, to hear the case, and to carry out the decision arrived at (by the nāṭṭār) and to have in the meantime, during the period of hearing (by the nāṭṭār), the worship of the temple performed by outsiders on payment; (8) A having then appealed to me while I happened to be present at Āragaḷūr to hear his case personally and give a just decision, I and the nāṭṭār together advised the parties to put their case before the Mahājanas and issued an order to this effect; (9) in obedience to our order the Mahājanas of the agrahāras of Kuḷattūr, Ālambaḷam, Śaḍaiyaṉpaṭṭu and Muṭṭiyākuricci heard both sides, and decided that although A may have been the hereditary holder of only 15 days of the privilege it was not fair to sell part of the disputed portion thereof to an outsider like C, while the right to purchase (in virtue of long enjoyment) primarily rested in A; (10) according therefore to this decision of the Mahājanas, we order that A must continue to enjoy the full 30 days as before, and that the sale deed you have given to C should be cancelled."⁵²

c8.87

⁵² 430 of 1913: Rep.. 1914, para 26.

c8.88

From the judicial procedure adopted in deciding the case of the aggrieved priest in the above suit, the following conclusions may be drawn. An aggrieved party had the right of petition to the governor or king. When the governor or king by himself could not decide the case, he sought the aid of the nāṭṭār. But even when this influential body of people could not decide the case, perhaps owing to the fact that it was too important a question and involved serious points of law, the Mahājanas of the surrounding villages were asked to decide the question, which they did by giving the award that the temple trustees had no power to sell the right of worship which originally belonged to B, and having been abandoned by him had gone to A and was with him for eight or ten generations, who had thus acquired a prescriptive right to the conduct of worship. This also shows that appeals could be made from the popular courts to regular courts of justice which belonged to the king.

c8.89

Though great value was attached to human evidence, sometimes divine help was sought in deciding certain cases which involved great legal and technical difficulties and hence could not be decided easily, or when there was not sufficient evidence to prove or disprove a case, or where a party demanded that the court should not content itself with an examination of the human evidence alone. In such cases trials by ordeal were resorted to. If the party who underwent the ordeal was not seriously injured, or recovered from the injury within a particular period, he was considered to have won his case; if it happened the other way, he was said to have lost his case. An undated record found at Mēlattāṇiyam in the Pudukkōṭṭai State records the settlement of a dispute between the Paraiyars and the Paḷḷars of the village about the enjoyment of certain privileges exclusively by them. It is said that one Vīra Śiṇṇu Nāyakkar decided the dispute by asking the parties to dip their hands in boiling ghee and that the Paḷḷars came out unscathed.⁵³ An epigraph in the Yēlandūr Jāgir in the Mysore State records a dispute among certain castes that was decided in a similar way. The inscription which records this states that in the time of Rāma Rāja Nāyaka the headman of the potters granted a charter to the following effect: "When the barbers and washermen said that for potters paring of toes and nails and tying on the upper cloth (probably on marriage occasions) are not allowed, the chiefs of the potters said that they were, and gained victory by the ordeal of dipping their hands in boiling ghee before the God Divyaliṅgēśvara in Haradanahaḷḷi."⁵⁴ An inscription of A.D. 1664 found at Abbinahole in the Hiriyūr taluk records that the śenabovas of Dummaḷalu, Kambaya's son Muduraṅga and four others, (named) with the consent of their wives, sons, agnates, heirs and the sāvantas of four villages, granted to the śenabovas of Guḍa-Abbinahoḷesthala, namely Gauraṇṇa's son Sadāśivayya and others (four named), a jayarēkhapatrikā (certificate of victory) as follows: "When we represented to the assembly consisting of the gauḍas, śēnabōvas, śeṭṭis and paṭṭaṇasvāmis of Agali, Muduvidu, Raṇṭa vaḷulu and other surrounding villages that the kāṇāci pertaining to the office of shanbog of Guḍasthala belonged to us, judgment was pronounced in your favour. Declining to abide by the decision of the assembly, we proposed to settle the dispute by the ordeal of dipping the hand in boiling ghee in the presence of the goddess Ellamma of Koḍihaḷḷi. Accordingly, by order of the chief, ghee was sent for by Sidapa Devaru of Haraṭi and others (named), boiled and placed before us, and when we put our hand into it saying that "the kāṇāci is ours" the hand was burnt and we lost our case while you won yours by escaping injury. We therefore give you this jayarēkhā. Justice being on your side, may you enjoy the office of shanbog for as long as the sun and moon last."55

c8.90

⁵³ I.P.S., 929.

c8.91

⁵⁴ E.C., IV, Yl.. 2.

c8.92

Nicolo dei Conti has the following remarks to make about ordeals: "In criminal charges oaths are allowed, where there is no witness to prove the offence. There are three modes of swearing. In one, the person to whom the oath is administered stands before the idol, and swears by the idol that he is innocent. Having taken the oath, he then licks with his tongue a piece of iron, such as a mattock, red hot; if he escape uninjured he is declared innocent. Others again, having first taken the oath, carry the same piece of iron, or a red hot plate for several paces before the idol; if burnt in any part he is punished as guilty; if he escape unhurt he is exempt from the punishment awarded for the offence. There is a third manner of swearing, and this is the most common of all. A vessel is placed before the idol filled with boiling butter. He who swears that he is innocent of the offence charged against him plunges two fingers into the butter, which are immediately wrapped up in linen and a seal impressed upon it, to prevent the covering being removed. On the third day the bandage is taken off. If any injury appear upon the fingers the accused is punished, if no injury present itself he is released."56

First 92 of 161 passages. Read on

Linked texts (10)