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Chandragupta Maurya and His Times c5: Chapter II: Conquests and Chronology

Chandragupta Maurya and His Times c5

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Chapter II: Conquests and Chronology

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**First Meeting of Chanakya and Chandragupta.** We have already seen the circumstances under which Chāṇakya and Chandragupta met for the first time in their lives. That meeting was a most fateful meeting fraught with immense consequences not merely to their personal history, but also to the history of their country. For Chandragupta it proved to be the turning-point in his life. No longer was he to live the insecure life of a hunter in the obscurity of wilderness. He was now to live the cultured life of a citizen, receiving the highest possible education of the times at India’s greatest seat of learning at far-off Taxila, and preparing for one of the biggest enterprises in history. But before dealing with the details of his political career, it is necessary to know the details of the circumstances which led up to the fateful meeting of Chāṇakya and Chandragupta in the vicinity of far-off Pāṭaliputra.

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**Pataliputra as a centre of Learning.** As related in the *Mahāvaṁsa Ṭīkā*, Chāṇakya came all the way from Taxila to Pāṭaliputra in pursuit of learning and disputation centred at that imperial capital (*vādam pariyesanto Pupphapuraṁ gantvā*).

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It is an extraordinary compliment paid to the status of Pāṭaliputra as the intellectual capital of India in those days when a scholar of encyclopaedic learning like Chāṇakya, himself the product of one of the greatest centres of learning like Takshaśilā, should seek to win fresh laurels for his learning at this far-off city in eastern India.

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The fame of Pāṭaliputra as a centre of learning continued through the ages, outliving its political glory. Thus it is referred to in a work which is about a thousand years later, the classical work known as *Kāvyamīmāṁsā* by the poet Rājaśekhara who makes the following interesting statement: "There is a tradition (*śrūyate*) that Pāṭaliputra was the place which was the centre of examination of all makers of *Śāstras* (*Śāstrakāra-parīkshā*), the founders and exponents of different systems. Here were thus examined eminent creative geniuses and authors like Varsha and Upavarsha, Pāṇini and Piṅgala, and Vyāḍi. In later times, Vararuchi and Patañjali achieved fame as scholars by first passing their examination (*parīkshā*) at this city of learning."

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It will be seen that Varsha was a most ancient author as one who was the teacher of Pāṇini himself (c. 500 B.C. or earlier). Upavarsha was his brother and a commentator of *Mīmāṁsā* and *Vedānta Sūtras*, from whom citations have been made even by the great Śaṅkarāchārya. Piṅgala, according to tradition, was Pāṇini's younger brother, the author of the *Chhanda-Śāstra*. Vyāḍi was the grammarian who came after Pāṇini and wrote on his system. Vararuchi and Patañjali were of course much later authors. It thus appears that Rājaśekhara has mentioned all these men of learning from Varsha to Vararuchi, Piṅgala to Patañjali, in a chronological order. All these hailing from different parts of the country emerged into eminence by taking their examination at Pāṭaliputra.

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Ugrasena-Nanda. The then ruler of Magadha, known as merely Nanda in Sanskrit tradition, is named Dhana-Nanda in the Pali texts which further acquaint us with the names and some particulars of all the nine Nandas. We are told that all the nine Nandas, who were brothers, ruled one after another in accordance with seniority (*vuḍḍhapaṭipāṭiyā*). Dhana-Nanda was the youngest of them. The eldest brother is named Ugrasena-Nanda, the founder of the Nanda dynasty. His early life was quite romantic, like that of Chandragupta. Originally, he was from the frontiers (*pachchanta-vāsika*) and fell into the hands of robbers who carried him captive to a frontier province called Malaya (cf. Malaya in *Mudrārākshasa*) and won him over to the doctrine that pillage was preferable to tillage as a pursuit. He enlisted himself as one of the gangs of robbers together with his brothers and kinsmen and soon became their leader. They started raiding the kingdoms of the neighbourhood (*raṭṭhaṁ vilumpamāno vicharanto*) and, marching against the cities of the frontiers (*pachchanta nagaraṁ gantvā*), gave them the ultimatum: ‘Either surrender your kingdom, or give battle (*rajjaṁ vā dentu yuddhaṁ vā*).’ Gradually they aimed at supreme sovereignty [*Mahāvaṁsa Ṭīkā* in Sinhalese text, read for me by Mr. C. D. Chatterji]. A robber-king thus rose to be a king of kings.

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But he achieved this position by nefarious means on which the Buddhist text is silent but other sources throw some light. Bāṇa’s *Harshacharita*, a text of the seventh century A.D., records the story that 'Kākavarṇī Śaiśunāga was killed by a dagger thrust into his throat in the neighbourhood of his city' (Pāṭaliputra). He is called Kākavarṇa in the *Purāṇas* but Kālāsoka in the *Mahāvaṁsa* list of the kings preceding the Nandas. Very probably the incident of this assassination is related by Curtius when he states : "The father of Agrammes was a barber scarcely staving off hunger by his daily earnings, but who, from his being not uncomely in person, had gained the affections of the queen, and was by her influence advanced to too near a place in the confidence of the reigning monarch. Afterwards, however, he treacherously murdered his sovereign and then, under the pretence of acting as guardian to the royal children, usurped the supreme authority, and, having put the young princes to death, begot the present king." The form Agrammes is modified into Xandramas by Diodorus, and F. W. Thomas takes it to be the equivalent of *Chandramas*. He takes Agrammes to be Dhana-Nanda [*Cambridge History*, I. p. 469], taking Dhana-Nanda to be his nickname, and Chandramas as his personal name. 'The young princes' mentioned by Curtius as being murdered by Ugrasena-Nanda were most probably the ten sons of Kālāsoka-Kākavarṇī of the aforesaid *Mahāvaṁsa* list.

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It is to be noted that Buddhist tradition does not impute any base origin to the Nandas and thus runs counter to the Brahminical and Jain traditions. The first Nanda in the Buddhist account simply overthrows by force the previous ruling dynasty of Magadha as the culmination of a previous career of violence, as described above. Another notable point of divergence between Buddhist and other traditions is that the Buddhist texts, while knowing of the *nine* Nandas, and even of the name of each Nanda, describes them as brothers. The *Mahāvaṁsa* states: "*Nava Nandā* (also *navabhātaro*) *tato āsuṁ*." The worst infamy which Buddhist tradition records against these Nandas is that they were originally outlaws and robbers. The *Mahābodhivaṁsa* describes the Nanda kings as *chorapubbas*,¹ ‘the dacoits of old.”

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¹ The Pali Text Society prints the word as “*c'orapubbā*” (=*ca orapubbā*) but admitted the above reading *corapubbā* (*chora-pubbā*) as correct at the suggestion of Mr. C. D. Chatterji (11th Dec. 1929).

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**Dhana-Nanda insults Chanakya.** Be that as it may, when Chāṇakya came to Pāṭaliputra, he saw Dhana-Nanda as the reigning king. He was notorious for his avarice, the possessor of “riches to the amount of 80 *koṭis*,” and given to “levying taxes even on skins, gums, trees and stones.” He was called Dhana-Nanda by way of contempt, because he was “addicted to hoarding treasure” [*Mahāvaṁsa Ṭīkā*]. The *Kathāsaritsāgara* speaks of Nanda’s “990 millions of gold pieces.” He is stated to have buried all his treasure in a rock excavated in the bed of the river Ganges [*Ib.*]. The fame of his riches reached the far South. A Tamil poem refers to his wealth “which having accumulated first in Pāṭali hid itself in the floods of the Ganges” [Aiyangar’s *Beginnings of South Indian History*, p. 89]. But Chāṇakya found him a changed man. Instead of any more hoarding of wealth, he was now bent upon spending it in charities which he organised through the machinery of an institution called *Dānasālā* administered by a *Saṁgha* whose President was to be a Brāhman. The rule was that the President could make gifts amounting up to a crore of coins, while the juniormost member of the *Saṁgha* could give up to one lac. Chāṇakya came to be chosen as the president of this *Saṁgha*. But, as fate would have it, the king could not brook him for the ugliness of his features and manners and dismissed him from that office. Chāṇakya, incensed at this insult, cursed the king, threatened the ruin of his race, and escaped from his clutches in disguise as a naked Ājivika ascetic. In his wanderings he chanced to come across the child Chandragupta under circumstances already related.

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It may be noted that this story of the Buddhist text has its echo in the Sanskrit work, *Mudrārākshasa*, which mentions king Nanda expelling Chāṇakya publicly from the place of honour assigned to him in his court [*agrāsanatovakṛishṭavaśaṁ* (I. 11)], whereupon Chāṇakya vowed that he would avenge himself on Nanda by encompassing the destruction of his whole family and progeny.

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**First task of Chandragupta: Overthrow of Greek rule.** We now return to the history which followed Chāṇakya's fateful discovery of Chandragupta as the chosen instrument of his designs. We have seen with what patience Chāṇakya first undertook the preliminary task of giving Chandragupta the best possible upbringing and education spread over a period of eight years so as to equip him for the great schemes he had in view. The first of these was to surmount a difficulty that lay at his door. His youthful imagination was already fired by the spectacle of a foreign invasion of his fatherland in progress before his very eyes, the amount of resistance offered to it at different centres by small republican peoples of the Punjab, and the final passing away of his country under foreign Greek rule. Thus his immediate imperative task was the liberation of his country from the yoke of this subjection. He was inspired in this task by the teaching of his preceptor, Kauṭilya, who condemned foreign rule as an unmitigated evil. He condemns foreign rule (*Vairājya*) as the worst form of exploitation, where the conqueror, who subdues a country by violence (*parasyāchchhidya*), never counts it as his own dear country (*naitat mama iti manyamānaḥ*), oppresses it by overtaxation and exactions (*karshayati*), and drains it of its wealth (*apavāhayati*) [VIII 2.]. Details are wanting as to how he was able to organise measures, the ways and means for the accomplishment of that stupendous task in the atmosphere of depression created by the victory of Alexander and the breakdown of the national opposition. He had to fall back upon the remnants of that opposition, to fan into flame its dying embers, and to reorganise the military resources of the country in men and material for purposes of another national endeavour to strike a blow for its freedom.

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**Sources of Chandragupta's Army: the republican peoples who resisted Alexander.** We learn from the *Mahāvaṁsa Ṭīkā* that on the completion of Chandragupta's education at Taxila, both Chāṇakya and Chandragupta set out for collecting recruits (*balaṁ saṁganhitvā*) from different places (*tato tato balaṁ sannipātetvā*). Chāṇakya placed the army thus recruited under the command of Chandragupta (*Mahābalakāyaṁ saṅgahetvā taṁ tassa paṭipādesi*). Rhys Davids [*Buddhist India*, p. 267] points out that "it was from the Panjab that Chandragupta recruited the nucleus of the force with which he besieged and conquered Dhana-Nanda." Justin also states [XV. 4] that Chandragupta got together an army of local recruits whom he describes as "*robbers*." As pointed out by McCrindle [*Invasion of India by Alexander*, p. 406], the term '*robbers*' indicated the republican peoples for which the Punjab was known in those days, the *Arāṭṭas* or *Arāshṭrakas*, "kingless" peoples, peoples not living under a *rāshṭra* or State, of which the usual normal type was a kingship. Baudhāyana, in his *Dharmasūtra* (*c.* 400 B.C.), describes the Punjab as the country of *Āraṭṭas* [I. 1, 2, 13-15]. The *Mahābhārata* [VIII. 44, 2070] calls the *Āraṭṭas* as *Pāñchanadas*, 'natives of the land of the five rivers', [*Ib.* 45, 2110] and also *Vāhīkas*, 'people of the land of rivers,' comprising the Prasthalas, Madras, Gāndhāras, Khaśas, Vasātis, Sindhus, and Sauvīras.

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It is also interesting to note that Kauṭilya mentions as the sources of recruitment for the army (1) the *Choras*, or *Pratirodhakas*, of the day, the robbers and outlaws, (2) the *Chora-gaṇas*, organised gangs of brigands, (3) the *Mlechchha* tribes like the Kirāta highlanders, (4) the *Āṭavikas*, the foresters, and (5) the Warrior clans called *śastropajīvi-śreṇīs*, and that he counts the soldiery recruited from these clans as most heroic (*pravīra*) [VII. 10; 14; VIII. 14]. The Punjab in those days had abundance of this type of military material. Alexander himself had to deal with some of these peoples in his campaigns. As is shown below, it is possible to find out the Indian equivalents of their Greek names as recorded in the classical accounts of his invasion.

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**Republican peoples known to the '*Mahābhārata.*'** The *Mahābhārata* mentions the following republican peoples of these regions, viz., (1) *Yaudheyas* [II. 52; VII 9]; (2) *Kshudrakas* (II. 51; VI. 57]; (3) *Mālavas* [II. 32, II. 52]; (4) *Vasātis* [II. 52; V. 30]; (5) *Śibis* [II. 32; II. 52]; (6) *Udumbaras* [II. 52]; (7) *Prasthālas* [VIII. 44]; (8) *Trigartas* [II. 52]; (9) *Madras* [II. 52; VI. 61]; (10) *Kekayas* [III. 120] and (11) *Agreyas* [III. 254].

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**Republican peoples known to Panini.** Pāṇini's term for a republic is *Saṁgha* or *Gaṇa* [III. 3, 86]. Most of these republics took to the pursuit of arms and were known as *Āyudhajīvi-Saṁghas*, 'Warrior-communities.' They were of the *Vāhīka* country, 'the land of rivers,' another name for the Punjab [V. 3, 114]. As examples of these self-governing communities of warriors, Pāṇini mentions the following:

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(1) *Kshudrakas* (Greek *Oxydrakai*), [IV. 2, 45].

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(2) *Mālavas* (Greek *Malloi*) [*Ib.*].

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(3) *Vṛikas*, also called *Vārkeṇya* [V. 3, 115], most probably corresponding to the people known as Hyrcanians (Śakas) mentioned as *Varkānaḥ* in the Behistun and as *Varkāḥ* in another old Persian inscription of Darius I.

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(4) *Dāmani* and others (not identified) [V. 3, 116].

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(5) Confederacy of the six Trigartas comprising (a) *Kauṇḍoparatha*, (b) *Dāṇḍaki*, (c)

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*Kaushṭaki*, (d) *Jālamāni*, (e) *Brāhmagupta* and (f) *Jānaki*.

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(6) *Parśu*, associated with *Asura* and *Rakshas*, and probably of the country called *Pārśa* in the Behistun inscription of Darius I, the place of origin of the Achaemenians, whence the name Persia.

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(7) *Yaudheyas*.

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(8) *Sālvas* (Alwar and its surrounding country), a large confederacy comprising (a) *Udumbaras*, (b) *Tilakhalas*, (c) *Madrakāras*, (d) *Yugandharas*, (e) *Bhūliṅgas*, (f) *Śaradaṇḍas*, (g) *Budhas*, (h) *Ajakrandas* and (i) *Ajamīḍhas*, [IV. I, 173].

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(9) *Bhargas*, mentioned in the *Gaṇa-pāṭha* along with (a) *Karushas*, (b) *Kekayas*, (c) *Kāśmīras*, (d) *Sālvas*, (e) *Susthalas*, (f) *Uraśas* (of Hazara District) and (g) *Kauravyas*, [IV. 1, 178].

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(10) *Ambashṭhas* (Greek *Abastanoi*) who are associated in the *Mahābhārata* [II. 52, 14-15] with the *Śibis*, *Kshudrakas*, *Mālavas* and other northwestern tribes.

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(11) *Hāstināyana* [VI. 4, 174] (Greek *Astanenoi*). modern Ferghana whose people called the *Parikanioi*

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(12) *Prakaṇva* [VI. 1, 153], corresponding to correspond to *Prakaṇvāyanas* [Sten Konow, *Kharoshṭhī Inscriptions*, p. XVIII.].

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(13) *Madras*, [IV. 2, 131].

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(14) *Madhumantas* [IV. 2, 133; Mbh. Bhīshma P., IX. 53] corresponding to the *Mohmands*.

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(15) *Āprītas* [IV. 2, 53], (Greek *Aparytai*, corresponding to the *Afridis*).

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(16) *Vasāti* [*Ib*.] (Greek *Ossadioi*).

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(17) *Śibis* [IV. 3, 112] (Greek *Sibioi*).

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(18) *Āśvāyana* [IV. 1, 110] and *Āśvakāyana* [*Ib.* 99] corresponding to Greek *Aspasii* and *Assakenoi* whose stronghold was Massaga (=*Maśakāvatī*).

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It is interesting to note that the city called Aornos by the Greeks corresponds to the term *Varaṇā* used by Pāṇini [IV. 2, 82].

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In the above list, the republican peoples outside the Punjab and the sphere of Chandragupta’s work are omitted.

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It will be seen from the above list that in Pāṇini’s time there were both individual republics functioning by themselves and confederacies of such republics such as the *Trigarta-shashṭha*, or the *Sālvas* [V. S. Agrawala’s *Pāṇini as a Source of History* to be published shortly].

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As Arrian tells us [IV. 21], a large part of the Punjab was then held by these “independent Indian tribes” whom Curtius [IX. 4] describes as “fierce nations” ready to resist Alexander “with their blood.” The kingdom which was restored by Alexander to his old enemy, king Poros (=Paurava), comprised territories held by “fifteen republican peoples owning 5000 considerable cities and villages without number” [Plutarch, *Lives*, lx].

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*How they fought Alexander: their military resources.* The military potentialities and heroism of these ‘independent’ peoples of the Punjab were brought to light by Alexander’s invasion and must have been observed by youthful Chandragupta. The story of their resistance against Alexander’s campaigns is not less inspiring than the story of Alexander’s victories. The Indian opposition to Alexander which was offered to him from different centres may be appraised and assessed in the light of the facts and figures recorded by the Greeks themselves.

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Alexander had its first taste from the tribal chief whom the Greeks call Astes corresponding to Sanskrit *Hastin*, the chief of the people known by the Indian name of *Hāstināyana* [Pāṇini, VI. 4, 174], Greek *Astakenoi* or *Astanenoi*, with his capital at Peukelaotis or Pushkalāvatī. This heroic chief stood the Greek siege of his walled town for full thirty days till he fell fighting.

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Similarly, the *Āśvāyanas* and *Āśvakāyanas* fought the invader to a man, as will be evident from the fact that as many as 40,000 of them were taken as captives. Their economic prosperity may also be noted from the fact that as many as 230,000 oxen fell into the hands of Alexander.

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The *Āśvakāyanas* gave battle to Alexander with an army of 30,000 cavalry, 38,000 infantry, and 30 elephants, aided by 7,000 mercenaries from the plains, all garrisoned in their fortified capital called Massaga [Sanskrit *Maśaka*, which stood on the banks of the river called *Maśakāvatī* in the *Kāśikā* comment on Pāṇini (IV. 2, 85; VI, 3, 119)], led by their heroic Queen Cleophis (=Sanskrit *Kṛipā*?), “resolved to defend their country to the last extremity.” Even their women took part in the defence along with the Queen. Even their mercenaries, at first vacillating, caught their spirit and preferred “a glorious death to a life with dishonour” [McCrindle’s *Invasion*, pp. 194 (Curtius), 270 (Diodorus)]. Their spirit infected the neighbouring hill-country called Abhisāra, which also joined them in their defence.

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The free cities of the region also followed suit, such as Aornos, Bazira, Ora or Dyrta, each of which surrendered after a protracted siege.

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The Indian military strength was seen at its highest in the army of King Poros (Paurava) who was Alexander's most formidable enemy whom he opposed with an army estimated by Arrian at 30,000 foot, 4,000 horse, 300 chariots, and 200 elephants. Even after his defeat, Alexander had to seek his alliance.

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The Agalassoi fought Alexander with an army of 40,000 foot and 3,000 horse. We are told that in one of their towns, the citizens numbering about 20,000 cast themselves into the flames, along with their wives and children, rather than submitting as prisoners to the enemy.

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Next, Alexander had to meet the opposition organised by a confederacy of the autonomous peoples, such as the Mālavas and the Kshudrakas, whose allied strength was made up of 90,000 foot, 10,000 horse, and above 900 chariots. Even their Brāhmans left the pen for the sword, and died fighting, "with few taken as prisoners."

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The Kathas were another heroic people who "enjoyed the highest reputation for courage" [Arrian, V. 22, 2]. We are told that their casualties alone amounted to 17,000 killed and 70,000 captives.

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The Mālavas by themselves defended the passage of a river with 50,000 men.

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The Ambashṭhas had an army of 60,000 foot, 6,000 horse, and 500 chariots.

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In the campaigns of the lower Indus, the number of killed alone amounted to 80,000. In this region, it was the Brāhmans who took the lead and created the spirit of resistance and war fever, and cheerfully sacrificed their lives in the defence of their *Dharma* [Plutarch, *Lives*, lix; *Cambridge History*, I. p. 378].

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Causes of their defeat. It may be noted that all these fairly large armies were recruited from small republican States. The number of the army was very large in proportion to the number of the total population of the State concerned. These republican peoples must have fought to a man, and mobilised their entire man-power in defence of their freedom in a sheer spirit of patriotism. Even their women fought with the men. If their heroic fight in the defence of their liberties against a supreme military leader like Alexander had failed for the time being, it was because it lacked leadership, organisation, unity of direction, and pooling of resources. The defence was far too localised and isolated at different centres. It was not organised into a national defence. Alexander was thus able to deal with the defence piecemeal, to proceed against each State separately, and to subdue it easily. The multiplicity of States prevented a united front against a common enemy and caused the collapse of opposition at individual and isolated centres. Division was fatal to defence. Some kind of national opposition was organised for once by the confederacy of the Kshudrakas and Mālavas who united their military resources in a powerful allied army. Such a federal army was known even in the days of Pāṇini who calls it 'the Kshaudraka-Mālavī-senā.' But these defects and deficiencies of the Indian military situation were soon to be removed by a great leader like Chandragupta with his superior power of organisation.

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It was left to the genius of Chāṇakya and Chandragupta to exploit and utilise once again the magnificent military material and resources, potentialities and possibilities, available in such abundance all over the Punjab among her republican peoples and States and her general population. It was easy for them to produce out of this material, the unconquered spirit of resistance in the people, a well-organised army to fight freedom's battle and to win it.

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**Other recruits for Chandragupta's Army.** But Chandragupta did not confine his army to the mere local recruits, if we may believe in the legends about it. For instance, the *Mudrārākshasa* mentions an alliance which Chāṇakya had arranged with a Himalayan chief named Parvataka or Parvateśa. The Jain text, *Pariśishṭaparvan*, also refers to this Himalayan alliance, stating that "Chāṇakya went to Himavatkūṭa and entered into alliance with Parvataka, the king of that region." Buddhist accounts also mention a Parvata as a close associate of Chāṇakya. Thus three traditions record this alliance. F. W. Thomas has gone further in suggesting (*Camb. Hist. of India*, Vol. I. p. 471), that this Parvataka was perhaps the same person as king Poros of the Greeks. The suggestion is quite plausible, considering what a large place Poros had filled in the politics of his country in his time, so that no adventure in that region could be undertaken without enlisting his support.

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The *Mudrārākshasa* gives us the further information that his Himalayan alliance gave Chandragupta a composite army recruited from a variety of peoples. Among these are mentioned the following: Śakas, Yavanas (probably Greeks), Kirātas, Kāmbojas, Pārasīkas, Bahlīkas [II. 12]. Chandragupta was opposed by a coalition of 5 kings, viz, Chitravarmā of Kulūta, Siṁhanāda of Malaya, Pushkarāksha of Kāśmīra, the Saindhava prince, Sindhsheṇa, and Meghākhya, the king of the Pārasīkas, who joined with a large force of cavalry (*pṛithu-turagabalaḥ*) [I. 20]. The army of Malayaketu comprised recruits from the following peoples: Khaśa, Māgadha, Gāndhāra, Yavana, Śaka, Chedi, and Hūṇa [V. II]. Thus these various peoples, mostly from the Punjab and the frontier Highlands, were involved in the great war between Chandragupta and his enemies in Magadha. This list unfortunately affects the value of *Mudrārākshasa* as a source of history. Some of the peoples named in it such as the Śakas or the Hūṇas appear in Indian history much later than the time of Chandragupta.

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**Insecurity of Greek Rule.** But apart from the military strength which Chandragupta was able to mobilise for his mission, it was materially helped by the internal conditions of the country and other factors which did not augur well for the future of Greek rule in India. Even from the very beginning, the course of Alexander's invasion did not run smooth. It appeared to be smooth only on the surface. Its difficulties lay deeper. Alexander was not sure of his rear. It was threatened by rebellions both among Greeks and Indians. The prospects of his enterprise did not appeal as much to his followers as to him personally. Alexander's policy was to plant colonies of Greek veterans at suitable centres, the new eastern cities, to mark the progress of his conquests, and to secure its fruits [Arrian, V. 27, 5]. Such colonies were set up first in Bactria and Sogdiana, but it was against the will of the colonists who were not reconciled to this exile. They were always longing for opportunity to desert. When Alexander was fighting with the distant Mālavas and received a wound, a rumour of his death spread far and wide, and at once these Greek colonists numbering 3,000 left for home [Diodorus, XVII. 99]. Alexander himself thought of these colonies as penal settlements to which the Greeks convicted of disloyalty were committed [Justin, XII. 5, 8, 13].

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The Greek Satrapies. Nor was the attitude of the Indians, who were subdued, more favourable. Their spirit of revolt was not subdued. The administrative arrangements which Alexander made to secure his conquests betray his own sense of their insecurity. He divided Greek India into six Satrapies, three on the west side of the Indus, and three on the east. The three western Satraps were Greeks, but not the eastern Satraps who were all Indians. Of the three western Satraps, Peithon was posted as governor of Sind. Nicanor was placed in charge of the province called 'India-west-of-the Indus'. It comprised lower Kabul valley and the hill-tracts up to the Hindukush, with its capital at Pushkalāvatī (Charsadda). The governor had at his disposal a Macedonian garrison under commandant Philip. Higher up, Oxyartes was appointed governor of the province of Paropanisadae (Kabul valley) with its capital at the new city called 'Alexandria under the Caucasus'. At first, Alexander tried Persian Satraps, but they failed. As Curtius informs us [IX. 8], "there were charges of extortion and tyranny proved against the Persian Satrap, Tyriespes, by the people of the Paropanisadae." This was about 326 B.C. Conditions were sought to be stabilised by Alexander appointing as Satrap his own father-in-law, Oxyartes, another Iranian noble.

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Alexander could not venture to post Greek governors to the east of the Indus. Here the three Satrapies were placed under Indian kings : Āmbhi, king of Taxila, ruling from the Indus to the Hydaspes; Poros (Paurava) ruling from the Hydaspes to the Hyphasis; and the king of Abhisāra country (Kashmir) ruling over the remainder.

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**Indian Unrest: Murder of Satrap Nicanor.** The position of the Greek governors to the west of the Indus rapidly became precarious. First, Kandahar raised the standard of rebellion at the instigation of an Indian chief whom the Greeks called Samaxus or Damaraxus. Next came the turn of the Āśvāyanas who dispatched the Greek Satrap, Nicanor, planted in their midst [Arrian, V. 20, 7]. The Āśvakāyanas made the position of their Greek governor very unsafe. It was the traitor of an Indian, Sisikottus, or Śaśigupta, the Indian agent of Greek Imperialism. Alexander sent him help from his westernmost Satrapy, as also further help under Philip from Taxila.

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**Decline of Recruits and Morale.** All this trouble was brewing in 326 B.C., when Alexander was busy in the interior in the thick of his campaigns. His supply of men was failing as he was advancing farther and farther. His progress was brought to a standstill on the banks of the Chenab till the situation was saved by the arrival of Thracian reinforcements from distant Iran. But the Beas proved the limit of his advance. It was because the limit of endurance was reached by his followers. The situation was thus brought home to him by Koinos as their spokesman: "From our ranks you sent away home from Baktra the Thessalians as soon as you saw they have no stomach for further toils... Of the other Greeks, some have been settled in the cities founded by you where all of them are not willing residents; others still share our toils and dangers. They and the Macedonian army have lost some of their numbers in the fields of battle; others have been disabled by wounds; others have been left behind in different parts of Asia, but the majority have perished by disease. A few only out of many survive, and these few possess no longer the same bodily strength as before, while their spirits are still more depressed. You see yourself how many Macedonians and Greeks started with you and how few of us are left."

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**Inherent Defect of Alexander's Scheme.** These words expose the inherent difficulty in the way of Alexander's ambitious scheme materialising. It was impossible to build up an empire which could not command its supplies and the support of its own people.

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The Indian popular opinion on the situation was cleverly conveyed to Alexander by an Indian ascetic. Taking a piece of dry hide, he placed it on the ground and asked Alexander to tread on it. As he placed his foot on one of its ends, the other ends flew up. It was difficult to keep the hide flat. Alexander was thus shown a visible image of what his strange enterprise meant, the uncertain and unstable consequences of campaigns carried on in countries too far from "the centre of his dominion" [McCrindle's *Invasion*, p. 315]. The fact was that the Indians do not seem to have taken Alexander's invasion very seriously. It was like a spectacular march through the country. The consolidation of conquests in distant countries depended on communications which could be ensured. The Indian attitude is truly expressed in the poet's word:

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"The East bowed low before the blast
In patient, deep disdain ;
She let the legions thunder past,
And plunged in thought again."
—*Mathew Arnold.*

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**Murder of Philip.** To return to the fate of the Greek Satrapies, on the assassination of governor Nicanor by the Indian "mutineers", Commandant Philip was deputed by Alexander to take his place. Philip was the most experienced Greek administrator in India. He started as Alexander's agent at Taxila to keep watch over the activities of the powerful Indian chief, Paurava. Alexander depended upon Philip to guard the rear of his advance down the Hydaspes. Alexander later deputed him to take charge of the territories of the free peoples, the Mālavas, and the Kshudrakas, as they were conquered by Alexander, and these stretched as far south as the confluence of the Indus and the Chenab. He was now put in charge of the most important province of Greek India which was like the gateway to India. Philip very soon left his new headquarters to see Alexander off on his return journey down the Hydaspes. But little did he know that his own days were numbered! He was assassinated on his return.

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A Blow to Greek Rule. According to Arrian [VI. 27, 2], Philip fell a victim to jealousy between the Greeks and Macedonians. But such a grave incident was due to deeper causes, to popular discontent with foreign rule. The murder of a Greek official of commanding position like Philip, in whom Greek rule was embodied and represented at its best, was really a fatal blow struck at that rule. He was the pillar of Greek Imperialism in India. His assassination took place in 325 B.C. when Alexander was in a position to retrace his steps to avenge it, as he had not gone even as far as Carmania. But he could not do so. The act was a challenge to Alexander's authority. But it was beyond his power to answer it. Alexander was retreating from India, with Greek rule retreating with him. The only remedy that he could think of was to seek the good offices of his Indian ally, the king of Taxila, to whom he sent despatches asking him kindly "to assume the administration of the province previously governed by Philippus until he could send a Satrap to govern it" [Arrian, VI. 27]. Such a Satrap was never sent. Eventually Alexander had to trust his Indian ally with that charge. This meant that the Indian king was helped to extend his authority beyond the Indus and the frontiers up to the Kabul valley and the Hindukush. A Thracian named Eudamus was now left as the sole Greek agent in India, who, under the Indian king, was placed in charge of the military garrison at Pushkalāvatī and also of the "command of the scattered bodies of Greek and Macedonian troops, with authority over the various colonists of Hellenic nationality" settled in that region [*Cambridge History*, I. p. 429].

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**Collapse of Greek Rule after Alexander's death in 323 B.C.** On the top of this took place the death of Alexander¹ himself (without issue) in 323 B.C. in distant Babylon, followed by confusion in his own empire. The empire could not hold together. His generals immediately met and decided on its division among themselves. A second partition of the empire took place in 321 B.C. at Triparadisus, in which no part of India to the east of the Indus was included as a part of that empire. The Greek governor of Sind, Peithon, was now removed, and placed in charge of the province between the Indus and the Paropanisus. Eudamus was the solitary Greek agent lingering on in India, but he had no official position in the empire and is ignored in its partitions. He probably set himself up as the leader of the Hellenic 'outlanders' left in the valleys of the Indus and the Hydaspes, but he, too, left India in 317 B.C. to help his chief, Eumenes, against Antigonos, with a small force of infantry and cavalry and of 120 elephants which he had secured by slaying treacherously an Indian chief (supposed to be Poros) who was his trusted colleague. Poor Eudamus met his doom at the hands of Antigonos [Diodorus, XIX. 44, 1]. Peithon also left his province and joined the fray and met the same fate. He fell fighting by the side of Demetrius at the battle of Gaza [*Ib.* 85, 2]. There was no more Greek to take the place of either in India.

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¹ The name Alexander passed immediately into Indian literature in various forms. Asoka in his inscriptions uses the forms *Alikasudara* (Shahbazgarhi Rock Edict XIII) and *Alikyasudala* (Kālsi text). Alexandria is transformed into *Alasanda* in *Milinda-pañho*. Sylvan Levi reads a definite, though solitary, reference in Sanskrit Literature to Alexander the Great himself in a passage in Bāṇa's *Harshacharita* stating that "*Alasa-Chaṇḍakośa* having conquered the earth did not penetrate into *Strīrājya* or the Kingdom of women." Alexander is here meant because Greek tradition mentions his conquest of a Kingdom of Amazons which he abstained from entering as special favour [*Memorial Sylvain Levi*, p. 414 (in French)]. According to Weber [*Berlin S. B.*, 1890, p. 903], "If Indian literature remembered Alexander at all, it was only in the form of a bogey called *Skanda*, used to frighten naughty children" [*Tarn, The Greeks in Bactria and India*, p. 168].

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**Chandragupta as Leader of Revolution.** The Greek withdrawal from India was not an automatic process. It was forced by a revolution, a war of independence declared by Chandragupta as its leader. The assassinations of the Greek governors are not to be looked upon as mere accidents or isolated events. They were the preliminary incidents of a planned scheme of attack against Greek rule. The two years, 325 B.C.–323 B.C., that intervened between the death of Philip and that of Philip's master were busy years for those who were planning India's freedom. What was then happening may be gathered from the following words of Justin [XV. 4], our only source of evidence for this fateful episode in India's history: "India, after the death of Alexander, had shaken, as it were, the yoke of servitude from its neck and put his governors to death. The author of this liberation was Sandrocottus. This man was of humble origin but was stimulated to aspire to regal power by supernatural encouragement; for, having offended Alexander (*Alexandrum* which some scholars replace by the name *Nandrum* or Nanda) by his boldness of speech, and orders being given to kill him, he saved himself by swiftness of foot; and, while he was lying asleep, after his fatigue, a lion of great size, having come up to him, licked off with his tongue the sweat that was running from him, and after gently waking him, left him. Being first prompted by this prodigy to conceive hopes of royal dignity, he drew together a band of robbers and instigated the Indians to overthrow the existing (Greek) government. Sometime after, as he was going to war with the generals of Alexander, a wild elephant of great bulk presented itself before him of its own accord and, as tamed down to gentleness, took him on his back and became his guide in the war and conspicuous in fields of battle. Sandrocottus, having thus acquired a throne, was in possession of India when Seleucus was laying the foundations of his future greatness." Stripped of its miraculous elements, the passage is a record of important history. It declares definitely that Chandragupta was the hero of this Indian war of independence. It also exhibits Chandragupta's plan of action which was first to dispose of what may be called the tall poppies of Greek India, its provincial governors who were Alexander's generals. We have already seen how this plan was given effect to by the assassination of the two most important Greek Satraps, Nicanor and Philip. It may be taken for granted that the removal of these two Greek governors practically meant the overthrow of Greek rule in India. Alexander when living was unable to take any effective steps against this defiance of his authority, and, after his death in 323 B.C., there was disruption in his empire, and India was left alone by the generals who partitioned the empire. Thus it may be assumed that the death of Alexander meant the death of Greek rule in India. We have already seen how the provisions of the second partition of Alexander’s empire in 321 B.C. practically point to the Greek recognition of the independence of India which was achieved by Chandragupta by about 323 B.C., and, certainly, before 321 B.C.

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If may be further noted that even if the reading *Alexander* is taken for the word *Nandrum* in the above passage of Justin, it will be quite in accord with the probabilities of the situation. The hero of Indian independence must have impressed Alexander with the promise of his future and roused his suspicion and enmity. This only added a private cause to the national cause of Chandragupta’s hostility to Greek rule.

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**War against Nanda: Stories of its strategy.** With the first part of his mission in life thus achieved in liberating the Punjab from foreign rule, he now turned to its second part, the liberation of the other parts of the country from the tyranny of its rulers, the hated Nandas. Unfortunately, there is not much evidence available on this important event of Chandragupta’s conquest of Magadha. There is, however, evidence to show that the event created a widespread sensation and roused popular interest. It passed into folk lore and tradition. It seems that, after recruiting their army locally in the Punjab in the manner described above, Chāṇakya and Chandragupta started by invading the countries on the frontiers (*āntojanapadaṁ pavisitvā*) and plundering their villages (*gāmaghātādikammaṁ*) in their desire for sovereignty (*rajjaṁ ichchanto*). Chandragupta’s movement was from the frontier to the interior of India, towards Magadha and Pāṭaliputra, but he first made mistakes in strategy. The story is thus related: “In one of these villages a woman [by whose hearth Chandragupta’s spy had taken refuge] baked a *chapathy* and gave it to her child. He, leaving the edges, ate only the centre, and, throwing the edges away, asked for another cake. Then she said, ‘This boy’s conduct is like Chandagutta’s attack on the kingdom.’ The boy said, ‘Why Mother, what am I doing, and what has Chandagutta done?’ ‘Thou, my dear,’ said she, ‘throwing away the outside of the cake, eatest the middle only. So Chandagutta, in his ambition to be a monarch, without beginning from the frontiers, and taking the towns in order as he passed, has invaded the heart of the country... and his army is surrounded and destroyed. That was his folly’ ” [*Mahāvaṁsa Ṭīkā*, p. 123; Appendix I]. Next, Chandragupta tried another method. He commenced operations from the frontiers (*pachchantato paṭṭhāya*) and conquered many *rāshtras* and *janapadas*, States and peoples, on the way; but his mistake was not to post garrisons to hold the conquests. The result was that the people left in the rear of his advance were free to combine, to encircle his army, and defeat his designs. Then the proper strategy dawned on him. He had garrisons stationed at the *rāshtras* and *janapadas* as they were conquered (*uggahitanayā balaṁ saṁvidhāya*) and, crossing the frontiers of Magadha with his victorious army, besieged Pāṭaliputra and killed Dhana-Nanda (Appendix I).

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A similar comment on strategy is also contained in the Jain work, *Pariśishtaparvan*, which states: "Like a child burning his finger which he greedily puts in the middle of the dish, instead of eating from the outer part which was cool, Chāṇakya had been defeated, because he had not secured the surrounding country before attacking the stronghold of the enemy. Profiting by this advice, Chāṇakya went to Himavatkūṭa and entered into alliance with Parvataka the king of that place ... They opened the campaign by reducing the provinces" [VIII. 291-301]. The same text further relates that at the very opening of this campaign, Chāṇakya and Chandragupta suffered a reverse by failing to reduce a town, until Chāṇakya reduced it by a ruse, throwing its defenders off their guard. Then they devastated the country (*Nandadeśaṁ*), besieged Pāṭaliputra, and forced Nanda to capitulate, with his reduced wealth (*kshīṇa-kośa*), army (*bala*), capacity (*dhīḥ*), and prowess (*vikrama*) [*Ib.* 301-313]. Nanda, however, was spared his life and permitted by Chāṇakya to leave Pāṭaliputra with his two wives and one daughter and as much luggage as he could carry off in a single chariot [*Ib.* 301-317].

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These stories, however, bring out the fundamental fact of Indian history through the ages that all movements of conquest in India have been from the frontier to the interior, from the north to the south, from the highlands to the plains. It is only in the case of an invading naval Power like the British that its movement has followed a different direction, from the sea upwards into the inland.

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The stories also bring out the probable fact that the conquest of Nanda’s empire was not an easy undertaking, but the result of several attempts. It was because that empire was possessed of immense power and resources. Curtius estimates its military strength at 200,000 infantry, 20,000 cavalry, 2,000 four-horsed chariots, and 3,000 elephants. The empire was also very wide in extent. It extended as far as the Punjab. It is stated that when Alexander invaded his country which lay between the Chenab and the Ravi, the second Poros escaped for shelter into the adjoining territory of the Nanda king [McCrindle’s *Invasion*, p. 273]. We have already seen how the Nanda king by his conquests made himself the supreme sovereign (*ekarāṭ*) of numerous States which he brought together under the umbrella of his sole authority (*eka-chchhatra*). These States are described to be those of the Aikshvākus, Pañchālas, Kāśis, Haihayas, Kaliṅgas, Aśmakas, Kurus, Maithilas, Śūrasenas, and Vitihotras. All these Kshatriya dynasties were “uprooted,” as the *Purāṇas* tell us. He is known to the Greeks as the ruler of peoples called the Gangaridae and the Prasii, i.e., the peoples of the Ganges valley, and the Prāchyas or ‘easterners,’ peoples living to the east of the “Middle country,” such as the Pañchālas, Śūrasenas, Kosalas, and the like. Towards the south also the Nanda king extended his sovereignty by his conquest of Kaliṅga, as recorded in the Hāthīgumphā inscription of Khāravela. It mentions 'Nanda-Rāja' as being associated with an old aqueduct, and as having carried away to Magadha as trophies the statue (or footprints) of the first Jina and treasures of the royal house. Nanda rule is also stated to have extended up to the province of Kuntala in the north of Mysore in some Mysore Inscriptions [Rice, *Mysore and Coorg from Inscriptions*, p. 3]. But these inscriptions are as late as twelfth century and cannot be considered as reliable evidence, failing earlier evidence on the subject. We have also seen how, by his grinding taxation, he made himself master of untold wealth which he hoarded in subterranean chambers.

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**His lack of popularity.** Nanda had thus enough of power and pelf. But he lacked popularity. Chandragupta himself, as we have seen, reported to Alexander that he was "hated by his subjects" and Alexander had this report confirmed by the Indian kings Poros (Paurava) and Phegelas (Bhagalā). His unpopularity is due as much to the original sin of his ancestor as mentioned above as to his tyrannical rule and exactions. Thus, his power was tottering to its fall. It was not broad-based upon the people's will. Thus the moral factor helped Chandragupta in his fight against Nanda more than the military factor.

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**Casualties.** The details of the actual battle between Chandragupta and Nanda are not known. The Jain work *Pariśishṭaparvan* [VIII. 253-54] contains a verse stating that 'Chāṇakya recruited for Chandragupta an army by means of wealth hidden underground for the purpose of uprooting Nanda.' "It has been conjectured that he employed Greek mercenaries in his struggle with Nanda" [*Cambridge History*, I. p. 435]. That it was a bloody battle between the two is indicated in exaggerated terms in a passage in the *Milindapañho*, [*SBE*, XXVI. p. 147] stating that "100 koṭis of soldiers, 10,000 elephants, 1 lac of horses and 5,000 charioteers" were killed in action and that Bhaddaśāla was the commander of Nanda's army. We have already seen the version of the event given in the *Mudrārākshasa* which begins with Chāṇakya's statement that he has already killed all the Nine Nandas and will not spare the surviving representative of the Nanda family, the old man, Sarvārthasiddhi, who, unable to stand the siege of his city Kusumapura, betook himself to the forest. Though living there as a hermit, he was done to death under orders of Chāṇakya who was out to uproot the last offshoot of the Nanda family.

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**Defeat of Seleucos, 304 B. C.: Extension of Empire up to Persia.** Chandragupta did not merely supplant the Nanda king in the sovereignty of Magadha. He made himself at once the sovereign of an empire which was much larger than that of Nanda, for it included the land of the five rivers up to the Indus. This empire also extended farther by his later conquests. His subsequent career may be gathered from the following statement of Plutarch [*Lives*, Chap. LXII]: "Not long afterwards, Androcottos, who had at that time mounted the throne, presented Seleukos with 500 elephants and overran and subdued the whole of India with an army of 600,000." "The throne" here is the throne of Magadha which he had won by defeating the Nanda king. The present to Seleukos was the result of a war between the two. It would appear that in the struggle for power which ensued among the generals of Alexander after his death, Seleukos won for himself a secure position as the ruler of Babylon by about 311 B.C. and felt free to devote himself to the consolidation of his authority in the distant provinces. Bactria was not subdued without hard fighting. And by about 305 or 304 B.C. at the latest, he planned for a recovery of the Indian conquests of Alexander. Taking the route along the Kabul river, he crossed the Indus [Appian, *Syr.* 55]. But the expedition proved abortive and ended in an alliance. It was because he had to confront a new India, strong and united, under Chandragupta in command of a formidable army, and felt that discretion was the better part of valour. By the terms of the treaty, Seleukos ceded to Chandragupta the Satrapies of Arachosia¹ (Kandahar) and the Paropanisadae (Kabul), together with portions of Aria (Herat) and Gedrosia (Baluchistan). Thus Chandragupta was able to add another glorious feather to his cap. He extended his empire beyond the frontiers of India up to the borders of Persia. That is why it was possible for his grandson Asoka to declare in two of his Rock Edicts [II and XIII] that the Syrian emperor, Antiochus [Aṁtiyako *Yona-rājā*], was his "immediate" neighbour, one of his "frontagers" (an *Anta* or a *Pratyanta* king). Chandragupta on his part cemented this alliance by making a present to Seleukos of 500 war-elephants. This gift was of great value to Seleukos who was at that time very much worried by a call for help from his friends, the confederate kings Cassander, Lysimachus, and Ptolemy, against their common adversary, Antigonus. The elephants arrived in time at the battle-field of Ipsus to turn the scale of victory against Antigonus. The present of Indian elephants by Chandragupta to Seleukos was followed by a demand for them in western wars. Pyrrhos transported these elephants from Epiros to Italy in 281 B.C. Hasdrubal in 251 B.C. used at Panormus elephants driven by 'Indians'. So did Hannibal and Hasdrubal during the second Punic war with Rome, and, at the battle of Raphia, Ptolemy's Libyan elephants were no match for the Indian elephants of Antiochos [Warmington, *Commerce between Roman Empire and India*, p. 151].

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