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The Philosophy of the Upanishads c11: Third Part of the System of the Upanishads: Psychology, or the Doctrine of the Soul

The Philosophy of the Upanishads c11

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Third Part of the System of the Upanishads: Psychology, or the Doctrine of the Soul

XI. The Supreme and the Individual Souls

1. The Theory of the later Vedânta

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THE Vedânta of S'ankara and his school makes a distinction between the supreme soul (*paramâtman*) and a multitude of individual souls (*jîva âtman, s'arîra âtman*). The former is omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent; the latter are limited in wisdom, power and capacity of movement. The former is neither active nor passive, and is therefore free from the very beginning; the latter are active and receptive, and are therefore entangled in the eternal round of saṃsâra, and stand in need of deliverance. Yet the individual âtmans are not properly distinct from the supreme âtman. Each of them is in full and complete measure the supreme âtman himself, as he manifests himself, though his real nature is concealed by the upâdhis (manas, indriyas, etc.). These upâdhis are unable to change his real nature, as little as the purity of the rock crystal is destroyed by the red colour with which it is externally smeared. Rather is it solely avidyâ, ignorance, which imposes the upâdhis on the supreme âtman, and thus comes to regard him as an individual âtman. Accordingly the entire individual soul as such has no reality, and yet the system cannot avoid treating it as a reality, and discussing in detail its organs and attributes, its wandering and final deliverance. This internal contradiction inherent in the system, as well as the designation of two different and yet not different entities by the one word âtman, points to the conclusion that the whole theory of a twofold soul, supreme and individual, is of secondary origin. We have now to trace its rise in the Upanishads.

2. Originally only one Soul

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The texts of the oldest Upanishads do not recognise two souls, but only one. “It is thy soul, which is within all.”¹ He who while dwelling in the earth, the water, the fire, in space, wind, heaven, sun, etc., is distinct from them, whose body they are, who rules them all from within, “he is thy soul, the inner guide, the immortal. He sees but is not seen, hears but is not heard, comprehends but is not comprehended, knows but is not known; there is none beside him that sees or hears or comprehends or knows.”² This âtman who alone exists is the knowing subject in us, and as such sustains the whole universe of conceptions, in which is everything and beyond which nothing, and with the knowledge of the âtman therefore all is known.³ This is the point of view of pure idealism, which denies the existence of a manifold universe, and of everything outside the knowing subject. It becomes pantheism, when it concedes a relative existence to the universe, but identifies this entire universe with the âtman, the knowing subject. Such an identification however, often as it is repeated, is always very obscure, and in order to bring it within the range of empirical comprehension a return is effected to the old cosmogony, and it is taught that the âtman created the universe and then entered into it as soul:—*anena jīvena ātmanā anupraviśya*.¹ Here for the first time we meet with the word *jīva ātman*, which later denotes “the individual soul” as contrasted with the supreme. But no such contrast yet exists here. It is the ātman himself who alone exists and creates the universe, who as *jīva ātman* enters into the universe that he has created. Neither from the point of view of pure idealism, nor in its empirical varieties of pantheism and cosmogonism, does any opposition exist between the supreme and individual souls. The contrast between them is first seen at the moment in which the ātman who creates the universe and then enters into his creation becomes a duality, the parts of which are set over-against one another. We have described this further accommodation to the empirical consciousness as theism, since here the original unity of the ātman is divided into God and the soul.

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¹ Bṛih. 3. 4. 1, 3. 5. 1.

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² Bṛih. 3. 7. 3–23.

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³ Bṛih. 2 4. 5.

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¹ Chând. 6. 3. 2.

3. The Individual Souls by the side of the Supreme

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All the Upanishads, even the oldest, when they discuss the conditions of bondage in the *saṃsāra* and of deliverance therefrom, distinguish between the imprisoned soul and that which has been delivered, between the soul entering on deliverance and that to which it enters in; and thus often enough a poetical personification of the two conditions is arrived at, as of the souls imprisoned in *saṃsāra*, and of the divine emancipated souls. An example is furnished by Chând. 3. 14. 4:—“To him shall I departing hence enter in”; or Kaush. 1, where a description is given how the souls that reach the other world appear before the throne of Brahmân (masc.), and are questioned by him with regard to their knowledge. The answer however that is rendered:² “The self of every being art thou, and what thou art, that am I,” proves that these poetical contrasts remain throughout dominated by the consciousness of the unity of the âtman. A real distinction between the individual and the supreme soul is first found in those texts in which the latter becomes concrete in the idea of a personal god over-against the souls, whose “grace” then is the condition of deliverance. This first occurs, as we saw before, in the Kâṭhaka Upanishad, and in harmony with this we meet the first real distinction of supreme and individual souls in Kâṭh. 3. 1:—

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² Kaush. 1. 6.

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Two, quaffers of the recompense for their deeds,
Yonder in the other world, entered into the pit;
Light and shadow are they called by him who knows Brahman.

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The unity of the two souls here distinguished is expressed in the fact that the “quaffing of the recompense” which is true only of the individual souls is ascribed to both, and also that the supreme soul is designated as the light, to which the individual soul clings as mere unsubstantial shadow.¹ On this passage Pras'na 3. 3 probably depends:—“From the âtman this prâṇa originates; as the shadow on a man, so it projects itself on the other.” In the words that immediately follow² we meet also for the first time with the description of the individual soul as the bhoktar, the “enjoyer,” that through the whole course of life has to enjoy, i.e. to expiate the fruit of the works of the preceding life. This enjoyer, the individual soul, results from the union of the âtman (the supreme soul) with the organs, manas and the indriyas.³ The description of the individual soul as bhoktar recurs in S'vet. 1. 8, 9, 12; 5. 7. The borrowing from Kâṭh. 3. 4 is, to judge from the entire relation of the two works, quite beyond doubt. Precisely the same contrast between individual and supreme souls is stated with remarkable heightening of the effect in S'vet. 4. 6-7,¹ adapting the verse Rigv. I. 164. 20 :²—

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¹ cp. Kâṭh. 6. 5.

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² Kâṭh. 3. 4.

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³ Kâṭh. 3. 4.

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¹ Mund. 3. 1. 1-2 also is probably dependent on it.

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² On the original meaning, cp. Allgemeine Einleitung, pp. 112, 113.

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Two fair-plumaged close friends
Surround one and the same tree;
One of them tastes the sweet berries,
The other, without eating, only gazes downwards.³

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³ Rigv. I. 164. 20.

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To such a tree the spirit sunk down
In its impotence mourns, a prey to delusion,
Yet when it worships and beholds the other
The omnipotence and majesty, then its grief departs.

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The entire adhyâya, S'vet. 5, serves as a further exposition of this contrast. Here, to begin with, vv. 2-6 depict the supreme soul, how at the beginning it gave birth to Hiranyagarbha (*kapila rishi*) as first-born, how it ever expands and contracts the web of the broad universe, how as Îs'vara exacting recompense it makes to grow and brings to maturity the fruit of all works. Then follows in vv. 7-12 the description of the "other" (the expression links itself with the verses 4, 7 already quoted), i.e. the individual soul :—

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7. The doer of works of inevitable result, abundant in fruit, Yea and the enjoyer of that which he does, He wanders as lord of life, in every form, Wrought of the three gunas, on triple path, even according to his work.

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8. An inch in height, shining like the sun, Endowed with thought and self-consciousness, By virtue of his buddhi, his âtman, The other appears, small as a needle's point.

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9. Split a hundred times the tip of a hair, And take therefrom a hundredth part, That deem I the size of the soul, And yet it wins immortality.

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10. He is neither male nor female, And yet is he not neuter; Even according to the body which he chooses, He resides in this or in that.

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11. Through the delusion of thought, touch, sight, He moves as soul, in harmony with his work, By the eating, drinking, begetting, which he himself effects, Changing here and there into various forms.

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12. As soul he selects many gross forms, Many subtle also, corresponding to his virtue; And that which fetters him by force of his deeds and self To these, fetters him also to others.

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The individual soul is here contrasted with the supreme soul as being endowed with *saṅkalpa* (the activity of the *manas*), *ahaṅkāra* and *buddhi*, enjoying the fruit of its action; and is described in a descending scale as “an inch in height,” “small as a needle’s point,” small as the ten-thousandth part of the tip of a hair,—“and it,” so it is further said, “wins immortality”; *i.e.* after getting rid of the delusion of empirical reality, we recognise this infinitely small individual soul as identical with the infinitely great supreme soul. The clear distinction and yet repeatedly asserted identity of the two is already the standpoint of the later Vedānta, as it has been characterised above at the beginning of this Chapter.

4. Reason for the Assumption of Bodily Form

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If however the individual soul is a mere apparition as compared with the supreme soul, how comes the eternally free and blessed supreme soul to assume this apparitional form, and as individual soul, having strayed from its true being to become fettered, to wander and to suffer? This question first arises in the latest Upanishads, and the answers to it are very indefinite and unsatisfactory.

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In Pras'na 3. 1 the question is proposed :—“Whence does this prâṇa (the individual soul) originate, and how does it enter into this body? and the answer runs:—From the âtman (the supreme soul) this prâṇa originates; as the shadow on a man, so he projects himself on it; and he enters into this body *manokṛitena*.” This term Śaṅkara explains as *manaḥ-saṅkalpa-ic’châ-âdi nishpanna-kar-manimittena*, “because of his works which have originated from the will, desire, etc. of the manas”; thus actions and imprisonment in the saṃsâra as their inevitable consequence would be the result of the free will of the soul. It must be admitted that this explanation is disputable on grammatical grounds, since *manokṛitena* can only be resolved as *mano-(a)kṛitena*, and would mean,—Without assent of its will, contrary to its will the soul is involved in the saṃsâra.

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The answer which is given to the same question in Maitr. 3. 2, falling back upon the terminology current later in the Sâṅkhya, shows a deeper insight. After establishing the distinction between the immortal (supreme) âtman and the natural (individual), it goes on to say here:—“Assuredly his immortal âtman continues to exist (uncontaminated) like the drops of water on the lotus flower (which only apparently assume its colouring); but yet this âtman is overcome by the guṇas of prakṛiti. Being thus overcome then it falls into an illusion, and because of this illusion it fails to recognise the august and holy creator subsisting in itself; but torn asunder and defiled by the stream of guṇas it becomes without support, weak, broken down, sensual, disordered, and a prey to delusion fancies ‘This is I,’ ‘This is mine,’ and fetters itself by its own action, as a bird by its nest.”

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Finally the verse may be quoted which forms the conclusion of the Maitr. Up. 7. 11:—

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To taste of reality and illusion
The great Self becomes twofold.

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According to this the individual soul would be dependent on the desire of the supreme soul to experience the illusion of a life in the world as well as eternal reality.

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In ancient times therefore the same difficulties were encountered which meet us when we search for causal relations in a sphere which by its very nature is beyond the reach of the entire rule of causality.

XII. The Organs of the Soul

1. Later View

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Here also it is worth while to begin with the teaching of the later Vedânta in order then to trace in the sphere of the Upanishads the development which led up to it.

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In agreement with the views of modern physiology, Saṅkara distinguishes (1) manas and indriyas (the organs of relation), and (2) the five prâṇas (the organs of nutrition), with which are associated as accompanying upâdhis of the soul (3) sûkṣmam s'arîram, the subtle body, and (4) a factor that changes from one birth to another, karma, the actions of each several existence.

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(1) To the brain as the central organ, and its two dependents the sensible and the motor nerves, corresponds the relation of manas (mind and conscious will) to the five jñâna—indriyas, or organs of knowledge (these are, following the order of the five elements to which they correspond,—hearing, touch, sight, taste and smell), and the five karma-indriyas, or organs of action (speech, hands, feet, and the organs of generation and secretion). The jñâna-indriyas convey the impressions of the senses to the manas, which manufactures them into ideas (saṅkalpa). On this side therefore it corresponds to our mind. These ideas are then formed into resolves (saṅkalpa) by the manas in its function as “conscious will,” and are carried into execution by the five karma-indriyas. The assigning a common organ (manas) for mind and conscious will, and a common function (saṅkalpa) for ideas and resolves corresponds to the physiological fact, according to which the brain both shapes the impressions of the sensible nerves into ideas, and also carries into execution these ideas, so far as they become resolves of the will, by means of the motor nerves. Manas in Śaṅkara’s view is the sole internal organ. Buddhi, ahaṅkâra and c’ittam, which are treated as separate organs by the Sâṅkhya and Yoga, are with him merely functions of manas.¹

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¹ Sûtram 2. 4. 6, 2. 3. 22.

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(2) Breathing, circulation of the blood, and nourishment equally with the quickening of the body are the functions of the prâṇa, which penetrates the whole body in its varieties as prâṇa, apâna, vyâna, udâna and samâna. According to Śaṅkara, the prâṇa causes exspiration (uc’chvâsa), the apâna inspiration (nis’vâsa).² The vyâna sustains life when the breath is arrested. The samâna is concerned with digestion. The udâna effects the departure of the soul from the body at death. According to other teachers,³ the prâṇa serves for breathing, the apâna for evacuation, the vyâna for quickening, the udâna for the departure of the soul, the samâna for the assimilation of food.

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² cp. Śaṅkara on Chând. 1. 3. 3 :—yad vai purushaḥ prâṇiti, mukha-nâsi-kâbhyâm vâyum vahir niḥsárayati, sa prâṇa-âkhyo vâyor vṛitti-vis’esho; yad apâniti, apas’vasiti, tâbhyâm eva antar âkarshati vâyum, so ’pâno, ’pâna-âkhyâ vṛittiḥ (otherwise on Chând. 3. 13. 3, Pras’na 3. 5).

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³ e.g. Vedântasâra 94–98.

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(3) A third companion of the soul in its wanderings is the “subtle body” (sûkshmam s’arîram), i.e. “the subtle parts of the elements which form the seed of the body” (deha-vîjâni-bhûta-sûkshmâṇi). While the gross body is dissolved at death, the subtle body departs with the organs. It is related to the gross body as the seed to the plant, or as the functions of seeing, hearing, etc., which depart with the soul, to the physical eye and ear.

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(4) Besides this substratum of the elements (*bhūta-âśraya*), out of which the body is built up in the following birth, the soul lastly is further attended by the ethical substratum (*karma-âśraya*), which determines the character of the new body and life. This ethical substratum is formed by the actions committed in the course of each several life, and is therefore different for each soul and for each life course. Without these factors the souls with their organs would be indistinguishable from one another.

2. The Âtman and the Organs

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“In the beginning the âtman alone in the form of a man was this universe. He gazed around; he saw nothing there but himself. Thereupon he cried out at the beginning:—‘It is I.’ Thence originated the name I. Therefore to-day, when anyone is summoned, he answers first ‘It is I’; and then only he names the other name which he bears.”¹ According to this passage, the first consciousness, and therefore the starting-point and vehicle of all certainty is self-consciousness,² and that for the supreme as well as for the individual soul, for the two are one. Only later, when this original idealism had been obscured by the advancing realism, and a distinction had been set up between supreme and individual soul, does *ahaṅkāra* appear among the functions or organs of the latter,³ as though the âtman the creator of the universe were something other than the self in me; a proposition which to the Indians as well as to Descartes serves already as the alpha and omega of all knowledge of the truth. “The self is the basis (*âśraya*) for the validity of proof, and therefore is constituted also before the validity of proof. And because it is thus formed it is impossible to call it in question. For we may call a thing in question which comes up (*âgantuka*) to us (from without), but not our own essential being. For if a man calls it in question, yet is it his own essential being.”¹ This thought is found expressed in the Upanishads, besides the passage above quoted from Bṛh. 1. 4. 1, in S’vet. 1. 2 also, in so far as it is there said:—

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¹ Bṛih. 1. 4. 1.

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² In Chând. 7. 25. 1 termed *ahaṅkāra*.

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³ For the first time in S'vet. 5. 8 and Pras'na 4. 8; so later on in Maitr. 2. 5, 3. 2, 6. 5, Prâṇâgnihotra 4, Mahâ 1, and in the Sâṅkhya.

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¹ S’aṅkara on Brahmasûtra 2. 3. 7.

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There are time, nature, necessity, chance,
Primitive matter, spirit,—is the union of these
As primal basis conceivable? Not so. For it is one Self.

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All the first principles proposed by other schools, time, nature, necessity, etc., are to be abandoned, *âtmabhâvât*, because the self, the *âtman*, is to be assumed as the first principle of things, since it is the necessary presupposition of them all.

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This *âtman* which in each one of us, as before the beginning of things is conceived as the I, as the passage from the Bṛh. sets forth further from the empirical standpoint, created the universe of names and forms, and then as soul entered into it :—“right to the tips of the fingers” he fills the body, and is hidden in it like the knife in the sheath or the fire in the fuel. “Therefore he is not seen, for he is divided ; as breathing he is called breath, as speaking speech, as seeing eye, as hearing ear, as understanding mind ; all these are only names for his effects.”² As eye he is the centre (*ekâyanam*) of all forms, as ear the centre of all sounds, etc.³ “When the eye directs itself into space, it is the spirit in the eye, the eye (itself) serves (only) for seeing ; and if a man desires to smell, that is the âtman, the nose serves only for odours,”¹ etc. The eye is nothing but eye, the ear nothing but ear, of that he who knows Brahman is aware,² and abandons the hearing of hearing, the thought of thinking, the speaking of speech, etc., in order to grasp that by which speech, breath, eye, ear and manas are harnessed and dismissed to their occupations.³ This essential identity of the organs with the âtman, when regarded empirically, appears as a creation of them from it:—“from it originates breath, the mind, and all the senses.”⁴ According to Chând. 6. 5, manas, prâṇa and speech are the most subtle product of the elements, food, water and heat, created by the âtman. To the organs of the individual âtman there correspond in the universe the forces of nature (nature gods) as organs of the cosmical âtman. Following up the ideas, which we learnt to know from the hymn of the purusha,⁵ Ait. 1. 1–2 represents the gods Agni, Vâyu, Âditya, Dis’, etc. as originating from the mouth, nose, eyes, ears, etc. of the primeval man, and these then enter into the individual man as speech, smell, sight, hearing. According to the Bṛih. Up., on the contrary, which in general prefers to start from the individual,⁶ the individual organs, speech, smell, eye, ear, manas, which are born at first as children of Prajâpati, are filled with evil by the demons, and then by the prâṇa are led beyond the reach of evil and death, to enjoy a continued existence as fire, wind, sun, the heavenly regions and the moon.⁷ The later theory⁸ of the protectorate which the nature gods exercise over the psychical organs depends upon conceptions of this kind. It makes its appearance first in Bṛih. 4. 4. 1, where a description is given how at death the material eye is set free,¹ and the spirit that dwells in the eye returns outwards to the sun,² while the psychical organ of the faculty of sight gathers with the rest of the organs in the heart around the soul, in order to journey forth in its company.

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² Bṛh. 1. 4. 7.

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³ Bṛh. 2. 4. 11.

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¹ Chând. 8. 12. 4.

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² Bṛih. 4. 4. 18.

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³ Kena 1–2; cp. the paraphrase of this passage in Maitr. 6. 31.

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⁴ Muṇḍ. 2. 1. 3.

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⁵ Rigv. X. 90. 13–14; cp. Allgemeine Einleitung, p. 157.

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⁶ cp. especially Bṛih. 1. 4. 6 ad fin.

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⁷ Bṛih. 1. 3. 11–16; cp. Chând. 1. 2.

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⁸ e.g. Pras’na 3. 8.

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¹ Bṛih. 4. 3. 36.

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² cp. the amplifications in Bṛih. 3. 2. 13.

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The names and number of the organs are still uncertain in the older texts. In Chând. 3. 1. 3 and Bṛih. 6. 4. 5 f. the word *indriyam* has still the meaning of "force"; it is first employed by Kaush. 2. 15, Kâṭh. 3. 4 as a name for the organs, as the physical forces in man. In the older texts the organs collectively are called the *prâṇas*, the "vital breaths," by virtue of a *denominatio a potiori*, from the organ of breathing (*prâṇa*), as being the most important and that upon which the life is dependent. "Therefore they are not called voices, eyes, ears, minds, but vital breaths (*prâṇâḥ*), for the breath (*prâṇa*) is all of them."³ As regards the number also of the organs, no agreement exists. It is frequently mentioned that man, like Prajâpati in his character as the moon,⁴ consists of sixteen parts. This is the case in the narrative of Chând. 6. 7.⁵ How little what was intended by the sixteen parts was understood is shown by Śatap. Br. X. 4. 1. 17, where the sixteen syllables of the words *loman, tvac, asṛij, medas, mâṃsam, snâvan, asthi, majjâ* (hair, skin, blood, sap, flesh, sinew, bones, marrow) do duty as such. In Pras'na 6 the sixteen parts are enumerated as (1) *prâṇa*, (2) *s'raddhâ*, faith, (3–7) the five elements, (8) *indriyam*, the organs of sense considered as one, (9) *manas*, (10) *annam*, food, (11) *vîryam*, strength, (12) *tapas*, (13) *mantrâḥ*, (14) *karman*, (15) *lokâḥ*, (16) *nâman*. The same are to be understood in S'vet. 5. 14, according to the commentary. It is perhaps on this sixteenfold enumeration of the parts of a man that the later summary of the organs as the ten indriyas with manas and the five prāṇas depends. By the “seven prāṇas” of Muṇḍ. 2. 18 should be understood, as in S'atap. Br. VI. 4. 2. 5 and elsewhere, the seven openings in the head; these with the two lower are described in S'vet. 3. 18 and later¹ as the nine gates of the city of the body. Adding the navel and Brahma-randhram² the number becomes eleven.³ An older verse⁴ describes the head as a drinking bowl with the opening at the side, on whose edges (the seven openings in the head) seven ṛishis (the seven organs of sense) dwell, who are identical with the seven guardians of the universe. A modification of this verse⁵ names speech as the eighth, and therefore by the seventh ṛishi (after ears, eyes, nostrils) vāc must again be understood as the organ of taste, and to this the explanation that follows⁶ refers.

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³ Chând. 5. 1. 15.

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⁴ Bṛih. 1. 5. 14.

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⁵ cp. Muṇḍ. 3. 2. 7, Pras'na 6.

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¹ e.g. Yogas'ikhâ 4, Yogatattvam 13, Bhag. G. 5. 13.

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² Ait. 1. 3. 12.

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³ Kâth. 5. 1.

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⁴ Atharvav. X. 8. 9.

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⁵ Bṛih. 2. 2. 3.

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⁶ Bṛih. 2. 2. 4.

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The seven so-called openings of the head have undoubtedly been the starting-point for the original enumeration of the organs of sense, as is clear from the fact that in the texts of the older Upanishads only speech, breath (smell), eye, ear and manas as a fifth are usually named as organs of sense (prāṇas).⁷ Where the number is fewer, special reasons are generally present, as in Bṛih. 3. 1. 3–6, where the number four is found, or Chând. 3. 13. 5, 5. 23. 2, where the surprising omissions are perhaps to be explained by the fact that smell was supposed to be already included in the five prāṇas.⁸ Where more than five organs are named the additions are usually appended to, or even made to precede the original speech, breath, eye, ear, manas. Thus in Bṛih. 2. 5. 1–7 (s'arīram, retas), 3. 2.

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⁷ This is the case in Bṛih. 1. 3. 2–6, 1. 4. 7, 2. 2. 3, Chând. 1. 2. 2–6, 2. 7. 1, 2. 11. 1, 3. 18. 1–6, 8. 12. 4–5, Kena 1. 4–8.

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⁸ cp. Taitt. 1. 7.

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13, 3. 7. 16-23 (*tvac*, *vijñānam*, *retas*), 4. 1. 2-7 (*hṛidayam*).¹ Bṛih. 3. 2. 2-9 is peculiar, where eight organs of sense are enumerated as the eight *grahas* or seizers (organ of smell, speech, tongue, eye, ear, *manas*, hands, skin), to which their objects correspond as *atigrahas* or over-seizers (smell, name, taste, form, sound, desire, action, touch). The assigning here of the names *prāṇa* and *apāna* severally to the organ of smell and to smell itself will be discussed later on. The name *graha* (seizer) for the organs of sense, according to S'aṅkara ² would signify that by them the soul is fettered to objects (*badhyate kṣetrajño 'nena graha-sañjñakena bandhanena iti*). In this may be found a confirmation of our conjecture ³ that the later conception of the "bands of the heart" ⁴ is derived from this passage or the view contained in it, that *graha* and *atigraha* tie the knots, which are unloosed on deliverance. The name *indriyas* for the organs of sense first meets us in the Upanishads in the rite of Kaush. 2. 15. The later enumeration of ten together with *manas* is followed with one exception. In the summary at the close they are again described by the old name of *prāṇas*. The oldest passage which cites the ten later *indriyas* complete, with the addition of *manas* and *hṛidayam*, is Bṛih. 2. 4. 11.⁵ With *manas* but without *hṛidayam* in the later total of eleven they appear first in Pras'na 4. 2, in evident contrast with the five *prāṇas*; while in the continuation of the passage ⁶ there are enumerated the five elements, five *tanmātras*, ten *indriyas* with their objects, together with *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahaṅkāra*, *c'ittam*, *tejas* and *prāṇa*. This passage is at one and the same time the precursor of the Vedânta’s sixteenfold enumeration of the psychical organs, and of the Sânkhya’s twenty-five principles.

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¹ cp. Ait. 1. 1. 4, Kaush. 3. 5.

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² On Brahmásûtra 2. 4. 6.

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³ See Deussen, Upan., p. 430.

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⁴ First in Chând. 7. 26. 2, then Kâth. 6. 15, Muṇḍ. 2. 2. 8, 3. 2. 9, and as "bands of ignorance" in Muṇḍ. 2. 1. 10.

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⁵ = 4. 5. 12.

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⁶ Pras'na 4. 8.

3. Manas and the Ten Indriyas

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The earliest passage in which, as in the later Vedânta, the indriyas are specified as neither more nor less than ten, subordinated to the manas as the central organ, and with it placed in contrast with the five prâṇas as the forces of unconscious life that are active even in sleep, is Pras'na 4. 2. As the rays of light are gathered into the sun at sunset “so also (on falling asleep) all this becomes one in the manas as supreme deity; therefore it comes to pass that then nothing is heard by a man, nothing seen, nothing smelt, nothing tasted, and nothing felt, nothing spoken, nothing comprehended, nothing begotten, nothing evacuated, no motion hither and thither, but as it is said he is asleep. Then the fires of prâṇa awaken (prâṇa, apâna, vyâna, samâna, udâna, which are then further explained) in this city (of the body).” This conception of manas as the central organ of the faculties of knowledge and action, of the powers of perception and conscious determination, and therefore of that which we call “mind” and “conscious will,” was at first gradually elaborated. Originally manas had a more general meaning, and in its indefinite character corresponded nearly to our “disposition,” “feeling,” “heart,” “spirit.” As such manas represents not infrequently the spiritual principle in general, and becomes sometimes a name for the first principle of things, Brahman or the âtman.¹ Even in the Upanishads, epithets of Brahman like manomaya, “consisting of manas,” are occasionally found,² and manas is one of the symbols under which Brahman is worshipped.¹ In Ait. 3. 2 also manas appears still among the functions or modifications of Brahman described as "consciousness" (*prajñānam*):—"what this heart and manas is, reflection, imagination, meditation, invention, mind, insight, resolve, purpose, desire, emotion, recollection, conception, force, life, love, will,—all these are names of consciousness." Nay, even in the section Kaush. 3, where generally manas appears in its later signification as an organ side by side with speech, sight, hearing,² and as such is subordinated to "consciousness" (*prajñā = prāṇa = brahman*; cp. 3. 8:—"we should not seek for manas, but to know the thinker), even here in 3. 7, in contradiction to the ordinary usage, manas is again employed in the old way as a synonym for "consciousness":—"For speech bereft of prajñā (consciousness) cannot bring any name whatever to consciousness, for it is said, 'My manas (mind) was elsewhere (*anyatra me mano 'bhût*), therefore have I not become conscious of that name." Precisely the same is then further said of the remaining organs, breath, eye, ear, tongue, etc., until the series reaches manas, where the formula is dropped, in order to conceal the contradiction in the double use of the word. In its second narrower meaning as the psychical organ of conception and will manas stands originally on a line with the organs of sense, (*prāṇas*) quoted above, and frequently repeated as speech, breath, eye, ear and manas. All five are subordinated to the âtman:—"As breathing he is called breath, as speaking speech, as seeing eye, as hearing ear, as understanding mind (*manas*); all these are only names for his effects."³

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¹ cp. the tendency pointed out, Allgemeine Einleitung, pp. 205, 206, to conceive Prajâpati as manas, and especially the beautiful hymn Vâj. Saṃh. 34. 1-6 (translated ib., p. 335), which as S'ivasaṅkalpa was included by the Oupnek'hat even in the Upanishads.

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² Chând. 3. 14. 2, Bṛih. 5. 6. 1, Taitt. 1. 6. 1, Muṇḍ. 2. 2. 7.

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¹ sup. p. 111 f.

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² cp. 3. 3:—"men live even without manas, for we see fools," and so in what follows.

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³ Bṛih. 1. 4. 7.

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In Bṛih. 1. 3. 2–6 all five are filled with evil by the demons, and then by the vital breath in the mouth (*āsanya prāṇa*) are led beyond evil and death. But the true knowledge that every sensible perception is a work of the mind (*manas*), from which it follows that the rest of the organs of sense are subordinated to the *manas*, comes to the front in the Upanishads, appearing in the famous oft-quoted saying of Bṛih. 1. 5. 3.¹ “‘I was elsewhere with my mind (*manas*), therefore I did not see; I was elsewhere with my mind, therefore I did not hear,’ so it is said; for only with the mind do we see, and only with the mind do we hear. Desire, judgement, doubt, belief, unbelief, firmness, weakness, modesty, knowledge, fear,—all this is only *manas*. When then anyone is touched from behind, he knows it through the *manas*.” This passage which is reproduced in Maitr. 6. 3, and countless times subsequently, and which all future ages regarded as authoritative, asserts that the *manas*, although only the organ of the *ātman*, is yet the central organ of the entire conscious life; which not only as “the primary root of the five faculties of knowledge”² shapes into ideas³ the impressions of sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch, since we “see only with the mind, hear with the mind,” but stamps these ideas further as resolves of the will (*saṅkalpa*, cp. Chānd. 7. 4), so that in the latter sense the *manas* becomes the organ of the will and its expression by the five organs of action (speech, grasp, movement, evacuation, begetting). “For by the *manas* is a man impelled towards his wife, and begets with her a son, who is like him”;⁴ “And when a man directs his *manas* to the study of the sacred hymns and sayings, then he studies them; or to the accomplishment of works, then he accomplishes them; or to the desire for sons and cattle, then he desires them; or to the desire for the present and the future world, then he desires them.”¹ Accordingly in Taitt. 2. 3 also, of the purusha consisting of manas (manomaya) “the Yajus is the head, the Ṛic is the right side, the Sâman the left side,” etc.; because the sacrificial cult depends upon the Vedas, and this is founded on the selfish desires of the gods for offerings, and of men for the blessings of the gods. The superiority of manas to the indriyas is further expanded in Kâṭh. 6. 7:—“Manas stands higher than the senses”; and in Kâṭh. 3. 3, where the senses are represented as the horses yoked to the waggon of the body, but the manas as their bridle. This illustration is changed in a sense still more favourable to the manas in Maitr. 2. 6, where the organs of knowledge (buddhi-indriyâṇi) are the five reins, the organs of action (karma indriyâṇi) are the horses, the manas is the driver, and the prakṛiti his whip. By means of this manas drives the organs of action (speech, grasp, movement, evacuation, begetting) to their work, and they are then guided and controlled by manas by means of the organs of knowledge (sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch). Later passages which exhibit manas side by side with the buddhîndriyâṇi and karmendriyâṇi are Garbha 4 and Prâṇâgnihotra 4. Mention is made in Mahâ 1 of ten indriyâṇi with manas as an eleventh. Their ten functions are already named in the passage quoted above from Pras'na 4. 2. An enumeration of the ten corresponding organs is not found within our recollection earlier than Manu 2. 89 f.

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¹ Forming a counterpart to the verse of Epicharmus :—νοῦς ὁρῇ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει, τἆλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά.

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² *pañca-buddhi-ādimūlam*, S'vet. 1. 5.

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³ *saṅkalpa* = “the definition of a presented object as black, white, etc.”; S'aṅkara on Bṛih. 1. 5. 3.

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⁴ Bṛih. 4. 1. 6.

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¹ Chând. 7. 3. 1.

5. The Prâṇa and its Five Varieties

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Prâṇa also, like manas, is a word of very varied meaning, which only gradually attained its later technical significance. Originally prâṇa is the “breath”; then the “life” as connected with the process of breathing. In this character the prâṇa frequently becomes an empirical and consequently symbolical representation of the âtman. In the older period¹ all the vital powers (speech, breath, eye, ear, manas, etc.), like the life, were called the prâṇas. Only gradually manas and the indriyas as the forces of conscious life were separated from the prâṇa, which with its five subdivisions is incessantly active in waking and in sleep, and is consequently the especial vehicle of life as such. In sleep manas enters into the prâṇa,² and causes the soul “to guard its lower nest by the prâṇa.”³ It is from this perhaps that the later conception is derived that in sleep, while the organs of sense are absorbed into manas, the fires of prâṇa keep watch in the city of the body.⁴ These fires of prâṇa, which are on the watch in sleep, are themselves five in number, viz. prâṇa, apâna, vyâna, samâna, udâna, and they are mentioned together both earlier and later numberless times, and employed in the most varied allegories, without its being possible to obtain a clear and consistent explanation of them. Sometimes only two (prâṇa and apâna) are named,⁵ or three⁶ (prâṇa, apâna, vyâna), or four⁷ (prâṇa, apâna, vyâna, udâna), usually however all five.⁸ This number is exceeded, as far as we know, only in Sarvopanishats. 10, where fourteen prâṇas are mentioned.⁹

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¹ Occasionally also later, e.g. Pras'na 3. 4. ² Chând. 6. 8. 2. ³ Bṛih. 4. 3. 12. ⁴ Pras'na 4. 3. ⁵ Taitt. Âr. 3. 14. 7; Atharvav. 11. 4. 13, Ait. Âr. 2. 1; Kâṭh. 5. 3; Muṇḍ. 2. 1. 7. ⁶ Bṛih. 3. 1. 10, 5. 14. 3, Chând. 1. 3. 3, Taitt. 1. 5. 3, 2. 2. ⁷ Bṛih. 3. 4. 1. ⁸ Bṛih. 1. 5. 3, 3. 9. 26, Chând. 3. 13. 1–5, 5. 19–23, Taitt. 1. 7, Pras'na 3. 5, 4. 4, Maitr. 2. 6, 6. 4, 6. 9, 6. 33, 7. 1–5, Amṛitab. 34–35, Prâṇâgnih. 1. 4, Kaṇṭhas'ruti 1, Nṛisimhott. 9, etc. ⁹ On their fourteen names, which the scholiast cites, cp. Vedântasâra 93–104.

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Often as the five prāṇas are enumerated in the Upanishads, it is rarely that anything is found which serves to explain them. We propose to attempt to determine the several conceptions involved, so far as is practicable.

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(1) Prāṇa and (2) Apāna. In the first place, it is certain from the witnesses cited on p. 264 that, according to Śaṅkara,¹ prāṇa denotes exspiration, apāna inspiration. The question is how this result is arrived at. Originally, in all probability prāṇa and apāna both denoted the same thing, viz. breath (without distinction of exspiration and inspiration) in general (whether with the slight difference that pra-an signifies “to begin to breathe,” apa-an “to cease to breathe,” in support of which view Ṛgv. X. 189. 2 is quoted, may be left undetermined considering the uncertainty of this passage). There is nothing in the prepositions to form the basis of a distinction, since pra (πρό) “forwards, onwards” is quite ambiguous, and apa (ἀπό, from) may just as well mean “from within outwards” as “from without inwards.” Prāṇa however is by far the more usual expression, and therefore where it stands alone frequently denotes the sense of smell, consequently inspiration, as in the passage Śatap. Br. X. 5. 2. 15 quoted by Böhtlingk, or in Bṛh. 1. 3. 3, Chând. 1. 2. 2, Ait. 1. 3. 4. So very clearly in Kaush. 2. 5:—yâvad vai purusho bhâshate, na tâvat prâṇitum s'aknoti. Where however prāṇa and apāna stand side by side, there (apart from the conception of apāna as the wind of digestion, as to which see below), so far as a distinction can be recognised, prāṇa is exspiration and apāna inspiration. This is the case probably as early as Chând. 1. 3. 3, because it is said previously² “this is hot,” and “as sound is it described.”

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¹ On Brahmasûtra, p. 723. 1-4, and on Chând. 1. 3. 3.

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² In 1. 3. 2, where prāṇa only can be the subject, since apāna has not yet been named.

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Both definitions apply better to exspiration than to inspiration. Though in Bṛih. 1. 3. 3 and Chând. 1. 2. 2 prâṇa as the vehicle of scent appears in its more general meaning of "breath" (inspiration and exspiration), in the parallel passage Tal. Up. Br. 2. 1. 16 the apâna takes its place:—"Its misfortune is that it inspires an evil odour by the apâna."¹ Here therefore apâna is certainly inspiration. So in Tal. Up. Br. 1. 60. 5:—*apânena jighrati*, "a man smells with inspiration," not "one smells with exhalation (!)." The same argument applies in Tal. Up. Br. 4. 22. 2–3; the world-producing waters "*huss* iti eva prâc'iḥ prâs'vasan; sa vâva prâṇo 'bhavat. Tâḥ prâṇya apânan, sa vâ apâno 'bhavat." The sound *huss* and the expression *prâc'iḥ prâs'vasan* point quite unmistakeably to prâṇa as exspiration, and consequently to apâna as inspiration. The principal passage is Bṛih. 3. 2. 2:—*prâṇo vai grahaḥ*; so 'pânena atigraheṇa gṛihîto; 'pânena hi gandham jighrati. Everyone sees that the context requires the meaning faculty of smell and smell, and Böhtlingk need not have reproached me on the supposition that I failed to see it. He might have assumed that I had other reasons for my inability to accept his suggestion of a simple correction here in the desired sense.

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My reason was, that there existed here something in the background which exercised possibly a stronger attraction on the author or redactor of the passage than analogy or consistency, viz.—the wish to join prâṇa and apâna together here also as *graha* and *atigraha* in accordance with their usual association. *Apâna* therefore, inspiration as the vehicle of smell, represented the latter, and the explanatory addition (*apânena hi gandham* jighrati) was employed in order to justify the connnection, not as before and usually between graha and atigraha, but between atigraha and the object which it represented. That apâna being inspiration, prâna by its side (in its general meaning of "breath") could not at the same time denote the sense of smell, as so often elsewhere, would therefore be overlooked. That the original author of the paragraph caused this confusion, I find myself unable to believe; but the mistake, if we must so call it, is older than the separation of the Kânvas and Mâdhyandinas, and therefore not much less than three thousand years old,¹ and certainly would not have maintained its ground all this time if apâna had not already at that period denoted the faculty of smell, and therefore inspiration. The same conclusion follows from the symbolical treatment in Br̥ih. 6. 4. 10–11, where the direction is given, if unfruitfulness is desired, abhiprânya apânyât, if fruitfulness, apânya abhiprânyât.

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The suppression of the vital power is symbolised by inspiration, its excitation by exspiration. Since however the emphasis lies not on the gerund but on the finite verb, apânyât signifies already in this passage "he inspires," abhiprânyât, "he exspires."² It is doubtful whether in Kâṭh. 5. 3 ûrddhvam prâṇam unnayati, apânam pratyag asyati, exspiration and inspiration are to be understood as suggested by 5. 5, or not rather already as breath and the wind of digestion. In contrast, that is to say, to the accepted idea of prâna as exspiration, apâna as inspiration, a disposition was formed, and grew stronger as time went on, to see in prâna the breath (exspiration and inspiration), and in apâna the wind of digestion dwelling in the bowels. For this view the following passages are cited. The prâna originates from the nose, the apâna from the navel of the primeval man;¹ Vâyu corresponds to the prâna, Mrityu to the apâna;² the prâna smells the food, the apâna overmasters it.³ So possibly in the passage quoted, Kâth. 5. 3. In Pras'na 3. 5, the prâna has its seat in eye, ear, mouth and nose, the apâna presides over the organs of evacuation and generation.⁴ The prâna makes its exit upwards, the apâna downwards, and carries off the excrements.⁵ The apâna serves for evacuation.⁶ The prâna dwells in the heart, the apâna in the bowels.⁷ The apâna is neighbour to the testicles.⁸ This is the view adopted also by Vedântasâra 94-95, and the commentary on Chând. 3. 13.

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3 and S'ankara's judgement on 1. 3. 3 maintains the same.

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¹ *pápam gandham apâniti*. These words cannot signify, as Oertel maintains is possible, "exhaling bad odour," since it is said previously of the prâṇa, *i.e.* breath in the mouth according to the parallel passages, *na pápam gandham apâniti*.

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¹ cp. Deussen, Upan., p. 377.

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² In the translation I allow myself to be betrayed into regarding it vice versâ.

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¹ Ait. 1. 1. 4.

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² Ait. 1. 2. 4.

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³ Ait. 1. 3. 4, 10.

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⁴ In Pras'na 4. 2-3, on the contrary, evacuation and generation are subordinated to the manas, not to the prânas; apparently therefore it follows the view first discussed.

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⁵ Maitr. 2. 6.

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⁶ Garbha 1.

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⁷ Amritabindhu 34.

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⁸ Sannyâsa 4.

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(3) Vyâna, “interspiration,” is “the bond between prâna and apâna.⁹ The conception of it is accommodated to that of apâna. If this is inspiration, then vyâna is the breath which sustains the life, when e.g. in drawing a stiff bow a man neither inspires nor exspires.¹⁰ If, on the contrary, apâna is the wind of digestion, then vyâna is the bond of union between it and the prâna,¹¹ rules in the veins,¹² and sweeps like a flame through all the limbs.¹³ So also in Vedântasâra 96.

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⁹ Chând. 1. 3. 3.

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¹⁰ Chând. 1. 3. 5.

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¹¹ Maitr. 2. 6.

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¹² Pras'na 3. 6.

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¹³ Amritab. 35. 37.

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(4) Samâna, “all-breathing,” bears the name because, according to Pras'na 4. 4, it “leads to union” (samam nayati) exspiration and inspiration. On the other hand, according to Pras'na 3. 5 and Maitr. 2. 6, it assimilates the food, and according to Amritab. 34, 37 dwells white as milk in the navel. Cp. Vedântasâra 98.

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(5) *Udâna*, or “up-breathing,” according to the usual view maintained also in Pras'na 3. 7, conducts the soul from the body at death, while according to Pras'na 4. 4 already in deep sleep it guides to Brahman; it is maintained however in Maitr. 2. 6 that udâna “either brings up again or swallows down that which is eaten and drunk.” Elsewhere it is represented as dwelling in the throat.¹ Similarly also in Vedântasâra 97, where it is otherwise explained as the wind of exit.

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¹ Amṛitab. 34.

5. The subtle Body and its ethical Qualification

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As further companions of the soul on its wanderings together with the indriyas, manas, and the prâṇas, the later Vedânta reckons “the primitive substance” (*bhûta-âs'raya*), *i.e.* the subtle body, and “the foundation of works” (*karma-âs'raya*), *i.e.* the moral qualification which conditions the future life. On both we are able to adduce but little from the Upanishads.

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In Chând. 6. 8. 6² it is said of the dying man :—“In the case of this man, my dear sir, when he dies, his speech enters into the manas, manas into the prâṇa, prâṇa into the heat, heat into the supreme godhead.” Here, according to S'aṅkara,³ as by speech the indriyas as a whole are to be understood, so by heat (*tejas*) the elements as a whole, as they constitute the subtle body in their character of vehicles of the organs on the departure of the soul. According to the words of the text however nothing further is implied here than the thought that the organs, manas, prâṇa and speech, as they have been derived according to Chând. 6. 5 by means of food, water, and heat from the “one being without a second,” so in a similar way at death they are again resolved into it as the supreme godhead.

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² cp. 6. 15. 2.

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³ Sûtra 4. 2. 8.

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We may recognise a trace of the later theory of the subtle body more clearly in the great transmigration text Chând. 5. 3–10,¹ where a description is given how the waters, having been five times in succession offered in sacrifice as faith, soma, rain, food and seed, in the sacrificial fires of the heavenly world, of rain, the earth, man and woman, “at the fifth sacrifice became endowed with human voice.”² Here by the “waters” which were offered as faith, etc., may certainly be understood the still undivided unity of the two companions of the soul, which later were distinguished from one another as the subtle body and the ethical qualification.³

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¹ Bṛih. 6. 2.

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² Chând. 5. 3. 3, 5. 9. 1.

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³ cp. below, Chap. XIV. 5.

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The same is true of the leading passage for both doctrines,⁴ where it is said of the soul as it departs and hastens to a new birth :—“In truth, this self is Brahman, consisting of knowledge, manas, life, eye and ear, consisting of earth, water, wind and ether, consisting of fire and not of fire, of desire and not of desire, of anger and not of anger, of justice and not of justice, consisting of all. Exactly as a man in this life consists of this or of that, exactly as he acts, exactly as he moves, so will he be born ; he who does good will be born good, he who does evil will be born evil, he becomes holy by holy deeds, evil by evil.” If we leave out of consideration the addition “and not by fire” which is wanting in the Mâdhyandina recension, and from which a satisfactory meaning can only with difficulty be extracted, the passage enumerates as permanent companions of the soul the organs and five elements, as changing factors the moral qualities. We see here the theories of the subtle body and the ethical qualification growing up side by side. The following verse is appended :—

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⁴ Bṛih. 4. 4. 5.

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To this he clings, after this he aspires by his actions,
Whereby his inner man (lingam) and his desire (manas) abide.

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Here we meet, apparently already a technical term, the word *lingam*, by which the adherents of the Sâṅkhya were accustomed later to denote the subtle body.¹ It is perhaps to be taken in the same meaning further on in Kâṭh. 6. 8 and S'vet. 6. 9; where moreover the âtman is described as "lord of the lord of the senses," *i.e.* lord of the subtle body. A similar conception may underlie the description of the âtman as "higher than this highest complex of life."² The *lingam* makes its appearance precisely as in the later Sâṅkhya in Maitr. 6. 10, especially if we read³ *mahad-âdi-avis'esha-antam lingam*, removing the anusvâra point, since the subtle body extends from the *mahân* to the subtle elements (*avis'esha*), not to the gross (*vis'esha*).⁴ The *lingas'arîram* is described in Sarvopanishats. 16 as the vehicle of the organs, the prâṇas, the guṇas, and the ethical qualification, and accordingly is identified with the bands of the heart, of which we have put forward another explanation (*sup.* p. 270), referring to Bṛih. 3. 2. 1–9.

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¹ *sup.* p. 242.

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² Pras'na 5. 5.

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³ As suggested, Deussen, *Upan.*, p. 337.

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⁴ Sâṅkhya-kârikâ 38–40.

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That finally the actions of the soul (the later *karma-âs'raya*) accompany it in the other world, and determine the formation of the next life, is often emphasized in the Upanishads, and will demand fuller consideration hereafter. The principal passages for this doctrine are Bṛih. 3. 2. 13, 4. 4. 5–6, Chând. 3. 14. 1, Kâṭh. 5. 7, Îs'â 17, etc.; above all Bṛih. 4. 4. 3:—"Then knowledge and actions take it by the hand, and its earlier formed experience." According to later belief also⁵ the thoughts which occupy a man in the hour of death are of especial significance. This idea is found suggested in Pras'na 3. 10.⁶

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⁵ Bhag. G. 8. 6.

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⁶ *cp.* also Chând. 3. 14. 1, Bṛih. 4. 4. 5, and the prayer of the dying man in Îs'â 15–17 = Bṛih. 5. 15.

6. Physiological Conclusions from the Upanishads

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The gross body which the soul abandons at death as the mango fruit its stalk,¹ must be distinguished from the subtle body, which in its capacity as vehicle of the psychical organs accompanies the soul on its wanderings up to the time of its release. We propose here by way of appendix to collect all that the Upanishads have to say on the body, its organs and functions.

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¹ Bṛih. 4. 3. 36.

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The body is the prâṇa's habitation, of which the head forms the roof, in which it is bound to the breath as posts by food as the rope.² It is the âtman “consisting of the juice of food,” annarasamaya, in which is enclosed the prâṇamaya âtman, in this again the manomaya, in this the vijñânamaya, and in this as the innermost the ânan-damaya.³ Only later⁴ is the ânandamaya âtman also described, like the rest, as a sheath kośa of the soul.⁵ Usually following Bṛih. 2. 5. 18, and especially Chând. 8. 1. 1, the body is described as the city of Brahman (brahma-puram), heavenly,⁶ desirable,⁷ the highest dwelling of Brahman,⁸ in which as a house the lotus flower of the heart abides,⁹ in which during sleep the fires of the prâṇa keep watch.¹⁰ This city of the body has eleven,¹¹ or more usually nine gates,¹² viz., the nine openings in the body, to which when eleven are reckoned the navel and the Brahman orifice (brahmarandhram) are added. The latter is an imaginary orifice of the skull on the top of the head, through which, according to Ait. 1. 3. 12, Brahman entered into the body, and by which the soul, or according to the more usual view only the souls of the emancipated,¹ having ascended by the hundred and first vein (subsequently named, following Maitr. 6. 21, *sushumnâ*), attains to union with Brahman.² Thus the conception is old. The name *brahma-randhram* is first found in Haṁsa Up. 3 in connection with the six mystical and imaginary regions on the body that occur there for the first time (the regions of the belly, loins, navel, heart, neck and eyebrows). It is perhaps an anticipation of this when, in Ait. 1. 3. 12, eye, manas and the ether of the heart (as the scholiast reckons them), are distinguished as special stations of the purusha, or in Brahma Up. 4, eye, throat, heart and head (in Brahma Up. 2, navel, heart, throat and head). From him who forms the light within men proceeds also, according to Chând. 3. 13. 8, the warmth of the body and the noises in the ear. The latter like digestion are ascribed by Bṛih. 5. 9 to the Vais'vânara fire in men, which when we bear in mind S'atap. Br. X. 6. 1 amounts to the same thing. The passages Mahân. 11. 10, Maitr. 2. 6, 6. 27, 6. 31 depend on a combination of the other two.

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