Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c5.s3: III. Who is called to the Study of the Vedânta?

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c5.s3

Language
English

Contents

III. Who is called to the Study of the Vedânta?

1. The indispensable Condition

c5.s3.t1.1

The question, who is to be admitted to the saving teaching of the Vedânta, and who is to be excluded from it, is discussed in an episode of the first Adhyâya of the Brahmasûtra's with great fulness (p. 280—323), and the result is, that there are called to knowledge, all those who are reborn (dvija) through the Sacrament of the Upanayanam (the initiation by a teacher with the solemn investiture with the sacred thread), therefore if they fulfil this condition, all Brâhmaṇa's, Kshatriya's and Vaiçyas, and further also the gods and (departed) Rishis; that, on the contrary, the Çûdra's (belonging to the fourth, non-Aryan, caste) are excluded from it.

c5.s3.t1.2

Both the exclusion of the Çûdra's and the inclusion of the gods, give rise to long and interesting discussions.

2. Exclusion of the Çûdra's

c5.s3.t2.1

At first sight it may appear strange considering the principle of the Vedânta, that the Çûdra's are shut out from the path of salvation. Of course birth in a particular caste is not a matter of chance, but the necessary consequence of conduct and works in a former existence; but, as the Vedânta makes no difference between the three higher castes, it should have been a logical consequence of its views (first however drawn by Buddhism), to admit the Çûdra too; for he also has a soul, he also is Brahman, and there is no conceivable reason why he also should not become conscious of this, and thus partake of the saving knowledge, especially as it is recognised that he is in need of it (p. 315, 11. 317, 3), and further the objector's argument of the Çûdra's qualification for knowledge (p. 315, 11) is not contested from a worldly point of view (p. 317, 4), as also his right, admitted by the Smṛiti, to participate in the hearing of the Itihâsa's and Purâṇa's (the epic and mythological poems) is not denied (p. 322, 14).

c5.s3.t2.2

But the same accommodation to national prejudices which determines the philosophers of the Vedânta to derive all their knowledge, even by the most tortuous procedure from the Veda, makes it also impossible for them to admit the Ṣûdra; for a condition precedent to the study of the Vedânta, is the study of the Veda and a knowledge of its contents (p. 316, 9), for this again, the Upanayanam (initiation by a teacher), to which the Ṣûdra cannot attain (p. 317, 2, 320, 6), as the law (smṛiti) further forbids the reading aloud of the Veda, even in the presence of a Ṣûdra (p. 322, 2. 6).

c5.s3.t2.3

With this is connected the discussion of certain cases occurring in the Veda itself, where a doctrine is apparently imparted to a Ṣûdra, or man of doubtful caste.

c5.s3.t2.4

The first is that of the Saṃvarga-vidyâ, a theory (reminding one of Anaximenes) of Vâyu (wind) and Prâṇa (breath) as "saṃvargâḥ" (absorbers), on the one hand, of the elements, on the other, of the life-organs, which Chând. 4, 1—3 Raikva imparts to Jânaṣruti, even after he has previously called him a Ṣûdra.³⁷

c5.s3.t2.5

³⁷ The wording of this legend, which shows in very drastic fashion that the knower of Brahman, be he ever so wretched, stands higher than the richest and best who does not know it, is as follows (Chând. 4, 1-2): "Jânaṣruti, the grandson [of Janaṣruta] was a dispenser, giving "much, cooking much. He had houses of rest built on all sides, that "men from all parts might eat with him. Once geese [or flamingoes] "flew past in the night. Then spoke one goose to the other: Ha there! "dim-eyed, dim-eyed [seest thou not] the splendour of Jânuṣruti the "grandson is extended like the heaven; approach it not, burn not thyself.'— "To her the other said: 'Who is he of whom thou speakest, as though "he were Raikva with the car!'—'What is this—of Raikva with the "car?'—'As [at dice] to him who has won with the kṛita [the highest] "throw [or perhaps vijitâya from vij, cf. Rigv. I, 92, 10 vijah] the lower "throws are also counted with it, so to him [Raikva] comes home all "the good the creatures do; and he who knows what he knows, for him "also is this true.'—This Jânaṣruti the grandson over-heard. As soon "as he rose, he spoke to his steward [who praised him in the way the

c5.s3.t2.6

On the other side, Çañkara reminds us firstly that a single case does not make a rule (p. 317, 9), and that what was right in the case of the Samvarga-vidyâ need not therefore be transferred to all other things (p. 318, 1); but after this both Sûtram and scholion (315, 6. 318, 10) affirm that "Çûdra" in the foregoing case is not to be taken in its tra-

c5.s3.t2.7

Vaitâlika's were afterwards wont to do]: 'Thou speakest [of me] as if I were Raikva with the car.'—'What is this—of Raikva with the car?'—'As to him who has won with the kṛita throw, the lower throws are also counted, so to him comes home all the good the creatures do; and he who knows what he knows, for him also is this true.'—Then went the steward forth to seek him. He came back and said 'I have not found him.'—He [Jânaçruti] spoke to him: 'Go seek him where a Brâhmaṇa [in the full sense, as Bṛih. 3, 5, 1. 3, 8, 10] is to be sought [in solitude, in the forest, on a sandbank, in the river, in a remote place,—as the scholiast explains].'—There sat one under his car, scratching his sores. To him he made obeisance saying: 'Art thou, venerable one, Raikva with the car?'—'I am verily he,' he answered.—The steward returned and said: 'I have found him.'—Then took Jânaçruti the grandson six hundred cows, a golden necklace, and a waggon with mules, and went to him and said: 'Raikva! here are six hundred cows, here is a golden necklace, here is a waggon with mules, teach me, venerable one, the Godhead whom thou worshippest.'—To him answered the other: 'Ha, ha! for a trinket and a yoke, thou Çûdra! keep them for thyself, with thy cows.'—Then took Jânaçruti the grandson again a thousand cows, a golden necklace, a waggon with mules and his daughter; he took them, and went to him and said: 'Raikva! here are a thousand cows, here is a golden necklace, here is a waggon with mules, here is a wife, here also is the village in which thou sittest;—teach me, venerable one!'-Then raised he her face [sunk in shame] and said: 'He has brought these [cows]; through this face alone, Çûdra, thou wouldst have made me speak.'—Those are the [villages] called Raikvaparṇa, in the country of the Mahâvṛisha's, where he dwelt [at his invitation] and he spoke to him."

c5.s3.t2.8

Then follows, in the mouth of Raikva, the Samvargavidyâ, which has, however, not the slightest connection with the foregoing narrative, so that one could substitute for it, quite as suitably, almost any other extract from the Upanishad's. Also the systematising at the beginning, the legend of Kâpeya and Abhipratârin in the middle, with its Trishṭubh verses, and the promise "ya' evam veda" at the conclusion, go to show that here, as so often in the Upanishad's, we have to do with two quite independent passages, originally placed side by side only perhaps because the kṛita throw occurs in both, carelessly united by a later editor, and in later times (e. g. by Çañkara, p. 1006, 7) expressly maintained to be connected with each other.

c5.s3.t2.9

ditional sense (*rûdhârtha*), but in its etymological sense (*avayavârtha*); namely because Jânaçruti from sorrow (*çu-câ*) at the humiliating speech of the goose, had run (*du-drâ-va*) to Raikva, this Rishi, who, through supernatural knowledge, became aware of what happened, and wished to make this evident, called him "*çu-dra*" (!). A subsequent (p. 319—320) direct proof that Jânaçruti was a Kshatriya, must be termed utterly inadequate, so far as it seeks by all kinds of quibbles to make it probable that the Abhipratârin mentioned in the Samvargavidyâ (Chând. 4, 3, 5) was a Kshatriya,—and therefore also Jânaçruti, because he is mentioned in the same Vidyâ (!). It is more arguable, as Çaṅkara insists in this connection, that Jânaçruti must have been a Kshatriya because he had a steward (*kshattar*) (p. 320, 2);—however this may be, the whole zealously prosecuted investigation only proves for us that, for the time of Çaṅkara and also for that of Bâdarâyaṇa, it was by no means held to be self-evident that a man of princely wealth and pomp like Jânaçruti, could not have been a Çûdra, which is interesting from the point of view of the history of culture.

c5.s3.t2.10

A further case is that of the boy Satyakâma, to whom his mother Jabâlâ declares she cannot tell him from what family (*gotram*) he comes, because in her youth she had had to do with too many; with childlike naiveté, Satyakâma (whose name, as M. Müller fittingly observes, means Φιλαλήθης) repeats this to the teacher who asks him concerning his family; the teacher finds that only a Brahman can be so sincere, and imparts the knowledge to him as such.³⁸

c5.s3.t2.11

³⁸ *Chândogya-Upanishad* 4, 4: "Satyakâma, the son of Jabâlâ, said to his mother: 'Venerable one, I would enter as a Brahman student; tell me of what family I am.'—She said to him: 'This I know not, my boy, of what family thou art: in my youth I went about much as a maid; there I got thee; I myself know not of what family thou art; my name is Jabâlâ, and thy name is Satyakâma; so call thyself [instead of after the father] Satyakâma, son of Jabâlâ.'—Then went he to Hâridrumata the Gautama, and said: 'I would enter with thee, venerable one, as Brahmacârin, deign to accept me, venerable one!' He said to him: 'Of what family art thou, dear one?'—He said: 'I know not, oh master, of what family I am. I asked my mother, and she answered

c5.s3.t2.12

In this story Bâdarâyaṇa (p. 321, 5) and Çaṅkara (p. 321, 6) find a confirmation of the rule excluding the Ҫûdra, because Satyakâma is admitted only "after it is decided that he cannot be Ҫûdra because he spoke the truth" (! —satya-vacanena Ҫûdratva-abhâve nirddhârite,)—but we might rather conclude from it that in ancient times liberality was greater, and that there was a disposition to let the question of Brahmanhood by birth alone, where a Brahmanhood of heart and mind existed.³⁹

c5.s3.t2.13

³⁹ Cf. for this especially the Upanishad translated in Anquetil Duperron II, 372-377 under the name of "Tschhakli" (according to Stenzler's view = Chûgaleya) and Weber's analysis of it, Ind. Stud. IX, 42-46.

c5.s3.t2.14

However this may be, for our authors, the Ҫûdra, so long as he has not been raised on the path of transmigration to a higher caste,⁴⁰ remains entirely excluded from all share in the teaching of salvation. On the other hand the boundary of admission, which is so ungenerously narrowed below, is very generously widened above, so that not only all men of the three Aryan castes, but also the Gods, and the departed Rishis, are called to the study of the saving Brahmavidyâ.

c5.s3.t2.15

⁴⁰ Chând. 5, 10, 7; Âpastamba-dharmasûtra 2, 5, 11, 10; Manu 10, 65.—In our work this one hope for the Ҫûdra so severely dismissed is, peculiarly enough, nowhere directly proclaimed; implicitly it is contained in the much used passage, Chând. 5, 10, 7, as also in the Smṛiti passage, Bhag. G. 6, 45, quoted p. 1045, 7.

c5.s3.t2.16

"me: 'in my youth I went about much as a maid; there I got thee; I myself know not of what family thou art; my name is Jabâlâ, and thy name is Satyakâma;' so am I called Satyakâma, the son of Jabâlâ, oh master.'—He said to him: 'only a Brahman can speak so frankly; bring the fuel, dear one [that is necessary to the ceremony], I will take thee because thou hast not departed from the truth.'"

c5.s3.t2.17

In the continuation (Chând. 4, 5-9) Satyakâma while he is keeping cows, is first taught concerning the four-fold feet of Brahman (4 cardinal points, 4 parts of the world, 4 sources of light, 4 organs of life), in order, by the bull, the fire, the goose and the diver, until he also receives the teacher's doctrine which "brings furthest." In the following section (Chând. 4, 10-15) Satyakâma is in his turn teacher of Upakosala, in whose case the supernatural teachings (like the miracles of Elija in the case of Elisha) are repeated.

3. Admission of the Gods; their rôle in the Vedânta system

c5.s3.t3.1

One would err if one held the being of the Gods (*deva*, *devatâ*) to be incompatible with the strict monistic teaching of our system of the Brahman as the Lord (*îçvara*) the omnipresent (*sarvagata*), the one without a second (*ekam eva advitîyam*). On the contrary, they are as real as the rest of the world: the phenomenal existence which the latter has, they also have, and the Gods of the Indian popular creed (whose retention was besides already necessitated by the recognition of the *Karma-kâṇḍa* and the *Karma-mîmânsâ* cf. above p. [18 ff.]), are as little denied by the Vedânta as the Gods of Greece were by Plato or Epicurus, even if, as in the latter case, they play no particular rôle, and the ideas of them which are occasionally found cannot very well be made to agree.

c5.s3.t3.2

In general the Gods, at whose head as a rule, Indra is mentioned,⁴¹ are, for our authors, still what they were in the Rigveda, personifications of natural forces and natural phenomena; and an attempt to resolve them into the corresponding natural elements⁴² is rejected in the following way (p. 309, 11):

c5.s3.t3.3

⁴¹ *Indra-âdayaḥ* p. 281, 8. 9. 282, 5. 7. 287, 4, etc.—From quite different ideas came the sporadically occurring *Hiraṇyagarbha-âdaya’ îçvarâḥ*, who at the disappearance of the world do not disappear like the other Gods and beings, but, as it seems, only pass the time in sleep, and at the new creation of the world, help the *îçvara*; p. 300, 3. 4. 9. 301, 1. 303, 9; cf. *Hiraṇyagarbha* as *prathamaja* p. 339, 3, as *adhyaksha* in the lower world of *Brahma* p. 1121, 13; *mahân* (*Kâṭh. 3, 11*) as *Hiraṇyagarbhî buddhiḥ* p. 343, 3; *sarva-karaṇa-âtmani Hiraṇyagarbhe brahma-loka-nivâsini* p. 247, 6; *samashṭi-vyashṭi-rûpeṇa Hiraṇyagarbheṇa prâṇâtmanâ* 724, 8; and the (*râja-*) *Vaivasvata-âdaya’ îçvarâḥ* p. 397, 8.

c5.s3.t3.4

⁴² (P. 307, 4). "To the disk of light dwelling in the heaven, which "lightens the world, mightily wandering by day and night [and the other "corresponding natural phenomena] apply the words which speak of Gods "as *Âditya* [the sun-god] and the like, as the ordinary use of the word, "as also the consistent sense of the passages shows; and it is not fitting "to ascribe to the light-disk individuality (*vigraha*) with a heart etc., "spirituality and needs and the like, as it is clear that, like the earth etc., "they are without spirit (*cetana*). This holds good also for Agni [Fire "and God of fire] and the others."

c5.s3.t3.5

“The names of the Gods, like *Âditya* and so forth, even if “they refer to light etc., compel us, according to the scriptures, “to assume spiritual beings corresponding [to the elements] “gifted with *aiçvaryam* (ruling power); for they are thus “used in the Mantra’s and Brâhmaṇa’s; and the Gods have, in “virtue of their *aiçvaryam*, the power of remaining as the “Self (*âtman*) of light etc., or, according to their pleasure, of “taking this or that individuality (*vigraha*); for the scriptures “say, in explaining the *Subrahmaṇyâ* formula [Shaḍviṅça-br. “1, 1]: ‘*O ram of Medhâtithi,*’—that is as ram he [Indra, as “Çaṅkara adds] once stole Medhâtithi, the scion of *Kâṇva*;’ and as the Smṛiti relates [Mahâbh. 1, 4397], *Âditya*, as a man “visited Kuntî; also the earth etc. have, according to the “scriptures, spiritual overseers, for it is said [Çatap. Br. 6, 1, “3, 2, 4] ‘the earth said’—‘the waters said’; and, even if the “natural elements, as the light in the sun, and so on, are “without spirit, still they have, to judge by the part they play “in the Mantra’s and Brâhmaṇa’s, God-like beings as their “spiritual overseers.”

c5.s3.t3.6

As such “overseers” and “disposers,” the Gods act especially in the life-organs (p. 186, 6: *devatâ-âtmâ indriyasya adhi-shṭhâtâ*, p. 728, 9: *karaṇânâm niyantṛishu devatâsu*), in which they entered according to Ait. 1, 2, 4, *Agni* as speech, *Vâyu* as breath, *Âditya* as eye, and so on (p. 423, 14); for, though the organs in themselves are capable (*çakta*) of doing their own work, yet they do it only like a cart, which must be drawn by an ox (p. 727, 1); however, the Gods do not therefore take part in the enjoyment [and suffering] which in the body is the lot only of the individual soul (p. 727, 13;—the Gods are only *bhoga-upakaraṇa-bhûta*, the soul alone is *bhoktar*, enjoyer, p. 379, 4), for the soul alone is stained by good and bad, affected by pleasure and pain (p. 728, 3), while the Gods are free from all evil (p. 728, 6); as also at death they do not wander forth with the life organs and the soul, but withdraw their assisting power (p. 745, 8), partly in order to hold intercourse on the moon with the (temporarily) blessed (p. 750, 5), partly, to show the way through the different heavenly regions, to the soul entering into the Brahman (p. 1117, 11).

c5.s3.t3.7

III. Who is called to the study of the Vedânta?

c5.s3.t3.8

As for the rest, the Gods dwell in the highest region of sovereignty (parasmin aiçvarye pade p. 728, 4), but all their aiçvaryam is dependent on the Parameçvara (p. 217, 7), the “highest lord,” that is the Brahman: this is the Âtman (the (Self), as in everything else, so also in the Gods (Âtmâ devânâm Chând. 4, 3, 7); it is the Antaryâmin (inner ruler), which, according to Brih. 3, 7, inwardly rules all beings, all organs, and so also all Gods without their being conscious of it themselves, being for that reason, in this sense, different from their empirical self (devatâtman, p. 196, 6). The Îçvara (Lord), as the Brahman is called by preference in these exoteric discussions, is further the power that creates Gods, men and beasts, being guided in doing so strictly by the merit and demerit of the soul in a previous existence (p. 492, 12), and in accordance with this, has destined animals to unending suffering, men to a middle state, and the Gods to “unending enjoyment” (p. 491, 6). But this “unending enjoyment,” like everything except the Brahman, comes at last to an end; the immortality of the Gods is a relative one (âpekshikam p. 326, 4. 241, 14) and means only longevity (p. 193, 12); they are also entangled in the Samsâra (the circle of transmigration), are mere products (vikâra p. 195, 13. 280, 3) doomed to transitoriness and want; for, as the scripture (Brih. 3, 4, 2) says: “whatever is different from Him is subject to sorrow” (p. 241, 15), and for this reason the Gods also are called to the saving knowledge, as we shall now consider more closely.

c5.s3.t3.9

First it is to be noted that the Gods are nowhere in the scriptures excluded from the Brahmavidyâ (p. 281, 1). They have, it is true, no part in the Upanayanam (initiation by a teacher), but they do not require this; for the aim of this ceremony is merely admission to the study of the Veda, which is of itself revealed (svayam-pratibhâta) to the gods (p. 281, 3). Moreover, there are even instances of gods and Rishis becoming Brahman pupils, like Indra of Prajâpati (Chând. 8, 7—12) and Bhrigu of Varuna (Taitt. 3, 1). In the hearts of the Gods too (according to Kâth. 4, 12) dwells the Purusha (Brahman) “a thumb’s breadth in height,” for the purpose of knowledge,—

c5.s3.t3.10

naturally in the case of the gods, we are to understand the breadth of a God's thumb (p. 282, 1).

c5.s3.t3.11

Moreover, the Gods are capable of liberation, because, according to the witness of the Mantra's, Brâhmaṇa's, Itihâsa's, Purâṇa's and popular belief, they possess individuality (*vigrahavattvam*) (p. 280, 9), and need liberation, because their power (*vibhûti*) belongs to the sphere of the changeable and is therefore transitory (p. 280, 7).

c5.s3.t3.12

Now against these two assumptions very serious difficulties are raised.

c5.s3.t3.13

First objection: The asserted individuality of the gods, says the opponent, is neither real nor possible. It is not real, because, although the gods are present when sacrifices are offered to them, they are not perceived (p. 282, 7), and it is not possible, because individuality cannot be in several places at the same time; but the gods can so, since Indra for instance is often recipient of offerings in several places at the same time (p. 282, 8).

c5.s3.t3.14

To this it is to be rejoined: The gods are not seen at sacrifices, because they have the power to make themselves invisible (p. 284, 5), and they can be in several places at the same time, because they are able to divide their being (*âtman*) into different forms (p. 284, 4); for even the Yogin, according to the *Smṛiti* (Mahâbhâratam 12, 11062), can multiply his body a thousand-fold, in order to enjoy the things of sense in one form, and to undergo frightful penances in another (p. 283, 9), how much more to the gods, who, according to one Vedic passage (Bṛih. 3, 9, 1), are first counted as 303 and 3003, that is 3306, and then as only 33, with the explanation that the greater number indicates only their powers (*mahimânas*), as the 33 are again reduced to one only, since the being of them all is *Prâṇa*, the Life (that is, here, the Brahman) (p. 283).

c5.s3.t3.15

Second objection: If the gods are, like ourselves, individuals, they must also, like ourselves, be born and die⁴³; now the Veda is eternal (in the spirit of the Creator, who "breathed it out" as the Vedânta affirms, p. 48, 6 after Bṛih. 2, 4, 10), and the Veda speaks of the gods. How is this possible if the gods are not also eternal (p. 285, 8)?

c5.s3.t3.16

⁴³ P. 285, 7; a quite correct deduction, which is also not contested by Çankara, but is in another place expressly stated by him (p. 598, 11).

c5.s3.t3.17

This objection forces the composer of the commentary, and, perhaps, even the composer of the Sûtra's (cf. 1, 3, 30), to a very remarkable theory, which comes very close to Plato's doctrine of ideas; and, as we have no ground at all for supposing that either side has borrowed from the other, this bears witness to the fact, that there is something in the nature of things, which tends towards Plato's teaching, to lead to which the teaching of the Indian can be of use.

c5.s3.t3.18

It is true, he says, the individual Gods are transitory, and the word of the Veda, which speaks of them, is eternal; but the words of the Veda, for instance the word "cow" occurring in the Veda, does not refer to individuals (to any separate cow), but to "the object of the words: cow etc." (çabda-artha p. 286, 6), that is, to the species; and in just the same way the word "Indra" means, not an individual, but a certain position (sthâna-viçeṣa), something like the word "General;" whoever occupies the position, bears the name (p. 287, 5).

c5.s3.t3.19

Therefore we must make a distinguish between the individuals (vyakti, p. 286, 7, and also p. 464, 5, literally: "manifestation"), which are transitory, and the species (âkṛiti, that is "form," "shape," "εἶδος,") which are eternal; p. 286, 7: "For though the individuals, as cows etc. originate, their species do not thereby originate; for in substances, qualities and activities originate the individual appearances (vyakti), not the forms of the species (âkṛiti), and only with the species, not with the individuals are the words [of the Veda] connected, "for with the latter, on account of the eternity [of the Veda],

c5.s3.t3.20

yadd hi loke iyattâ-paricchinnaṃ vastu ghaṭa-âdi, tad antavad dṛiṣṭam) with a profound feeling that what is limited in space must be so in time also; of which the sole exception, perhaps is matter (that is) if its quantity in space is limited, (which we do not know), which, however, as such, is an abstraction without individual existence.—Among the Greeks this thought was expressed by Melissos, ap. Simplic. in Aristot. Phys. fol. 23b: οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ εἶναι ἀνυστὸν, ὅ,τι μὴ πᾶν ἐστι.

c5.s3.t3.21

“no connection can be admitted. Therefore, though the individuals originate, the species, in words like cow etc., are eternal; “therefore there is no contradiction; in just the same way there “is no contradiction in the case of names [of the gods] like “Vasu and the like, because the species of the gods are eternal, “even when an origin is admitted for the individuals.”

c5.s3.t3.22

These eternal species of things, as they are stored up in the Veda as the everlasting repository of all wisdom and knowledge, are, however, for our author not mere forms (*ākṛiti*, *εἶδος*), but the conception of them, exactly as in Plato (Soph. p. 247 D. ff.) approaches that of the efficient powers (*çakti*, *δύναμις*), from which the universe, after its disappearance, originates again and again; p. 303, 1: “This world in truth “disappears, but in such fashion that the powers remain, and “these powers are the root from which it comes forth anew; “for otherwise we should have an effect without a cause. Now “it cannot be assumed that the powers [from which the world “comes forth anew] are different in kind [from those from which “it formerly came forth]. Therefore it must be granted that, “in spite of the constantly repeated interruption [of the course “of the world], a necessary determination (*niyatatvam*) exists “in the beginningless *Samsāra* for the [newly] developing series “of worlds, as the earth etc., for the series of groups of living “beings, gods, animals and men, and for the different con“ditions of castes, *Āçrama’s*, duties and rewards, like the “necessary determination in the correlation of the [five] sense“organs with the [five] elements: for in the case of these “also, we cannot admit as possible a difference for each new “creation, so that there might be a sixth sense-organ and “element.⁴⁴ While therefore the process of the world in all “world-periods (*kalpa*) is similar and makes it possible [in a “new creation] to be guided according to the process in the “former world-period, therefore at every creation the differences “of the same names and forms are present in the mind of the “creators (īçvarāḥ cf. n. 41), and in consequence of the likeness “of names and forms it happens that, even if a return of the “world by means of a collective evolution and a collective “disappearance is maintained, yet the authority and so forth “of the word of the Veda suffers no injury.”

c5.s3.t3.23

⁴⁴ P. 303, 7: *shashṭha-indriya-vishaya*; in the same way, as an example of impossibility p. 415, 1: *shashṭhasya iva indriya-arthasya*.—Of other scholastic examples, to indicate impossibility, there occur in our work: *bandhyā-putra* (the son of the barren) p. 570, 12 and *çaça-vishāṇam* (hare's horn) p. 564, 1. 4. 8. 565, 7. Cf. 332, 8: *sa prāçīm api diçam prasthāpitaḥ pratīcīm api diçam pratishṭheta* (for “for him all things are possible”); the same image as Xenoph. Memorab. 4, 2, 21.

c5.s3.t3.24

Thus the word of the Veda, with its whole complex of ideas of the world and its relations, forms an eternal rule of guidance for the Creator, outlasting every disappearance of the world. The Creator “remembers,” while he shapes the world, the words of the Veda (p. 297, 10), and thus the world originates with its constant forms (niyata-ākṛiti) as the gods and the rest, from the word of the Veda (p. 298, 2). Naturally this coming forth of the gods etc. from the Veda is not, like the evolution from the Brahman, to be taken in the sense of a causa materialis (upādāna-kāraṇam), but it means only “a coming forth of the individuals of things in conformity with the use of the words of the scriptures” (çabda-vyavahāra-yogya-artha-vyakti-nishpattiḥ, p. 287, 9), which were there before the world, not only according to the witness of scripture and tradition (p. 288), but also because they are the necessary pre-supposition of creation. For if one wishes to make anything, one must first call to mind the word that indicates it (p. 289, 3), and thus also before the creation the Vedic words were present in the spirit of the Creator, and, according to them, he shaped all things (p. 289, 5).

c5.s3.t3.25

But what are we to understand by “word” in this world-creating sense (p. 289, 9)?—Perhaps we might answer: the concepts corresponding to the words. But this answer the Indian cannot give, because he never reached a conscious separation of concept and perception. He answers in the first place: By word he understands 45 here the Sphoṭa (the bursting forth, the sudden coming to consciousness of the idea on hearing the letters of the word); and this conception leads to a discussion which is not without interest, and which, as a contribution to the Philosophy of Language, we here translate as accurately as possible in the form of an episode.

c5.s3.t3.26

⁴⁵ Who? is not said. It is the opponent, but not Çankara, as Cowell assumes in Colebr. M. E.³ p. 373 n. 1; what Cowell quotes is only the Pūrvapaksha, not the Siddhānta, which Upavarsha afterwards maintains; probably Çankara took the whole discussion from his commentary (cf. n. 17).

4. Episode: on the vedântic philosophy of language

c5.s3.t4.1

[The Opponent, who defends the Sphoṭa, says:] “An origination of individuals, such as gods etc., from the eternal words [of the Veda] is not possible, on the assumption that the letters [of the word are the bearers of its meaning], for they as soon as they appear, pass away. Not only so but the letters which pass away as soon as they have appeared are continually apprehended differently according to their pronunciation. Thus it is possible, for example, to recognise a man with certainty, even without seeing him, when we hear him read aloud, by his voice, and to say ‘Devadatta is reading,’ or ‘Yajñadatta is reading.’ And this diversity of apprehension of the [same] letters is, however, not based on error, because there is no apprehension which could refute it.—It cannot, therefore, be assumed at all that the meaning of a word is recognised [merely] from the letters. For [firstly] it cannot be assumed that each single letter in itself makes known the sense, because they are different from each other; [secondly] [the sense of the word] is also not [merely] a conception of the sense of the letters, because they succeed each other [so that the earlier have already passed away when the latter are pronounced]. It is perhaps [thirdly] that the last letter, assisted by the impression [samskāra], which the perception of the preceding letters has produced, makes the sense known?—This also is impossible. For [only] the word itself, presupposing the apprehension of the connection [of the letters], makes the meaning known, as in the case of smoke [whose vanishing and continually reproduced particles alone are not able to give the conception of smoke]. Further, an apprehension of the ‘last letter, assisted by the impression which the perception of the preceding letters has produced,’ is not possible, because the impressions are not [any longer] perceptible.—Is it then perhaps [fourthly] the last letter, assisted by the impressions [of the preceding] perceived in their after effect, which makes the sense known?—Not this, either; for the recalling also, as it is the after effect of the impressions, is again a series [of presentations in time,—which has already been discussed above, under the second head].—Therefore it only remains possible that the word [as a whole, that is, its sense] is a Sphoṭa [an outbursting], which, after the percipient has received the seed of the impression through the apprehension of the single letters,

c5.s3.t4.2

“and has brought it to ripeness by means of the apprehension of the last letter, flashes before him suddenly in its unity as a single conception. “And this single conception is no reminiscence, referring back to the letters; for the letters are several, and cannot, therefore, be the object of the single conception. This |Sphota, the soul of the word, as we might say,] is [only] recognised again, [not produced], on the occasion of its pronunciation, and is therefore eternal [as well as a unity,] because the conception of the manifold refers only to the letters. Thus the word, [that is, its sense] in the form of the Sphota is eternal, and from it, as that which names, goes forth as that which is to be named, the world, consisting of deed, doer and fruits.”

c5.s3.t4.3

“In reply, the venerable Upavarsha” [an old Mîmânsâ and Vedânta teacher, cf. above, Note 17, and Colebrooke Misc. Ess.³ I, 332] “maintains that only the letters are the word.”

c5.s3.t4.4

[Opponent:] “But I have said, however, that the letters, as soon they appear, pass away.”

c5.s3.t4.5

[Upavarsha:] “This it not so, because they are again recognised as the same.”

c5.s3.t4.6

[Opponent:] “That they are recognised again, depends in their case on the fact that they resemble [the former], somewhat as in the case of hairs (cf. on Brih. 743, 2).”

c5.s3.t4.7

[Upavarsha:] “O no! For that it is a recognition [of the same, not merely of like], is not refuted by any other recognition.”

c5.s3.t4.8

[Opponent:] “Recognition is grounded on species (âkṛiti).” [When I say a repeatedly, it is not the individual a, but the species a, which recurs in different individuals.]

c5.s3.t4.9

[Upavarsha:] “No; it is a recognition of individuals. Yes, if in speech other letters were continually apprehended, as in the case of other individuals, for example, cows, then recognition would be grounded on species; but this is not so; for only the individual letters are recognised again in speaking, and [if the same word, for example, ‘cow,’ is repeated,] then it is assumed that the word ‘cow’ has been spoken, twice, not two words ‘cow’ [once].

c5.s3.t4.10

[Opponent:] “But the letters are still [as argued above] apprehended as different, according to the difference of pronunciation; for when the reading aloud of Devadatta and Yajñadatta can be recognised by the tone, merely by hearing them, it results from the fact that a difference is apprehended.” [Therefore the recognition of a letter must be that of the species, not of the individual differing according to pronunciation.]

c5.s3.t4.11

[Upavarsha:] “Without detriment to the exactness of the recognition in the case of the letters, letters may be pronounced [more] joined or [more] separated; hence the different apprehension of the letters is “grounded on the difference of pronunciation, not in the nature of the letters. Further: he also, who transfers the difference to the individual letters [instead of the manner of pronunciation], must, if a recognition is to be possible, [first] settle species for the letters, and then assume, that these [species] are differently apprehended owing to foreign influences; and here it is preferable to assume, as simpler, that, in the case of the individual letters, the apprehension of the difference is conditioned by foreign influences, while, on the other hand, their recognition is conditioned by their own nature. For the assumption that there is a difference in the letters, is refuted precisely by the fact that a recognition of them takes place.”

c5.s3.t4.12

[Opponent:] “But how can it happen that the sound *ga* which is one, is at the same time different, when several pronounce it at the same time, and [likewise] when it is pronounced with the acute, grave, or circumflex accent, or without the nasal?”

c5.s3.t4.13

[Upavarsha:] “But this difference of apprehension is not caused by the letters, but by the tone (*dhvani*).”

c5.s3.t4.14

[Opponent:] “What is tone?”

c5.s3.t4.15

[Upavarsha:] “That which reaches the ear, when one hears sounds from a distance, and does not perceive the difference of the syllables, and which prompts one sitting near to attribute his own differences of stupidity and sagacity to the letters [which he hears]. And from this [the tone] depend attached the differences of accentuation with the acute etc., and not the nature of the letters. But the letters are recognised just as they are pronounced [independently of the tone]. If this be assumed, then the perceptions of accentuation have a basis, otherwise not; for, as regards the letters, they are only recognised again, and do not differ [in themselves]; therefore we should have to assume that the differences of accentuation lie in their connection and separation; but connection and separation are not perceptible, and we cannot take our stand on them, in order to arrive at an explanation of the difference of the letters; consequently the perception of accentuation etc. would have no basis [without the assumption of tone].—We must not fall into that error either that, because the accentuation is different, the letters to be recognised are also different. For because one thing shews differences, another, which is not different does not need to shew them also; as, for example, one does not conclude that the species is different, because individuals differ among themselves. And as it is thus possible to recognise the sense from the letters, the hypothesis of the *Sphota* is unnecessary.”

c5.s3.t4.16

[Opponent:] “But the *Sphota* is no hypothesis, but an object of perception. For in the understanding (*buddhi*), after it has received [different] impressions through apprehension of the single letters, [the sense of the word] flashes out suddenly.”

c5.s3.t4.17

[Upavarsha:] “This is not so: for this understanding [of the sense of the word] also refers to the letters. For after the apprehension of the separate letters [of the word ‘cow,’ for example,] has preceded in time, there follows this single concept (buddhi)—‘cow,’ whose object is the totality of the letters and nothing else.”

c5.s3.t4.18

[Opponent:] “How do you prove this?”

c5.s3.t4.19

[Upavarsha:] “By the fact that with the concept which thus comes into being [cow], the letters C etc., and not the letters T etc., are connected; for if the object of this concept were a Sphoṭa, something different from the letters C etc., then the letters C etc., would have just as little to do with it as the letters T etc.; but this is not so; and therefore this simple concept [of the idea] is [not a Sphoṭa, but] only a reminiscence connected with the letters.”

c5.s3.t4.20

[Opponent:] “But how is it possible, that the different letters are the object of the simple concept?”

c5.s3.t4.21

[Upavarsha:] “To this we answer: a thing which is not simple can also be the object of a simple concept, as is seen in examples like: series, forest, army, ten, hundred, thousand, and the like. For the understanding of the word ‘cow’ as a unity, since it is conditioned by the extracting of one sense from many letters, is a metaphorical one (aupacâriki), just as is the understanding of forest, army, and the like.”

c5.s3.t4.22

[Opponent:] “But if the mere letters, by entering, in their totality, into the sphere of a simple concept, formed the word, then no difference would be made between words like jâ-râ (paramours) and râ-jâ (king), ka-pi (ape), and pi-ka (cuckoo), for the letters are the same, yet in a different connection they give a different sense.”

c5.s3.t4.23

[Upavarsha:] “To this we answer: even when all the letters perceived, just as ants can only form our idea of a row, when they are in a row, so the letters can only form the concept of a word, when they keep their sequence [this is only an evasion of the opponent's objection] and there is no contradiction in the fact that, even when there is no difference in the letters, a difference in the words may be perceived in consequence of a different order of letters. Therefore since certain letters perceived in their order etc. are, according to the traditional usage of language, connected with a given meaning, apprehended [through them], though they are perceived in their own proper function as single letters, our unifying understanding becomes conscious of them simply as this or that, and they thereby convey this or that given sense. —Therefore the assumption that the letters [are the bearers of the sense] is the simpler, while the assumption of a Sphoṭa leaves the sensible and hypostatises the supersensible, by which it is assumed that these given letters, perceived in order, reveal the Sphoṭa and this Sphoṭa reveals the sense; which is certainly complicated enough. Admitting “therefore that the letters, according as they are pronounced, are different in each case, it must yet undeniably be assumed, that as that on which recognition rests is an identity existing in the letters, and that in the case of the letters the deliberate design of communicating the sense is transmitted in this identity.”

c5.s3.t4.24

Author’s note. The truth in this controversy probably lies between the two extremes. The Opponent is right, in so far as philosophy cannot dispense with the acceptance of ideas (for ideas are reasonably to be understood by the Sphoṭa), and Upavarsha is right, in so far as ideas exist only so far as words exist (retained by memory). Moreover, the relation between idea and word is certainly no mere external, conventional one, but originally inner and organic; but why just these sounds express just this idea, is a problem which philosophy, comparative philology and physiology have hitherto worked at in vain, yet the solution of which can and will never be abandoned by science.

Linked texts (10)