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The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c8.s3: XXIV. Relation of the Soul to God

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c8.s3

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XXIV. Relation of the Soul to God

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UNDER this heading, making a change in the arrangement of the Sûtras we treat the section 2, 3, 43—53, which, like the concluding sections in several other cases, makes the impression of a later addition, and in respect of its contents stands in close relationship to the thoughts of the preceding chapter; therefore we include it here; it is impossible in our presentation to avoid completely the numerous repetitions of the original if we wish to avoid too great a departure from the original line of thought.

1. Non-identity and Identity

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pp. 684, 13—688, 3.

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The relation of the soul to God is presented by the Scripture in two ways, partly [exoteric] as the relation of a servant to his master and of the part to the whole, and partly [esoteric] as a relation of identity.

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The position of the soul as servant with God as its master can be conceived in the following way: God (îçvara) by virtue of his connection with unsurpassable (niratiçaya) Upâdhis exercises authority over the soul which is affected only by imperfect (nihîna) Upâdhis (p. 688, 1; our author contents himself here with the remark that the whole relationship depends on the Upâdhis; for greater detail see chap. XX, 3, e, above p. 271).—The soul is further conceived as a part of God; *e. g.* by the simile of the Fire and the sparks (p. 685, 6; cf. above p. 131); further in the passage of the Rigveda X, 90, 3 (cf. chap. XI, 3):

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“ However great is nature's majesty,
“ The spirit is yet higher raised by far
“ Of it but one foot do all beings make
“ Three feet are immortality in heaven.”

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where under one foot all animated beings, the immovable (plants) and the movable, are to be understood (p. 687, 3). The passage of *Bhagavadgîtâ* 15, 7 affirms the same (p. 687, 9).

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However this view of the soul as a part of Brahman is not to be taken strictly, for Brahman has no parts (p. 685, 7); and the case is the same with the passages in which the soul appears as different from Brahman (p. 685, 9); for it is taught on the other hand that all souls, as they have entered “into the complex of organs formed of names and shapes” (*nâma-rûpa-kṛita-kârya-karaṇa-saṅghâta*, i. e. the body), are Brahman Himself (p. 686, 5). Not even the lowest creatures are to be excepted here, as a verse of the Brahman song of the *Atharvanikas* (not found in our collection of Atharva songs) says:

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“ Brahman are fishers and slaves, and even the players are Brahman”

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and another (*Çvet*. 4, 3 = *Atharva-V*. X, 8, 27):

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“ The woman art thou, and the man, the maiden and the boy,
“ Thou art born, and growest in every form, thou totterest in old age.”

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Thus the soul is sometimes regarded as identical with Brahman, sometimes as a part of Him (p. 686).

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The passages p. 1127, 14—1128, 14 (translated above p. 111) serve to complete what this passage leaves uncertain; it is there proved from the esoteric standpoint that the soul can be conceived neither a part nor a transformation of Brahman nor as different from him but only as identical with Brahman.—An explanation of this is offered by the image (used pp. 690, 3. 695, 1. 809, 12) of the sun and its reflections in the water (above p. 208) and that of cosmic space, whose local divisions depend only on the limitations of vessels which produce no change in its nature (note 106, above p. 277); cf. also p. 120, 13: “It is however forbidden, in the sense of the “highest reality (*paramârthatas*) to assume a seer or hearer “different from the highest God, when we read (*Bṛih*. 3, 7, 23): “ ‘There is no seer besides him,’ etc. (above p. 149); on the “contrary the highest God differs from the individual soul

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"created by Ignorance and termed *Vijñânâtman* (cf. note 82)
"which acts and enjoys only in the same way as the magician,
"who in reality remains upon the earth, is different from the
"magician, who with sword and shield climbs up the rope."

2. Illusion of all Pain

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pp. 688, 3--691, 3.

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One might imagine that, if the soul is a part of God, God must feel the pains of the soul also, just as when one member of the body suffers, the whole body suffers with it (p. 688, 3); nay the sufferings of God must be much greater than those of the individual soul, and it is better for us to remain as individual souls in the state of *Saṃsâra* than by the gaining of perfect knowledge to rise to a consciousness of identity with God (p. 688, 6).

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To this is to be replied (in connection with what was brought forward above p. 154): only through Ignorance does the soul fall into the illusion of seeing the Self in the body, and upon this illusion (*abhimâna*) alone, from which God is free, depends the sensation of pain. Pain is consequently a delusion (*bhrama*) which arises from our not distinguishing the Self from the limitations, such as body, senses, etc. which have their origin in the realm of names and shapes created by Ignorance (p. 689, 1). Therefore pain depends only on a mistaken idea, as is proved by the fact that it persists even beyond the body. If for example a son or friend of ours dies, we feel pain from the mistaken idea that they belong to us. The *Parivrâjaka* (above p. 17) on the other hand, who has delivered himself from that illusion, feels no pain at it. In the same way he too feels no more bodily pain who has by perfect knowledge delivered himself from the illusion that his body belongs to him (p. 689, 9).

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Just as sunlight falling on the finger appears straight when the finger is straight, and crooked when it is crooked but in reality is neither the one nor the other—just as space in vessels seems to move when they are moved but in reality remains motionless—just as the sun does not quiver when its reflections quiver in the water—so God does not suffer when the individual soul suffers, and even the suffering of the individual soul depends, as we saw, only on Ignorance. Such words of the Vedânta as *tat tvam asi*, "that art thou," serve to drive away this illusion of the existence of the individual soul and to produce the consciousness of the Brahmanhood of the soul (p. 689, 16—690, 9).

3. Subjection to and Freedom from Law

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pp. 691, 3—694, 3.

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"If there is only one soul in all beings, how then are the worldly and Vedic prohibitions possible?"

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—So far as the individual soul is a part of God.

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"But the Scripture teaches also that it is not simply a part of him but also identical with him!"

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—The difference and identity consists exactly in its being a part of Him.

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"But where the Scripture speaks seriously, it surely teaches the identity of God and the soul and reproves the natural view of difference! It still remains therefore to be explained how commands and prohibitions are possible."

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—Let us take commands such as: a man shall visit his wife at a fit time—a man shall ask his consent of the sacrificial animal—a man shall stand by his friend; and prohibitions such as: thou shalt not commit adultery,—thou shalt not kill,—thou shalt avoid thy enemy, such commands and prohibitions are valid in spite of the unity of the Âtman, on account of the connection with the body. For on this connection with the body depends the mistaken opinion that we see the Self in the body, which is and remains common to all creatures with the exception of such as attain to perfect knowledge. The commands and prohibitions refer to this distinction [of the Ego from the non-Ego] though it depends on Ignorance and is caused by the connection with the body and the other Upâdhis; and only for him who has attained perfect knowledge do they cease to hold good; as he has no further object to aim at, he has also no further obligations. For him there is nothing to be toiled after or avoided because there is nothing that reaches beyond his own Self (ātman); but a duty towards one's own Self is meaningless (na ca ātmā ātmani eva niyojyaḥ syāt). It is true he has a body, but he knows that its structure (saṃhalatvam) is a mere illusion. Only for him who is still subject to the illusion of the body does the illusion of duty still persist: how should it persist for him who has recognised the unity of the soul?

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"But if the sage has no duties, can he do what he will?"—Not at all! For it is only illusion that moves to action and it is just this illusion that exists no more for this sage.—But in spite of the unity of all existence, command and prohibition exist for him who has not attained knowledge. For as one shrinks from the fire which has burnt a corpse, though it is as much fire as any other—as one avoids sunlight in unclean places, though it comes just as much from the sun—as one flees from a human corpse though it consists of the same materials as the living body—so there are certain things to be avoided, though all things are one in the Ātman.

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4. How are the individual Souls separated from each other? Sûtras 2, 3, 49—50.

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The works of souls are individually different, and so are the fruits (reward and punishment in the succeeding existence) which correspond to the works in each case. How is this possible if the soul is in reality only one?—How can it happen that works and fruits of different souls (which at death return to unity and proceed out of it again to a new existence Chând. 6, 10, above p. 264) do not mutually intermingle?

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To this we have two replies:

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1) The soul is, it is true, as a result of its unity with Brahman (as we shall soon see more in detail) omnipresent (i.e. spaceless); but this omnipresence does not mean that the acting and enjoying soul also pervades every thing and is thus connected with all bodies. For this individual soul is only conditioned by the Upâdhis; as these Upâdhis are not all pervading, the individual soul is not so either, and no confusion of works and fruits happens (p. 694, 5—10).—Compare with this what has been said above pp. 228 ff. 276 as to the persistence of the power of differentiation after entrance into Brahman.

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2) Individual souls are to be regarded only as phantoms (*âbhâsa*) of the highest soul, comparable to images of the sun in water. Just as when one of these reflected suns quivers, the others do not quiver too, the deeds and fruits of one soul do not concern the others. These phantoms and with them the whole of *Samsâra* with its deeds and fruits depend on Ignorance (*avidyâ*). Only when this is removed, is unity with Brahman attained (p. 694, 12—695, 5) and thereby, as we may add, a point of view, from which questions as to works and fruits and consequently as to their intermingling, have no meaning.

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Of these two answers the one refers the plurality of souls to the Upâdhis, the others to *Avidyâ*. What is the relation of these two to each other? This question leads us to collect here the most important passages on the Upâdhis, a fundamental idea of the system, which is however nowhere treated connectedly by Çañkara.

5. Brahman and the Upâdhis

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In reality (*paramârthatas*) there is nothing else besides Brahman alone. If we imagine we perceive a transformation (*vikâra*) of Him into the world, a division (*bheda*) of Him into a plurality of individual souls, this depends on *Avidyâ*. But how does this happen? How do we manage to deceive ourselves into seeing a transformation and a plurality, where in reality Brahman alone is?—On this question our authors give no information.

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Since *Avidyâ* is, as we saw above (p. 55) innate, and our birth depends on the works of a previous existence, one might imagine the innate obscuration of our knowledge was a result of previous offences reaching back *ad infinitum*. But the system gives no real ground for this assumption. Avidyâ cannot properly be a result of Samsâra, for on the contrary the reverse is the case and the whole of Samsâra depends on Avidyâ. Under these circumstances nothing remains but to recall the negative character of the idea of Avidyâ. It needs no explanation so far as it is not a positive defect, but only Ignorance, the absence of knowledge. It is true something very positive depends on Avidyâ; viz. the whole existence of the world and of the individual soul. It is however just the meaning of this reference of all empirical existence to Ignorance, that this whole world, the whole beginningless and endless Samsâra, is only for us something positive and real, but is in actuality non-Brahman and (as Brahman alone is the Existent) non-Existent, a mere mirage (mâyâ, mṛigatṛishṇikâ), a product of Ignorance.

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The extension of the world and the plurality of wandering souls, this hybrid which is neither Being nor non-Being (tattva-anyatvâbhyâm anirvacanîyam) and comparable to an hallucination or to a dream, is produced by Ignorance by virtue of the Upâdhis, the limitations, literally "the ascription" (with the secondary idea of the unpermitted) by means of which we "ascribe" to Brahman what does not naturally belong to him, and through which, as we shall show in detail, he becomes 1) a personal God, 2) the world, 3) the individual soul. All this depends on the Upâdhis, and the Upâdhis on Avidyâ. Avidyâ alone is the cause of the origin of the Upâdhis (they are avidyâ-kṛita p. 1133, 12, avidyâ-nimitta p. 692, 14, avidyâ-pratyupasthâpita pp. 199, 5. 690, 5) and is the cause of their persistence so far as the essence of Avidyâ is the non-discrimination of Brahman from the Upâdhis (upâdhi-aviveka p. 473, 17. 689, l. 98, 8, cf. 185, 10); Brahman himself on the other hand is not in the least affected or changed by the Upâdhis, just as little in fact as the crystal by the red colour with which it is painted p. 265, 7. 803, 14. It is in this sense that a contact of the Upâdhis (upâdhi-samparka p. 389, 2. 794, 7) and a contamination (p. 389, 2) by them is spoken of. Brahman is merged in the Upâdhis (upâdhi-antarbhâva p. 811, 5. 9) and thereby his nature is hidden (svarûpa-tirobhâva p. 837, 2) and his natural omniscience (in his existential form as soul) suffers a limitation (the knowledge of the soul is *upâdhi-paricchinna* p. 231, 1).

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On this connection of the Brahman with the Upâdhis depend, as we have said, three phenomena, and it is characteristic that all three are included under this conception without distinction: 1) Through the Upâdhis the higher Brahman becomes the lower, the object of worship p. 111, 3. 662, 13. 1142, 9; the Upâdhis of the Îçvara are however perfect (*nir-atiçaya*) in contrast with those of the individual soul which are imperfect (*nihîna*) (p. 688, 1); details of this distinction are not given. 2) The extension of nature too (*nâma-rûpa-prapañca*) which is commonly referred directly to Avidyâ (e.g. 1132, 10. 507, 1. 473, 17. 787, 13) seems occasionally to be reckoned among the Upâdhis of Brahman; this is the case p. 803, 12. 807, 4 (*prithivî-âdi-upâdhi-yoga*), 391, 2 (*upâdhi-âçraya-nâmarûpam*), 1133, 12 (*nâmarûpa-upâdhika*) just as external objects (*vishaya*) also appear among the Upâdhis of the soul (p. 265, 6, cf. 787, 10. 1056, 1. 739, 7). This description of nature however as Upâdhi of Brahman is uncertain and at any rate seldom. 3) But so much the more frequently is everything regarded as Upâdhi, which makes Brahman into a Jîva or Çarîra, *i.e.*, individual soul, whose existence as a being different from Brahman depends solely on the Upâdhis, p. 735, 3. 244, 13. 360, 2. 199, 8. 836, 8. 799, 5. 982, 5. 173, 16. 162, 16. The best explanation of this relationship is the comparison of the Upâdhis with vessels which limit cosmic space locally (cf. note 106 above p. 277). In this sense can be considered as Upâdhis firstly all psychic organs or Prâṇas (*Mukhya prâṇa*, *Manas*, and the *Indriyas*; for details see chap. XXVII) together with the subtle body and the moral determination of the soul (p. 1091, 9) which all share together in transmigration; further the gross body which only exists until death (*kârya-karaṇa-saṅghâta* or *deha*, cf. 473, 17. 199, 5. 787, 13. 389, 2. 98, 4. 9. 692, 14. 811, 5. 9); and finally to these are added occasionally external objects and sensation (*vishaya-vedanâ* p. 265, 6. 787, 10. 1056, 1, where it must be taken as a Dvandva). In waking and dreaming contact with the Upâdhis (*upâdhi-samparka*) takes place, in deep sleep release (*upaçama*) from them (p. 794, 7. 836, 6). Frequently only such are to be understood as Upâdhis as share in transmigration; then for example p. 793, 14, where veins and pericardium are termed receptacles of the Upâdhis (*upâdhi-âdhâra*); thus the definition of the Upâdhis fluctuates and must in each case be settled by the context.

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