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The System of the Vedanta according to Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras and Cankara's Commentary c8.s5: XXVI. Relation of the Soul to its Actions

The System of the Vedânta according to Bâdarâyana's Brahma-Sûtras and Çankara's Commentary c8.s5

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Contents

XXVI. Relation of the Soul to its Actions

1. Preliminary

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It may repeatedly be observed how psychological problems familiar to us reappear in a different form in Indian philosophy. The question as to the size of the soul gave us some informations as to the relation of the soul to the body; the question as to how the soul is related to its actions includes an enquiry into the will. Essential to the soul is as we saw (chap. XXIII, 2) intelligence; but this intelligence is at the bottom imaginary; for the Indians, as will be more exactly shown later, separate the whole apparatus of perception from the soul and unite it to the physical (i.e. dependent on Avidyâ) part of man, which indeed shares in transmigration but is extinguished by liberation. Now what is the position with regard to the will? Must we recognize in it perhaps an eternal absolutely inseparable determination of the soul?—The negation of this question which will appear in what follows, may at first seem strange to him who has accustomed himself to see in Will the final origin of Being. The denial however, as will be shown, comes to this, that besides the Velle another state of the soul is possible, viz. a Nolle; and it makes in the end no great difference whether this for us quite incomprehensible state is characterised in our fashion as a Negation of all volition, or in the Indian manner as an imaginary cognition, which, as may be seen by the sketch of the Akâmayamâna (chap. XII, 4, f, above p. 194), presupposes this Negation of all volition.

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2. Reasons for Supposing the Soul to be essentially an Agent (i.e. exercising Volition).

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1. The canon of Scripture with its commands and prohibitions presupposes that the soul is an agent, for it prescribes for it a certain course of action. If the soul were not an agent, these prescriptions would be purposeless, which cannot be assumed to be the case (p. 668, 5).

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2. Of the soul in the state of dreaming it is said (Brih. 4, 3, 12, above p. 190):

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"Immortal soars the soul where'er it will."

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This presupposes that the soul is an agent (p. 669, 4).

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3. On the same presupposition depends the absorption ascribed to it in the passage (Brih. 2, 1, 17): "The soul ab"sorbs [in deep sleep] by virtue of its intelligence the intelligence "of those vital spirits [into itself]" (p. 669, 8).

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4. Taitt. 2, 5 says:

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"Intelligence performs the sacrifice, and does the works"

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By intelligence (vijñânam) the soul is here to be understood, not the Buddhi (p. 670, 5); for otherwise the word "intelligence" would have to be in the instrumental (p. 670, 7) and the passage would have to read: "it (the soul) by means of in"telligence performs sacrifice and works."—Therefore the soul is an agent.

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It might be objected: if the soul independently of the Buddhi [without the Upâdhi, and therefore as it really is] is an agent, why does it not, as it is in this state free (svatantra), bring about only what is pleasant and profitable to it? For experience shows that it often brings about the contrary of what is good for it (p. 670, 11).—Answer: the soul is free too with regard to perception and yet perceives what is pleasant and what is unpleasant. So it is too with action (p. 670, 16).—But in perception the soul is influenced by the causes of perception and is therefore not free (p. 671, 1)!—Answer: That is not so! The causes of perception only determine the objects of perception but not the act of perception, for the soul is in this by virtue of its spirituality free [! p. 671, 2; the difference between receptivity which is present in perception, and spontaneity which is present in thinking and acting, is here completely overlooked; in the same way empirical psychology asserts for both a common faculty, the *Manas*. Besides in action the soul is not absolutely free but is determined by differences of time, space, and causality (*deça-kāla-nimitta* p. 671, 4; the same formula is found pp. 38, 3. 40, 2. 482, 1. 579, 5. 671, 4. 684, 9. 775, 2. 3. 4. 781, 3. 4. 1043. 6. 7. 10. 1075, 17. 1078, 9. 1129, 11); the soul is however all the same an agent, just as the cook remains a cook, though he makes use of fuel and water (p. 671, 5).

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5. If you insist that not the soul but the Buddhi is the agent, you make the latter an agent instead of an organ; but in that case the Buddhi must also be an object of Self-consciousness (*ahampratyaya*) without which no action is possible; it takes the place of the agent, and therefore needs something else as its organ, and so the whole dispute is about a name (because you call Buddhi what we call soul); p. 671, 9 to 672, 7.

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6. Moreover the meditation on the highest soul demanded by the Vedānta is impossible if the soul is not an agent (for that too is an action); p. 672, 12.

3. The Soul is naturally not an Agent (exercising Volition)

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Sûtram 2, 3, 40.

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The section in question—one of the most important in Çankara’s work—we translate literally:

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(p. 673, 3:) “Activity cannot be the real nature of the soul, “because then no liberation would be possible. For if activity “were the real nature of the soul there would be no release from “it, just as fire cannot lose its heat;¹¹³ but without release “from activity the attainment of the goal of man is impossible,

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¹¹³ The contradiction with the last sentence of p. 1130 (translated above p. 113) is resolved by the soul being spoken of there in an exoteric sense but here in an esoteric.

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“for activity is naturally painful (kartṛtvasya duḥkha-rūpatvāt).”

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“But cannot the goal of man be attained if one avoids the effects by shunning the occasion of activity even when the power of activity continues; just as with fire the effect of burning does not follow if wood is withdrawn, though the fire still possesses the power of burning?—By no means! For it is impossible to avoid the occasions altogether because they too are connected potentially¹¹⁴ [with the soul].”

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¹¹⁴ p. 673, 9: nimittānām api çakti-lakṣaṇena sambandhena sambadhānām atyanta-parihāra-asambhavāt; cf. note 65, above p. 113; the passage to which it refers must probably be understood in this sense.

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“But cannot liberation be attained by employing the means (sādhanam) necessary to it?—No! Because what depends on means, is not eternal.”

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“Moreover the consummation of liberation is said to follow from the teaching as to the eternal, pure, wise and free soul [identical with Brahman]; but the teaching that the soul is of this nature is not possible if activity is its proper nature.”

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“Therefore the activity of the soul depends only on the qualities of the Upādhis being ascribed to it (upādhi-dharma-adhyāsena) and not on its own nature.”

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“And so the Scripture teaches when it says (Bṛh. 4, 3, 7, above p. 189): ‘it is as though it reflected, as though it moved unsteadily’ and in the passage (Kāṭh. 3, 4):

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“Bound up with Manas, senses, and the body,
“The sages call it ‘the enjoying one.’”

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“where it asserts that the soul passes into the specific state of enjoyment [and activity] only by the connection with the Upādhis. For in the opinion of competent persons there is no agent and enjoyer different from the highest soul and termed ‘individual soul’ (Jīva), because the Scripture says: ‘besides him there is no other seer,’ etc. (Bṛh. 3, 7, 23, translated above p. 149, cf. above pp. 133, 191).”

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“But if besides the highest soul there is no individual soul endowed with intelligence, which exists after the withdrawal of the aggregate of Buddhi, etc., it follows that the highest “soul is itself a wanderer, agent, and enjoyer?—O no! For “enjoyment and activity are based on Ignorance. For so “teaches the Scripture (Brih. 4, 5, 15, translated above p. 175): “ ‘For where a duplicity exists as it were, one sees the other;’ “and after it has shown in these words that activity and en“joyment exist for Ignorance, it denies the existence of the “activity and enjoyment for knowledge, continuing: ‘but where “ ‘all has become for a man as his own self, how should he “ ‘see anyone?’—In the same way the Scripture shows (Brih. “4, 3, 19, translated above p. 190), how the soul in the states “of dreaming and waking in consequence of the contact (sam“parka) with the Upâdhis grows weary like a hawk soaring “in the air, but in deep sleep on the other hand, where it is “embraced by the Self of knowledge there is no weariness: ‘this “ ‘indeed is that nature of his, in which his desire is satiated, “ ‘in which he is himself his desire, without desire and free “ ‘from sorrow;’ and further (above p. 191) summarizing: ‘this “ ‘is his highest goal, this is his highest happiness, this is his “ ‘highest world, this is his highest bliss.’—This is just what “the teacher [Bâdarâyana in the Sûtram in question] says: “ ‘and as a carpenter in both ways’ where ‘and’ has the same “meaning as ‘but’ [a remark which possibly hints at fun“damental differences between Bâdarâyana and Çankara]. I.e., “we must not believe that activity is in the proper nature of “the soul, like heat in that of fire. On the contrary, as in “life a carpenter busies himself with the axe and other tools “in his hand, and feels pain, but afterwards goes home, lays “aside the axe and other tools and in his natural state “rejoicing and at ease feels pleasure, so too the soul, as long “as it is affected by the duality founded on Ignorance, is “busied in the states of dreaming and waking and feels pain; “but when it enters into itself, to throw off weariness, into the “highest self, it is freed from the complex of the organs of “work [the body], is not an agent and feels pleasure in the “state of deep sleep; it is the same in the state of liberation “where it is pure soul (kevala), reposes and is happy after “the gloom of Ignorance is driven away by the torch of know“ledge. The simile of the carpenter is to be taken as follows:

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“the carpenter is, in respect of various kinds of work such as “fitting, etc. with regard to certain tools such as his axe, etc., “an agent, but a non-agent so far as his body goes; so too “the soul in its exertions with regard to the organs, *Manas*, “etc. is an agent, but a non-agent in its own self. The soul “as opposed to the carpenter has not like him limbs with “which it could take up the organs, *Manas*, etc. or lay them “aside, as the carpenter with his hands takes up and lays “aside his tools [for all these organs belong to the *Upâdhis* “which are attributed to the soul only by Ignorance].”

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Then follows a refutation of the arguments brought forward in the preceding section, so far as they maintain an activity of the soul dependent not on the *Upâdhis* but on its own nature (p. 673, 1). We go through these briefly in order, according to the numbers above on p. 316.

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1. Certainly the Canon of Scripture presupposes an activity; it is not part of its real nature however but one which is founded on Ignorance (p. 676, 13).

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2. If the soul is still an agent in the dream-state, this depends on its being in this state not yet [as in deep sleep] wholly free from the *Upâdhis*, in so far as the sense-organs are at rest in the dream-state while the *Manas* remains active, as the Smriti (Mahâbhâratam 12, 9897) says:

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“When senses rest, and understanding wakes,
“And plays its part, this state is called a dream.”

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it is further to be noticed that action in dreams is a matter of appearance only (*vâsanâ*) and not real in the full sense (p. 678, 1).

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3. When it is said that the soul by means of intelligence absorbs intelligence in itself, no activity of the soul delivered from its organs is to be recognised but only a phrase like “the king fights by means of his soldiers” where it is meant that only the soldiers fight (p. 678, 9). Further in the passage in question what is spoken of is only an entering into rest, not an activity properly so called.

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⁴ In the passage Taitt. 2, 5 by “intelligence” not the soul but the Buddhi is to be understood, as is further proved pp. 679, 3—680, 1 from the context.—Çankara does not here

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return to the controversy as to the freedom of the soul in perception and action.

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5. "There is in no sense a change of functions on the part of the Buddhi if we ascribe activity to the organs; for all organs are in respect of their functions necessarily agents; but the activity of these organs demands in addition apperception (upalabdhi) and this belongs to the soul; but activity is not thereby ascribed to it; for its essence is eternal apperception (nitya-upalabdhi-svarûpatvât). It is true self-consciousness (ahaṅkâra) precedes activity, but it is not antecedent to apperception, for it is itself apperceived." [Only the individual, active and enjoying soul is on the one hand ahaṅkartar and pratyayin, on the other hand aham-pratyaya-vishaya, p. 73, 5; the upâdhi-less soul is neither the one nor the other but in its state of freedom is opposed to them as sâkshin or pure upalabdhi; cf. note 30, above p. 54].

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6. Finally as to meditation (samâdhi), it certainly assumes an activity of the soul but only in the same sense as the other prescriptions of the canon discussed under no. 1, of which it is a part (p. 680, 8).

4. Freedom of the Will and Determinism

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Sûtras 2, 3, 41-42.

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That the soul is metaphysically speaking identical with God and therefore like him "eternal, pure, wise, and free" we have already seen repeatedly. But how is it with the soul so far as it is an empirical being connected with the Upâdhis? Is it free or unfree in this state which is conditioned by Ignorance but has nevertheless existed from eternity?--This question in our system takes the following form (p. 680, 12): "Is the activity of the soul, which, from the standpoint of Ignorance, is conditioned by the Upâdhis, dependent on God (îçvara) or not?"

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It is a fundamental principle of the original Brahman doctrine that everything existing, and therefore the soul also, is absolutely dependent on God; from this follows that He is on the one hand the necessary cause of the fate and sufferings of the soul, and on the other hand of its actions, whatever they are. The philosophical elaboration of the doctrine of the Vedānta has violated this principle in both directions by referring both the action and sufferings of man to a cause inherent in himself. It is true both are none the less dependent on God; but only in the same sense that the growth of plants depends on rain, which causes the seed to develop, but exercises no influence on its nature. We have already seen that the seed of the sufferings and destinies of this life is to be found in the works of the previous existence, which demand to be atoned for (above p. 279); and so too are the works of each existence necessarily determined by the works of the former existence—how this is possible is, as in the case of all moral questions, not plainly developed. According to p. 1131 (translated above p. 113) works are the product of the *nimittas* or motives and of the *çakti*, power, i. e., character; and this consists generally speaking in the natural disposition (destructible only by perfect knowledge) to activity and enjoyment; however as it produces works that differ individually, character must be imagined as specially modified in the case of each individual. We must think of an innate character of this sort, conditioned by the works of the previous existence, when the soul, in what follows, is described as "connected with defects like love and hate" (*rāga-dvesha-ādi-dosha-prayuktah* p. 681, 3); and when as the seed from which works grow appears the "effort of the soul directed towards good and evil" (*kritah prayatno jivasya, dharma-adharma-lakshanah*), which seems to be summed up just in that innate disposition of character.

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One might think, says Çankara, that we have no ground for assuming an influence of God on human action (p. 681, 2) so far as the soul alone, connected as it is with such defects as love and hate and equipped with the apparatus of the organs, suffices for activity (p. 681, 3); for it, like the ox at the plough, needs no further cause to move it to action (p. 681, 5). The actions of beings proceed only from their sense of justice and injustice; if the actions are referred to God, there happens *akrita-abhyāgamah* (p. 681, 11; cf. p. 798, 12) "the occurrence of something that has not been incurred [by the actions of the previous life],”—an expression applicable to the motivation of suffering but not of actions, which seems to show that our thinker had not made clear to himself the difference between the two.

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In reply to these objections Śaṅkara (in the passage translated above p. 86) explains that the soul involved in ignorance is dependent on God in respect of its action and sufferings (*kartṛtvam* and *bhoktṛtvam*) because by his permission (*anujñā*) Saṃsāra results, and by his grace (*anugraha*) liberation (p. 682, 5). For even if the soul is connected with defects like love, etc., and equipped with the apparatus, yet in all activity God is the active cause, for thus says the Scripture (Kaush. 3, 8, above p. 179): “for he alone causes him to do good works, whom “he will raise out of these worlds, and he alone causes him to “do evil works, whom he will make to descend.”—

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(p. 683, 2:) “God causes the soul to act, but in so doing “he has regard to the efforts made by it towards good or “evil; hence the objections raised do not hold good. The good “and evil done by the soul is unequal; having regard to this “God divides the corresponding fruits unequally, for he like “the rain is only the efficient cause (*nimittam*). For as in “life the common cause of different bushes and shrubs, of rice, “barley, etc. that spring each from their own seed, which is “not common to all, is the rain, because without rain their “differences in respect of sap, blossom, fruit, leaf, etc. could “not develop any more than they could without the special “seed of each sort—so God, having regard to the efforts made “by the souls, apportions good and evil (*śubha-aśubham*) among “them.—But can this regard to the efforts made by the “souls exist together with the dependence of all activity on “God?—Certainly! For though the activity depends on God, “it is only the soul that acts (*karoti*), while God causes it to “act (*kārayati*) when it acts; and as He now in causing it to “act pays regard to former efforts, so too He in causing it “to act formerly had regard to still earlier efforts; for Saṃ- “sāra is without beginning.”

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