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Aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and its Relation to Hinayana c6: Chapter II. General Observations on the Relation between Hinayāna and Mahāyāna

Aspects of Mahāyāna Buddhism and its Relation to Hīnayāna c6

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Chapter II. General Observations on the Relation between Hinayāna and Mahāyāna

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Throughout the long history of Buddhism, unity amidst diversity is strikingly evident. Every student or adherent of Buddhism, at all times and places, admits that Buddha taught a middle path (*madhyamā pratipad*), comprising a doctrine which kept clear of the two extremes, existence and non-existence,¹ eternity and non-eternity of the world and its contents, and a discipline which advocated neither self-mortification nor a life of ease. Without questioning the validity of the doctrines of the Teacher about the two extremes, the Buddhist philosophers found ample latitude for speculations about the middle path, but they failed to come to any agreement about the sort of life that Buddha actually wanted men to lead. Some understood it to consist in the leading of the life of a monk and realising the transitoriness of the things of this world including the self; while others understood it to be living in and through this world and realising that there is absolutely no difference between one's self and any other thing of the world, or, in the words of the Mahāyānic texts, between Saṃsāra (world) and Nirvāṇa (its cessation). Even the formulæ, Sarvam duḥkham, Sarvam anityam, and Sarvam anātmam,² which came to be recognised as the characteristic marks of Nirodha, Mārga (misery, cause of misery, cessation of misery, and the path leading to the cessation of misery) and the Pratītyasamutpāda form the watchword of the Hīnayānists and hardly need any explanation for the prominence received by them in the Hīnayāna literature. But those who conceive this world as only an apparition, or as a mere delusion of the mind, must show reasons why the Truths and the Causal Law should find a place in their doctrines. Nāgārjuna devotes two chapters¹ to these two topics, and, at the very commencement of his chapter on Āryasatyas, he anticipates this objection and says that there would have been no Buddha, Dharma and Saṅgha, had there not been the Truths and the Causal Law, for it is through them that the ultimate truth is attained and hence they could not but have a place in their doctrines. According to him Śūnyatā is not nihilism but the absolute principle immanent in all, and hence, with it, no relation of the worldly things and usages can be established; the four Truths and the Causal Law relate to the world and are worldly. The Yogācārins hold an identical view. They have three forms of truth called Parikalpita (imaginary), Paratantra (dependent), and Pariniṣpanna (perfect or ultimate).² Their view of Śūnyatā that the world is a delusion of the mind is a pariniṣpanna truth, while the Āryasatyas and the Pratītyasamutpāda relate to the Paratantra and Parikalpita. In short, the Mahāyānists hold that the four Truths and the Causal Law are the preparatory steps indispensable to the realisation of the absolute truth. Their doctrines exist to lead the ignorant beings from ignorance to knowledge, from darkness to light, and this is effected by and through the Āryasatyas and the Pratītyasamutpāda.

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¹ See Vinaya, Mv., i. 5. 17; Mtu., III, pp. 331, 345; Saṃyutta, II, pp. 17, 20, 76, 23, 61, III, p. 235. Also M. Vr., p. 445: Na śūnyam nāpi cāśūnyam tasmāt sarvam vidhīyate,
* * sattvād asattvāc ca madhyamā pratipac ca sā. M. Vr., p. 504: Bhāvābhāvāntadvaya-rahitatvāt-sarvasvabhāvanut-pattilakṣaṇā śūnyatā madhyamā pratipan madhyamo mārga ity ucyate. Sūtrā., p. 53: antadvayānuyogapratipakṣeṇa vinayaḥ sāvadyapari-bhoga-pratiṣedhataḥ kāmasukhallikānuyogantasyānāvadyaparibhogānu-jñānata ātmaklamathānuyogāntasya.

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² All is full of misery, All is transitory, and All is egoless.

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¹ M. Vṛ., Ch. I & XXIV; see infra. Ch. III (d).

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² For detailed treatment, see Ch. III (d).

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Though the Causal Law is relegated by the Mahāyānists to the domain of convention, it will be observed that it received their earnest attention. Nāgārjuna opens his work with a long dissertation on the Causal Law in order to prove that the things and events, of which we are cognizant, as body or different from it; neither has it been explained by me whether Tathāgata exists or does not exist after death, or whether Tathāgata not-exists or not not-exists after death.

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These expressions, which receive no more than bare mention in the Pāli literature under the belief that their true sense can only be comprehended by one who has risen to the highest state of sanctification, served, however, as a basis for many of the speculations of the later Buddhists. The Yogācārins recognise that the truth is beyond the four limitations, viz., the same or different or both or non-both, *i.e.*, it does not admit of the questions of existence or non-existence.¹ But this recognition did not deter them from conceiving a Tathāgata-garbha, the "Womb of the Universe," or "the transcendental soul of man just coming under the bondage of karmaic causation".² The Mādhyamikas, who are too severe in their logical conclusions, consider that the four limitations are so many impossibilities and that any discussion about them is like the discussion about the 'colour of the son of a barren woman'; and it is for this reason that they add that Buddha had no other alternative than to say that they are indeterminable (*avyākṛta*).³ The limitations, however, helped the Mādhyamikas in building their theory of Śūnyatā as an impersonal absolute principle, regarding which the above mentioned fourfold inquiry is inadmissible.

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¹ *Laṅkā.*, p. 96 : Catuṣṭaya-vinirmuktā tathāgatānāṃ dharmadeśanā yadutaikatvānyatvobhayānubhaya-pakṣa-vivarjitā nāstyasti-samāropāpavāda-vinirumktā.

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² Sogen, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

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³ *M. Vr.*, pp. 446-47: 14 indeterminable problems are enumerated. Cf. *Con. of N.*, pp. 44-45.

Agreement re. the Four Truths and the Causal Law

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Though the Hinayānists and the Mahāyānists did not agree regarding the conception of Śūnyatā, there was no disagreement among them in regard to the fact that Buddha preached the four Truths (*Āryasatyas*) and the Causal Law (*Pratītyasamutpāda*).⁴ The four truths, Duḥkha, Samudaya, Buddhism, lost their value in the eyes of the later Buddhists, the Mahāyānists. But *Nirvāṇam śāntam*,¹ however, never lost its charm for any of the Buddhist thinkers. Almost all of them agree in holding that Nirvāṇa is *śānta* (peaceful i.e., unruffled by origination and destruction) and that it is something inexpressible, and without decay and origin. It has found expression in the well-known lines of the

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⁴ See *Laṅkā.*, p. 96.

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¹ Sogen in his *Systems of Buddhistic Thought* (pp. 7 ff) takes *Sarvam anityam* and *Sarvam anātmam* and *Nirvāṇam śāntam* as the threefold cornerstone upon which rest both Hīnayānism and Mahāyānism. Strictly speaking, Anitya and Anātma do not find place in the Mahāyānic conception of Śūnyatā or Tathatā, the ultimate truth. In fact, *Sarvam tathātvam* (all is such as it is) replaces the former two in Mahāyāna.

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*Mādhyamika Vṛtti*:² *aniruddham anutpannam etan nirvāṇam ucyate* (Nirvāṇa is....undecaying and unoriginating) and

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² *M. Vr.*, p. 521; Burnouf, *Intro.*, p. 519.

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*Itivuttaka*:³ *Atthi, bhikkhave, abhūtam akataṃ asaṅkhatam* (there is, o bhikkhus, the unborn, uncreated, and unconstituted).

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³ *Itiv.*, p. 37; *Ud.*, p. 80.

The Extent of Agreement re. the Conception of Śūnyatā

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That all is transitory and all is egoless sometimes expressed by the words *sarvam śūnyam* (all is essenceless) formed the subject of keen controversies among the various sects. The differences of opinion centred round the extent to which the transitory nature of the world should be carried. The Hīnayānists remained satisfied with a simple definition of Śūnya, declaring that as the world is void of individuality or anything belonging to an individuality, it is called śūnya (*yasmā ca suññam attena va attaniyena va tasmā suñño loko ti vuccati ti*). In other words, they say that as there is nothing permanent or personal in this world, the world is devoid of any substantiality. The Mahāyānists, especially the Mādhyamikas, however, would not stop there. They would carry the conception of Śūnya to its farthest limits, arriving at the Śūnyatā of not only the apparent existences but also of the so-called Tathāgata,⁴ Nirvāṇa, or Ākāśa.

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⁴ *Śata.*, p. 120: *Nāmamātram idaṃ yaduta Buddha iti*.

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They add that the Tathāgatas never trouble themselves about these terms, which to them are as meaningless as the self-contradictory expression like ‘the son of a barren woman’.¹ The usual way in which they speak of the non-existence of anything is

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¹ Laṅkā., p. 19: Alabdhātmaka dharmāḥ katame yaduta śaśakharoṣtra-vājiviṣāṇa-bandhyāputra-prabhṛtayo dharmāḥ.

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Na śūnyatayā rūpaṃ śūnyam, nānyatra rūpāt śūnyatā, rūpam eva śūnyatā, śūnyataiva rūpam (form is not devoid of śūnyatā, śūnyatā is not outside form, form is śūnyatā, and śūnyatā is form).²

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² Śata., p. 118: rūpam (lit. form=material constituents of a body) has been taken here as X, i.e., any term may be put for it. In the Pañcavimśati (leaf 72b), ‘Māyā’ has been used for ‘Śūnyatā’ in a formula exactly like this.

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It is remarkable that this form of generalisation of the śūnyatā has been resorted to not only by the early Mahāyānists in the Prajñāpāramitās but also by the Mādhyamikas³ and the Yogācāras.⁴ An attempt has been made to show with the help of this passage that though śūnyatā seems to be the ultimate abstraction of all dharmas (things), it is actually the name which is given to the real svabhāva (nature) of things (dharmas or dravyas). It is dharmatā in the sense that it is neither apart from the dharma nor identical with it. If we say that it is apart from dharma, then the dharmas would be void, and if we say it is identical with dharma then the dharmas would be nitya (permanent). This conception of Śūnyatā is only foreshadowed, but does not appear in a developed form in Pāli literature in passages like—

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³ M. Vr., p. 248.

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⁴ Sūtrā., p. 76. In the Vijñaptimātratā, śūnyatā is the same as bhūta-tathatā.

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Avyākataṃ mayā taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ or aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīraṃ. Hoti tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā; na hoti tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā; hoti ca na hoti ca tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā; n’ eva hoti na na hoti tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā”.⁵ (It has not been explained by me whether soul is the same are all relative, appearing and disappearing through some causes and conditions, and asserts that the moment a person realises this fact he is emancipated and knows the Truth, Śūnyatā.¹ The Hinayānists and the Mahāyānists differ as regards the Truth but they agree that the Truth, as conceived by them, is attainable through the comprehension of the causal law, and so the Buddhist texts, whether Hinayānic or Mahāyānic,² are unanimous in holding—

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⁵ See, e.g., Dīgha, I, p. 188; Anesaki takes the word ‘Tathāgato’ in stead of ‘Buddha’ as significant. See E.R.E., vol. iv, p. 836.

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¹ Nāgārjuna even identified Pratītyasamutpāda with Śūnyatā, see M. Vr., pp. 503, 542: yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tām praca-kṣmahe.

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² Majjhima, I, p. 191; Saṃyutta, III, p. 120; Itiv., p. 92; Sad. Saṅ. (J.P.T.S.), 1890, p. 69 Mil., p. 71; Dīgha, II, p. 154; Bodhic., p. 386; M. Vr., pp. 6, 160; Sālistambasūtra, p. 70.

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Yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ paśyati sa dharmaṃ paśyati, yo dharmaṃ paśyati so buddhaṃ paśyati. (He who realises the causal law of things sees the Truth; one who sees the Truth sees the Buddha.)

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The formula of the Causal Law appealed so much to the Buddhists of all times and places that not only the scriptures of the Hinayānists and the Mahāyānists but also the inscriptions of different periods record

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Ye dharmā utprabhavā hetum teṣāṃ tathāgataḥ hyavadat, Teṣāṃ ca yo nirodha evaṃvādī mahāśramaṇaḥ.

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(The Tathāgata explained the origin of those things, which proceed from a cause. He explained their cessation as well: this is the doctrine of the great Śramaṇa).

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These show that there was complete unanimity amongst all the sects with regard to the fact that Buddha preached the Causal Law and the Āryasatyas. But it has to be admitted that though the Āryasatyas, the Pratītyasamutpāda and the uncaused and uncreated Nirvāṇa find a place in the doctrines of all the schools, the standpoint from which each of them is being viewed is as apart as the poles. In fact, around these three principles have developed various conflicting opinions, giving rise to a number of schools, each trying to show that its own view of the principles is right, while the views of the others are wrong.

Ekayānatā

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As the Hīnayānists were confident of having preserved the original teachings of the Master, and of existing anterior to the Mahāyānists, they did not think it worth while to show the agreements and disagreements between their own doctrines and those of the Mahāyānists. But the Mahāyānists, aware of their later origin and remoteness from the Founder of their religion in point of time, could not help devoting some thought to establishing their claim as the true representatives of the Founder. They attempted to prove that the real point of view of the Founder had been missed by the Hīnayānists to whom they usually referred as Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas. They did not deny the authenticity of the literature of the Hīnayānists and the doctrines propounded by them, but what they desired to prove was that Buddha knew the mediocre character of the intellect of most of his disciples and delivered some discourses in a modified form to suit their understanding while to the select few he gave out his real teachings, which became known as the Mahāyāna sūtras. They did not say that Buddha had different truths for people of different mental calibres. According to them, Buddha preached one and only one Truth and Path; but the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas see and practise only a portion of same. They are not debarred from seeing the whole truth and the real path, for many of them do so by becoming Mahāyānists after the attainment of Arhathood or Pratyekabuddhahood. They do not state that there could be two kinds of knowledge (prajñā), one for the Hīnayānists and another for the Mahāyānists for the realisation of the Truth; so the Prajñāpāramitās say in their opening verses addressed to Prajñā:

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Buddhaiḥ pratyekabuddhaiś ca śrāvakaiś ca niṣevitā,
Mārgas tvam ekā mokṣasya nāsty anya iti niścayaḥ.
(You are the only path leading to emancipation, there is no other. It is the path followed by Buddhas, Pratyekabuddhas and Śrāvakas alike).¹ The Prajñāpāramitā texts lay too much stress on the practice of prajñāpāramitā, identify-

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¹ Aṣṭa., p. 3; Pañca., p. 1; Bodhic., p. 430.

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ing it sometimes also with the absolute truth. The texts remark in many places that the three Yānas are embodied in the Prajñāpāramitā, and that the achievements of the Bodhisattvas, Śrāvakas, or Pratyekabuddhas depend on the Prajñāpāramitā. So, according to these texts, the Prajñāpāramitā is the only Yāna for arriving at the Truth,¹ and it includes all other Yānas.

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¹ See, e.g., Pañca., leaf 167a; Bodhic., p. 431. It should be noted that the perfection in prajñāpāramitā means the realisation of the Absolute through the comprehension of the non-existence of things altogether.

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The Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka,² concerned as it is to prove that Hinayāna is a stepping stone to Mahāyāna, supports this idea in these verses:—

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² Sad. P., p. 46.

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Ekam hi yānam dvitīyam na vidyate,
tṛtīyam hi naivāsti kadāci loke.
Anyatrupāyā puruṣottamānām,
yad yāna-nānātyupadarśayanti.
Bauddhasya jñānasya prakāśanārtham,
loke samutpadyati lokanāthaḥ.
Ekam hi kāryam dvitīyam na vidyate,
na hīnayānena nayanti Buddhāḥ.

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(There is only one path, no second, never does a third exist in the world. The exhibition of the variety of Yānas is only a means adopted by the great sages. The Teacher appears in the world to give out the Buddha knowledge. He has only one object in view, and nothing else. Buddhas never lead men by an inferior path.) It states again elsewhere³:

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³ Ibid., p. 143.

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Sa paśyati mahāprajño dharmakāyam aśeṣataḥ,
Nāsti yānatrayam kiñcid ekayānam ihāsti tu.

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(For him, the highly wise, who has seen the Dharmakāya in its fullness, there is only one Yāna and not three). But as the avowed object of the Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka is to show that the Śrāvakayāna was only a means (upāya) of uplift of the devotee as devised by the Teacher, it harps on the theme:

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Ekam eva yānam ārabhya sattvānām dharmam deśitavanto yad idam Buddhayānam sarvajñatāparyavasānam, etc.¹ (it is concerning only one Yāna that the dharma has been preached, it is the Buddhayāna leading to the attainment of all-knowledge, etc.).

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¹ Sad. P., p. 41, see also Śiksā., pp. 95-6: “I have never preached the law in separate forms, one for Śrāvakas, one for Pratyekabuddhas and one for Bodhisattvas.”

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The object of these verses is to show that the real Truth and the real Path are one, and that which is followed by the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas is ultimately followed by Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas; hence there are not, in fact, three yānas called Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Buddhayāna but only one Yāna and that is Buddhayāna or Mahāyāna.

Points of Agreement between the Two Yānas Mentioned in the Mahāyānic Texts

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Some of the Mahāyānic texts have also attempted to prove the simultaneous origin and the essential unity of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna by bringing out the points of agreement existing between the two Yānas. The (Tibetan) Madhyamakāvatāra remarks on the basis of Nāgārjuna’s statement in his Mādhyamika-sūtras about the conception of Śūnyatā of the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists that “it is the same śūnyatā (vacuity) whether it be in the sense of destruction or of non-origin” and takes this fact as a proof of the simultaneous origin of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna.² The Sūtrālaṅkāra³ also attempts to prove that there is only one yāna, not two or three, and that Hīnayāna is not altogether different from Mahāyāna. Its object is to show that the only Yāna (Ekayāna) is really Mahāyāna, the other two Yānas being subservient to it. It points out that there are many things common to the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists, some of which are:

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² La Vallée Poussin’s Fr. transl. in the Le Muséon, VIII, (N.S.), p. 271: “Ce point est enseigné par (Nāgārjuna) notre maître, quand il dit: Le Grand Véhicule enseigne la non-naissance, l’autre Véhicule la destruction; c’est la même vacutié dans la sens de destruction et de non-naissance”. Cf. Madhyamaka Sāstra, XV, 7; M. Vr., p. 269, Kātyāyanavavāde cāstīti nāstīti cobhayam, pratisiddham bhagavatā bhāvābhāvavibhāvinā. Cf. also Saṃyutta, II, p. 17.

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³ Sūtrā., pp. 68-70.

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(i) Sameness of the *dharmadhātu* (totality of existence or things), i.e., the Śrāvakas and Bodhisattvas emanate from the identical *dharmadhātu*.¹

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¹ Cf. *Kāś. P.* p. 116, § 80; *Kārikā* (A.S.B. ms.), leaf 2a; *Dharmadhātor asambhedāt gotrabhedo na yujyate; Ādheyadharmabhedāt tu tad bhedaḥ parigīyate*. 39.

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(ii) Sameness of *nairātmya* (absence of any substance). The Śrāvakas assert the absence of substance (*ātmabhāva*), the difference between the Śrāvakas and Bodhisattvas being that the former apply it to Pudgala (person) only, while the latter apply it to both Pudgala and Dharma (world).

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(iii) Sameness of *vimukti* (liberation). It refers to the *kleśa-vimukti* (abandonment of passions) which is sought for by both the Śrāvakas and Bodhisattvas, the latter seeking something more, viz., the *Jñeyāvaraṇa-vimukti* (abandonment of the screen obstructing knowledge).

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(iv) In spite of the *gotrabheda* (difference in *gotras*), there are many who are of the *Aniyata-gotras* and become Mahāyānists. The *Aniyata-gotras* include two classes of individuals, one class prone to become Śrāvakas and the other Bodhisattvas. Many of the former class are attracted to Mahāyāna, while those of the latter are not allowed to slip (*saṃdhāraṇāya*) from Mahāyāna.²

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² See *Sūtrā.*, p. 69, v. 54.

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(v) Though Buddhas and Śrāvakas have two different *āśayas*, still there is a point of contact between the two. On the one hand, Buddhas identify themselves with all beings, while on the other, those of the Śrāvaka-*gotras*, before they turn definitely to Śrāvaka-yāna, perform meritorious deeds which enable them to attain Bodhi, and also cherish a desire (*āśaya*) to become Buddha.³ There is no difference between Buddhas and Śrāvakas in the matter of getting release from the series of births. Hence, after obtaining release, the Śrāvakas develop a desire (*āśaya*), through the grace and influence of Buddhas, to become Buddhas, and ultimately the two āśayas become identical and so there is only one Yāna.

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³ Prof. Lévi corrects the reading of the text from ‘*anātmani buddhāśaya*’ to ‘*ātmani buddhāśaya*’. See his *Transl.*, p. 125, fn.

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(vi) Buddha’s exhibition of attainment of parinirvāṇa through Śrāvakayāna. It refers to the fact of Buddha’s attaining Mahāparinirvāṇa as conceived by the Hīnayānists. The Mahāyānists usually explain it away by saying that it was the parinirvāṇa of the Nirmāṇakāya of the real Buddha, but the text here takes it as a point of contact between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna.

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(vii) Ultimateness (paryantāt) of the Mahāyāna, i.e., as there is nothing beyond Mahāyāna, so it is the only Yāna, Śrāvakayāna making only some progress towards it.

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The above arguments of Asaṅga adduced by him to demonstrate the agreements between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna are more or less laboured. His idea clearly is that there is only one Yāna properly so called, viz., the Mahāyāna and that the Śrāvakas pass through a course of Śrāvakahood only to take to Mahāyāna in order to become Buddhas in course of time. The commentator explains it by a reference to the Śrīmālāsūtra, in which it has been stated that a Śrāvaka becomes a Pratyekabuddha, and ultimately a Buddha.¹

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¹ Sūtra., p. 70: tam avasthātrayastham saṃdhāyoktam Bhagavatā Śrīmālāsūtre, śrāvako bhūtvā pratyekabuddho bhavati punaś ca Buddha iti.

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The Laṅkāvatāra² is more emphatic in its assertion that all Yānas are one and the same. Its point of view, however, is quite different, for all its remarks are made mainly from the pure Yogācāra standpoint that everything is mental delusion. It establishes the fact that all Yānas are essentially one and that they have been looked upon as different only because of their suitability to people according to the degree of progress made by them in mental and spiritual development. It says—

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² Laṅkā., pp. 65, 243.

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Triyānam ekayānam ca ayānam ca vadāmyaham,
Bālānām mandabuddhīnām āryānām ca viviktatām.

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Dvāraṃ hi paramārthasya vijñaptidvayavarjitam, Yānatrayavyavasthānaṃ nirābhāse sthite kutaḥ.

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[On account of the distinction existing among the ignorant, the dullards and the sages, I speak of Triyāna, Ekayāna, or Ayāna, (i.e., absence of any yāna) as the entrance leading to Paramārtha, (i.e., the absolute truth), which is devoid of the two kinds of designations (vijñapti); in the absence of appearances (nirābhāse) how can this discrimination of three yānas stand.] Still more philosophical is its definition of Ekayāna, when it says¹ that the realisation of Ekayāna means the cessation of all thought-creations (vikalpa) by thoroughly comprehending that the subject and the object are mere delusions. This, according to the text, was discovered for the first time by Buddha; it was not known to the non-buddhists, Śrāvakas, or Pratyekabuddhas; hence it should be called Ekayāna.

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¹ Laṅkā., pp. 133: Ekayānamārgādhigamāvabodhaḥ katamo yaduta grāhyagrāhakavikalpa-yathābhūtāvasthānād apravṛtter vikalpasyaika-yānāvabodhaḥ. See also p. 155.

Mahāyāna is not the Original Buddhism but a Later and More Developed Stage of Same

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From the standpoint of Mahāyānic philosophy, the three yānas may be essentially one, but the philosophic expositors of Ekayānatā never saw eye to eye with the Hinayānists, and expressed their feelings for the latter in disparaging terms. The Hinayānists, however, literally obeyed the dictum of the Teacher, attānam na ukkamseti paraṃ na vambheti (neither praise yourself nor disparage others) and did not choose to embody in their literature condemnations of their opponents. It cannot, however, be denied that Mahāyāna had in some features and principles for which it can rightly claim superiority over Hinayāna in some directions. Its wider outlook with the great emphasis laid on Maitrī and Karuṇā and its attempt to put together in as perfect a manner as possible the philosophical truths can claim for it a superior position in regard to Hinayāna, but it should be remembered that Mahāyāna is an advanced stage of Buddhism; in fact, it is a later phase of Buddhistic thought and religion, an outcome of the Buddhist culture of two or three centuries. The relation of Hinayāna to Mahāyāna has been happily expressed by Dr. Maeda thus:—"The teachings of Śākyamuni are the seeds, those of Hinayāna are the branches and leaves, those of Mahāyāna are the blossoms and fruits. Long after the seeds were hidden away and when the time was ripe, the fruit appeared". According to Dr. Murakami¹ "Buddha did not necessarily teach Hinayāna or Mahāyāna, as these are designations invented later. What was really preached by Buddha himself was primitive Buddhism in which there was yet no differentiation". Even the Āgamas of Hinayāna Buddhism, in his opinion, do not preserve all the features of early Buddhism, as they were compiled some centuries after Buddha, but yet they contain more primitive Buddhism than other scriptural texts. Drs. Anesaki and Chuki Tominaga also agree that Mahāyāna cannot have historically a direct relation to Śākyamuni².

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¹ Vide his article on Mahāyāna in the Eastern Buddhist, I, ii, pp. 1, 2.

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² The opinions of the Japanese scholars have been taken from the paper of Mr. R. C. Armstrong on "The discussion of the origin of Mahāyāna Buddhism" in the Eastern Buddhist, IV, i.

Attempts to Prove that Mahāyāna was Derived Directly from Śākyamuni

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There are however scholars, both ancient and modern, who are not willing to accept the unpleasant truth that Mahāyāna is not derived from Śākyamuni directly. The ancient scholars take shelter in scholastic arguments to oppose the inference, while the modern rely with the same object on a few traditions preserved in the literatures of Japan and India.

I. Asaṅga

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Asaṅga in the first chapter of his Sūtrālaṅkāra³ puts forward these arguments: "If it be a fact that Mahāyāna was not preached by Buddha and that it was invented (utpāditam) by some body at a later time, then it would be a danger (antarāya) to the excellent religion (saddharma), and it should have been foretold by Buddha as one of the many dangers that might befall his religion in future (anāgata-bhayas),¹ but it was not. It appears that Mahāyāna originated at the same time with Hīnayāna and not afterwards; then why should it not be regarded as based on Buddhavacana. Mahāyāna is a sublime and profound religion and so it cannot be understood by tārkikas (sceptical dialecticians). It is also not correct to say that it was uttered by some body other than Buddha, for it does not appear in the Śāstras of the non-Buddhists (tirthikas), and even if the tirthikas are told of it, they do not believe it. If we admit that it was said by some body other than Śākyamuni, then it must have been uttered by some one who had attained Bodhi. In that case also it is Buddhavacana, for he who after realising Bodhi has uttered this is a Buddha. If the existence of the Mahāyāna be denied, then there cannot exist a Śrāvakayāna, because Śrāvakayāna is Buddhavacana and it is not proper to say that there is no Mahāyāna (or Buddhayāna), for there cannot arise a Buddha without a Buddhayāna. It is also Buddhavacana in view of the fact that the unconditioned knowledge (sarvanirvikalpajñāna) attainable through Mahāyāna operates as an antidote to all kleśas. This scholastic reasoning of Asaṅga may have a value of its own but it does not establish the simultaneous origin of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna.

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³ Sūtrā., pp. 3, 4. This passage of the Sūtrālaṅkāra is cited also in the Chinese commentary of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi for proving the authenticity of Mahāyāna. See Prof. Poussin's French translation of the Chinese commentary, pp. 176-78.

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¹ For a note on the Anāgatabhayas, see Lévi's French Translation of Sūtra., pp. 6, 7 fn.

II. Śāntideva

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Śāntideva, in his Bodhicaryāvatāra, adduces reasons different from those of Asaṅga to establish the authenticity of the Mahāyāna scriptures. His attempt is more to challenge the authenticity of the Hīnayāna Āgamas than to establish the aforesaid point. He says that the statement found in the Prajñāpāramitās that all the three yānas have been preached in them (atra prajñāpāramitāyām sarvāni trīṇi yānāni vistareṇopadiṣṭāni) is not accepted by the Hīnayānists, for the latter deny the authenticity of the Mahāyāna scriptures. To establish the authenticity of their own Āgamas, the first argument advanced by the Hīnayānists is this, that with regard to the authenticity of the Hīnayāna scriptures, the Mahāyānists have nothing to say by way of objection, while the Hīnayānists do not accept the scriptures which the Mahāyānists accept as the authentic utterances of Buddha himself. But the argument for establishing the authenticity of the scriptures on the acceptance of the same by persons (in this case the Hīnayānists or the Mahāyānists) is considered worthless by the Mahāyānists. The second argument put forward by the Hīnayānists is that their Āgamas have been handed from teacher to pupil and that it satisfies the conditions laid down by Buddha as proofs of authenticity, viz., that it agrees with the Sūtra, it can be traced (samdṛśyate) in the Vinaya, and that it is not in conflict with the causal origin of things (dharmatā¹, i.e., pratīyasamutpāda). But this argument also falls through on account of the fact that the Mahāyānists also can quote a similar passage from the Adhyāśaya-samcodanā-sūtra of theirs. The third argument of the Hīnayānists is that the authenticity of their scriptures is acknowledged not only by the Hīnayānists and the Mahāyānists but also by the non-Buddhists. This again is met by the Mahāyānists, who argue that the Vedas and such other literature would also then be accepted as authentic. The fourth and the last argument of the Hīnayānists is that as regards their scriptures, there are no differences of opinion, while there are many in regard to the Mahāyāna scriptures. This is answered by the Mahāyānists by pointing out that, leaving out of account the non-Buddhists such as the Mīmāṃsakas, the Hīnayānists themselves are not unanimous in their opinion about their scriptures, as they are divided into eighteen sects (bheda); the division does not stop there, the commentator adds, because in each sect (bheda) again, there are differences of opinion according as one is a Sautrāntika (one who studies the Sūtras only), an Ābhidharmika (one who studies the Abhidharma only), or a Vainayika (one who studies the Vinaya only)¹. The Hinayānists, therefore, should give up their Sūtras, Vinaya, and Abhidharma. This fact shows the unsoundness of the Hinayānic argument that their scriptures have been handed down faithfully from teacher to pupil. Moreover, there should not be any disagreement regarding Buddha- or Sarvajña-vacana if they have been faithfully preserved. Śāntideva’s arguments may show the anomaly of the position of the Hinayānists, but they do not establish his proposition that the Mahāyāna scriptures originated with Buddha.

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¹ Bodhic., p. 431: Yae ca sūtre' vatarati, vinaye ca samdṛśyate, dharmatām ca na vilomayati, tad Buddhavacanam nānyad; see also Sūtra., p. 5; cf. Dīgha, II; p. 124: Tāni padavyañjanāni sutte c'eva otaranti vinaye ca sandissanti, etc.

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¹ For detailed discussion on the division of monks belonging to the same sect, see my *Early History etc.*, p. 207; *Laṅkā.*, (B.T.S. ed.) pp. 135, 137.

The Japanese Scholars on the Authenticity of Mahāyāna

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Let us now see what the modern scholars have to say about the authenticity of Mahāyānism and Mahāyāna scriptures. Mr. Suzuki takes to a line of reasoning different from those of the ancient scholars. He tries to draw an analogy between Buddhism and Christianity and says that if Protestantism be the genuine teaching of Jesus of Nazareth then Mahāyāna Buddhism is also the genuine teaching of Buddha Śākyamuni. This sort of argument may well serve Mr. Suzuki in a controversy with an orthodox advocate of Protestantism speaking on Mahāyāna, but in historical criticism, it has no weight. However, he reveals the real state of things when he points out in another place that Mahāyānism is not a fossilised but a living religion like Christianity and though some “changes it has made during its historical evolution, its spirit and central ideas are all those of its founder”. He states further that if we take the term “genuine” to mean a lifeless preservation of the original, then Mahāyānism is not the genuine teaching of Buddha, but "the Mahāyānists would be proud of the fact, because being a living religious force, it would never descend to be the corpse of a bygone faith". Ultimately he says "What does it matter, then, whether or not Mahāyānism is the genuine teaching of Buddha" ¹.

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¹ Suzuki, *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, p. 16.

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Mr. Suzuki admits, therefore, that Mahāyāna may not be the teaching of Buddha, but Mr. Kimura, without denying the fact that the "Mahāyāna sūtras and the statements embodied therein undoubtedly came into being after Buddha's death", puts forward his theory about the possession of two kinds of "perception" by Buddha, Mahāyāna representing the "introspectional or esoteric" side of the "perception" and Hinayāna the "phenomenological or exoteric" side ². He believes that Buddha imparted his introspectional teachings to the select few among his disciples, preaching his 'phenomenological' teachings to all the rest. This theory is based partly on the traditions to the same effect preserved in Japan and partly on an uncritical acceptance of some of the statements relating to Sāmvṛta and Paramārtha truths found in the early Mahāyāna treatises, specially the Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka. There could be no objection to accept Mr. Kimura's view if he could point out the "advanced and brilliant disciples" who "rightly grasped Buddha's introspectional ideas" and of which they made an exposition resulting in the development of "Mahāyānic ideas". If Śāriputra, Subhūti, Mahāmaudgalyāyana were not able to grasp Buddha's ontological teachings as the Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka actually states, then who were the others able to do so? They certainly cannot be the Bodhisattvas, who have the appearance of fictitious figures even in the Mahāyāna literature. In fact, the interlocutors in the early Mahāyāna treatises, such as the Prajñāpāramitās, are the Hinayāna savants, Śāriputra, Subhūti, etc., and the names that we most frequently come across in the Mahāyāna works are those of the prominent figures of the Hīnayāna literature. No student of history will probably believe the statement of the *Prajñāpāramitās* that these disciples delivered the Mahāyāna teachings only by being inspired by Buddha¹ and without properly grasping them. Japanese traditions, which are relied upon in this connection to establish the authenticity of the Mahāyāna, reveal, I think, the actual state of things. They accord priority of origin to Hīnayāna, as will be seen from the following:—

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² Evidently Mr. Kimura has in his mind the Paramārtha- and Samvṛti-satyas. For Mr. Kimura's statements, see *Journal of Letters* (Calcutta University), vol. xii, pp. 47, 59, 65. For the two Satyas see Chapter III (d).

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¹ *Aṣṭa.*, p. 33: Sthaviraḥ Subhūtir āha. Tena hi Kauśika upadekṣyāmi te buddhānubhāvena buddhatejasā buddhādhiṣṭhānena.

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(a) The Hsien Shou school thus arranges chronologically the Japanese traditions on the various forms of the Buddhist teachings:—

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(i) Siao Chiao or primitive teaching;

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(ii) Shih Chiao or the beginning of the true religion (transitional state);

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(iii) Chung Chiao or the final development of the true religion;

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(iv) Tun Chiao or the school of meditation;² and

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² "This second school founded by the last Buddhist patriarch Ta Mo is not mentioned separately in the Tien Tai classification" T. Richard, *New Testament of Higher Buddhism*, p. 41.

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(v) Yuan Chiao or the complete religion of all the schools.

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(b) The Tien Tai school puts the order thus:—

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(i) Tsang Chiao or primitive teaching;

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(ii) Tung Chiao or the teaching in a transitional state;

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(iii) Pieh Chiao or the new teaching; and

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(iv) Yuan Chiao or the complete religion of all the schools.³

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³ See T. Richard, *op. cit.*, p. 4; here the word "teaching" has been preferred to "Buddhism"; see also *Journal of Letters*, xii, p. 64, *Eastern Buddhist*, iv, i.

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The tradition of the Tien Tai school, however, adds that the *Avatamsaka sūtras* were preached first, but as they were not understood by the disciples, the *Āgamas* were preached.

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Then, after some time when Buddha had some disciples with more developed mental powers, the ontological doctrines found in the *Prajñāpāramitās* and such other works were preached. Both the traditions support the view that both the forms of teaching were delivered by Buddha within the space of forty years. The Tibetan traditions go further and state that Śākyamuni delivered his instructions on the *Prajñāpāramitā* sixteen years after the attainment of bodhi, i.e., in the fifty-first year of his age while he was dwelling on the Gṛdhrakūṭa mountain, and add that they were compiled by Kāśyapa.¹ Any one who examines the style of writing and the nature of the doctrinal and other matters discussed in the *Gaṇḍavyūha*, an old treatise of the *Avataṃsaka* class, can have little doubt about the posteriority of this class of literature not only to the Hīnayāna *Āgamas* or the *Nikāyas*, but also to the *Prajñāpāramitās*. Considering, for instance, the conception of the lokadhātus or the account of the existence of Buddhism in the south of India as found in the *Gaṇḍavyūha*, its composition cannot but be relegated to a time much later than the *Prajñāpāramitās*.²

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¹ *As. Res.*, xx, pp. 399, 400.

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² For a discussion about the time of the earliest *Prajñāpāramitā*, see my Intro. to the *Pañca*.

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The *Prajñāpāramitās* like the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* and the *Śatasāhasrikā* occupy a position between the *Mahāvastu* and the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka* or the *Gaṇḍavyūha*. This fits in with the chronological arrangement of the Japanese traditions, if we leave out of account the statement mentioned in them that Buddha could not have any disciples able to understand the teachings embodied in the *Avataṃsaka sūtras*. Thus, we find, that the traditions do not deny the priority of origin of Hīnayāna referred to as Tsang Chiao (primitive teaching). Their mention of Tung Chiao (teaching in a transitional state) is also very interesting in view of the fact that it probably refers to the various schools like the Sarvāstivādins, the Mahāsānghikas, the Lokottaravādins, etc., which were half-way between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. But Yamakami Sogen³ thinks that "Harivarman's doctrine (Satyasiddhi school) is to be regarded as the highest point of philosophical perception attained by Hīnayānism, and in a sense it constitutes the stage of transition between Hīnayānism and Mahāyānism”. But the difficulty in the way of taking the Satyasiddhi school as indicative of the transitional state of Buddhism lies in the fact that the school came into existence as late as the 3rd century A.C., when Mahāyāna had already developed. It may be taken as an attempt made by Harivarman to reconcile Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. The third name Pieh or Chung Chiao evidently refers to the early form of Mahāyānism as found in the Prajñāpāramitās and the contemporaneous literature.

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³ Sogen, *Systems of Buddhistic Thought*, p. 173.

The Policy of Reconciliation in the Puṇḍarīka

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The view shared by Dr. Enryo Inouye and a few other scholars¹ on the strength of the Japanese traditions that Śākyamuni imparted two forms of teaching, esoteric and exoteric, is very probably derived from statements in Mahāyāna works, in which it is said that Buddha’s teachings were based on two kinds of truth, conventional and transcendental, and from the Puṇḍarīka which seeks to maintain that Hīnayāna was only an upāya-kauśalya adopted by Śākyamuni to attract people of average intellect to his teachings and then ultimately to Mahāyāna. It is well known how popular the Puṇḍarīka is among the Mahāyānists, and what a great influence it still exercises over their opinion. The statements are valuable from our standpoint, because their chief aim is the reconciliation of Hīnayāna with Mahāyāna. It is stated that the Hīnayānists like Śāriputra acquired merits in previous births like the Bodhisattvas, but these they cannot remember now². It is to remind them of these merits, and also the resolutions formed by them in the previous births, that the Puṇḍarīka is preached to the Śrāvakas¹. Though the treatise maintains throughout the superiority of the doctrines and practices of the Mahāyānists to those of the Hīnayānists, yet it does not disparage the latter as quite worthless. It tries to show that Hīnayāna is an expedient (*upāya-kauśalya*) that was adopted by Buddha to suit his disciples in a lower stage of intellectual and spiritual progress, and to serve as a step to Mahāyāna.

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Those who had reached the highest stage to which the practice of Hīnayāna doctrines can lead become Mahāyānists and ultimately Buddhas. In fact, it devotes quite a large space to show how the bhikṣus, Śāriputra, Kāśyapa, Subhūti, Mahākātyāyana, Mahāmaudgalyāyana, Pūrṇa Maitrāyaṇīputra, Ānanda, Rāhula, and others, and the bhikṣuṇīs, Mahāprajāpati Gautamī, Rāhulamātā, etc., who were held in high esteem by the Hīnayānists on account of their deep spiritual insight and high attainments, repented when they were old that they had to follow a lower course, as they did not possess the capacity to understand the covert teachings (*sandhābhāṣā*) of Buddha, and could not have the full benefit from his teachings. The statement is put into Śāriputra's mouth that he had been selected by the Teacher as the chief of Śrāvakas of his time. He is the eldest son born of the mouth of the Teacher (*jyeṣṭhaputra mukhajāta*), but yet he mourns for his lot that he attains Nirvāṇa (arahathood) only, and cannot become a Bodhisattva or Buddha. Then he curses himself that he has been found suitable by Buddha to be led through only a lower course of training (hīnena yānena niryātitah). The Teacher is represented as consoling him by saying that he can never have the intention of preaching different Yānas. He has preached only one Yāna. Though he first taught Hīnayāna to some, it was to take them ultimately to Mahāyāna and make them realise Buddhahood in due course².

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The Puṇḍarika does not disappoint the Hinayānists, for it holds out to them the hope that they will become Buddha provided they perform the duties enjoined upon a Bodhisattva. As they have already attained the qualities pertaining to arhatood, it would not be difficult for them to perform the pāramitās, develop Bodhicitta, worship and serve the innumerable Tathāgatas, build stūpas, etc., and thus ultimately reach Buddhahood. The treatise, proceeding further, predicts regarding each of the noted bhiksus the time when he will become a Buddha, what name he will bear, and over which lokadhātu he will preside¹. It also states that the bhiksus, who had become old and decrepit and had therefore no aspiration (sprhā) for Buddhahood or for powers pertaining to it, will not be left aside. They are like a poor man who had long been separated from his father and was not aware of his vast wealth. He would not believe that he would inherit this wealth. Similarly these Śrāvakas, though devoid of desire or energy for attaining the glory of Buddhahood, will still obtain it as their birthright.² There is also a reference to another class of bhiksus who will, in future, be Śrāvakas, be satisfied with their parinirvāna and not aspire to Bodhisattvahood. They will be reborn in the lokadhātus where Śākyamuni Buddha will appear under other names, and where they will develop under his influence a desire for Tathāgatajñāna and ultimately win it¹.

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The following beautiful simile used in the treatise shows in a concrete form the object which it has in view, viz., that every Hinayānist is to become a Buddha, though he may not strive for it or may think it beyond his power to attain it. A guide was leading a large number of men through an extensive forest to Mahāratnadvīpa. After travelling some distance, they became tired and alarmed, and wanted to return. The accomplished guide, quick in devising means (upāya-kuśala), brought into being a country by dint of his supernatural powers and asked them to take rest there. When the people were refreshed after rest, the guide caused the country to disappear, told them that it was only a magical creation of his, and that they should now proceed to Mahāratnadvīpa. The magical country is the Hinayānic Nirvāṇa, while the Mahāratnadvīpa is the ultimate goal (i.e., Buddhahood)². Such similes make the object of the treatise apparent. It does not deny the priority of Hinayāna, but it wants to relegate it to a position subservient to Mahāyāna, implying that the real teaching of Buddha was not Hinayāna but Mahāyāna.

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¹ See *Eastern Buddhist*, IV.

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² Contrast Hardy, *Manual of Buddhism*, p. 312: Śāriputta enquired of Buddha if the Śrāvakas like him could become Buddhas. Buddha answered in the negative, saying that the Śrāvakas must complete the Pāramis.

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¹ *Sad. P.*, pp. 64-5: So'ham tvām Śāriputra pūrvacaryāpraṇidhānajñānānubodham anusmārayitukāma imam Saddharma-Puṇḍarīkam dharmaparyāyam sūtrāntam mahāvaipulyam bodhisattvavavādam sarvabuddhaparigraham śrāvakāṇām samprakāśayāmi.

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² *Sad. P.*, pp. 36, 38, 60, 61; *Sata.*, p. 502; *Pañca.* (A.S.B. ms.), leaf 231b.

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¹ Sad. P., pp. 65, 144, 148, 150, 152, 201. Śariputra after following the Saddharma of countless Tathāgatas, worshipping them in various ways, and fulfilling the Bodhisattvacaryās, will become Padmaprabhā Tathāgata, and preside over the Buddhakṣetra called Viraja. Similarly will Kāśyapa and others as stated below: Kāśyapa—Raśmiprabhā Tathāgata—Avabhāsaprāpta Buddhakṣetra. Subhūti—Śaśiketu Tathāgata—Ratnasambhava Buddhakṣetra. Mahākātyāyana—Jāmbunadaprabhāsa Tathāgata—Buddhakṣetra not mentioned. Mahāmaudgalyāyana—Tamālapatracandanagandha Tathāgata—Manobhirāma Buddhakṣetra Pūrṇa Maitrāyaṇiputra—Dharmaprasāda Tathāgata—Buddhakṣetra not mentioned. In pages 309-310, Buddha foretells regarding 300 bhiksus that they have the āśaya for Buddhahood but they are not at present aware of same. They will, however, develop Bodhicitta after ages and attain Buddhahood. Compare Laṅkā., p. 240: Arhantaḥ punar Bhagavātā vyākrtā anuttarāyām samyaksambodhau; Pañca. (A.S.B. ms). leaf 231b.

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² Sad. P., pp. 100, 101.

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¹ Sad. P., pp. 186 ff.

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² Ibid., p. 188.

Two Hīnayāna Statements Utilised to Prove that Mahāyāna is the Genuine Teaching of Buddha

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The Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka utilises two statements found in the Hinayāna literature for proving that Mahāyāna is genuine, and contains the most important teachings of Buddha:

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(i) The first is that Buddha, just after attaining bodhi, was hesitating as to whether he should preach the truth, or proceed to attain Nirvāṇa. In the Ariyapariyesana-sutta³ it is stated that the Truth (dharma) is deep and abstruse; it is excellent and beyond the range of dialectics; it can be understood by the wise only. People are addicted to desires and will hardly be able to understand the Paṭiccasamuppāda or Nirodha; so the preaching of the truth would be of no avail, as nobody would understand him, and his labours would be thrown away. Cognizant of these thoughts passing through Buddha's mind, Brahmā appears and requests him to preach the truth, saying that though Magadha is full of impure religions, still there are beings with higher faculties and powers of vision, and the preaching of the Truth would save them from the miseries of the world, leading them to the haven of quietude. Buddha realised the value of Brahmā's words and decided to preach the Truth.

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³ Majjhima, I, pp. 160-175; Dīgha, II. p. 36; Atthasālini, p. 35; Mvu., III, pp. 314 f., Lal. Vis., pp. 395-396; Divyā., p. 492; M.Vr., p. 498.

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(ii) The second statement is that Buddha does not preach the Truth in a uniform manner.¹ After observing the mental proclivities and capabilities of the persons to whom he desired to impart religious lessons he selected discourses appealing to their minds, and thus initiated them into the Truth. To a householder, he would first preach the dānakathā, sīlakathā, saggakathā, kāmānam ādīnavam okāram saṃkilesam, nekkhamme ānisaṃsam (discourses on almsgiving, moral precepts, heavens, perils, corruptions, impurities of desires and the blessings of retirement). He would prepare the mind of a brahmin student by holding conversation with him on topics relating to sacrifice, caste-system and the like, and would deliver the Truth in a form suited to the mentality of the brahmin. To a husbandman he would preach the Truth through similes or topics relating to the tilling of lands, and so forth.² It was only when he perceived that the minds of his hearers were sufficiently prepared that he would deliver the higher teachings, viz., dukkha, samudaya, nirodha, magga (misery of beings; how it originates, *i.e.*, the theory of causation; how it can be destroyed; and the various practices to which one must resort for achieving the goal), which, according to the Hinayānists, were the highest and the most profound (sāmukkamsikā dhammadesanā) teachings of Buddha.¹

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¹ See Ch. III (d), for the conventional and real teachings.

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² Majjhima, Āsayānusayam viditvā dhammam deseti; Divyā., p. 97: Atha Bhagavā teṣām āśayānusayam viditvā dhātuṃ prakṛtim ca jñātvā tādṛśī dharmadeśanā karoti; p. 463: Bhagavatā teṣām karṣakāṇām āśayānusayam dhātuṃ prakṛtim ca jñātvā dharmadeśanā kṛtā. See also pp. 124, 550-1, 554. Sutta Nipāta, Dhaniya Sutta; Dīgha, Ambaṭṭha Sutta; Vinaya, I, pp. 15f.-Yasapabbajjā; Mtu., III, pp. 408, 413; Ava. S., II, p. 26.

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¹ *Dīgha*, I, p. 148; *Vinaya*, I, pp. 15 ff; VI, p. 248; *Majjhima*, I, p. 380.

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The first statement cited above that Buddha was wavering just after attaining Bodhi as to whether he should live in peace in a solitary place, or go out to preach the abstruse doctrines found out by him, has been taken by the *Puṇḍarīka* as an admission on the part of the Hinayānists that their intellect is of a lower order. The story woven around it is that Śākyamuni came into existence when one of the five kaṣāyas² (evils) or the sixty-two wrong views like ‘nityam astīti nāstīti tathāsti nāsti’³ prevailed, when men were overwhelmed by tṛṣṇā (desire), moha (delusion) and kāma (passion) and did not possess the merits usually acquired by Bodhisattvas in their previous lives (cīrṇacaryā purimajātiṣu). When the evils were raging over the land, Buddha at Brahmā’s request came out to preach the religion, but found the vision of his audience too dim to get an insight into his abstruse doctrines. There was even the likelihood of their incurring sin by scoffing at these doctrines. Hence he thought it wiser to follow the previous Buddhas by devising some means to impart the Truth robed in different forms. The people inspired as they were by lower aims (hīnādhimukta) would not strive heartily if they were asked to aspire to Buddhahood. He therefore proceeded to Benares and preached to the five monks the dharma of quietude (dharmam praśāntabhūmim)⁴ and of which, the Nirvāṇa, as conceived by the Hinayānists, was the highest goal. Later on (paścime ca kāle), when he found some excellent men (putrān dvipadottamān), who had already been working through many rebirths to attain the highest Bodhi, he thought it fit to preach his excellent religion (sāmutkarṣiki dharmadeśanā) relating to the attainment of Buddhajñāna.¹ This was, however, preached in such a language that it could not be understood by the untrained.² The Puṇḍarīka goes to the length of saying that it was beyond the comprehension of Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas.³ The Prajñāpāramitā proceeds so far as to state that the collective prajñā of countless Maudgalyāyanas and Śāriputras would not be an infinite part of the prajñā of a Bodhisattva who has practised the prajñāpāramitā.⁴

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