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Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c6: Chapter I: The Historical Background I—Vedic

Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c6

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Chapter I: The Historical Background I—Vedic

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(1) When we consider the history of thought in Greece, we find that metaphysics first develops out of mythology¹ and it is only when metaphysical speculation attains a certain maturity and results in the formulation of a variety of theories that an interest is shown in the problem of knowledge and epistemological questions are first mooted.² If we turn to the Indian context we can trace an analogous though by no means an identical development.

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(2) The intense speculative interest, which is so evident in the tenth book (maṇḍala) of the Ṛgveda persists as an undercurrent in the period of the Brāhmaṇas and issues forth in the theories and intuitions of the Upaniṣads, whether we consider them a linear development in Vedic thought or as being due to the impact of an external element Aryan or non-Aryan. Contemporaneous with the Middle³ or Late Upaniṣads or perhaps even later, we find the existence *v infra*, 147, 158) and the epistemological and logical theories peculiar to Materialism, Ājīvikism, Jainism and Buddhism.

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(3) When a metaphysical theory is fairly well developed, there is a tendency to inquire into the grounds of its truth. Similarly, where there are a number of conflicting theories about a particular problem, it would be natural to ask which of them was true. Both these queries lead to an investigation of the nature of truth and knowledge, which may give rise to logical and epistemological doctrines This seems to have been the general pattern according to which interest was first stimulated and advances made in the solution of the problem of knowledge both in India as well as in Greece.

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(4) In this survey of the Vedic period we shall be concerned with what the Vedic (Brāhmanic and Upaniṣadic) thinkers assumed or thought were the means of knowledge and in the origin and nature of reasoning as we find it in this literature Both these questions shall be considered in the light of their bearing on the thought of the Pāli Canon.

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(5) The Ṛgveda does not betray any awareness of the nature of problems of knowledge If we accept the naturalistic explanation, the Ṛgvedic gods were probably fashioned on the analogy of ourselves by positing wills behind the dynamic forces of nature but there is no indication whatsoever that the thinkers were consciously employing an argument from analogy. The mechanical and organic views of creation¹ seem to have been similarly arrived at, although here the analogies with some observable facts of nature are more evident at least to the reader. The tendency on the part of the mind to look for simpler explanations in place of the more complex is perhaps responsible for the emergence of monotheistic and monistic tendencies² in the last phase of Ṛgvedic thought.

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¹ Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, I, pp 99 ff

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² *Op cit*, pp 89 ff

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(6) Interest is almost invariably focused on the outer world and it is rarely that we meet with a thinker in an introspective mood though we find an instance of a person who asks himself in a sceptical tone: 'I do not clearly know what I am like here; bewildered and bound with a mind, I wander' (na vi jānāmi yadivedām asmı nınyah³ samnaddho manasā carāmi, RV. 1.164.37). Mādhava, the pre-Sāyaṇa commentator of the Vedas,¹ interprets this statement to mean '"I do not clearly know", i.e. I do not understand whether I am this (world), being beyond nature (*prakṛti-*); thoroughly bound by a mind attracted by objects and being concealed, I wander'.² While Mādhava speaks in terms of Sāṅkhya philosophy (*v. prakṛti-*), Sāyaṇa tries to give an explanation, consistent with the philosophy of Advaita Vedānta, when commenting on this statement he explains it as: 'I do not know that I am that which is the existent, the intelligent and the blissful (saccidānando)'.³ Both commentators take 'idam' to mean 'the universe' and Sāyaṇa makes this quite explicit (yadivedaṃ yadapīdaṃ viśvam asmi, *loc. cit.*). These interpretations, based as they are on later philosophies, are inadmissible for the Ṛgveda and we have tried to render the sentence literally taking 'idam' in its adverbial sense to mean 'here'.⁴ With the exception of Wilson who as usual follows Sāyaṇa closely,⁵ the translations of scholars bring out the sceptical nature of the utterance. Griffith has: 'What thing I truly am, I know not clearly: mysterious, fettered in my mind I wander'⁶ and Geldner renders it as; 'Ich verstehe nicht was dem vergleichbar ist, was ich bin. Ich wandele, heimlich mit dem Denken ausgerüstet.'⁷ Prasad denies that this verse betrays any scepticism,⁸ but translates it as: 'I do not know whether I am like this, ignorant, prepared I go about'. Here the translation of 'saṃnaddho manasā' as 'prepared' is in contradiction with 'ignorant', but even this translation which differs from that of Sāyaṇa reflects a little of the sceptical mood of the original, though Prasad prefers to call this ignorance rather than scepticism (*v. op. cit.*, pp. 24, 28).

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³ We have followed the commentators in translating this term, Mādhava takes it to mean 'concealed' (antarhitah, *v.* fn 2) and Sāyana following him says, 'the term "nınyah" denotes what is concealed (and means here that) he is concealed, 1 e. has a bewildered mind (antarhitanāmartat antarhito mūḍhacıttah) '

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¹ *v.* Ṛgarthadīpikā on Ṛgvedasaṃhitā by Mādhava, ed. L. Sarup, Vol. I Lahore, 1939, Preface, p. 15. The pre-Mādhava commentary (*v. op. cit.*, p. 16) of Skandhasvāmin pertaining to this section is not available in print. [^2] Na vi jānāmi na vijānāmi yadapyaham idam asmi prakṛteḥ paraḥ viśayaparena manasā samyakbaddhaḥ antarhitaḥ carāmi, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, Lahore, 1940, pp. 326, 327. [^3] Yo'yaṃ saccidānando' sti so aham asmī ti na vijānāmi, *loc. cit.* [^4] *v.* Macdonell, *A Vedic Grammar for Students*, p. 210, Section 178, 2(a). [^5] 'I distinguish not if I am this all: for I go perplexed and bound in mind', H. H. Wilson, *Rigveda Sanhitā*, Vol. II, Poona, 1925, p. 77. [^6] R. T. H. Griffith, *The Hymns of the Ṛgveda*, Vol. I, Benares, 1889, p. 291. [^7] K. F. Geldner, *Der Rigveda, Übersetzt und Erläutert*, Göttingen, 1923, Vol. I, p. 211. [^8] *History of Indian Epistemology*, 2nd ed. Delhi, 1958, pp. 20 ff.

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(7) The very few stanzas which strike a sceptical note deserve a special mention.¹ Here for the first time there is an expression of doubt about the possibility of knowing certain things and a dim awareness that some sort of evidence was necessary before we can afford to make factual assertions. What evidence is there for the existence of Indra unless someone has seen him? One stanza in a hymn says, 'One and another say, "there is no Indra". Who hath beheld him? Whom then shall we honour?'² Who again can be sure about the fact or nature of creation when no one has beheld the spectacle, 'Who has seen that the Boneless One bears the Bony, when he is first born? Where is the breath, the blood and the soul of the earth? Who would approach the wise man to ask this?' (Ko dadarśa prathamam jāyamānam, asthanvantam yad anasthā vibharti, bhūmya asur asṛgātmā kva svit, ko vidvāmsam upagāt prastum etat. RV. 1.164 4). It will be noticed that the author of this statement is the same as the person who felt uncertain about himself (*v. supra*, 6). Now Prasad has questioned the propriety of concluding that these questions suggest an attitude of scepticism and says that 'either they are simply meant to introduce a discussion, or at the most they indicate a confession of ignorance on the part of the individual, who puts them' (*op. cit.*, p. 24) Prasad is quite right in pointing out that this hymn contains the subject matter of a *brahmodya* (*v. infra*, 46) at which questions of this type were asked, but if we examine the nature of this question itself, it will be seen that it cannot be explained away as a confession of ignorance on the part of the author. The question expresses the puzzlement of one who cannot understand (in a philosophical sense) how a Boneless Being can produce a Bony offspring—an apparent contradiction. Quite apart from the contradictory nature of this statement, what evidence was there to believe in it People doubted the existence of Indra because they could not see him and the Nāsadīya hymn poses the problem, 'the gods are posterior to this creation. if so, who knows whence it evolved?' (arvāg devā'sya visarjanenātha ko veda yata ābabhūva, RV. 10 129.6) Surely it is in this same sceptical spirit that it is asked, ko dadarśa ...? (who has seen ...?), meaning thereby 'who could have seen this spectacle for us to know that it did really happen?'. The fact that the author of this hymn doubts his own nature and confesses in all humility that he is ‘asking these questions out of immaturity and ignorance’ (pākaḥ pṛcchāmi manasāvijānan, 1.164.⁵) does not mark him off as an ignoramus, any more than Socrates could be deemed to be ignorant because he confessed that he knew nothing.

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¹ For a collection of sceptical stanzas in the Ṛgveda, *v.* Radhakrishnan and Moore, *A Source Book of Indian Philosophy*, pp 34–36

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² N'endra astī ti nema u tva āha, ka īm dadarśa kamabhi stavāma, RV 8 100 3 (=8 89 3, Griffith's Translation)

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(8) The Scepticism of the Nāsadīya hymn (RV. 10.129), which has been unanimously accepted by scholars,¹ is denied by Prasad² following Sāyaṇa. The hymn ends on a sceptical note according to the usually accepted interpretation³ and the question as to whether this is scepticism or not depends on the interpretation given to this last stanza, which reads:

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¹ In addition to the translators we may mention Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas*, HOS, Vol 32, p. 435, Ranade, *A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy*, p. 3, Barua, *History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, p. 16, Winternitz, *Geschichte der indischen Litterature*, Vol. I, pp. 87, 88

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² *Op cit.*, pp 25 ff

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³ Griffith translates,

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Iyam visṛṣṭir yata ābabhūva
Yadi vā dadhe yadi vā na
Yo’ syādhyakṣaḥ parame vyomant
So aṅga veda yadi vā na veda, 10.129.7.

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Let us consider Sāyaṇa’s explanation, especially since Prasad claims that it agrees with his.⁴ Commenting on the first two lines Sāyaṇa says: ‘The Highest Self which is the material cause from which this creation (i.e. this diverse creation variegated by way of its mountains, rivers, oceans, etc.) has evolved, i.e. has arisen, is indeed the One who either bears, i.e. sustains or does not sustain this; and thus, who else indeed would be capable of sustaining it: if (anyone) sustains it, it must be the Lord Himself, who would sustain it and no other’.⁵

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⁴ Cp. Prasad, ‘. . . compare Sāyaṇa’s interpretation of the verse which agrees with that of mine’ (*op. cit*, p. 27, fn 1).

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⁵ Yata upādānabhūtātparamātmana iyam visṛṣṭir vividhā girinadīsamudrādirūpena vicitrā sṛṣṭir ābabhūvājāta so’pi kila yadi vā dadhe dhārayati yadi vā na dhārayati evaṁ ca ko nāmānyo dhartum śaknuyāt yadi dhārayedīśvara eva dhārayennānya iti, *op. cit.*, Vol 6, p. 410.

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‘He the first origin of this creation, whether he formed it all or did not form it,
Whose eye controls this world in highest heaven, he verily knows it, or perhaps he knows not’.

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*Op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 368.

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In the light of this comment Sāyaṇa's translation of the first two lines would be as follows:

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'That (Highest Self) from whom this creation arose,
Either sustains it or does not sustain it.'

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The comment on the next two lines is as follows: 'The Highest Lord who is such a person does indeed ("indeed" in the sense of "as is well known") know, i.e. understands: if he does not know, i e. does not understand, who else indeed would know: the sense is that the omniscient Lord alone would know about this creation and no other'.¹ This implies the following translation of the last two lines:

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¹ Īdṛśo yaḥ parameśvaraḥ so aṅga aṅgeti prasiddhau so'pi nāma veda jānāti, yadi vā na veda na jānāti ko nāma anyo janīyāt sarvajña īśvara eva taṃ sṛṣṭiṃ jānīyāt nānya ityarthaḥ, *op cit*, Vol 6, p. 471.

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'He who is the Lord in the highest heaven,
He verily knows, if (anyone else) does not know'.

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Sāyaṇa's translation of the first two lines is unobjectionable from the point of view of grammar and syntax though his contention is that the second line means, 'the (Highest Self) alone sustains it and no one else', which is not apparent from even his literal rendering of the sentence. But his translation of the fourth line is clearly at variance with grammar, for he alters the subject of the verb 'veda' of the second sentence from 'saḥ' to 'ka anyaḥ' (understood) without any support from the original. If we have misunderstood Sāyaṇa in attributing to him such an unwarranted periphrasis, he is at least translating this line as 'he verily knows or does not know' and interpreting it to mean 'it is only he who knows and no one else', although it is evident that this sentence cannot mean this either in a literal or a figurative sense Now Prasad, speaking of the second and fourth lines of this verse, observes, 'These two clauses do not express doubt or ignorance, but mean and that quite in accordance with idiom that it is only He who bore it, and no body else and it is He who knows it and no body else respectively' (*op. cit.*, p. 27, fn. 1), but he does not translate the verse or explain how the only possible literal translation can idiomatically mean what he and Sāyaṇa try to make it mean. It is evident that Sāyaṇa is really trying to explain the verse away rather than to interpret what it strictly meant since he could not countenance the claim that the sacred scriptures contained statements sceptical about the knowledge or power of the deity but we cannot be led by these considerations.

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(9) The scepticism of this hymn is interesting not merely because it ends on a sceptical note but because it does so, after taking account of almost every possibility with regard to the problem of the origin of the world. If we consider the problem in the abstract at the purely philosophical level, we can say that we can either know the answer to this question or we cannot.¹ If we say we can know the answer, we can suggest either that the world was created or it was not. If we say that the world was created, we can say that it was created out of Being or Non-Being. If we say it is out of Being we may say that it is created either out of matter or out of spirit. An analysis of the hymn reveals that all these suggestions are implicit in it, although it offers its own theory tentatively by trying to synthesize the concepts of Being and Non-Being, of matter and of spirit. We may diagrammatically represent the alternatives considered in the hymn in the light of its statements as follows:

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¹ We are leaving out the possibility that the question is meaningless in the Positivist's sense of the term.

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(10) Despite the (to us) dogmatic presentation of his own theory, the sceptical conclusion, after taking account of almost all the possible answers to this question, nearly approaches scepticism with regard to the possibility of knowledge in respect of the problem of the origin of the world. This scepticism which is based on the consideration that 'since the gods came after the creation (śrṣṭi-, *lit.* emission, emanation) no one knows how the world began' (arvāg devāsya visarjanenātha ko veda yata ābabhūva, 6) because no one was there to behold the spectacle (cp ko. dadarśa ...?, *supra*, 7), is soon forgotten in the orthodox tradition. However, it leaves its mark in (or is rediscovered by?) Buddhism, where Brahmā, reputed to be 'the creator', (sajjitā, D. I.18 < śrj-1-tā(5) = Skr. śrastā: *cp* kattā, nimmātā, *loc. cit.*) is said to be ignorant of his own origin (*loc. cit.*, *v. infra*, 645) Moreover, it is said that 'it is not possible to conceive of the beginning of the world: a first cause (*lit* prior end) cannot be known'.¹

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¹ Anamataggo'yaṃ . saṃsāro pubbākoṭi na paññāyati, S II 178, the translation of 'anamataggo' is not without its problems (*s v* PTS Dictionary) but it is the etymology that is doubtful and not the sense, which is clear from the contexts of its use in the Saṃyutta Nikāya, cp CPD Dictionary, s v anamatagga

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(11) The desire for simple and single principles of explanation, which seems to have led to the emergence of the monotheistic and monistic concepts in the final stratum of Ṛgvedic thought seems to have worked its way into the undercurrent of speculation found in the Atharvaveda and the Brāhmaṇas, where the few philosophical hymns try to comprehend the entirety of the universe under some single concept such as Time (Kāla),² Eros (Kāma),³ Creative Power (Brahman),⁴ Life Principle (Prāṇa)⁵ or an Ontological Framework (Skambha).⁶

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² AV. 19 54, 53

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³ AV 9 2

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⁴ AV 19 42

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⁵ AV. 11 4

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⁶ AV. 10 7.

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(12) The same tendency is found in the Brāhmaṇas For although here thought is subservient to the practical ends of the sacrifice, the universe, conceived on the analogy of the sacrifice, is regarded as a unity. The unity is, however, not evident on the surface and is made up of hidden bonds and relations lying concealed beneath the plural universe.⁷ 'What is evident (pratyakṣam) to men is concealed (parokṣam) to the gods, and what is concealed to men is evident to the gods' (yad vai manuṣyāṇām pratyakṣam tad devānām parokṣam atha yan manuṣ- yānāṁ parokṣaṁ tad devānāṁ pratyakṣam, Tāṇḍyamahābrāhmaṇa, 22.10.³). In the Ṛgveda there was a primitive conception of causality underlying the idea of ṛta which seems to have denoted the 'course of things' or the observable physical order of the world before it acquired a moral and theological connotation. But in the Brāhmaṇas, which value 'what lies beyond the sphere of the senses' (parokṣa-),¹ the conception of a causal order gives way to that of a magical order.²

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⁷ This is how one thing becomes the mystic name (nāma), the mystic symbol (rūpa), the mystic body (tanu) and the mystic bond (bandhu) of another For examples and references to Brāhmaṇic literature see Ranade and Belvalkar, *History of Indian Philosophy*, II, pp 62–5

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² Oldenberg, *Religion des Veda*, pp. 315 ff, 321 ff, Keith, HOS, Vol. 32, pp. 379 ff, Frauwallner, *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*, Band I, pp. 41 ff. References to magic are found in the Ṛgveda and the Yajurveda as well, *v.* H. Luders, *Varuna*, Band II, Gottingen 1959, pp. 509-45, *Die magische Kraft des Ṛta in den vedischen Mythen*.

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(13) It is in the Brāhmaṇas that we find developed what became for orthodoxy the supreme source of knowledge—the revealed scriptural text. As Ranade and Belvalkar say, 'the Brāhmaṇas came to invest the mantras with the character of divine revelation. They are at times spoken of as eternally self-subsistent and coeval with God-head—if not actually prior to Him. At other times—and especially *in the newer Brāhmaṇa texts* (underlining mine)—they are described as creations of Prajāpati, the head of the whole pantheon'.³ The hymns are said to be seen, learned or found generally by some special insight on the part of the seers and not made or composed by them.⁴

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³ *Op. cit.*, p. 56.

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(14) The reasoning in the Brāhmaṇas is analogical and centres round the symbolism of the sacrifice. The analogies are remote. A fanciful etymology, a myth, legend or a vague similarity is sufficient to establish a connection between two things.⁵ An explanation to be satisfactory has to be made in terms of a sacrificial analogy. Examples of typically Brāhmaṇic reasoning may be found at ŚB. 11.⁴.¹.12-15, which describes the debate between Uddālaka Āruṇi and Svaidāyana Gautama. The following are two arguments found there: (1) Atha yadapuro'nuvākyakā prayājā bhavanti, *tasmād imāḥ prajā'dantakā jāyante*, i.e. and *since* the fore-offerings are without preliminary formulae, *therefore* creatures are born here without teeth, 11.4.1.12, (2) atha yadājyahaviṣaḥ prayājā bhavanti *tasmāt kumārasya retaḥ siktanna sambhavaty udakamivaiva bhavaty udakam iva hyājyam*, i.e.

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¹ The expression parokṣapriyā hi devāḥ, i.e. the gods love what is not evident, is common in the Brāhmaṇas, *v. op cit*, p 63.

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⁴ Keith, HOS., Vol. 32, p. 482.

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⁵ *v.* Ranade and Belvalkar, *op. cit*, p. 63.

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and since the fore-offerings have ghee for their offering material, a boy's seed is not productive but is like water since ghee is like water. This sounds utter balderdash, but just as much as a biological reason would be given today as to why a 'boy's seed is not productive', nothing short of a 'sacrificial' reason would have satisfied a Brāhmanic thinker. Anything to be understood had to be explained on a sacrificial analogy and discovering these analogies (bandhutā) was as much an art as the reasoning itself The reasoning in the above argument may be exhibited as follows since much is taken for granted in the arguments:

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1. Ghee fore-offerings are not productive (since ghee is like water—*v.* udakaṁ iva hyājyam—and water is not productive in a biological sense)
2. Ghee fore-offerings are like the boy's seed (since both are at the beginning, ghee fore-offerings at the beginning of the sacrifice and the boy at the beginning of life)
3. Therefore, the boy's seed is not productive.

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The form of this argument from analogy would be as follows

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1. *A* has the characteristic *p*
2. *A* is like *B*
3. Therefore, *B* has the characteristic *p*.

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The remotest connection, natural or magical, between two things is sufficient for the Brāhmanas to draw the analogy that '*A* is like *B*' on the basis of which inferences are made.

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(15) There is rarely any admission of the need for or possibility of doubt and investigation (mīmāṁsā)¹ is always carried out with the conviction that the correct interpretation of the revealed texts opens the door to all knowledge but there is mention of vicikitsā, or the doubt that promotes inquiry.² Vicikitsā or 'doubt' is in fact one of the recognized states of mind. The Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa says, 'wish, conception, doubt, faith, lack of faith, determination, lack of determination, shame, thought, fear—all this is mind' (kāmaḥ saṁkalpo vicikitsā śraddhāsraddhā dhṛtiradhṛtirhrīrdhīrbhīr ity etat sarvaṁ mana eva ..., 14 4 3.9); thus, 'Pratardana ... questions about his doubt' (Pratardanaḥ vicikitsam papraccha, Kauś Br. 26 5). Of specific doubts there is mention of the doubt regarding man's survival in the next world.¹ Some of the doubts raised appear to be genuinely philosophical as when it is asked how the raw and red cow can yield hot white milk and how the boneless semen can produce creatures with bones² but the answers given in terms of sacrificial analogies are, needless to say, hardly satisfactory.

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¹ *v* Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas*, HOS, Vol 32, p 483

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² *Ibid*

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¹ *v.* Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Vedas*, HOS, Vol 32, p 483

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² Ranade and Belvalkar, *op. cit*, p 73.

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(16) In the Āraṇyakas knowledge comes to be greatly valued; where the knowledge of the symbolism of the ritual was what really mattered, the performance of the ritual itself may be dispensed with. The knowledge is not prized for its own sake but is invariably considered to be a means to an end. The usual formula would be that knowledge of *X* gives *Y*, where *X* may stand for some item of empirical or metaphysical knowledge and *Y* for anything from material gain to spiritual reward. Thus we have the following statement in the Aitareya Āraṇyaka: 'The Hotṛ mounts the swing, the Udgātṛ the seat made of Udumbara wood. The swing is masculine and the seat feminine and they form a union. Thus he makes a union at the beginning of the uktha in order to get offspring. *He who knows this gets offspring and cattle.*'³ The growing importance attached to knowledge, however, is such that everything had to be subordinated and one's entire life geared to this end by the time of the Upaniṣads.

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(17) In the Upaniṣads there is a continuation of the theme that knowledge gives some kind of reward. He who knows (veda, Bṛh. 1.³.7.), for instance, the superiority of the breathing principle (prāṇa-) over the sensory and motor organs becomes his true self and the enemy who hates him is crushed (*loc. cit.*). There is, however, no explanation as to why this knowledge should give this specified result. One of the rewards is immortality, conceived in the earliest Upaniṣads as the escape from a second death (punar-mṛtyu-): 'He who knows that air is the totality of all individuals conquers repeated death.'⁴

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³ Prenkham hotādhirchaty audumbarīm āsandīm udgātā, vṛsā vai prenkho yoṣā sandī, tan mithunam eva, tad ukthamukhe karoti prajātyai. Prajāyate prajayā pasubhir ya evam veda, Aitareya Āraṇyaka, 1 2 4 10,11.

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⁴ Vāyuh samastiḥ apa punar mṛtyum jayati ya evam veda, Bṛh 3 3 2

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(18) This great importance attached to knowledge paves the way for thinkers to speculate on the nature of reality and the problems of life without being hampered by the limitations of the Vedic tradition. The influence of the earlier mythology and theology is no doubt felt, but the thinkers bring a fresh mind to bear on the problems they seek to solve

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(19) The tendency especially on the part of Indian scholars to regard the Upaniṣads as presenting a single systematic and coherent philosophy on the basis of the interpretations and expositions of either Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva or others has much obscured the independence and originality of the speculations of many thinkers of the Upaniṣadic tradition. Such an attitude fails to take account of the fact that although the Upaniṣadic thinkers owed allegiance to the Vedic tradition, they were free to theorize on matters and topics that fell outside the scope of that tradition. They not only belonged to separate schools but were often separated and isolated geographically. Besides, many generations would have lapsed between one outstanding teacher and another. We find evidence of conflicting theories, of the criticism and replacement of one theory by another and the influence of earlier views on later thinkers, who build on them. All this would not have been possible if there was a single uniform philosophy called the *vedānta*, which is unfolded on every page of the Upaniṣadic texts

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(20) If we examine the Upaniṣadic texts, considering the theories found in separate sections or ideological units separately, we would find that the thinkers of the Upaniṣads can be classified into two different categories. Firstly, there are those who found and propound their views by indulging in metaphysical speculation and rational argument not without a basis in experience, despite the earlier mythology weighing heavily on their minds. Secondly, there are those who profess their theories as an expression and interpretation of what they claim to have themselves experienced by the practice of yoga, although in the form in which they are presented they are dressed in a good deal of metaphysical clothing. The former set of thinkers are usually met with in the Early Upaniṣads while the latter are generally represented in the Middle and Late Upaniṣads, but no absolute division is possible since the rational metaphysicians are found in some of the Middle and Late Upaniṣads (e.g. Praśna) while references to yoga philosophy and practice are not entirely absent in the Early Upaniṣads

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(21) The difference between these two types of thinkers, namely the rational metaphysicians who found their theories on *a priori* and empirical reasoning and the contemplative intuitionists who claim to acquire special insights into the nature of reality by following certain techniques of mind control and culture, would be clearer if we take samples of their theories and statements and examine the epistemological bases of their thought. Let us first consider some of the metaphysical theories and see on what kind of thinking and reasoning they are based.

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(22) Let us take the philosophy of Uddālaka. His philosophy has been treated separately¹ by both Barua² as well as Ruben.³ Ruben examines his ontology and calls it a ‘hylozoistische Monismus’,⁴ and refers to Uddālaka as ‘der alteste Materialist’⁵ and as a ‘Realist’.⁶ Barua starts with his theory of knowledge and is inclined to call him an Empiricist. Since we are interested only in this aspect of his thought we may examine Barua’s appraisal of it. He says; ‘… Uddālaka propounded an empirical theory of knowledge. Henceforth let no one speak, he asserts, of anything but that which is heard, perceived or cognized. He seems repeatedly to point out:—The only right method of scientific investigation into the nature of reality is that of inference by way of induction’ (*op. cit.*, p. 138). Later Barua seems to qualify Uddālaka’s claims to be a pure empiricist: ‘According to his own showing the senses furnish us with sufficient indications from which the knowing mind can easily infer the nature and relations of things in themselves’.⁷

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¹ I e. separately from the rest of Upaniṣadic thought

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² *A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy*, pp 124–42

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³ *Die Philosophen der Upanishaden*, Bern, 1947, pp 156–77, cp. *Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie, Einführung in die Indienkunde*, Berlin, 1954, pp. 25–7, 81–94.

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⁶ *Die Philosophen der Upanishaden*, p. 156.

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⁷ *Op cit*, p. 140, v his subtitle, ‘Uddālaka neither trusts nor yet distrusts the evidence of the senses’.

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(23) Now the statement that Barua attributes to Uddālaka, namely ‘henceforth let no one speak of anything but that which is heard, perceived or cognized’ does not seem to bear the meaning that Barua gives to it, when we consider its literal translation in the context in which it appears. Uddālaka propounds the elements of his philosophy and then says, ‘Verily, it was just this that the great householders and great students of sacred knowledge knew when they said of old, “no one will now mention to us what we have not heard, what we have not perceived, what we have not thought” ’ (etaddha sma vai tad vidvāṁsa āhuḥ purve mahāśālā mahāśrotriyāḥ na no ’dya kaścana aśrutaṁ, amatam, avijñātaṁ udāhariṣyatī ti, Ch. 6.⁴.⁵). This statement does not seem to convey anything more than that anyone who has grasped the theory set forth by Uddālaka knows all there is to be known and therefore no one can teach him, 1.e. make him hear, think or understand anything new It is a dogmatic assertion claiming finality for his philosophy. It does not mean, 'henceforth let no one speak ...' but 'today (adya) no one (na kaścana) will speak (udāhariṣyati) ...' and no epistemological significance can be attached to it.

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⁴ *Die Philosophen der Upanishaden*, p. 166

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⁵ *Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie*, p. 81.

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(24) Whether Uddālaka is an empiricist or not can only be determined by examining the epistemic origin of his theory and when we do so, he appears to be basically a rationalist, who makes considerable use of empirical premises to illustrate his theory and serve as a basis for his metaphysical insights.

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(25) Uddālaka for the first time in the history of Indian thought expressly suggests a proof of the reality of Being (sat) instead of merely assuming it, when he asserts, 'some say that . from non-Being Being was produced But, verily, my dear, whence could this be? ... how could Being be produced from Non-Being?' (taddhaika āhuh ... asatah saj jāyata. Kutas tu khalu, saumya, evam syāt ... katham asatah saj jāyeta, Ch 6 2.¹, 2)

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(26) Having proved the reality of being by pure reasoning, Uddālaka had to explain how the world could have a plurality of things, if Being (sat) alone were real. If Being was the only reality, plurality is mere appearance. The different shapes and names that things have, cannot be real, for Being is the one and only substance that exists This is illustrated by some empirical examples. When we see an object of clay, we know that its shape and name can be changed but its substance cannot be changed for 'the modification is merely a verbal distinction, a name, the reality is just clay' (vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttikety eva satyam, 6.¹.4)

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(27) It is not only the present plurality that has to be accounted for but the origin of this plurality. Here Uddālaka uncritically accepts the earlier mythological notions and says that Being *wishes* to multiply and procreate and produces heat (6 2.3) Heat (tejas) produces water (apas) and water food (annam) (6 2.3, 4) Empirical evidence is adduced in favour of this causal sequence,¹ where it is pointed out that when we are hot, water (i.e. tears or perspiration) is produced (6.2.3) and that water in the form of rain produces food (6.2.4).

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¹ Note that heat, water and food are in the relationship of root and sprout, ' with food for a sprout look for water as the root With water as a sprout look for heat as the root' . annena śungeṅāpo mūlam anviccha, abdhih . . śungena tejo mūlam anviccha, 6 8 4)

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(28) Original being conceived as an active and animating principle now produces everything out of its three emergent products, heat, water and food (6.3.2). So all things are made out of these three constituents, which are called the three colours or forms (trīṇī rūpāṇi, 6.4.1) because heat is supposed to be red in colour, water white and food or earth dark (6.4.2), again presumably on empirical grounds. Man himself is therefore a product of these three forms. But how can the mind or voice be explained as a by-product of these three primary products? Uddālaka here speaks of the coarse (sthaviṣṭaḥ), medium (madhyamaḥ) and fine (aṇiṣṭhaḥ) constituents of these products (6.5) and argues that the finest essence of food moves upward on the analogy of butter moving upward when milk is churned (6.6.1) and becomes the mind. Food becoming mind is again proved empirically on the grounds that if you refrain taking food while drinking only water for some time you forget what is in your mind¹ (6.7.1–3). Physiological processes like hunger and thirst are likewise explained as being due to the interaction of the primary products. You are hungry (*aśanā* = *aś-a-nā*) because water leads off (*nayanti*) the food eaten (*aśitam*) (6.8.3). This argument is based on fanciful etymology and is reminiscent of the type of reasoning found in the Brāhmaṇas (*v. supra*, 14).

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(29) We are therefore produced from Being though we do not know it (6.9.2). We also reach Being at death for in the process of dying there is a reversal of the process of production, the mind (the product of food) goes into breath (prāṇa, the product of water) and breath in turn to heat and heat into the highest deity, at which point he knows not (6.15.1–2), for he cannot recognize the people who gather round him (*loc. cit.*). What is empirically urged by observations made on the dying man is also rationally arrived at where it is suggested that the substance of our personality, constituting the mind, breath and voice are so completely mixed up on reaching homogeneous Being that there would be no separate mind to know that 'I am this one' (iyam aham asmi) or 'I am that one' (iyam aham asmi) so that we know not that we have reached Being (6.9.¹, 6.10.1).

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¹ This is one of the earliest experiments performed with the idea of testing a theory; cp Ruben, 'Er liess seinen Sohn Śvetaketu funfzehn Tage nicht fur einen Ritus, sondern als materialistisches Experiment fasten. . .', *Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie*, p 87

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(30) Uddālaka ought to have said in accordance with his metaphysics that all beings are produced from Being at birth without knowing it and subsequently reach Being at death without knowing it. But the necessity of assigning a special reward to knowledge as was the prevalent fashion of the times (*v. supra*, 16) probably makes him say inconsistently that those who do not know his theory become tigers, lions, etc., in the next life (6.9.3) while those who know his theory (which is assumed to be the truth) reach Being and are merged in it never to return, their belief in truth ensuring this just as much as he who speaks the truth is saved in a trial by ordeal (6.16.1–3).

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(31) At the end of the lecture, Uddālaka's son understands (vijajñau, 6.16.3) the theory that was propounded. There is no suggestion or implication whatsoever that the theory was to be comprehended by the practice of special techniques such as yoga It was merely this rational understanding that was considered necessary for ensuring the goal of reaching Being at death. The theory itself is clearly a product of reason and speculation, as we have shown. The reasoning is partly *a priori* and partly empirical, although the *a priori* reasoning is not consistent and the empirical conclusions not warranted by the evidence adduced. It is also necessary to note the impact of the earlier mythology and the Brāhmanic 'reasoning' on the thought of Uddālaka. When the Buddha says that there was a class of brahmins who propounded theories on the basis of reason and speculation (*v. infra*, 420 ff.), was he thinking of thinkers of the type of Uddālaka, whose name and the central theme of whose philosophy was known to the Jātakas?¹

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(32) Let us now consider another metaphysical theory which is a product of rational and empirical reasoning and which is attributed to Prajāpati in the section 8.7–12 of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. Its interest for Buddhism lies in the fact that it contains a kind of reasoning, which is taken to its logical conclusion in Buddhism (*v. infra*, 39).

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(33) The inquiry begins with the assumption that there is a soul (ātman) which has the characteristics, *inter alia*, of being free from death (vimṛtyuh), free from sorrow (viśokaḥ) and having real thoughts (satyasaṃkalpaḥ) (8.7.¹). The problem is to locate this soul in one's personality.

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(34) The first suggestion is that the soul may be the physical personality, which is seen reflected in a pan of water (8 8.¹). But this physical personality, it is argued on empirical grounds, is subject to death; ‘it perishes in the wake of the perishing of this body’ (asyaiva śarīrasya nāśam anv eṣa naśyati, 8.9.1). So this will not do (nāham atra bhogyam paśyāmi *loc. cit.*). This conclusion embodies a rational argument of the following sort: if *X* (the body, in this instance) has the characteristic not-*p* (i.e. not free from death), then it cannot be an instance of *A* (the ātman), which necessarily has (by definition, i.e. assumption) the characteristic *p*.

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¹ *v.* Barua, *op. cit.*, pp 125–7.

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(35) The next suggestion is that the soul may be identified with the self in the dream-state (8.10.1). This escapes the objection against the previous suggestion for the dream-self ‘is not slain when (the body) is slain’ (na vadhenāsya hanyate, 8.10.2). The logic of the reasoning is as follows: here is an instance of *Y* (the dream-self), which has the characteristic *p* (free from death) and which therefore may be an instance of *A* which must have the characteristic *p*. But this suggestion too is turned down (*v.* nāham atra bhogyam paśyāmi, 8.10.2) for not only must *Y* have the characteristic *p* to be an instance of *A*, but it must also have the characteristic *q* (free from sorrow, viśokaḥ). But it is seen on empirical grounds that *Y* does not have the characteristic *q*: ‘he comes to experience as it were what is unpleasant, he even weeps as it were’ (apriyavetteva bhavati, api rodatīva, 8.10.2). Therefore, *Y* cannot be an instance of *A*.

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(36) The next suggestion is that the soul may be identified with the state of deep sleep (8.11.1). This, it may be observed, escapes the objections against the two previous suggestions. The reasoning may be represented as follows: here is an instance of *Z* (the state of deep sleep), which has the characteristic *p* (free from death; *v.* etad amṛtam, this is immortal, 8.11.1) and also the characteristic *q* (free from sorrow or grief; *v.* samastaḥ samprasannaḥ ... etad abhayam, being composed and serene ... this is free from fear, 8.11.1) and which therefore may be an instance of *A*, which must have the characteristics *p* and *q*. But this suggestion too is turned down, (*v.* nāham atra bhogyam paśyāmi, 8.11.1) for not only must *Z* have the characteristics *p* and *q* to be an instance of *A*, but it must also have the characteristic *r* (real thoughts, satya-saṃkalpaḥ) But it is seen on empirical grounds (i.e. by introspection) that *Z* does not have the characteristic *r*, ‘in truth he does not know himself with the thought “I am he” nor indeed the things here—he becomes one who has gone to destruction’ (nāha khalv ayam evaṃ sampraty ātmānaṃ jānāti, ayam aham asmī ti, no eveṁāni bhūtāni, vināśam evāpīto bhavati, 8.11.¹). The argument up to this point is that the ātman cannot be identified with any aspect of the personality, physical or psychological.

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(37) Not satisfied with this purely negative conclusion empirically arrived at, the metaphysical assumption is then made that the ātman (not identifiable with its states) must be an unobservable entity (a pure ego¹) within the personality with all its aspects. 'The body is mortal but is the support of the immortal bodiless ātman' (martyam ... idam śarīram ... tadasyāmṛtasyāśarīrasyātmano'dhiṣṭhānam, 8.12.1). Dogmatic utterances have now taken the place of rational arguments and Prajāpati now indulges in his own quota of Brāhmanic 'reasoning'. He sees an analogy between 'air, clouds, lightning and thunder' on the one hand and the ātman on the other, since both are bodiless (8.12.2) and argues that since the air, etc., 'reach the highest light and appear each with its own form' (param jyotir upasampadya svena svena rupenābhinispadyante, 8 12 2), the ātman too, similarly (evam, 8.11.2), 'rises up from this body and reaches the highest light and appears in its own form' (asmāc charīrāt samutthāya param jyotir upasampadya svena rupenābhinispadyate, 8 11.3).

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¹ On the use of this term, *v* Broad, *The Mind and its Place in Nature*, pp 214 ff, 278 ff, 558 ff, and 603 ff.

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(38) Incidentally, it is significant that elsewhere in the Upaniṣads the soul (ātman) is identified with the dream-state (Bṛh. 4.3.9, 10, Ch. 8.3.2) and with the state of deep sleep (Bṛh 2 1.16–20) and therefore this theory constitutes a criticism of these earlier theories (*v. supra*, 19)

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(39) It will be seen that the Buddha in advocating the theory of anattā follows a pattern of argument very similar to that used by Prajāpati here in the earlier part of his theory. The Buddha like Prajāpati takes various aspects of the personality and shows that none of them can be identified with the ātman, since they do not have the characteristics of the ātman. The following is a sample of such an argument.

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Buddha—What think you? Is the physical personality permanent or impermanent? (Taṁ kim maññasi? ... rūpam niccam vā aniccam vā ti, M.I. 232) Saccaka—It is impermanent (aniccam ..., *loc. cit*) Buddha—Is what is impermanent sorrowful or happy? (Yam panā-niccaṁ dukkhaṁ vā tam sukhaṁ vā ti, *loc. cit.*)

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Saccaka—Sorrowful (dukkham ..., *loc. cit.*) Buddha—Of what is impermanent, sorrowful and liable to change, is it proper to regard it as ‘this is mine, this I am, this is my soul’? (Yam panāniccaṃ dukkham vipariṇāmadhammam, kallan nu tam samanupassitum: etam mama, eso’ham asmi, eso me attā ti, M. I.233) Saccaka—It is not (No h’idam ..., *loc. cit.*).

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This same argument is now repeated for other aspects of the personality such as feeling (vedanā), ideation (saññā), etc. (*loc. cit.*). One may compare the expression used in the Pāli passage, *eso aham asmi* to indicate the identification, with the corresponding expression, *ayam aham asmi* (Ch. 8.11.1) used for the same purpose, in the Upanisad. The main difference in the attitude of Prajāpati and the Buddha is that the former assumes the existence of an ātman and on failing to identify it with any of the states of the personality, continues to assume that it must exist within it and is not satisfied with the results of the purely empirical investigation, while the latter as an Empiricist makes use of the definition of the concept of the ātman without assuming its existence (or non-existence) and is satisfied with the empirical investigation which shows that no such ātman exists because there is no evidence for its existence. Was it those who reasoned in this manner basing their reasoning on definitions (laksaṇa-), who were called *lakkhana-vādā* (Nd. I.294; *v. infra*, 367)?

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(40) Whether these Upanisadic theories were known to Buddhism and had an impact on the thought of Buddhism can only be determined in the light of evidence. It is worth noting that Prajāpati’s theory of the state of the soul after death is utterly different from Uddālaka’s. In the Brahmajāla Sutta there is a reference to a theory held by a school of brahmins (eke samaṇa-brāhmaṇā, D. I.30) to the effect that the soul after death has form (rūpī), is without defect (arogo, *lit.* without disease) and is conscious (saññī) (D. I.31). Prajapati’s theory assigned all these characteristics to the soul after death. The soul has form since ‘it appears in its own form’ (svena rūpeṇābhiniṣpadyate, 8.12.3). It is without defect or disease since it is said that ‘when crossing that bridge (to the next world) if one is blind he becomes no longer blind, if he is sick he becomes no longer sick’ (etam setum tīrtvāndhaḥ sann anandho bhavati, viddhaḥ sann aviddho bhavati, Ch. 8.4.2). And the soul is conscious because if it so desires it becomes conscious of enjoyment with women, chariots or relations (8.12.3). According to Uddālaka’s theory on the other hand the soul would be without form (arūpī), without defect (arogo) and without consciousness¹ (asaññī) being merged in Being, which is another theory about the after-life ascribed to a school of brahmins in the Brahmajāla Sutta (*v.* D. I 32).

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¹ Note his saying that on reaching Being after death, 'they know not, "I am this one", "I am that one" ' (Ch 6 10 1).

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(41) Let us now briefly consider some aspects of the thought of Yājñavalkya. Yājñavalkya's importance for us lies in the fact that he too is a rationalist thinker, who popularized a double negative form of expression, used in the Buddhist texts. His theory of survival also seems to be known to Buddhism.²

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(42) Yājñavalkya has been called a mystic (Mystiker)² by Ruben but this is misleading since there is no reason to believe that Yājñavalkya's theories are based on any kind of mystical experience as were the views of most of the thinkers of the Middle and Late Upaniṣads. Besides, another fact that has not been considered in the treatment of Yājñavalkya is that the teachings ascribed to him in different places in the Upaniṣads do not seem to be of a piece, consistent with each other. For instance, on the one hand the *neti neti* doctrine or the transcendent conception of Brahman, who is describable only in terms of negative epithets, is attributed to him (Brh. 3.9 26, 4 5.13) and on the other hand the pantheistic doctrine totally opposed to it to the effect that Brahman is 'made of this, made of that' (idammayaḥ adomaya iti, Brh. 4.4.5). The probable explanation for this is that several incompatible doctrines were put in the mouth of an outstanding teacher.

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² *Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie*, p 95

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(43) We shall confine ourselves to Yājñavalkya of the *neti neti* doctrine and consider the passages ascribed to him in sections 2 4.1-14, 3 9.28 and 4 5.15 of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Now Deussen quite rightly traces 'the primitive source of the entire conception of the unknowableness of the ātman'³ to the statements ascribed to Yājñavalkya in this Upaniṣad, but it is equally necessary to emphasize the fact that the rational unknowability of the ātman is rationally arrived at and is not a product of mystic experience. In fact Deussen himself points this out when examining (Brh. 2.4 12-14 = 4 5.13-15), the *locus classicus* of this doctrine, he says, 'On careful consideration two thoughts will be found to be implied here. (1) the supreme ātman is unknowable because he is the all-comprehending unity, whereas all knowledge presupposes a duality of subject and object; but (2) the individual ātman also is unknowable because in all knowledge he is the knowing subject, consequently can never be the object'.¹ We agree with Deussen that two arguments are implicit in this passage, first that since reality is one and knowledge is dual, we cannot have knowledge of reality and second that the subject of knowledge cannot be known since it is never the object and 'thou canst not know the knower of knowing' (na vijñater vijñātāram vijānīyāḥ, Brh. 3.4.²). This is reasoning and not mystic experience.

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³ *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, Edinburgh, 1906, p 79

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¹ *Op cit*, pp 79, 80

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(44) Yājñavalkya's conception of the after-life is also a product of reasoning. At Brh. 3.9.28, he compares man to a tree. Now a tree when it is felled at the root grows up again from the root 'but when a man dies from what root can he grow up' (martyaḥ svin mṛtyunā vṛkṇaḥ kasmān mūlāt prarohati, 3.9.28.4). One cannot say it is from semen (retasa iti mā vocata, 3.9.28.5) for that is possible even while the person is living. The answer given is cryptic for it is said that 'when born he is not born again for who would again beget him' (jāta eva na jāyate, konvenam janayet punaḥ, 3.9.28.7). This is a plain denial of the possibility of rebirth (*punar janman*) and his theory seems to be as he himself states that 'after death there is no consciousness' (na pretya² samjñāsti, 4.5.13). By this he means the absence of any sense-consciousness, since this is possible only by the presence of the sense-organs, the uniting place (ekāyanam) of the sense-data (3.5.12). But he is at the same time not denying that all consciousness is absent since the subject of consciousness, conceived by him as 'a mass of pure experience' (*ayam ātmā*, anantaro'bāhyaḥ, kṛtsnaḥ prajñāna-ghana eva, 4.5.13) persists. So the state of survival is one in which 'there is no samjñā' nor a lack of it, i.e. no asamjñā. Now in the Majjhima Nikāya (II.231) there is a reference to a school of recluses and brahmins who argued that 'the state of being neither conscious nor unconscious' (na-eva-saññā-na-asaññā) was a peaceful (santa-) and an excellent state (paṇītam) because on the one hand 'normal consciousness is defective, a disease, a thorn' (saññā rogo saññā gaṇḍo saññā sallam, *loc. cit*) while 'unconsciousness is utterly bewildering' (asaññā sammoho). Yājñavalkya's conclusion is at least the same, though his argument is somewhat different but we may observe the parallel between the use of sammoha in the Pāli passage with the use of *moha*- to denote the bewilderment of Maitreyī (mohāntam āpīpipat) when Yājñavalkya says that 'after death there is no consciousness' at which Yājñavalkya replies, 'I am not speaking of a state of bewilderment' (na vā are'ham *mohaṃ* bravīmi, 8.5.14) probably implying as in the Pāli passage to a state of utter blankness in which there is no consciousness at all.

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