Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.141
Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.141
- Language
- English
c8.141
(202) Whether for the niyati-vādin, causation in the ultimate analysis was unreal or not, the fact of causation seems to have been accepted by him at least at the level of conventional truth. That even the later Ājīvika rigidly believed in causation in a strictly determinist sense is evident from the argument for niyati in Gunaratna’s (14th C ) work, according to which it is necessary to posit the existence of the force of niyati in order to account for causes and effects (kāryakāraṇa). Professor Basham has given the gist of this argument but has failed to quote the sentence, which seems to imply a belief in causation on the part of the niyati-vādin. We may translate the argument as stated by Gunaratna as follows· ‘Whatever happens at any time, anywhere, is to be conceived as happening in the form of niyati only. Otherwise there would be no *definite* sequence of causes and effects (*kārya-kāraṇa-vyavasthā*) or a fixed pattern of anything, owing to the absence of a controlling agent’.^1