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Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.142

Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.142

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English

c8.142

(203) When we consider the arguments of the niyativādin as stated by Śīlāṅka (9th C.) we find that arguments based on the two principles of causal determination play a fundamental rôle As Mill stated in his ‘A System of Logic’, the methods of discovering a causal connection are ‘two in number’ (*op. cit*, 253) of which ‘one is, by comparing together different instances in which the phenomenon occurs The other is, by comparing instances in which the phenomenon does occur, with instances in other respects similar in which it does not. These two methods may be respectively denominated the Method of Agreement and the Method of Difference’ (*loc. cit*). These two principles known in Indian logic as the *anvaya-vyatireka-rīti* first appear in a concrete form in the causal formula of the Pāli Nikāyas But this notion is constantly made use of by the niyativādin in arguing against his opponent One of the arguments of the believer in karma, is that there is a causal connection between good karma and pleasant consequences and evil karma and unpleasant consequences The niyativādin shows by applying the two principles of causal determination to what is observable in this world, that there is no such causal connection Good is not always followed by happiness nor evil by grief, nor is the absence of good followed by the absence of happiness and the absence of evil by the absence of grief. The argument is actually stated as follows: ‘In this world, grief does not arise for a man even though he delights in evil courses, while for another person who does good, it does’. ¹ It is thus concluded that there is no causal connection between evil and grief or good and happiness.