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Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.159

Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.159

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English

c8.159

where A==belief in niyatiyavāda From observing the two sequences one may draw the conclusion that A is not a causal factor; so is not-A not a causal factor for the absence of A has made no difference to the result. So both those who claim that kiriya (the act) is a cause or that akiriya (the non-act) is a cause are equally wrong as regards the cause—this is in fact supported by Jacobi's second translation, though it is not supported by the actual wording of the argument. Although this negative conclusion—that belief in kiriya or akiriya cannot be the cause—seems to be implied, the actual conclusion that is drawn is a positive one, namely that niyati must be the causal factor. But this is an assumption, since niyati is a metaphysical factor, which is unobservable and cannot be discovered experimentally. Yet what is most significant is that the niyativādin seems to have been convinced in some sense of the fact of causation and made use of the causal argument, based on a belief in the principles of causal determination to show that his opponent was wrong. The problem is whether these concepts were borrowed from another school or were intrinsic to his own system.