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Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.160

Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.160

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English

c8.160

(207) According to the argument of the niyativādin as stated by Guṇaratna (*v. supra*, 202), the niyativādin believed in a ‘fixed pattern of causes and effects’ (kārya-kāraṇavyavasthā) but we saw at the same time that Pūraṇa, the niyativādin, was called an upholder of the ‘doctrine of causelessness’¹ (ahetuvāda-). The reason for these contradictory evaluations would be clear if we can comprehend the niyativādin's concept of causation. He denied whatever was held as the causes of events natural or metaphysical, by his opponents (*e.g.* purusakāra-, karma-, kāla-, īśvara-). This would have made him appear in the eyes of his opponents as one who denied all causes, internal or external, of events. But all his criticisms imply a belief in causation, which in the ultimate analysis turns out to be a belief in niyati conceived as the first and the efficient cause of all phenomena. Nature to him was a single rigidly deterministic system, in which no individual or separate causal lines² or processes were discoverable or distinguishable. All events and processes were caused but caused by the all-embracing metaphysical principle of niyati. For such a rigid determinist individual causal processes could not be conceived in isolation from the entire system. This would have appeared to be the very denial of causation as understood by some of their opponents and it is difficult to believe that the conception of the principles of causal determination could have arisen in such a system. On the other hand if niyati was only a metaphysical controlling force which guaranteed the operation of the laws of cause and effect, as Gunaratna's argument of the niyativādin would make us understand, we would have to say that he believed in causation with the difference that for him the supreme Cause of causes and causal processes was the factor of niyati. In such a case he would be an ahetukavādin only in the sense of denying the metaphysical validity of what his opponents conceived to be the hetu-s of things.