Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.230
Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.230
- Language
- English
c8.230
(237) This attitude is reflected in Mahāvīra's solution to at least some metaphysical problems. For instance, at this time the Materialists on the one hand held that the body and the soul were identical or that there was no soul apart from the body (*v. supra*, 130); on the other hand the eternalists held that the soul was different from the body (*v. infra*, 384–7). It is said that when Mahāvīra was asked whether 'the body was (identical with) the soul or different from it' (āyā, bhante, kāye anne kāye? Bhagavatī Sūtra, 13.7.495, *op. cit.*, fol. 1141), he is said to have replied that 'the body is (identical with) the soul as well as different from it' (āyā vi kāye anne vi kāye, *loc. cit.*). The same kind of reply is given in this context to the questions as to whether the body has form (rūvim) or has no form (arūvim), is conscious (sacitte) or is not conscious (acitte), is a 'jīva or is an ajīva' (jīve vı kāye ajīve vı kāye, *loc. cit*). These would appear to be self-contradictory propositions to assert, but Mahāvīra would have resolved the contradiction by saying that the soul is identical with the body from one point of view and different from the body in another point of view (naya-) It is only when 'one understands the true nature of all substance by all the standard means of knowledge (pramāṇa) and all the points of view (naya) that one's knowledge is comprehensive'.¹
Cites (1)
- Viyāhapannatti — Sudharman, Ardhamāgadhī Prakrit