Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.236
Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.236
- Language
- English
c8.236
(239) The attitude of mind that favoured this kind of relativism was also suspicious of the possibility of the truth lying in extreme points of view. We already found this in the compromise solutions of Mahāvīra who uses the expressions ‘both . . . and’ (syādastināsti) like the Trairāśikas with their sadasat to express the fact that two opposing points of view are both right and wrong and that their falsity consists in taking each extreme point of view to be the sole truth. At times Mahāvīra expressly states the truth is not to be found in extremes. It is said: ‘He should not believe that (this world) is without beginning or without end, eternal or not eternal, according to the argumentation (of the heretics). From these alternatives you cannot arrive at truth; from these alternatives you are led to error’ (Jacobi's Translation, SBE., Vol. 45, pp. 405, 406). The text reads: anādīyaṃ parinnāyā anavadaggeti vā guṇo, sāsayamasāsaë vā iti diṭṭhiṃ na dhārae, *eehiṃ dohiṃ thānehiṃ vavahāro na vijjaï. eehiṃ dohiṃthānehiṃ aṇāyāraṃ tu jānaë* (Sū. 2.5.2, 3). This point of view is in a sense a corollary of Jain relativism but, as would be seen, it plays a central rôle in Buddhism (*v. infra*, 607–9).
Cites (1)
- Sūyagaḍa — Sudharman, Ardhamāgadhī Prakrit