Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.49

c8.49

(160) This description as it stands obviously admits of more than one interpretation. On a very literal interpretation of it, it need not represent the point of view of a Sceptic at all, unless we mean by a Sceptic a person who suspends his judgment on the truth or falsity of a proposition, in the absence of adequate evidence or grounds for believing in its truth or falsity. If this class of thinkers merely refused to assert that something was positively good or evil, unless they had objective grounds for doing so, without being misled by subjective bias due to their likes and dislikes, they would not be Sceptics but critical thinkers recommending the outlook of science or intelligent commonsense. The only difference from scientific scepticism, which advocates the suspension of judgment in the absence of good evidence or valid grounds for asserting the truth or falsity of a proposition, would be that these thinkers did not merely consider that it was intellectually unsatisfactory not to suspend judgment under such circumstances, but that it was a moral danger (antarāyo) as well not to do so.