Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c8.80

c8.80

(176) The sceptical philosophy of this school is defined as follows: ‘Herein a certain recluse or brahmin is dull, stupid. And by reason of his dullness and stupidity, when questioned on this or that matter, he resorts to verbal jugglery or eel-wriggling: “If you ask me whether there is a next world, then if it were to occur to me (iti ce me assa) that there is a next world, I would pronounce that there is a next world. Yet, I do not say so, I do not say thus, I do not say otherwise, I do not say no, I deny the denials. Similarly with regard to the propositions, “there is no next world”, “there is and is not a next world”, “there neither is nor is not a next world”, “there are beings who survive (death)”, “there are no beings who survive”, “there are and are no beings who survive”, “there neither are nor are there no beings who survive”, “there is a result and a consequence of good and evil actions”, “there is no result or consequence of good or evil actions”, “there is and is no result or consequence of good or evil actions”, “the Perfect One (Tathāgato) exists after death”, “the Perfect One does not exist after death”, “the Perfect One both exists and does not exist after death”, “the Perfect One neither exists nor does not exist after death”’.⁴ (177) Professor Basham, dissenting from Barua's view that the passage mentioned above represents a doctrine that was held in good faith by a school of Pyrrhonists, thinks that the passage is 'probably satirical, a tilt at agnostic teachers who were unwilling to give a definite answer to any metaphysical question put to them' (*op. cit.*, p. 17). He adds that 'its agnosticism was never a part of the Ājīvika creed, and it may be omitted from further consideration' (*loc. cit.*).