Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge c9.76

c9.76

(289) Let us look at the Buddhist criticisms of the Vedic tradition in the light of the later claims which we have outlined above (*v. supra*, 253-257), made on behalf of this tradition by the orthodox schools The main Buddhist criticism was that the authors of the Vedas or their successors did not have any special insight nor did they admit seeing directly the truth of their assertions and claim infallibility for them The denial that the seers had a direct vision and knowledge of Brahmā was also tantamount to a denial that the Vedic tradition could claim to have been derived from Brahmā. Now both these criticisms are of a pauruṣeya-theory, which was advocated later by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika only out of all the orthodox schools. We have already stated the evidence which seemed to indicate how in the Brāhmanic and Early Upaniṣadic tradition, Vedic knowledge was deemed to be derived directly from a divine omniscient being, namely Prajāpati or Brahmā. At the same time there seems to have arisen about this time the belief that the original seers had a special intuitive knowledge of the Vedic dharma. This is apparent from Yāska's statement: sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇaḥ ṛṣayo babhūvuḥ, i.e. the seers had a direct personal knowledge of dharma, Nirukta, 1.20. It is this notion which the Nyāya utilizes to define the competency of the seers when it bases Vedic authority on the testimony of experts (āptāḥ): kim punar āptānāṃ prāmāṇyam, sākṣātkṛtadharmatā bhūtadayā yathābhūtārthachikhyāpayiṣā iti,¹ i.e. wherein lies the validity of experts—(it lies in) the fact that they have a direct knowledge of dharma, compassion for beings and a desire to speak the truth. It seems to have been this very notion which was the main target of the criticism of the Buddhists who granted the honesty and trustworthiness of the seers but denied any special knowledge to them.