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Purva-Mimamsa in its Sources c28: Chapter XXIII: ‘Principal’ and ‘Auxiliary’

Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources c28

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Chapter XXIII: ‘Principal’ and ‘Auxiliary’

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Difference among Acts having been established, the next question that arises is—Is every one of these Acts self-contained and independent by itself in bringing about the *Apūrva*? Or some of them are auxiliary or subsidiary and subordinate to, and subserving the purposes of, some others? And if the latter, then what Acts are subsidiary and subservient to what? Though this ‘subserviency of Acts’ is the main subject-matter of this *Third Discourse*, yet as we proceed we shall find that it is not only *Acts* that are so ‘subservient’ or ‘auxiliary’, but also *Substances* and their *Properties*. This fact has to be borne in mind, because, as a matter of fact, the whole of the rest of the *Sūtras* (Discourses IV to XII) turn directly or indirectly, upon this relation of ‘Principal’ and ‘Auxiliary’. This has been thus declared by *Kumārila* (*Tantra-Vā.*, Trs., p. 924):—

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शेषस्यैवाधिकारोऽत्र युक्तो नान्यस्य कस्यचित् ।
शेषधीसिद्ध्यपेक्षत्वात् सर्वलक्षणवाधिधाम् ॥

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That is, the question of ‘Auxiliary character’ has to be dealt with here, because the proper consideration of all other questions of *Motive* and the rest dealt with under Discourses IV to XII, is dependent upon this idea of ‘auxiliary character’.

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The *first* question is—What is an ‘Auxiliary’?

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The answer to this has been provided in Sū. 3.1.2—*The Auxiliary is that which subserves the purposes of something else*; that is, the Auxiliary is to be defined as ‘that which helps another’;—that is, what exists entirely for helping others. (*Bhāṣya*, Trs., p. 337). This has been further explained as ‘that which is indicated by *Direct Assertion*, etc., as helping some *Action*, towards the fulfilment of its *Apūrva*;' this latter qualification being necessary for precluding mere verbal relationship. This helping, or subserving the purpose of, something else does not necessarily, in itself, imply that the Auxiliary must in some way help the Principal; but such helping is assumed on the basis of Presumption. For instance, in the case of *Sprinkling water* on the corn, the fact of its having been enjoined in connection with a Sacrifice leads to the Presumption that it must accord some help to this Sacrifice; similarly in the case of the *Prayājas* prescribed in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices, we find that these latter stand in need of *help*; and also that certain other Acts in the shape of the *Prayājas* need something to which they could accord some help; and this mutual need leads us to the Presumption that the *Prayājas* help, and subserve the purpose of, the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices.

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In this connection there is a question that has created some confusion in the minds of the students of *Mīmāṃsā*. In Sū. 2.1. 7-8, we have a division of Acts into ‘Primary’ and Subsidiary’; now the ‘Subsidiary’ Act will naturally be *subservient* to the ‘Primary’, that is it will help it; where then is the use of raising the same question over again (under Discourse III)?

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Two answers have been provided to this question. (1) That the *Sūtras* under Discourse II have taken note of Acts only, and those also, only such as are actually found to fulfil only visible ends; while the present Discourse III takes up not only all *Acts* serving visible and invisible ends, but also such details as *Substances*, *Mantras* and so forth. This answer has been rejected by Kumārila (*Tantra-Vā.*, Trs., p. 670), on the ground that under the said explanation, the subject-matter of Discourse II would be only a part of what is dealt with under Discourse III. The explanation that he suggests is that—(2) the fact that the *Acts* dealt with under Discourse II—Threshing of the Corn, for instance,—are ‘subservient’ to others can be ascertained only from what the *Sūtras* set forth under Discourse III;—what has been said under Discourse II therefore is only this—that these acts cannot be regarded as bringing about an *Apūrva* by themselves, for the simple reason that they are found to fulfil purely visible purposes in connection with some other acts;—‘and under the circumstances, if they were to produce their own *Apūrva*,—there would be several *Apūrvas* produced by the Act’—adds the *Ṛijuvimalā* (MS., Vol. III, p. 11). (See p. 265)

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According to Prabhākara (*Bṛhatī*, MS., p. 65 and *Ṛijuvimalā*. MS., p. 1) the connection between the two Discourses (III and IV) is to be explained thus:—What has been explained under Discourse II is only the difference among *Injunctive Texts*: that is to say, it has been shown there how and where two such texts are to be treated as *different*, by reason of the difference between the resultant *Apūrvas* indicated in each, and also of the difference among the several adjuncts of these; and as the *Act* is the most important of these Adjuncts, the difference among *Acts* also has been expounded in this Discourse II; but this last only as the *basis of differentiation among the Texts*; thus the difference dealt with under that Discourse is that based upon consideration of connection among the words of the Injunctive Text. On the other hand, the difference upon which the subject-matter of Discourse III is based is that of the *Niyoga* or *Apūrva* resulting from *Acts*. (See *Rijuvimalā*, MS., Vol. III, p. 3). The distinction herein drawn becomes clear from the example of the text ‘Washes the Cup’, where the relation between the *Cup* and the *Washing*, as expressed by the words, is only that of the *Cup* being the objective of the Act of *Washing*; while the relation of ‘Subserviency’ between the two is based upon the fact that the *Washing* helps the *Cup* towards the fulfilment of some other result. Thus what is dealt with under Discourse III is closely connected with what has gone before under Discourse II.

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The next question is—What is it that can be ‘Auxiliary’ or ‘Subsidiary’?

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The answer to this has been provided by *Sūtra* 3.1. 3—6; wherein it is stated that the ‘Auxiliary character’ can belong to (*a*) Substances, (*b*) Properties, and (*c*) Embellishments, (Sū. 3), also to (*d*) Acts (Sū. 4), (*e*) Results (Sū. 5) and (*f*) the Human Agent (Sū. 6).—(*a*) The Substance helps the Acts; no Act can be performed without a *Substance*;—(*b*) the Property serves the purpose of marking out the Substance to be used; and thereby helps the Act;—(*c*) the *Embellishment* is that on the accomplishment of which a certain Substance becomes fit for a certain purpose, and thus helps the Act; (*d*) the *Act* also is enjoined, not as something to be accomplished in itself, but only as a means of accomplishing the desired Result; and in this capacity the Act is ‘auxiliary’ to the Result;—(*e*) the *Result* of the Act also accrues to the performing Agent, and thereby serves to help and benefit him; thus the Result also is ‘Auxiliary’ to the Agent;—(*f*) the performing Agent also figures as ‘Auxiliary’ to the Act, in cases where, for instance, the Sacrificial Post is declared to be ‘as tall as the Sacrificer’. (*Bhāṣya*, Trs., pp. 339-340.)

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There has been a difference of opinion among ancient sages on this matter of what can be an ‘Auxiliary’: According to sage *Bādari*, the ‘Auxiliary’ character can belong to Substances, Properties and Embellishments only (as stated in Sū. 3); while according to Jaimini, it can belong to the Act, the Result and the Agent also. These two views have been sought to be reconciled by the ‘revered *Vṛtti-kāra* in the following manner:—In relation to the *Sacrificial Act*, it is only Substances, Properties and Embellishments whose ‘Auxiliary character’ is *absolute*, these are always *auxiliary*; while the ‘Auxiliary character’ of the other three—Act, Result and the Performing Agent—is *relative*; for instance, while the Act is ‘Principal’ in relation to the *Substance*, it is ‘Auxiliary’ to the *Result*; the Result is ‘Principal’ in relation to the Act, but ‘Auxiliary’ to the *Agent*; and the *Agent* is ‘Principal’ in relation to the *Result*, but ‘Auxiliary’ to the *Act*,—(*Bhāṣya*, Trs., p. 340)

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The ‘auxiliary character’ of the *Agent* in relation to the *Act* (of Sacrifice, as enjoined by the word ‘*Yajēta*’) is clearly indicated by the Injunctive word ‘*Yajēta*’ itself, in the connotation whereof the *Act* of Sacrifice forms the ‘Principal’ factor; and the *Agent* comes in only because without him, the said *Act* would not be possible.

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The conclusion thus is that while Substances, Properties and Embellishments are *always* ‘Subsidiary’,—the Act, the Result and the *Agent* are both ‘Auxiliary’ and ‘Principal’ in relation to one another.

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—Says *Kumārila* (*Tantravārtika*, Trs., p. 944). फलायागनराणां च श्यकारत्वं परस्परम् ।

(A) Classification of Auxiliaries

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*Auxiliaries* have been classified by *Kumārila* and his followers under two heads—(1) Direct and (2) Indirect. Those Auxiliaries which help in the fulfilment of the Sacrifice, and only through that Sacrifice, the Final *Apūrva*, are called ‘Direct’; for instance, (*a*) the Substance (Corn) and (*b*) its Embellishments (Washing and Water-sprinkling), (*c*) the Deity (Agni, etc.) and (d) *Mantras*;—the water-sprinkling produces in the *Corn* a certain *Embellishment* not otherwise possible; the *threshing* helps the *Corn* by removing the chaff from the grain; the *Corn* itself helps the Sacrifice by making up the Cake; the *Mantras* help the Sacrifice by recalling and consecrating the Deity; the Deity helps the Sacrifice by becoming the Recipient, without whom no act of Sacrifice is possible; as the act of Sacrifice consists in offering Substances to a Deity. All these are ‘Direct’ Auxiliaries. On the other hand, those Auxiliaries are called ‘Indirect’ which produce distinct *Apūrvas* of their own,—these *Apūrvas* being produced in the Performer’s Soul—and through these subsidiary *Apūrvas*, help the Final *Apūrva* of the Sacrifice itself. (*Śāstradīpikā*, p. 202).

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*Prabhākara* and his followers (*Prakaraṇapañchikā*, pp. 202–205) have proceeded on somewhat different lines, in regard to the classification of Auxiliaries. Their classification appears to be more logical and exhaustive. It has been made under the following four heads—(1) *Jāti*, Universal, (2) *Guṇa*, Quality, (3) *Dravya*, Substance, and (4) *Bhāvārthātmaka*, Action. The last of these, Action, has been divided into (1) *Sannipattyopakāraka*, Directly helpful and (2) *Ārādupakāraka*, Indirectly helpful. That which produces its direct effects in a certain entity which is conducive to the fulfilment of the Sacrifice is the *Sannipattyopakāraka*, Direct ‘Auxiliary’, of the Sacrifice (*Prakaraṇapañchikā*, p. 202); *e.g.*, the *Sitting* of the Sacrificer, the *thumping* of the Corn and so forth, bring about no *Apūrva* of their own; but are related to the Final *Apūrva* of the Sacrifice to which they are Auxiliary. The *Sannipattyopakāraka*, or Direct Subsidiary, is again divided into the following four kinds—(a) that which brings about a certain Substance, *e.g.*, the *kneading* of the Flour, which brings into existence the Dough, which did not exist before;—(b) that which leads to the acquiring of a certain Substance that existed already; *e.g.*, the *milking* of the Cow; which brings about the acquisition of the Milk which was already there in the Cow;—(c) that which produces some modification in a Substance; *e.g.*, the *melting* of Clarified Butter, which changes the semi-solid into the liquid form; and (d) that which purifies, sanctifies or embellishes a Substance; *e.g.*, the *Sprinkling* of Water over the Corn, which does not produce any material change in the Corn, but adds to it something invisible and transcendental. (*Prakaraṇapañchikā*, pp. 202—205.)

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Under the *Bhaṭṭa* view, the *Sannipattyopakāraka* or Direct Auxiliaries lead to no distinct *Apūrvas* of their own; their full effect lies only in the accomplishment of certain material Substances; these have thus only visible Effects (See *Tantra-vā.* Trs. p. 526), and help the final *Apūrva* of the Sacrifice only through the aid that they impart to the material fulfilment of the Sacrifice. But even though these Auxiliaries themselves do not bring about distinct *Apūrvas*, yet, according to the followers of *Kumārila*, a certain distinct *Apūrva* does proceed from the choice of the particular Subsidiary; says the *Shāstradīpikā* (P. 203)—

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नियमदृष्टं तु कल्पनीयम् । तद्वरमेकमेव दृष्टार्थवघातनियमत् अदृष्टं कल्पितम् ॥

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For instance, the visible effect, in the shape of the removal of chaff, for which the Thumping and Threshing of the Corn have been laid down, can be accomplished by several methods; and hence, though the *Thumping and Threshing* may not produce an *Apūrva*, yet the *choice* that the Performer exercises, in having recourse to the one method of *Thumping and Threshing*, for removing the Chaff, does produce an *Apūrva*. The reason for this is that, according to *Kumārila*, every Vedic Injunction, by its very nature, must be related to an *Apūrva*; and as the *Thumping and Threshing* have been enjoined, it must be related to an *Apūrva*; but as the Act of *Thumping and Threshing* itself is found to be productive of a *visible Result*, in the shape of the removal of the Chaff, the *Apūrva* to which it is related can be due only to the *choice* of that particular method of removing the Chaff in preference to other methods; and the real reason underlying all this lies in the fact that the Vedic Injunction must lay down a *Dharma*,—and if that *Dharma* were not conducive to an *Apūrva*, the said Injunction would lose its character of ‘being an Injunction of *Dharma*’; and hence as the act itself is found to be conducive to only a visible end, we must accept an *Apūrva* as proceeding from the *choice* that is exercised. It is for this reason that such Injunctions have been called ‘*Niyamavidhi*’, ‘Restrictive Injunction’.

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This above view has not been accepted by the *Prābhākara*, according to whom, as explained above, though the *Sannipattyopakāraka*, Direct Auxiliary, is related to the Final *Apūrva* of the Sacrifice, it does not produce any distinct *Apūrva* of its own; as all that the Auxiliary—the *Thumping* of the Corn, for instance, does is to bring about something visible, e.g., the Removal of the Chaff; and yet it is a fit object of Injunction, as it does, through the fulfilment of the Sacrificial performance, help in the bringing about of the Final *Apūrva* of that Sacrifice. That is why such Auxiliary Acts have been called *Sannipattyopakāraka*,—which term has been etymologically explained as—

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यागस्वरूपे एव सन्निपत्य तस्यापूर्वसिद्धौ उपकुर्वन्ति

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(*Prakaraṇapañchikā*). This relationship to the Final *Apūrva* is deduced from the proximity of the text enjoining the Auxiliary to the text enjoining the Principal Sacrifice as leading to that Final *Apūrva*, and from the words of the text itself. This explanation has been objected to on the ground that, in this manner, as the principal fact of the Subsidiary being related to the *Apūrva* would not be expressed by the Vedic text itself, this text would become practically meaningless. The *Prābhākara’s* answer to this objection is that it is not necessary that every Vedic text must mention some purpose to be served; it is only a question of facts; a text that does not mention a purpose cannot be made to mention it. In the case in question however, the text does not become meaningless or purposeless, as it serves the purpose of laying down a certain method of doing a certain Act; and it is only the connection of that method with the *Apūrva* that is left to be implied by the said proximity of the text to the text enjoining the Principal Sacrifice;—and that Proximity forms one of the bases of Syntactical Connection is admitted by all philosophers. Thus the conclusion arrived at by the *Prābhākara* is—(*a*) that all *Sannipattyopakāraka*, Direct Auxiliaries, are ‘Subservient’ to the *Apūrva*, through Direct Assertion, (*b*) that they are ‘Subservient’ to the Substance conducive to the fulfilment of the Sacrificial Performance, through the very nature of the Substance concerned,—and (*c*) they are ‘Subservient’ to the Sacrifice itself, which is ‘instrumental’ in the bringing about of the Final *Apūrva*, by virtue of their providing the Substance suitable for being offered at the Sacrifice.—(*Prakaraṇapañchikā*, pp. 202—209.)

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As regards the second kind of Auxiliary, the *Ārādupakāraka*, Indirect Auxiliary,—it is of two kinds—(*a*) That which fulfils only an *unseen* purpose, and (*b*) That which fulfils a *Seen* as well as an *Unseen* purpose. As an example of the latter kind we have the *Payovrata*—the Penance of Living on Milk alone,—observed by the Sacrificer and his wife, during the performance of the *Jyotiṣṭoma*; and as examples of the former kind, we have all the Acts that are enjoined by the texts like ‘Perform the *Samiṭ*-Sacrifice’, which do not mention any effects produced by the Act either in any Substance or in the performing Agent, which would help the main Act of Sacrifice; and as it is only effects produced in the Substance or in the Agent that could be *seen*, the act of Sacrifice cannot but be regarded as bringing about an *Unseen* result. But all Acts of this class produce an intermediate *Apūrva*, through which they help in the appearance of the Final *Apūrva* of the Principal Sacrifice, to which latter, on that account, they are regarded as ‘Auxiliary’. As these Actions do not help the Principal Sacrifice in any perceptible manner, if they were not held to be productive of the *intermediate Apūrva*, then, as they will have disappeared long before the fruition of the Final *Apūrva*, they would not accord any help to the Principal Sacrifice. It is for this reason that in such cases, *Prābhākara* also admits of intermediate *Apūrvas* resulting from the Auxiliaries.

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This admission of the intermediate *Apūrvas* might give rise to the idea that a result of this kind would raise the further question regarding the method by which those Intermediate *Apūrvas* are to be brought about. With a view to such a contingency, the *Prābhākara* (in *Prakaraṇapañchikā*, pp. 214-215) has drawn a subtle distinction between the *‘Anuṣṭheya’* and the *‘Kārya’*; that which is recognised by the Agent, independently by itself, as something ‘to be done by me’ is *Anuṣṭheya*; while that is *Kārya* which, not existent before, is brought into existence only for the sake of the accomplishment of the former. It is the Final *Apūrva* alone that is *Anuṣṭheya*; and as a rule, the questions of method and procedure arise only in regard to what is *Anuṣṭheya*, not in regard to what is *Kārya*; hence no such question can arise in regard to the Intermediate *Apūrvas*, which are recognised only as helping in the accomplishment of the Final *Apūrva*.

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It may be noted here that the *Prābhākara* is rather strict in the matter of postulating *Apūrvas*; so long as he can find any perceptible result to justify an act, he will not assume an *Adṛṣṭa* or *Apūrva*; *Kumārila*, on the other hand, postulates an *Apūrva* in connection with every Injunction. Being an *Anvitābhidhānavādin*, the *Prābhākara* does not accept the maxim, ‘*Śābdī ākāṅkṣā śabdenaira pūryate*’,—by which the Details of Method and Procedure can be sought after only for the sake of a result in the shape of the *Apūrva*, and not for the sake of the Substance. (See *Nyāyamālāvistara*, p. 423). This maxim necessitates the assumption of an *Apūrva* with every Injunction, each of which under this maxim, must be self-contained, having all its needs as an Injunction supplied by itself; hence even that *Apūrva*, which is one of the factors in the *Bhāvanā* denoted by the Injunctive verb, has to be got out of every Injunction, even of the *Sannipattyopakāraka* or Direct Auxiliary; such *Apūrva* arising, if not from the Auxiliary act itself, at least from the *Niyama* or Choice of the particular method (See above). The *Prābhākara* however, not accepting the said maxim, takes every Injunction all along with all that it is found to be related to; and thus when the Auxiliary Act mentioned in the Injunctive text is found to be expressive of the bringing about of a material Substance, it becomes related to the Injunction of the Principal Sacrifice in the following manner:—The *Apūrva* of the Principal Sacrifice enjoined by the Principal Injunctive text is to be brought about by means of the Principal Act performed with materials and Substances brought into existence by means of the Auxiliary Acts enjoined by the Auxiliary Injunctive texts. Thus there is no need for assuming an *Apūrva* in connection with these latter acts; the objective of these injunctions resting entirely in the materials and substances brought into existence in accordance with them, which materials and substances are used at the principal Sacrifice.

(B) Means of Ascertaining What is Auxiliary to What

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There are six means of ascertaining what is auxiliary to what. These are (1) *Shruti*—Direct Assertion (in the Veda); (2) *Linga*—Indirect Indication; (3) *Vākya*—Syntactical Connection; (4) *Prakaraṇa*—Context; (5) *Krama* (or *Sthāna*), Order of Sequence, (or Place); and (6) *Samākhyā*—Name.

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As an instance of (1) *Direct Assertion*, we have the following;—There are certain *Mantra-texts* which are held to be sacred to certain Deities; one such Mantra is named ‘*Aindrī*’; in regard to this there is the *Direct Assertion*, in *Vajasanēya-Samhitā* (12—66), to the effect that ‘*With the Aindrī one should worship the Gārhapatya Fire*’;—in regard to this *Aindrī-Mantra*, there is a doubt, as to whether it should be used in the worshipping of *Indra*,—as indicated by its name '*Aindri*'—or in that of the *Gārhapatya Fire*,—as declared in the Direct Assertion of the Veda; the conclusion is that it should be used in the worshipping of the *Gārhapatya Fire*; and thus the Mantra becomes 'auxiliary' to the act of worshipping the said Fire. (Mīmā-Sū. 3.2.3-4).

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(2) *Linga*—Indirect Indication.—It has been laid down in the Veda that at the *Soma-Sacrifice*, the Soma-juice that is left after all the offerings have been made should not be thrown away, it should be drunk. In connection with the drinking of the Soma-Juice, we meet with the Mantra-text—'*Bhakṣchi* etc.' (Tai. Sam. 3.2.5.1) called the '*Bhakṣanuvāka*'. In regard to this the question arising as to whether this Mantra is to be used in connection with the act of actual *drinking* itself—as indicated by the name '*Bhakṣanuvāka*'—or in connection with the several acts attendant upon that act; the conclusion that it is to be used in connection with the *drinking* and also at all the attendant acts, such as holding the Juice in the hand, examining it, swallowing it,—all which collectively go to make up the act of '*Drinking*'. In accordance with this conclusion, the whole of the said *Bhakṣanuvāka* Mantra-text is broken up into four parts,—each part being employed with each of the four acts mentioned above as making up the act of '*Drinking*'. All this is due to the Indirect Indication of the words and expressions contained in the said Mantra-text. (a) So that the sentence beginning with the word '*bhakṣchi*' and ending with the word '*saghyāsam*' is to be used in connection with the holding of the juice-cup, such being the Indirect Indication of the word '*saghyāsam*'; (b) the Sentence beginning with the word '*Nṛchakṣasam*' and ending with the word '*Avakhyēṣam*' is to be used in connection with the act of *Looking* at or *Examining* the juice, through the indication of some of the words; (c) the Sentence beginning with the word '*Hinva*' and ending with the word '*Atigāḥ*', is to be used in connection with the act of *digesting* (swallowing) the juice, through the implication of the words in the Mantra; and (d) the sentence beginning with the word '*Mandrābhibhūti*' and ending with the word '*bhakṣayami*', is to be used with the act of actual *Eating* or *Drinking*, as indicated by last word.—(Mi. Su.)

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(3) *Vākya*, Syntactical Connection.—In connection with the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, we meet with the declaration (*Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 4.4.6.16 and 4.6.17.18) that 'The *Rk* should be recited *loudly*, and the *Yajus*, silently'. The question arises as to the exact meaning of the terms *Rk* and *Yajus* in this connection. Do they mean the *Rgveda* and the *Yajurveda*?—or the Metrical and Prose passages respectively? In the latter case, those *Mantras* which are in the metrical form, even though they may be contained in the *Yajurveda*, would have to be recited *loudly*; while, in the former case, all that appears in the *Yajurveda* would have to be recited silently. The conclusion on this point is that the *two* words stand for the two *Vedas*, not for the metrical and prose passages; and thus on the ground that, in the earlier part of the passage, at the end of which was found the text in question, we have this declaration—'These *Vedas* came into existence, the *Rgveda* from *Agni*, the *Yajurveda* from *Vāyu* etc. etc.'; and as the aforesaid direction in regard to the *Rk* being recited *loudly* is a continuation of this same sentence asserting the origin of the *Vedas*,—there is *Syntactical connection* between the two parts of the passage, by virtue of which connection it is clear that the terms '*rk*' and '*yajus*' in the latter part of the passage refer to the *Vedas* spoken of in the former part; and in accordance with this conclusion the metrical passages occurring in the text of the *Yajurveda* should *not* be recited *loudly*. (Mī. Sū. 3.3.1).

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(4) '*Prakaraṇa*, Context.—There are the Vedic texts—'(a) Desiring Heaven, one should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifices',—(b) 'He should perform the *Samid*-Sacrifice',—(c) 'He should perform the *Tanūnapāt* Sacrifice'—(*Shatapatha* Brs. 1.5.3.9);—we find that there is no *Syntactical Connection* among these three sentences, and each sentence stands independently by itself, and is, as such, capable of being regarded as the Injunction of a distinct Sacrifice;—nor is there anything in the Sentences to deduce an Indirect Indication of any sort of dependence or connection between the *Samid* and *Tanūnapāt* Sacrifices—enjoined by the second and third sentences respectively—on the one hand, and the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifice—enjoined by the first sentence, on the other. It is found however that no result has been mentioned in connection with either the *Samid* or the *Tanūnapāt* Sacrifice, in the way that 'Heaven' is mentioned in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*. We also recognise the fact that, being enjoined by the Veda, those two sacrifices also must lead to some desirable result; and yet at the same time, no such result is found to be mentioned. All this leads to the conclusion that the Injunction of these Sacrifices is wanting in that factor of the Result, as without the Result to be accomplished, the operation of the Injunction remains incomplete (See above). Then again, as regards the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifice also, it is found that all the information that the injunction (contained in the first sentence) provides is that ‘if one desires to attain Heaven, he should perform the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Sacrifice’; and it says nothing as to the procedure or method to be adopted in the performance of those Sacrifices. This shows that this Injunction also is wanting in the factor of the *Procedure*; and without this, the operation of the Injunction remains incomplete. Now then, taking the two sets of Injunctions into consideration, we find that, if taken together, they supply each othr’s need; the factors wanting in the one being supplied by the other; so that ‘the attainment of Heaven’ mentioned in the Injunction of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, becomes recognised as the result towards the accomplishment of which the *Samid* and *Tanūnapāt* Sacrifices also lend some help;—and also that these two Sacrifices make up the *Procedure* needed by the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*. This *Supplying of Mutual Need* is what has been called *Prakaraṇa* (Context). The conclusion thus is that the *Samid* and *Tanūnapāt* Sacrifices—collectively known as *Prayājas*—are auxiliary to the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*—(Mī. Sū. 3.3.2).

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(5) *Krama* or *Sthāna*—*Order of Sequence, or Position*.—Under the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa* Section there is the Mantra

c28.s2.7

दन्धिर्अस अदभ्यो भूयासम् अमुं दमेयम् ।

c28.s2.8

‘Thou art the Missile, May I remain unhurt; may I strike *so and so* (the enemy)’—(Taitti. Sam. 1.6.2.4). There is no *Direct Assertion* in the Veda as to where this Mantra is to be used; nor is there anything in the *Mantra* that could show by *Indirect Indication* where it is to be used; nor is any guidance available in the shape of *Syntactical Connection* or *Context*. We find however that three sacrifices—the *Agneya*, the *Upāmshu*, and the *Agṇīṣomīya*—have been mentioned in a definite order; and subsequently we find three *Mantras* mentioned in connection with these three sacrifices; and as the three sacrifices are mentioned in a definite order,—and the three *Mantras* also are mentioned in a definite order,—the natural conclusion is that the first of the *Mantras* is to be used at the first of the Sacrifices, the second at the second and the third at the third. The Mantra quoted above happens to be *second* of the three *Mantras*; hence it is taken as to be used at, and be auxiliary to, the Second of the Sacrifices,—viz., the *Upāmshuyāga*. (Mī. Sū. 3.3.12).

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(6) *Samākhyā*, Name.—There are several *Mantras* mentioned as to be recited by the several Priests officiating at the Sacrificial Performance; in many cases, there are no definite Direct Injunctions as to which Mantra is to be recited by which Priest; nor, in many cases, is there anything to indirectly indicate this;—nor is any guidance provided by either Syntactical Connection or Context or Order of Sequence. The conclusion however that there might otherwise arise under the circumstances has been averted by the *Names* that have been applied to the *Mantras*—such as (a) ‘*Hautra*’ indicating that the Mantras (mainly those of the *Ṛgveda*) so named are to be recited by the *Hotṛ* Priest,—(b) ‘*Adhvaryava*’, indicating that the Mantras (mainly those of the *Yajurveda*) so named are to be recited by the *Adhvaryu*-Priest, (c) ‘*Audgātra*’, indicating that the Mantras (mainly those of the *Sāmaveda*) so named are to be recited by the *Udgātṛ*-Priest. Thus the fact of the *Hautra*-Mantras being ‘auxiliary’ to the *Hotṛ*-Priest and so forth is ascertained through the name of the Mantra.—(Mī. Sū. 3.3.13).

Cases of Conflict

c28.s3.1

The six Means of determining the character of *Auxiliaries* have been described. Now arises the question—Which of these is to be regarded as most authoritative in a case where two or more of these are applicable, but in conflict with one another?

c28.s3.2

The answer to this question has been provided by *Sūtra* 3.3.14. Among ‘Direct Assertion’, ‘Indicative Power’, ‘Syntactical Connection’, ‘Context’, ‘Place’, and ‘Name’,—that which follows is weaker than that which precedes; because it is more remote from the final Objective. That is to say, when there is conflict between what is directly asserted by a Vedic text and what is implied by the Indicative Power of a certain word, it is the former that is to be accepted and the latter to be rejected. The principle underlying this supersession of the one by the other is that in all matters relating to *Dharma*, nothing can be accepted as authoritative except what is declared in the Veda; in the case of Direct Assertion, what should be done is directly declared in the Veda; in the case of Indicative Power, on the other hand, even when the indication is accepted, the course of action indicated is accepted as authorised only after, on the strength of the said indication, a Direct Assertion to the same effect is assumed. It is for this reason that whenever there is conflict between these two, the Direct Assertion, which is self-sufficient, accomplishes its purpose long before the Indicative Power can accomplish its own, through the assumed Direct Assertion.

c28.s3.3

(1) As an instance of this conflict and supersession, we have the following:—There is the Vedic text ऐन्द्र्या गार्हपत्यमुपतिष्ठते—‘With the Aindrī-Mantra one worships the Gārhapatya Fire’ (Vājasa. Sam, 12.66); here we have Direct Assertion declaring the use of the Aindrī-Mantra in the worshipping of the Gārhapatya Fire; on the other hand in the said Mantra itself

c28.s3.4

कदा च नस्तरीरसिनेन्द्र सश्वसि दाशुषे-

c28.s3.5

(O Indra, you never hurt any one, etc. etc.') (Ṛgveda Sam. 8. 51. 7),—we find the word ‘Indra’ which, by its Indicative Power, indicates the Mantra as to be used in the worshipping of ‘Indra’. Thus there is conflict between the two—Direct Assertion and Indicative Power; but before the latter can become effective, it is necessary to assume, on the strength of this Indication, a Direct Assertion to the effect that ‘the Aindrī Mantra should be used in the worshipping of Indra’; but the way to this assumption is barred by the actual Direct Assertion to the contrary declaring that ‘the Aindrī-Mantra is to be used in the worshipping of the Gārhapatya Fire. (Bṛhati MS., p. 78B). As a consequence, the Indicative Power loses all its force and becomes superseded by the Direct Assertion to the contrary, and the conclusion is that the Aindrī Mantra is used in worshipping the Gārhapatya Fire.

c28.s3.6

(2) Indicative Power in its turn is more authoritative than Syntactical Connection. There is conflict between these two in the following case:—In connection with the Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa Sacrifice, there is the Mantra—

c28.s3.7

स्योनं ते सदनं कृणोमि घृतस्य धारया सुषेवं कल्पयामि, सीदामृते प्रतितिष्ठ व्रीणामेध सुमनस्यमानः—

c28.s3.8

['O Cake, I am preparing a nice seat for thee, and with clarified butter I am making it comfortable; O Essence of Corn, may thou, with a peaceful mind, take thy seat upon this' (Tai. Brā. 3. 7. 5. 2)]. Here the words as *Syntactically Connected* make a single sentence of the two parts of the *Mantra*; and this would imply that the *whole Mantra* is to be used in the preparing of the Kusha-Seat for the Cake;—but the words of the two parts of the Mantra distinctly indicate that the first part of it is to be used in the *preparing of seat* ('*Sadanam Kṛṇomi*'), and the second part in the *placing of the Cake upon the Kusha* ('*tasminsīda*'). What makes this latter indication by the Indicative Power of the words more authoritative than the former implication by Syntactical Connection is that in the case of the Syntactical Connection, it is necessary to assume *firstly*, the Indicative Power of the word '*Kṛṇomi*' indicating the use of the *Mantra* in the *preparing of the seat*, and then *secondly* the *Direct Assertion* in support of the idea that the *Whole Mantra* is to be used in that act of preparing; whereas in the case Indicative Power, the only assumption necessary is that of the *Direct Assertion* to the effect that 'the first part of the Mantra is to be used in the *preparing* of the seat, and the second in *placing the Cake upon it*'; thus this is one step nearer to *Direct Assertion* than Syntactical Connection. This is what is meant by the words of the *Sūtra*—'Because it is more remote from the final objective'. *Prabhākara* has added one more reason for *Indicative Power* being more authoritative than *Syntactical Connection*:—As to how a certain *Yajus-Mantra* is to be used depends upon the useful purpose served by it; what this purpose is can be learnt,—in the absence of *Direct Assertion* on the point,—only from the signification of the words composing the *Mantra*; thus then, the use indicated by the Indicative Power of the words is based directly upon what follows the very foundation of the usefulness of the *Mantra*; *Syntactical Connection* on the other hand, indicates the use of the *Mantra* only on the verbal basis of grammatical construction afforded by the words, irrespectively of any useful purpose served by it;—in this way *Indicative Power* is much nearer to the basis of usefulness than *Syntactical Connection*. (*Bṛhatī* Ms. pp. 79A-79B).

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(3) *Syntactical Connection* is more authoritative than *Context*. In the *Sūktavāka* mentioned in connection with the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, there is the text—

c28.s3.10

अग्नीषोमविदं हविराजुषेताम्—इन्द्राग्नी इदं हविराजुषेताम् ।

c28.s3.11

(Tai. Brā. 3. 5. 10. 3);—as this *Mantra* occurs in the *Context* of the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, one section of which is performed on the Moonless Day and the other on the Full-Moon Day—it would follow that the word ‘*Agnīsomau*’ should be omitted on the Fullmoon Day; but before this implication of the *Context* is accepted as authoritative it would be necessary—(1) to assume, on the strength of the *Context*, the *Syntactical Connection* (which is not present) between the two sets of words ‘*havirā-juṣṭam*’ and ‘*indrāgnī*’,—(2) to assume on the strength of this assumed *Syntactical Connection*, the indication of *Indra* etc., by the *Indicative Power* of the words of the first section of the *Mantra*,—and (3) to assume, on the strength of the assumed *Indicative Power*, the *Direct Assertion* to the effect that the *Mantra* is to be used in making offerings to *Indra-Agni*. On the other hand, *Syntactical Connection* directly indicates that the words have to be retained in both cases, in as much as each is syntactically connected with the word that follows; and for the acceptance of this Procedure, as the *Syntactical Connection* is already present, it is necessary to assume only the *Indicative Power* indicating the Deities and the ultimate *Direct Assertion*. This being one step less remote from the ultimate *Direct Assertion*, *Syntactical Connection* has been regarded as more authoritative than *Context*. A further reason provided by *Prabhākara* (*Bṛhatī* Ms. p. 79B) is that what is indicated by *Syntactical Connection* is based upon the meaning afforded by the natural construction and interpretation of the words of the *Mantra*,—while what is indicated by *Context* would, at best, be based upon some construction or interpretation forced upon the words in view of circumstances beyond the limits of the *Mantra*-text itself.

c28.s3.12

(4) *Context* is more authoritative than *Order of Sequence* or *Place*. Under the *Rājasūya* Sacrifice there are several Primary Sacrifices, one of which is the *Abhiṣechanīya*; close upon the Injunction of this *Abhiṣechanīya*, we find the Injunctions of certain minor acts like *Gambling*; the *Place*, i.e., the *proximity*—of these latter to the *Abhiṣechanīya* would indicate that the Gambling is ‘auxiliary’ to the *Abhiṣechanīya*: on the other hand, the fact that the Gambling is mentioned under the *Context* of the *Rājasūya*, would indicate it as being ‘auxiliary’ to the *Rājasūya* itself. Under the circumstances, the Gambling has been regarded as ‘auxiliary’ to the *Rājasūya*. The reason for this preference is the same as in the previous cases—*Context* being one step nearer to *Direct Assertion* than *Place* (Proximity). According to Prabhākara (*Brhati* Ms. 79B-80), *Context* is operative only through the mutual need between a certain *act* and a certain *Mantra*; hence when the *Context* indicates that the *Mantra* is to be used at a certain act (Sacrifice), it is more direct in its operation than *Order* or *Place*; because the connection between the *Act* and the *Mantra* is indicated by *Context*—or Mutual Need,—directly through *Syntactical Connection*, which is established, through that mutual need, between the words of the *Mantra* and the word denoting the *Act*; while, for establishing such a connection, the *Order* or *Place* would stand in need of several more intervening factors; for instance, the (1) *Order* or *Place* will indicate the Mutual need, (2) the Mutual Need will indicate the *Syntactical Connection*, and (3) the *Syntactical Connection* will indicate the connection between the *Mantra* and the *Act*.

c28.s3.13

(5) *Order* or *Place* is more authoritative than *Name*. There is the *Mantra*—शुन्धध्वं दैव्याय कर्मणे (‘Become purified for purposes of the Divine Act’) (Tai. Sam. 1. 1. 3. 1);—this is found in the chapter known as ‘*Pauroḍāshika*’ by name;—this fact would imply that the *Mantra* should be used for the purification of the *Puroḍāsha*, the Cake. On the other hand, the *Mantra* is found in a *Place* in close proximity to the words speaking of the *Sānnāyya* vessels; on the strength of this latter fact the *Mantra* is used in the cleaning of these latter vessels. The reason for this also lies in the fact that the *Order* or *Place* is one step nearer to *Direct Assertion* than *Name*; and also according to Prabhākara (*Brhati* Ms. p. 80) in the fact that while *Order* or *Place* is something *Vedic*, Scriptural, the *Name* is more or less *Laukika*, worldly, Secular.

c28.s3.14

It being impossible for every act at the Sacrificial performance to be done by the Sacrificing Householder himself alone, the need arose for the calling in of outside assistance; this gave rise to the question as to how far the results of the acts done by these other persons would accrue to the *Sacrificer*; and the conclusion arrived at is that if the *Sacrificer* selects and appoints and pays for the services rendered by these other persons,—he becomes the prime mover of all that is done by these persons; so that the results and benefits of these acts should all accrue to the *Sacrificer* himself; his assistants, being paid officiating priests, get only the Sacrificial Fee provided in connection with each act or office. As such *securing of services on payment* has been laid down in the Scriptures, there is nothing incongruous in it. As a result of this conclusion, the acts that are actually *done* by the Sacrificing Master of the House himself are only (1) the *Saṅkalpa*, the declaring of his resolution to perform the Sacrifice, (2) the *Varaṇa*—the selecting and appointing— of the Priests to officiate at the performance, and (3) the Paying of the Fees to them;—and the rest of the detailed performance is done for him by these officiating Priests. (Sū. 3. 7. 18—20).

c28.s3.15

This is the Principle that may be taken as underlying the law that the instigator of the act is as responsible as the actual doer of it.

c28.s3.16

This leads us on to the subject of these Officiating Priests styled *Ṛtviks*. The first question that arises is—

c28.s3.17

Is the number of such Priests limited? or may one engage as many as one likes?—The conclusion is that the number is limited; because they should be engaged in accordance with their titles, as it is *under these titles that their respective duties have been severally assigned in the Veda*,—says Sū. 3.7.22. What is meant is that the number of Priests to be engaged should be as many as the duties that have been laid down as to be performed by the several performers named in the Veda. The texts naming such performers are the following:—‘First of all, the *Adhvaryu* (1) does the distribution, the *Pratiprasthātṛ* (2) offers the *Manthin*—the *Neṣṭṛ* (3) brings up the Sacrificer’s Wife,—the *Unnetṛ* (4) fills the cup;—the *Prastotṛ* (5) introduces the Chant,—the *Udgātṛ* (6) does the chanting,—the *Pratihartṛ* (7) sings the *Pratihāra* chant,—the *Subrahmaṇya* (8) recites the *Subrahmaṇyā*,—the *Hotṛ* (9) recites the *Prātaranuvāka* hymn,—the *Maitrāvaruṇa* (10) gives directions and recites the *Puronuvākyā*,—the *Achchāvāka* (11) recites the *Yājyā*,—the *Grāvastut* (12) recites the *Grāvastotrīya Mantra*’. In accordance with this Vedic Text, there is need for just these twelve priests; hence these must be engaged. All the numerous acts have not been mentioned here. There are however several whose performer is indicated by the titles of the priests; for instance, the act of *Homa*—Pouring Libations into Fire,—is to be done by the priest who holds the title of '*Hotṛ*'. (*Bhāṣya*, Trs., pp. 632-633.)

c28.s3.18

It might be argued that—“As one and the same person may perform several duties, the enumeration of the Duties cannot determine the exact number of Priests to be engaged” (Sū. 23). The answer to this is that this cannot be right; because in the originative Injunctions laying down the employment of Priests, it is found that each Priest, before he begins to function, is given a distinct title; for instance, we find such texts as ‘He appoints the Brahman Priest’, ‘He appoints the *Hotṛ*-Priest’, ‘He appoints the *Udgātṛ*-Priest’, ‘He appoints the *Adhvaryu*-Priest’; according to this each priest is given the title along with his appointment, before he has begun to function. From this it is clear that in the performance of the Sacrifice, there is need for the Priests of this kind, hence they must be engaged; and in as much as the necessity of engaging the Priests is dictated by the requirements of the Sacrifice, the text quoted is to be taken merely as describing the appointment of the Priests, *not as an Injunction of actually engaging them*. [*Kumārila* has demurred to this and declared, in *Tantra. Vā.* Trs. p. 1622, that ‘the number is laid down by the Injunction of the appointments themselves’].—Nor is it necessary for the Veda to declare it in so many words that ‘So many Priests should be appointed’. (*Bhāṣya*, Trs. pp. 633-634).

c28.s3.19

The exact number of the Priests at the Soma-Sacrifice, as also at the *Darsha-Pūrṇamāsa*, (Says the *Bhāṣya*, Trs. p. 635) is seventeen; these are the following, as definitely enunciated in the text prescribing their Initiation. (1) The *Adhvaryu*, who does all that is prescribed in the *Yajurvēda*—and under him come (2) the *Pratipasthātṛ*, (3) *Nēṣṭṛ*, (4) *Unnētṛ*; (5) *Brahman*, who supervises the performance of the acts prescribed in all the *Vedas*, and under him come (6) *Brāhmaṇācchhaṃsin*, (7) *Agnīt* and (8) *Potṛ*;—(9) *Udgātṛ*—who does the chanting,—and under him come (10) *Prastotṛ*, (11) *Pratihartṛ*, (12) *Subrahmanya*;—(13) *Hotṛ*, who does the invoking of blessings,—and under him come (14) *Maitrāvaruṇa*, (15) *Achchhāvāka* and (16) *Grāvastut*—(Sū. 3.7.37, *Bhāṣya* Trs. pp. 646-647). The *Master of the Sacrifice*, i.e., the Sacrificer, has been regarded as the seventeenth ‘Priest’—on the basis of the Similarity of Functions—says the *Sūtra* (3.7.38). This ‘similarity of functions' has been thus explained—As a matter of fact, persons taking part in the performance of the Sacrifice are called 'Priests'; —the *Sacrificer* also takes part in this performance, and as such is entitled to be regarded as a 'Priest'.

c28.s3.20

As regards the duties of these Priests, their functions are restricted by their names, that is, *there should be a restriction and distribution of functions among the Priests on the basis of their names, as it is for that purpose that distinct titles have been assigned to them.* (Sū. 40). That is, on the basis of the particular titles given to the particular Priests, there should be a restriction of their functions. The functions that have been named after a certain priest should be performed by that priest; for example, the functions named '*Adhvaryara*' should be performed by the *Adhvaryu* Priest, those named '*Hautra*', by the *Hotṛ* Priest, those named '*Audgātra*' by the *Udgātṛ*-Priest. (*Bhāṣya* Trs. p. 650).

c28.s3.21

That the duties of the Priests are regulated by the names (of the Acts and of the Priests) is the general rule; but there are exceptions to this. For instance, in certain cases, there are distinct texts enjoining the performance of a certain act by a particular priest. For instance, there is the text laying down that '*the Maitrāvaruṇa-Priest gives directions and recites the Puronuvākyā*' (Tai. Br. 3. 12. 9. 5), where the two functions of giving directions and reciting are specifically assigned to the *Maitrāvaruṇa-Priest*, though, under the general rule, the work of giving directions falls within the scope of the '*Adhvaryu's functions*', and reciting is an act falling within the scope of the '*Hotṛ's functions*'; but in view of the direct Injunction quoted, the said functions are performed by the *Maitrāvaruṇa-Priest*.

c28.s3.22

Similarly, certain acts have been given distinct names which take them out of the purview of the Priest to whom they would fall under the general rule, and assign them to other Priests. For instance, certain acts have been called '*Potrīya*' and '*Neṣṭrīya*',—which acts would, under the General Rule, have been performed by the *Brahman* and the *Adhvaryu* respectively, but have become transferred by the said special names, to the purview of the *Potṛ* and *Neṣṭṛ* Priests respectively.—(*Bhāṣya*, Trs. p. 651).

c28.s3.23

There is an important counter-exception to this exception. The *Shyēna-Sacrifice* is found mentioned in the section called '*Audgātra*'; under the rule just stated, the whole of this Sacrifice should have to be performed by the *Udgātṛ-Priest* alone. As a matter of fact however, the *Śyena* has the *Jyotiṣṭoma* for its Archetype; and the Injunctions relating to the *Jyotiṣṭoma* distinctly indicate certain acts as to be performed by certain Priests; hence according to these, the same has to be done at the *Śyena-Sacrifice* also. (Sūtra 3. 7. 50-51).

c28.s3.24

There are several special functions assigned to definite persons; these have been dealt with in the Sū. 3. 8. The following are a few instances: (*a*) The *Engaging of Services* is to be done by the Master of the Sacrifice (3. 8. 1); (*b*) The ‘Shaving of the Head’ is to be done by the Master (3. 8. 3—8); (*c*) the observance of Fasting and the like are to be kept by the Master (3. 8. 3—8), (*d*) the wearing of the gold necklace, etc., appertain to all Priests (3. 8. 12).

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CHAPTER XXIV

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MOTIVE.

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'KRATVARTHA' AND 'PURUṢĀRTHA' ACTS.

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After the disposal of the question of the 'Principal' and 'Auxiliary' character of Acts, there arises the question of what has been called 'Prayukti', *motivating*. This question is dealt with in the form—What is it that provides the occasion for a certain act? What is it for whose accomplishment, the Act is to be performed, or a thing brought into use? This question follows upon the question of 'Principal and Auxiliary', because as a rule, it is the 'Principal Act that motivates, incites, provides the occasion for, the Auxiliary'. There are some acts however for which the sole *motive*, or inciting cause, is afforded by the Desirable Result expected to follow from it; while there are others which do not accomplish anything desired by the Agent, and yet are performed for the purpose of helping in the fulfilment of some other act, which latter accomplishes something desired by the Agent. Hence the question of the 'Motive' of an Act necessarily turns upon the question as to whether the Act by itself fulfils something desired by the Agent, or something related to another Act. In the former case, the Act would be '*Puruṣārtha*', '*subserving the purposes of Man*', and in the latter case it would be '*Kratvartha*', '*subserving the purposes of an Act*'. For this reason, before considering the main question of *Motive*, it becomes necessary to consider what is '*Puruṣārtha*' and what is '*Kratvartha*'.

First 62 of 81 passages. Read on

Cites (8)