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The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies v4.c23: Notes to Summaries

The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies v4.c23

Language
English

Contents

Notes to Summaries

v4.c23.1

1. KAPILA

v4.c23.2

1. Wezler RB3984, 255-262, and see note 8 above under Philosophy of Sāṃkhya.

v4.c23.3

3. PAÑCAŚIKHA

v4.c23.4

1. V. M. Bedekar, Introduction to *The Śāntiparvan*, vol. 16 of the *Mahābhārata* (critical edition), pp. ccv-ccxlvii.
2. Franklin Edgerton, *The Beginnings of Indian Philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 256-334.
3. Dasgupta B7653; RB11305, vol. 1, 213-222.
4. E. H. Johnston (B6346; RB9587), *Early Sāṃkhya* (London, 1937).
5. Aśvaghoṣa, *Buddhacarita*, translated by E. H. Johnston (Calcutta, 1936), 166-187.
6. Frauwallner B6293; RB9549, 179-206.
7. Van Buitenen B6423; RB9620, Pt. 1, 153-157.
8. V. M. Bedekar (B285; RB543), “Pañcaśikha and Caraka,” *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 38 (1958): 140-147; V. M. Bedekar (B286; RB544), “The teachings of Pañcaśikha in the Mahābhārata,” *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute* 38 (1958): 233-234.
9. Larson RB1378, 36-57.
10. Bedekar, Introduction to *The Śāntiparvan*, ccxi and ccxxxvi.
11. Woods B340; RB1121, *passim*.
12. N. L. Simha (B281; RB539), *The Sāṃkhya Philosophy*. Sacred Books of the Hindus 11 (1915), 415.
13. Ibid., 571.
14. Ibid., 184.
15. Translation of Gauḍapāda’s *Bhāṣya* on *Kārikā* 1 by T. G. Mainkar (RB1363), *The Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa*. Poona Oriental Series 9, (1964), 3.
16. Bedekar, Introduction to *The Śāntiparvan*, ccxliii.
17. Chakravarti B6381; RB9596, 115-116.
18. Frauwallner B6431A; RB9627, 84-139.
19. Frauwallner B8590; RB12160, vol. 1, 408-411, 476-477.

v4.c23.5

4. ṢAṢṬITANTRA

v4.c23.6

1. In F. Otto Schrader (B280; RB538), “Das Ṣaṣṭitantra,” *Zeitschrift der Deutsche *Morgenländische Gesellschaft* 63 (1914): 101-110, and his *Introduction to the Pāñcarātra and the Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā* (Madras: Adyar Library, 1916), 109-111.
2. A Berriedale Keith (B742; RB9348), *The Sāṃkhya System* (Calcutta, 1924), 1949, 73-76.
3. Dasgupta B7653; RB11305, 219-221.
4. Frauwallner B6431A; RB9627, 84ff.
5. Chakravarti B6381; RB9596, 126-127.

v4.c23.7

8. VĀRṢAGAṆYA

v4.c23.8

1. M. J. Takakusu (B742; RB1322), "La Sāṃkhyakārikā étudiée à la lumière de sa versione chinoise," *Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême-Orient* 1 and 2 (1904), 2, 40-41.
2. Ibid., 2, 38.
3. Ibid., 1, 1-65; 2, 978-1064.
4. Frauwallner B6431A; RB9627, 84-137.
5. Chakravarti L6381; RB9596, 115.
6. Woods B340; RB1121, 291.
7. Ibid., 317.
8. Th. Stcherbatsky (B504; RB1400), *The Central Conception of Buddhism* (Calcutta, 1956), 75.
9. Cited in Chakravarti B6381; RB9596, 140.

v4.c23.9

9. VINDHYAVĀSIN

v4.c23.10

1. Cited in Chakravarti B6381; RB9596, 145, note 4.
2. Cited in Chakravarti, ibid., 142-143.
3. Ibid., 144.
4. Ibid., 141.
5. Ibid., 188.
6. Ibid., 138 ff.
7. Frauwallner B8590; RB12160, vol. 1, 482, footnote 212.
8. Chakravarti B6381; RB9596, 138ff.

v4.c23.11

10. MĀDHAVA

v4.c23.12

1. Frauwallner B8590; RB12160, vol. 1, 408.
2. Hattori RB1791, 6.
3. Translated and annotated in detail by Hattori, ibid., 52-62 and 148-160.
4. Frauwallner B8590; RB12160, vol. 1, 408.
5. Solomon RB1387, 153-169.
6. Solomon RB1818.

v4.c23.13

¹ In *Sanskrit Research* 1, 107-117, cited in Chakravarti B6381; RB9596, 156-157.

v4.c23.14

² S. Suryanarayana Sastri B742; RB1322.

v4.c23.15

³ Pandeya RB1370, 146-153.

v4.c23.16

⁴ Solomon RB1387, 194-207.

v4.c23.17

⁵ The term "vaikṛta" is evidently an ancient technical term. There is insufficient evidence from available sources to determine its precise significance.

v4.c23.18

⁶ In both cases, however (that is to say, whether in knowing what is perceptible of what is beyond perception), intellect/will, egoity, and mind function only when preceded by perception of an external object.

v4.c23.19

11. ĪŚVARAKṚṢṆA

v4.c23.20

7. The term "dvārin" here signifies "principal" whereas "dvāra" signifies "subordinate."
8. That is to say, just as a dramatic actor is capable of assuming a variety of roles, so also prakṛti by its inherent power is capable of producing any number of bodies.
9. To "come upon frustration" (duḥkham prāpnoti) is, of course, meant here only figuratively. Indeed, consciousness (puruṣa) cannot do anything. It is completely inactive.
10. This verse does not appear in the Chinese translation.
11. Verses 72 and 73 are probably later interpolations.
12. Verse 73 is read only by Māṭharavṛtti and Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti.

v4.c23.21

12. PATAÑJALI

v4.c23.22

1. Yoga entries will be treated in greater detail in the Yoga volume of the Encyclopedia (in preparation).
2. Woods B340; RB1121, 13ff.
3. Dasgupta B7653; RB11305, vol. 1, 230ff.
4. J. W. Hauer (B6322A; RB9775), Der Yoga im Licht der Psychotherapie (Leipzig, 1930), 239-258.
5. Frauwallner B8590; RB12160, 287-288.
6. Chakravarti B6381; RB9596, 138ff.
7. Woods B340; RB1121, xx.

v4.c23.23

13. SUVARṆASAPTATI

v4.c23.24

1. M. J. Takakusu B742; RB1322.
2. Belvalkar B1285; RB2153A.
3. A. B. Keith B1286; RB2153B.
4. Suryanarayana Sastri B1289; RB2153E.
5. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (B742; RB1322), The Sāṃkhya Kārikā Studied in the Light of Its Chinese Version (Madras, 1933).
6. Umesh Mishra B1288; RB2153D.
7. N. Aiyasvami Sastri, ed. (B775; RB1352), Suvarṇasaptati Śāstra. Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Series 7 (Tirupati 1944).
8. Ibid., xxxvii.
9. Solomon RB1585 and RB1818.
10. Solomon RB1387.
11. Frauwallner B8590; RB12160, vol. 1, 478.
12. It is to be noted that here at kārikā 3 and again later in the commentary on kārikās 8, 10, 26 and 56 the present commentator derives the sense capacities as well as the gross elements from the five subtle elements, even though this clearly contradicts the Sāṃkhyakārikā itself (cf. verses 24, 25 and 38). Possibly the explanation of derivation here and again under kārikā 26 reflects an older, pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa account of the system. In any case it strongly suggests that the author of the Suvarṇasaptati is not the same as the author of the Sāṃkhyakārikās.
13. Suryanarayana Sastri thinks that the Chinese text may have read "vyāpini" or "vyāpti" instead of "khyāti," which usually means "discrimination."
14. For purposes of symmetry, one would have expected form (rūpa) to give rise to the organ of seeing and to be related to the gross element fire, but the commentator instead relates form to all five gross objects. In N. A. Sastri's Sanskrit reconstruction from the original Chinese, however, the text is reconstructed to relate rūpa (form), cakṣus (eye), and tejas (fire or light). The reconstruction is undoubtedly correct.
15. There is an obvious anomaly here. In kārikā 25 the subtle elements are said to be endowed with tamas, but here they are said to be characterized by sattva. Possibly the commentator holds a view that includes two sets of subtle elements, one pertaining to a very subtle (and largely sattvic and divine) set of essences from which the sense capacities, action capacities, mind, and the gross elements are all derived, and another less subtle (and largely tamasic and human) set of essences from which the gross human world is derived. There is little evidence in other texts, however, for postulating two sets of subtle elements, although it must be admitted that the various commentaries appear to be confused regarding the interpretation of the notions viśeṣa and aviśeṣa in the Sāṃkhyakārikā. It could be the case, of course, in classical times issues such as this had not been definitively settled one way or the other.

v4.c23.25

16. It is to be noted that Paramārtha differs here from the other commentaries. According to Paramārtha, the subtle body has seven components: intellect, ego, and the five subtle elements. According to Gauḍapāda, the subtle body has eight components: intellect, ego, mind, and the five subtle elements. According to most commentators (e.g., Vācaspati Miśra) the subtle body is made up of intellect, ego, the five subtle elements, and the eleven capacities.

v4.c23.26

17. It should be noted that the Suvarṇasaptati reads mohanatāra for the sixth siddhi, but this is probably an error in transmission. Mohana means “deluded” or “confused,” whereas this siddhi appears to describe a joyous state in which the three kinds of frustration have been overcome. It is perhaps justified then to read modana instead of mohana, or possibly to follow Gauḍapāda who reads pramodamāna.

v4.c23.27

18. Note that Gauḍapāda lists saumya (soma) instead of asura. Vācaspati Miśra lists pitṛ instead of soma or asura. Yuktidīpikā lists nāga instead of yakṣa.

v4.c23.28

19. Kārikā 63 does not appear in Paramārtha’s Chinese version, suggesting perhaps that this verse is a later interpolation after the period of Paramārtha (who dates from around the middle of the 6th century).

v4.c23.29

20. In three Chinese editions the name “Vindhyavāsin” appears, but in the Korean text Vindhyavāsin is not mentioned.

v4.c23.30

21. The same quotation appears with minor variations both in Māṭharavṛtti and in Jayamaṅgalā.

v4.c23.31

22. According to Paramārtha, this final verse is not original to the Sāṃkhyakārikā but is a later addition by an intelligent follower of the Sāṃkhya school.

v4.c23.32

23. It is to be noted that this listing of the ten important subjects is different from the list as set forth in the Tattvakaumudī and the Yuktidīpikā. See the Introduction for a full discussion of the principal topics (mūlikārtha).

v4.c23.33

14. SĀṂKHYAVṚTTI

v4.c23.34

1. Sāṃkhyavṛtti, edited by E. A. Solomon, RB1585.

v4.c23.35

2. The commentary does not refer to the problem of plurality of puruṣas.

v4.c23.36

3. An old verse enumerating the ten basic topics (mūlikārtha) is given here:

v4.c23.37

astitvam ekatvam atha arthavattvam
pārārthyam anyatvam atha nivṛttiḥ;
yogo viyogo bahavaḥ pumaṃsaḥ
sthitiḥ śarīrasya ca śeṣavṛttiḥ,
evam ete mūlikārthāḥ.

v4.c23.38

See Introduction, p. 82, for translation. The Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti, Māṭharavṛtti, Jayamaṅgalā and Tattvakaumudī cite this verse in their explanations of kārikā 72. The Yuktidīpikā cites a variant of the verse in its introductory verses. Yet another variant is cited in Suvarṇasaptati under kārikā 71.

v4.c23.39

4. It should be noted that this commentary, like the Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti and Paramārtha’s commentary, does not quote or follow the Yogasūtra.

v4.c23.40

5. The text of verse 27 here is the same as in the Yuktidīpikā:

v4.c23.41

saṅkalpakam atra manaḥ tac ca indriyam ubhayathā samākhyātam;
antas trikālaviṣayam tasmād ubhayapracaram tat.

v4.c23.42

6. The commentator says that "ete" in verse 36 should not be construed with "guṇaviśeṣāḥ." "Etāni" referring to the above-mentioned "indriyāṇi" would have been better.
7. According to Paramārtha, his family name was Kauśika.

v4.c23.43

15. SĀMKHYASAPTATIVṚTTI

v4.c23.44

1. Sāmkhyasaptativṛtti, edited by Esther A. Solomon RB1818.
2. For a useful discussion of this problem, see E. A. Solomon RB1387, 153ff.
3. The last part of the first kārikā has a different reading: "naikāntātyantatobhāvāt."
4. The second line of this kārikā as read here is different from the well-known one: it reads "prakṛtijño vikārajñaḥ sarvair duḥkhair vimucyate."
5. The first line of verse 56 is differently read here than in most of the versions. Here it is "Ity eṣa prakṛtivikṛtaḥ pravartate vaikṛtaḥ prājāsargaḥ."

v4.c23.45

16. GAUDAPĀDA

v4.c23.46

1. E. A. Solomon RB1387, passim.
2. For a useful discussion of the Vedāntin Gauḍapāda, his life, and works, see Karl H. Potter, ed., Advaita Vedānta up to Śamkara and his Pupils, 103-105. For discussions pro and con about the identity of the two Gauḍapādas, see the following: A. B. Keith B6291; RB9548, 85; Umesh Mishra B1288; RB2153D, 371-386; Amar Nath Ray (B1250; RB1917), "The Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the Kārikās of Gauḍapāda," Indian Historical Quarterly 14, (1938); 564-569; B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma (B1236; RB1901), "New light on the Gauḍapādakārikās," Review of Philosophy and Religion (Poona) 2, no. 1 (1931), 35-56; Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya (B1254; RB1922), The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda, lxxxix ff.; R. D. Karmarkar (B1264; RB1933), trans., Gauḍapādakārikā (Poona 1953), v.ff; E. A. Solomon RB1387, 171-175.
3. See E. Sachau, trans., Alberuni's India, 1 (London: Kegan Paul, 1910), 266-267.
4. It should be noted that the nature of inference is not discussed at this point in the commentary.
5. It should be noted that Jaimini and the Mīmāṃsakas do not mention these six in any available text. The six that are usually mentioned by the Mīmāṃsaka are pratyakṣa, anumāna, śabda, upamāna, arthāpatti, and abhāva.
6. Again, it should be noted that the Gauḍapāda Bhāṣya appears to be confused concerning epistemological issues. Usually comparison, presumption, probability, etc., are discussed as varieties of inference, although sometimes comparison is also discussed as a variety verbal testimony. Negation (or nonapprehension) is discussed in terms of inference or perception, and only tradition is included within verbal testimony. In view of the inconsistencies throughout this section of the Bhāṣya, one is tempted to think that the present text of Gauḍapāda is corrupt.

v4.c23.47

17. VYĀSA

v4.c23.48

1. Chakravarti B6381; RB9596, 138ff.
2. Frauwallner B8590; RB12160, Vol. 1, 482.

v4.c23.49

¹ Chakravarti, ed., B1046A; RB2207.

v4.c23.50

² Pandeya, ed., RB1370.

v4.c23.51

³ Albrecht Wezler RB2213, 434-455.

v4.c23.52

⁴ Pandeya RB1370, xiv.

v4.c23.53

⁵ Wezler RB2213
6. Frauwallner B8590; RB12160, Vol. 1, 287.

v4.c23.54

18. YUKTIDĪPIKĀ

v4.c23.55

7. Allen W. Thrasher, "The dates of Maṇḍana Miśra and Śaṅkara," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Sudasiens* 23 (1979): 117-139.
8. Pandeya RB1370, xv.
9. This is not always the case: verses 13, 15, 28, 33, 41-43, 46, 49, 51, 53, 56, 58, 64, and 68 are not broken down into parts.
10. The author designates the discussion thus far as the introduction (*upodghāta*) to the commentary. It might be noted that the mode of presentation in terms of the "basic characteristics of a tantra" (*tantraguṇa* or *tantrayukti*) is reminiscent of that found in chapter 65 of the *Uttara Tantra* of the *Suśrutasaṃhitā*, also entitled *tantrayukti*. Similar accounts of *tantrayuktis* may also be found in *Carakasaṃhitā*, *siddhisthāna*, chapter 12; *Aṣṭāṅgasamgraha*, *uttara*, 50; and Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* 15, chapter 1.
11. The compounding of the word "tad" with "*apaghātaka*", though not permissible (see Pāṇini 2.².15), is justified by such other usages as in Pāṇini 1.⁴.55, Kātyāyana 4.¹.44, and *Mahābhāṣya* 5.1.59.
12. *Vākyapadīya* 2.426-427.
13. Compare *Nyāyabhāṣya* 1.2.⁹ and *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* 1.1.⁵.
14. For example, Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* 5.1.119 and 1.1.57.
15. Cf. *Mahābhāṣya* 2.1.1.
16. Pāṇini 3.1.87 and *Mahābhāṣya* 111.2.
17. In other words, having a locative *tatpuruṣa* compound between *sarvapramāṇa* and *siddhatva*, by Pāṇini 2.1.41.
18. Cf. *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.⁶.
19. All of these varieties of perception are implied in the compound *prativiṣaya* by construing it as an *ekaśeṣadvandva*.
20. In *Kārikā* 25 the *sattva* and *tamas* forms of *buddhi* were described, and it was said that both these forms derive from *taijasa*, which probably means *rajas*. Possibly, the theory of the five *karmayonis* fits into the Sāṃkhya analysis as an explanation of the *taijasa* or *rajas* form of *buddhi*.
21. The basic meanings for the contentments and attainments may be found in *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 50-51, and see the commentaries of Gauḍapāda, Vācaspati Miśra, and Paramārtha's Chinese version for variant listings of the ancient names. A precise characterization of each of these ancient lists is no longer available. The interpretations of the ancient terminology in each of the commentaries appear forced and fanciful.

v4.c23.56

¹ Chakravarti B6381; RB9596, 166.

v4.c23.57

² Ibid., 167.

v4.c23.58

⁴ *Quarterly Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society* (October 1927): 133-136.

v4.c23.59

⁵ "Muni" in this verse may refer to the author of the text, i.e., Īśvarakṛṣṇa. But since such an assertion does not appear to be supported by any authority it is quite reasonable to take "muni" as referring to the first teacher of Sāṃkhya, i.e., Kapila, the first enlightened being (*ādividvas*). The term may, however, refer to Pañcaśikha, the well-known Sāṃkhya teacher (mentioned in SK 70), as he is said to have transmitted *lokottarajñāna* to Janaka (*Śāntiparvan* 320.38).

v4.c23.60

⁶ The definitions are derived from the commentary on SK 53.

v4.c23.61

⁹ Jayamaṅgalā reads "*ca*" (showing emphasis) in the third foot instead of "*tu*."

v4.c23.62

19. JAYAMAṄGALĀ

v4.c23.63

(notes 5-45 by R. S. Bhattacharya)

v4.c23.64

³ Calcutta Sanskrit Series 19 (1926), 1-9.

v4.c23.65

⁷ The printed reading appears to be corrupt. Because "*pradhāna*" and "*prakṛti*" are synonymous, *prakṛti* cannot be said to be a product of *pradhāna*.

v4.c23.66

⁸ Yāska's *Nirukta* 2.4.

v4.c23.67

10. Vācaspati in his commentary on Nyāyavārttika I.1.5 quotes a verse:

v4.c23.68

*Mātrā nimitta saṃyogiviyogasahacāribhiḥ*
*Svasvāmivadhyaghātādyaiḥ sāṃkhyānāṃ saptadhānumā.*

v4.c23.69

It is attributed to the Sāṃkhyavārttika by Vardhamāna in his Prakāśa (BI edition, p. 671). There is a slight difference of opinion between the Jayamaṅgalā and this verse.

v4.c23.70

11. The Jayamaṅgalā appears to read *prasiddhi* in place of *pratiti*.

v4.c23.71

12. This contention of the Jayamaṅgalā, that puruṣa must not be held as *eka* owing to its plurality, is wrong. The epithet "eka" must be applied to puruṣa as the aforesaid statement demands. But we are to take "eka," not in the sense of number, but in the sense of *ekarūpa*, having one form or one aspect, i.e., immutable or isolated (*kevala*), unmixed, without having any subdivision (*svāgatabhedaśūnya*). The same word "eka" will be applied to the unmanifested also in the sense of "one" and to puruṣa in the sense of *kevala* or *ekarūpa*.

v4.c23.72

13. The printed reading of the commentary on the fourth foot of this verse is slightly corrupt.

v4.c23.73

14. The passage "tatra siddhe . . . vedāntavādinaḥ" is printed as a part of the commentary on SK 17. It is actually the *pāṭanikā* of SK 18.

v4.c23.74

15. How the *pratiniyama* of birth, death, and organs prove the plurality of puruṣas is not clearly shown here.

v4.c23.75

16. The expression "*anyatra vicāritatvāt granthagauravabhayāt*" clearly refers to another work by the commentator. The identity of the work is yet to be determined.

v4.c23.76

17. The printed reading quoted for describing these seven forms is corrupt and not fully intelligible.

v4.c23.77

18. The two illustrations seem to indicate that this connection has some cause and that it can be destroyed by proper means.

v4.c23.78

19. The reason for the former name appears to be its imperceptible aspect, i.e., the *avyakta* or the *guṇasamya* form. Ancient teachers used the term "tamas" for *prakṛtis*; see Jayamaṅgalā on SK 70 and also Durga's commentary on Nirukta 7.3. "*Avyākṛta*" is used in Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad I.4.7.

v4.c23.79

20. The printed reading "*atiśaya*" is wrong.

v4.c23.80

21. Jayamaṅgalā seems to read "*tanmātrapañcakam.*" According to us the original reading of the second half of this *kārikā* is "*ekādaśaca gaṇaḥ tanmātraḥ pañcakaś caiva.*" The sentence shows that there are two groups evolving from *ahaṃkāra*: one group (*gaṇa*) consisting of eleven members (of the organs), the other consisting of five members of the nature of tanmātras. "*Tānmātra*" means "concerning or pertaining to the *tanmātras*."

v4.c23.81

22. The Jayamaṅgalā notes that the word "upastha" is masculine in gender and that it belongs to both sexes. The seat of *vāc* is in the throat.

v4.c23.82

23. The passage "anena dvāreṇa tu . . .ity uktam" is not quite intelligible. The printed reading seems to be corrupt.

v4.c23.83

24. Pakti: the printed reading "patti" is corrupt.

v4.c23.84

25. It is possible that this verse does not deal with the subtle body but with the *liṅga* that is mentioned in verse 20. In verse 40, the word "*liṅga*" is not an adjective meaning that which goes to destruction (*layam gacchati*) but a substantive. This *liṅga*, not being a product of the *viśeṣas*, is quite distinct from the subtle body, which is positively a product of the *viśeṣas*. Had verse 40 treated of the subtle body mentioned in verse 39, one might have expected plural number and masculine gender, while using the adjectives of the *sūkṣmaśarīra*, as are found in verse 39. The *liṅga* is of the nature of a whole of which the internal and external organs are the parts. The five *tanmātras*, though not parts of the *liṅga*, are attached to it so long as creation exists.

v4.c23.85

26. The printed reading of the explanation of the term "*kārya*" is corrupt.

v4.c23.86

27. The Jayamaṅgalā seems to read "*guṇavaiṣamyavimardena*" instead of "*guṇavaiṣamyavimardāt.*"

v4.c23.87

28. The second explanation, “dharmo vā pratyayaḥ sargaḥ,” is not quite clear.
29. The name for the third uparama is wanting in the commentary. The commentary on this seems to be lost.
30. The reading “śakteḥ” should be corrected to “aśakteḥ” in the passage “teṣām śakter antarbhavati . . . .”
31. It is remarked that siddhi is jñānājñānalakṣaṇa, which seems to be a corrupt reading.
32. The printed reading of the alternative name of the third siddhi is corrupt.
33. The printed reading of the passage containing the names of these asiddhis is corrupt. Properly speaking, ūha, etc., are the cause of siddhi (cf. ūhahetukā prathamā siddhiḥ).
34. In this connection, the Jayamaṅgalā has quoted a verse from a treatise named “Saṃgraha.” “Saṃgrahakāra,” however, may mean an author of a saṃgrahaśloka, a verse in which a long discussion is summarized in the briefest words.
35. It should be noted that the characteristic features of these species are not stated by the commentator.
36. The Jayamaṅgalā remarks that the bhautikasarga is of two kinds. The reading “dvividhaḥ” appears to be wrong and should be corrected to “trividhaḥ,” i.e., “of three kinds.”
37. The argument is not quite clear.
38. The printed reading of the explanatory passage on the expression “svārtha iva” is corrupt.
39. What these kinds of objects are is not mentioned.
40. The sentence “vyaktātmanā . . . .” is to be connected with the commentary on SK. 61.
41. The verse “guṇānām . . . .” quoted here is also quoted in the Vyāsabhāṣya 4.13 (with slight variation) with the remark that it is a śāstrānuśāsana. According to Vācaspati, this verse belongs to some work by Vārṣagaṇya, an exponent of yoga; see Bhāmatī 2.1.3.
42. The printed reading of the explanatory sentence “liṅga bhautika . . . .” is corrupt.
43. The import of the word “bheda” is obscure. It may be “veda.” Thus, “agrya” would mean that this doctrine (i.e., the knowledge propounded in Sāṃkhya) surpasses the Vedas (i.e., the path of action, the karmakāṇḍa). As the tattvas are realized through samādhi only, Sāṃkhya must have its basis in Yoga, which is regarded as higher than the path of action. Cf. Bhagavadgītā 6.44.
44. A statement of pradhāna and puruṣa is quoted here that seems to be an aphoristic statement of some ancient Sāṃkhya teacher. According to Durga, it is a pāramarśa sūtra; see his commentary on Nirukta 7.3.
45. This shows that the last two verses were composed by the author to glorify himself and his work.

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20. ŚAṂKARA

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1. Gerald J. Larson RB1378, 209-235.
2. Allen W. Thrasher, “The dates of Maṇḍana Miśra and Śaṃkara,” 117-139.

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21. MĀṬHARAVṚTTI

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(notes by Harsh Narain)

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1. The commentary under this kārikā contains a number of quotations from the Brāhmaṇas and Śrauta-Sūtra texts and also one quotation from the Bhāgavata Purāṇa bearing upon the slaughter of animals in Vedic sacrifices.

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2. The commentary also makes a passing reference to the threefold classification of the operations of words (*śabdavrtti*): primary signification (*abhidhā*), secondary signification (*lakṣaṇā*), and suggestion (*vyañjanā*).

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3. The expression “*guṇalakṣaṇena*” in the text appears to be a misreading of “*aguṇa-lakṣaṇena*” which alone can restore sense to the passage.

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4. “*Duyaṅgulakaśayoḥ*” in the text is meaningless. “*Dvyaṅgulyoḥ*” (between two fingers) would be a better reading.

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5. The sentence is not clear. Action capacities (*karmendriya*) cannot be said to know or sense anything.

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6. The commentator on SK.33 makes a reference to the incarnation of Viṣṇu named Kalki, which detracts from the antiquity of the commentary.

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7. This is cited as a pro-Sāṃkhya verse, but it fits the Cārvāka materialism better.

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8. *Kārikā* 73 (see summary under *Sāṃkhyakārikās* above) is absent in other editions of the *Sāṃkhyakārikās*.

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22. VĀCASPATI MIŚRA

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1. Karl H. Potter RB9446, 453-455.

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2. S. A. Srinivasan, ed. (RB3878), *Vācaspatimiśras Tattvakaumudī: Ein Beitrag zur Textkritik bei kontaminierter Überlieferung* (Hamburg: Cram, De Gruyter, 1967), 60-63.

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3. Umesha Mishra (RB12387), *History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 2 (Allahabad, 1966), 100.

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4. Richard Garbe, trans. (B732; RB1315), *Der Mondschein der Sāṃkhya Wahrheit* (Munich, 1891).

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5. Srinivasan RB3878.

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6. (B737; RB1317) *The Tattvakaumudī: Vācaspati Miśra's Commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā*, Poona Oriental Series No. 10. (Poona, Oriental Book Agency, 1965).

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7. With these poetic verses, Vācaspati Miśra is making several significant allusions to the older intellectual tradition. On one level, he is paraphrasing an old verse from the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (IV.5). Vācaspati's paraphrase indicates, however, an important shift in conceptualization. In *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* IV.5 reference is made to a feminine “unborn one” and to a masculine “unborn one.” Vācaspati retains the feminine “unborn one” but changes the masculine “unborn one” to many “unborn ones,” thereby stressing the classical Sāṃkhya notion of a plurality of *puruṣas*. On another level, Vācaspati is probably also alluding to the Vedānta tradition, and specifically to *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* I.4.8-10 in which Śaṃkara discusses the meaning of *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* IV.5 and in which Śaṃkara argues, interestingly, that the old Upaniṣadic passage is *not* a reference to Sāṃkhya notions. On yet another level, Vācaspati is possibly also alluding to *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI in which Being (*sat*) is described as having three constituents, namely, fire, water, and food, which are referred to as being characterized by the colors red, white, and black respectively. Here again, however, the Vedānta tradition of Śaṃkara denies that the old *Chāndogya* passage refers to Sāṃkhya notions. Finally, on still another level, Vācaspati is probably alluding to *Ṛg Veda* I.164.20 (the famous “two birds” passage) and X.129 (the hymn that refers to “that one,” or *tad ekam*). Both of these passages were claimed by the followers of Sāṃkhya as references to the Vedic sources for Sāṃkhya philosophy, but the followers of Vedānta (and especially Śaṃkara) denied such claims. Vācaspati, therefore, by making these obvious allusions and by then linking these with the tradition of Sāṃkhya teachers is most likely engaging in an intellectual double entendre. The informed reader knows that this is an appropriate manner to begin a treatise on Sāṃkhya philosophy, but the informed reader also knows that a Vedāntin would not take these traditional allusions very seriously. One is tempted to think that Vācaspati wants to eat his cake and have it too. More likely, however, is that Vācaspati is indicating at the outset that although he is composing a treatise on Sāṃkhya philosophy, he is himself approaching the task from the perspective of Vedānta.

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8. Although Vācaspati does not appear to draw any ultimate conclusions with respect to this final set of arguments, the upshot would appear to be that both interpretations of the problem of cause and effect, namely, the Sāṃkhya *satkārya* and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika *asatkārya*, appear to require some kind of regress. The Sāṃkhya theory of the manifestation of an existent effect, however, is superior, because it at least allows one to maintain an intelligible relation between cause and effect, even though it also entails an endless regress of continuous transformation. This problem of an endless regress of continuous transformation is dealt with in Sāṃkhya in terms of one of its two basic postulates, namely, *prakṛti* and its transformations.

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9. It is to be noted that Vācaspati does not comment on the issue of *puruṣa* being "one" (*eka*) or "plural" (*bahu*) in his interpretation of these two verses. See, however, the *Bhasya* of Gauḍapada, *Jayamangalā*, *Māṭharavṛtti* and the Chinese commentary for differing interpretations.

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10. This quotation from a so-called *Rājavārttika* is the same as verses 10-12 of the introductory verses to the *Yuktidīpikā*.

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11. B340; RB1121.

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23. BHOJARĀJA

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1. E. Frauwallner B8590; RB12160, vol. 1 288.

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24. TATTVASAMĀSASŪTRA

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1. Frauwallner B8590; RB12160, vol. 1, 475.
2. As collected and discussed in Frauwallner B6431A; RB9627, 123-137.
3. And see S. N. Dasgupta B7653; RB11309, vol. 2, 171ff.
4. Garbe B3574; RB5524, vii.
5. Ibid., viii.
6. Max Müller B7625; RB11286, 225-229.
7. Chakravarti B6381; RB9596, 168-169.

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25. KRAMADĪPIKĀ

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1. Chakravarti, ibid., 168-170.

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26. SĀMKHYASŪTRA

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1. B3574; RB5524, vii-ix of the preface.

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¹ Garbe B3574; RB5524, viii-ix.

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² Ibid., xxiv.

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³ That is to say, bondage is caused only on the basis of a fundamental nondiscrimination that takes place when consciousness and materiality come in contact or proximity (*saṃyoga*) with each other. Bondage, in other words, is *not* an ontological problem vis-à-vis such issues as essential nature (*svabhāva*), time (*kala*), place (*desa*), action (*karman*), etc., because ontologically, consciousness and materiality are completely distinct. It is, rather, an epistemological problem of nondiscrimination when consciousness and materiality are in contact or proximity.

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⁴ In other words, the assertion to be proved is so broad as to include literally everything. Hence, nothing can be cited as an illustration or documentation that is not already included in the original assertion to be proved. Put into modern terms,

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27. ANIRUDDHA

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the statement "everything is momentary" has no nonvacuous contrast by means of which its truth can be judged one way or another.

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5. It should be noted that Vijñānabhikṣu, Nāgeśa, and Mahādeva reverse the order of sūtras 53 and 54. Presumably, this reversal is because of the particle "iti" that appears at the end of sūtra 53. Vijñānabhikṣu argues that the use of iti indicates that the discourse on bondage in the sūtras has now been completed. Because sūtra 54 also deals with bondage, evidently Vijñānabhikṣu solves this discrepancy by simply reversing the order of the two sūtras. Aniruddha, however, who is the oldest commentator, does not reverse the order, nor does he suggest that the discourse on bondage has been concluded at this point.

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6. Presumably, 'internal organ' here refers to the intellect.

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7. That is to say, the atomic theory and the theory of primordial materiality are alike in the sense that both are intellectual constructs for purposes of systematic, philosophical reflection and so are first principles functioning more or less as heuristic devices or limiting parameters in which that which is knowable can be talked about.

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8. It should be noted that this sūtra appears to make manas equivalent to buddhi or mahat. If this is the case, however, then one cannot easily account for the reference in sūtra 61 to the "aggregate" of twenty-five. It is probably the case, therefore, that manas in this context is not the same as the indriya referred to by that name in Sāṃkhyakārikā 27. At least, Vijñānabhikṣu argues in this way. Possibly, however, we have here an example of the conflation of traditions. That is to say, different schools of ancient Sāṃkhya speculation may have interpreted manas differently and in the Kārikā as well as in the Sāṃkhyasūtra traces remain here and there as in this instance of the attempt to resolve such divergences. Compare, for example, the views of Vindhyavāsin as set forth in the Yuktidīpikā.

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9. In other words, there is no convincing inference that the world does not exist, nor can it be argued that our perception of the world is mistaken, as it is when we perceive a mirage, etc. Indeed, the very possibility of a mistaken perception—as for example in hallucination or mirage—can be accounted for only on the basis of the experience of a nonmistaken perception that corrects the error. If the world were unreal, there could be no rational criterion for even identifying a "mistaken" perception.

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10. It should be noted that if one construes sūtras 92-99 as dealing with the issues of the existence and functioning of God, the Sāṃkhya position appears to be the following: not only is the existence of God logically untenable, but even more than that, all of the conventional beliefs about God are more adequately accounted for by other means. Thus, God's agency, his controllership, his apparent Vedic attestation, and his discriminative capacity can all be accounted for in terms of the functioning of the antaḥkaraṇa or internal organ vis-à-vis the proximity of passive consciousness (puruṣa). But compare Vijñānabhikṣu for a varying interpretation of these sūtras. Also, see Book V.112 for further comments on the problem of God.

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11. That is to say, a jar becomes manifest by the work of a potter, or it becomes destroyed by smashing it with a hammer, etc. In all cases, however, a jar, or clay, etc., are possibilities within a certain causal environment, and in that sense they are always existent effects. Hence, it is quite possible to hold to the theory of satkārya and at the same time make relevant distinctions regarding prior absence, posterior absence, etc., of particular manifestations. The latter are verbal characterizations within certain contextual environments and depend on a given manifestation.

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12. That is to say, the preceding objections in sūtras 119-123 concerning respectively the problems of sequence, of destruction, and of vicious regress likewise arise with respect to the theory of asatkārya.

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13. That is to say, presumably, space and time presuppose the quantitative measure of distance and duration and, thus, can only be relevant notions when the gross world has been constituted. In other words, space and time in Sāṃkhya are considered to be phenomenal derivatives of the fundamental principles and are not in themselves real in the sense that the twenty-five fundamental principles are real.

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14. It should be noted that the term “*vaikṛta*” is evidently an ancient technical term the precise significance of which is unclear. See Introduction.

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15. That is to say, in a given state the designations “primary” and “secondary” are always based on the various functions that have to be performed on various levels of government. Overall, however, it is the governor who retains an ultimate superiority.

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16. That is to say, although it is possible to discuss the sun as an intelligible entity in and of itself, any accurate characterization of its functioning must always take account of what is illumined and sustained by it (namely, the manifest world of nature illumined and supported by it). Moreover, because the subtle body is inextricably related to the gross body, therefore, the subtle body cannot be considered to be the Self or contentless consciousness, which by definition can have no such dependence or relation.

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17. The *sūtrakāra* does not appear to object to the alternative explanations of the makeup of the gross body, and hence it can perhaps be assumed that these varying interpretations were legitimate positions within the network of Sāṃkhya “schools.”

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18. That is to say, discrimination and nondiscrimination are the necessary and sufficient conditions for liberation and bondage respectively.

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19. Just as dream constructions are derived from our experience of waking objects and are judged to be dream constructions precisely because of that, so also the conceptual constructions of accomplished Yogins are to be interpreted. Put simply, the experience of waking awareness is the primary criterion for identifying and assessing other kinds of awareness.

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20. Although materiality is eternal and self-sufficient, it nevertheless serves the needs of consciousness in terms of experience and liberation. Materiality, therefore, is the locus for nondiscrimination.

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21. It should be noted that there is an interesting contrast between Sāṃkhya and Yoga on the problem of God. Both systems deny the notion of God in a traditional theistic sense, but both accept “God-talk” as it were in a limited way. For Yoga, God is a particular *puruṣa*; for Sāṃkhya, “God” is simply another term for *buddhi* in its apparent manifestation as omniscient and omnipotent.

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22. The expression “for the sake of” should be construed in the light of the clarification given by the *sūtrakāra* in II.1.

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23. The analogy holds only for the milk and not for the cow. See II.37 for the use of the analogy of the cow.

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24. That is to say, action need not be considered a primary cause either of bondage or liberation as it is according to the Mīmāṃsā.

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25. For those of middle-level capability, even after discrimination, *prārabdha-karman* or “action that is in the process of being worked through” continues to operate for a time and, hence, there is a kind of experience (*upabhoga*).

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26. There is one source of this ancient tale that would indicate that “Piśācaka” is a proper name of a person rather than an imp. The source is *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* 2.3; see the commentary by Jñānottama.

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27. Śuka is the narrator of the *Śrīmad Bhāgavatam*. The story is in the *Śāntiparvan* of the *Mahābhārata*.

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28. One attains the final goal (*kṛtakṛtyatā*) by means of the knowledge of the principles (*tattvajñāna*), which is brought about through devotion to an authoritative teacher (*gurūpāsanā*), according to Aniruddha.

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29. That is to say, if God should have such personal need, then He could not be God, and if He had no such need He would not engage in action or work.

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30. The principles of *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*, according to Sāṃkhya, are established by means of inference. *Puruṣa* is inferred by means of *saṃghātaparārthatva*, etc., as set forth in I.146. On the basis of these effects, which establish prakṛti, and the resulting implications, which establish puruṣa, however, a God cannot be inferred. All of the functions of God can be more adequately accounted for with respect to the notions of puruṣa and prakṛti. At best, puruṣa or consciousness can be called "God" when, under the influence of nondiscrimination, consciousness appears to be an agent, but such a God is nothing more than a convenient verbal characterization and is certainly not an independently existing entity. Thus, neither perceptual nor inferential grounds exist for establishing the existence of God.

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31. The sūtrakāra asserts that the existence of God cannot be established by either perception, inference, or reliable authority, and, according to Sāṃkhya, there is no other means for reliable knowing. Hence, the existence of God cannot be established. Compare Vijñānabhikṣu's commentary wherein the bhāṣyakāra makes a valiant, albeit unconvincing, attempt to soften the Sāṃkhya denial of God. See especially his commentary on V.12. Finally, it should be noted that, for a full account of the Sāṃkhya denial of God, one should read and compare I.92-99 with V.2-12.

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32. Both Aniruddha and Vijñānabhikṣu construe "sukha" in this sūtra to mean satisfaction, and they then proceed to show how satisfaction is established on the basis of the fivefold inference.

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33. An inference may work both ways vis-à-vis that which is to be proved, or only one way. For example, in the inference "all transitory things are produced," the inference works both ways, so that it is equally valid to assert that "all produced things are transitory." In the inference "where there is smoke there is fire," however, the inference only works one way, or on one side, for there are examples of fire without smoke.

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34. It should be noted that Vijñānabhikṣu interprets this sūtra as applying only to the Veda or āptavacana. If construed in this way, then the sūtra should be taken with the preceding sūtras in which the authority and authorship of the Veda have been discussed.

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35. The Prābhākara theory of error is usually called "akhyāti" or "vivekakhyāti" and not "satkhyāti." The latter designation is usually given to the Vijñānavāda theory of error. The sūtra V.53 (na, sato bādhadarśanāt) could be taken as referring to Vijñānavāda, and the argument against the theory would be that it entails the denial of the incontrovertible perceptions of an external world. All of the commentaries, however, take the sūtra as referring to Prābhākara, and both Garbe and Nandalal Simha agree.

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¹ In S. N. Dasgupta B7653; RB11305, vol. 3, 445-495.

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² Richard Garbe B6227; RB9527, 100-105.

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³ A. B. Keith B6291; RB9548, 112.

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⁴ M. Winternitz, Geschichte der indischen literatur vol. 3, 454-457.

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⁵ Udayavira Sastrin, Sāṃkhyadarśan kā itihās, 305-304.

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⁶ Chakravarti B6381; RB9596, 171.

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⁷ Vijñānabhikṣu, Yogavārttika, translated by R. T. Rukmani, 5-7.

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⁸ The author gives two meanings of sūtra 152, but philosophically speaking both the meanings are identical. Here he cites a verse of the Buddhist Bhāvaviveka and wrongly attributes it to the Viṣṇu Purāṇa.

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⁹ It should be noted that Aniruddha accepts the classical doctrine of the eighteen-fold subtle body, thus construing this sūtra to mean "seventeen plus one more make up the liṅga." Vijñānabhikṣu says that the subtle body is seventeenfold, the reference to "one" in the sūtra alluding to the uniform aggregate that appears at the beginning of creation.

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28. VIJÑĀNABHIKṢU

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10. This is a unique view of Vijñānabhikṣu’s that is not in keeping with classical Sāṃkhya.

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11. That is to say, there is (a) a subtle body (*liṅga*), (b) a subtle form of the five gross elements that provides a cover or wrap for the *liṅga* in the process of transmigration, and (c) a gross body born of father and mother. Such an interpretation appears forced and awkward.

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29. BHĀVAGAṆEŚA DĪKṢITA

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1. No gloss by Pañcaśikha has been published as yet. As indicated earlier, the reference may be to the *Kramadīpikā*.

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30. MAHĀDEVA VEDĀNTIN

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1. Keith B6291; RB9548, 112.
2. Mentioned by Garbe in B3574; RB5524, v.
3. Ibid., 5.

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33. NĀGOJĪ, OR NĀGEŚA BHAṬṬA

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1. Keith B6291; RB9548, 112.
2. Cf. *Bibliography* (B) pp. 327-328 (RB, p. 452), for citations of his works.
3. Keith, 112.

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34. VAMŚIDHARA MIŚRA

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(notes by R. S. Bhattacharya)

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1. See the Sanskrit Introduction to the edition by Rāmaśāstrin. The surname mentioned in the introduction is Puṇataṃkara, which seems to be a variation in spelling only. Gopinath Kaviraj places Mahādeva in the second half of the 17th century. See G. Kaviraj B6007; RB9253, 80.
2. See the commentary on *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 55.
3. Vamśidhara takes the word “sāṃkhya” as a word of the *yogarūḍha* class, i.e., as a word in which both the etymological and customary meanings are partly retained, and shows its two meanings clearly.
4. For elucidation of this view see *Vyāsabhāṣya* on *Yogasūtra* 3.14.
5. As Vamśidhara does not criticize this view we may surmise that he was in favor of the Vedāntic view.
6. As shown in *Yogasūtra* 3.13.
7. As the Vedāntic view has not been criticized by Vamśidhara, it appears that he did not consider the Sāṃkhyan view valid.
8. For the nature of *bhoga* and *apavarga* see *Vyāsabhāṣya* on *Yogasūtra* 2.18.
9. “Udbhid,” as a source of beings, does not in fact mean a seed or soil as is sometimes supposed. “Udbhid” means *udbhedana*, the act of breaking through or shooting out. Because trees, etc., appear as a result of breaking through the earth they are called “udbhijja.” See Nīlakaṇṭha’s commentary on the *Bhīṣmaparvan* of the *Mahābhārata* 4.14, and Lakṣmīnṛsiṃha’s commentary on *Śivagītā* 32-33.

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43. PRAMATHANĀTHA TARKABHŪṢAṆA

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(notes by Kalidas Bhattacharya)

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1. Pramathanāthatarkabhūṣaṇa is unnecessarily worried about interpreting *sūtras* 10 and 11 as though they are in the context of bondage and liberation. May they not be understood plainly in the context of sūtra 9, purporting to show that in the case of a white sheet of cloth changing into red, or a seed germinating, there is no destruction of its nature (svabhāva)?

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2. Under sūtra 26, there is another reading for “āptavādāt” in the passage Aniruddha quotes. It is “apravādāt,” “apravāda” meaning “statement without justification.” “Āptavāda” means a statement for which justification is believed to have been given.

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3. One wonders why the meaning of a word should change so often and so soon.

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4. Here, “arthakriyā” is taken by Pramathanāthatarkabhūṣaṇa to mean “cause.” After elaborating Aniruddha’s argument against the Buddhists, Parmathanāthatarkabhūṣaṇa refers to an alternative reading for “uttarayogāt” in sūtra 39. But he observes that in that case another word, viz., “kāle” has to be added after “pūrvapāye,” meaning that, if only at the moment a cause is destroyed its effect arises, then that cause can never be a material cause, even through the postulation of anything intermediately extra (atiśaya).

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For “hetukāle” in Aniruddha’s commentary on sūtra 40 there is an alternative reading, viz., “hetuhetumatkāle.” According to Pramathanāthatarkabhūṣaṇa this reading is unacceptable.

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5. This, according to Pramathanāthatarkabhūṣaṇa, is what Aniruddha means by “ubhayavyabhicārāt.”

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6. Those to whom Aniruddha is referring by the name “viśeṣavādin” are just the Sāṃkhyists. The word “ābhāsa” in “kāryatvābhāsa” in Aniruddha’s commentary means a fallacy of the hetu.

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The expression “vidhivākyottambhanaya” in Aniruddha’s commentary on I.95 is not found in all texts.

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7. But is such an interpretation at all necessary? “Yoga” may well mean contact in both cases; and is not this contact the cause of sṛṣṭi—manifest nature, nonattachment (virāga) being itself a part of that sṛṣṭi?

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8. But did Aniruddha really understand vikalpa to be doubt? He has simply said “It touches both.” One has only to note that immediately before that he spoke of pramāṇa (instrument of knowledge) and viparyaya (error or misconception). So, he may well have meant that vikalpa touches both correct knowledge and error. Is this vikalpa different substantially from Vyāsa’s and Vijñānabhikṣu’s?

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9. Why Pramathanāthatarkabhūṣaṇa brings in the subtle body here is not clear, for it has no relevance for the next sūtra. For the word “pariṣvakta” in III.6 there is an alternative reading. It is “parimukta” meaning “in bondage” (the prefix “pari” meaning “contrary to”).

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10. As Aniruddha states III.21, it reads “prapañcatvādyabhāvaś ca,” where by “prapañcatva” he means death. But there are two other alternative readings. One that Vijñānabhikṣu accepts is “prapañcamaraṇādyabhāvaś ca” and the other is “prapañcasyābhāvaḥ.”

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Under sūtra IV.21, for “tatsvarūpopāsanāt” in Aniruddha’s commentary there is an alternative reading, “tatsādṛśyopāsanāt.” Pramathanāthatarkabhūṣaṇa is definite that it is a wrong reading.

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11. Was this interpretation, with the same word taken to be used so differently in two successive sentences, at all necessary?

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12. But, as so interpreted, whose view is it after all? It could be imputed to the Vijñānavādin or the Śūnyavādin or the Advaita Vedāntin. But, as the context suggests, it belongs to none of them.

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13. But was this necessary? From the context it appears that “ubhayatra” here means as much in the case of “white cloth” as in that of “this horse is running” or “this is a cow.”

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14. But this clarifies nothing.

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(notes by Kalidas Bhattacharya)

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1. Evidently, all these are cases of passing from the knowledge of *x* to what is analytically involved in *x*.
2. But even then things do not clear up.
3. But are they? Are they immediately experienced at all? Earlier in their commentaries Vācaspati Miśra and Nyāyapañcānana had said that they are not immediately experienced.
4. In other words, right predispositions alone are either innate or acquired, acquisition being effected through other factors. Wrong predispositions are always acquired ones.
5. Nyāyapañcānana refers to another reading for "ādhyātmika." It is "ādhyātmikya," found, he says, in some manuscripts. But Nyāyapañcānana holds that this reading is unacceptable because it spoils the rhythm of the first line of the verse. Again, for "pañca ca" he refers to another reading, viz., "niścakara," and rejects it on similar grounds.

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He refers to another alternative reading for "hastacandārdhacandrajam" in the śloka quoted by Vācaspati Miśra. The other reading is "cañcaccandārdhacandrajam." "Cañcat" here means "extended."

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49. PAÑCĀNANA TARKARATNA

First 200 of 442 passages. Read on

Cites (55)