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A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy c9: Chapter VI: Ethics

A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy c9

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Chapter VI: Ethics

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formulation of such theories is a more concrete problem than the formulation of the theories of Moral Standards, which are by their very nature of the case bound to be abstract. As there is a variety of Metaphysical theories in the Upadishadic literature as we saw in a previous chapter, similarly there is a variety of theories about the nature of the Moral Ideal. To begin with, we have an entirely anti-hedonistic theory advocated by the author of the Kaṭhopanishad. We are told there that " there are two different paths, the path of the good and the path of the pleasant, and that these two diverse paths try to seduce a man each to itself. Of these, he who follows the path of the good is ultimately rewarded by the fulfilment of his aim; while he who follows the path of the pleasant loses the goal which he is pursuing. When the good and the pleasant present themselves before a man, he looks about him if he be wise, and decides which of them to choose. The wise man chooses the good before the pleasant, while the fool chooses the pleasant before the good " (S. 4. a). In these two verses from the Kaṭhopanishad we have a classical expression of the conflict between the good and the pleasant as experienced even in the Upanishadic days. Who will not say that the story of the conflict between the Good and the Pleasant in the Kaṭhopanishad trying to attract a man to themselves reminds one of a similar story of the choice of Hercules in Xenophon, where the two maidens, Pleasure and Virtue, present themselves before Hercules with their several seductions, and Hercules chooses Virtue? As with Hercules, so with Nachiketas. Even though the God of Death tries to seduce Nachiketas by the offer of a life of pleasure and glory, Nachiketas refuses to be imprisoned in the chains which Yama has forged for him (S. 4. b), and therein proves that he is not like the ordinary run of mankind which hugs to its heart the path of plesaure and glory but ultimately disillusioned in its choice. Nachiketas, however, refuses to be seduced by the life of pleasure.

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7. It is likely, however, that anti-hedonism may degenerate into an utter pessimism, and so likewise does it happen in the case of certain Upanishads. The Kaṭhopanishad asks in a pessimistic vein: "what decaying mortal here below would delight in a life of the contemplation of the pleasures of beauty and love, when once he has come to taste of the kind of life enjoyed by the unageing immortals?" (S. 5. a). This is almost in the spirit of Schopenhauer who said that the best thing for man here below is not to have been born at all, and the second best to have died young. In a similar spirit, the Kaṭhopanishad condemns the desire for a long life of sensual enjoyment in preference to even a momentary contemplation of the life immortal. This pessimistic mood is most expressively brought forth in the Maitri Upanishad, where, our attention having been called to the contemplation of the universal evil that exists in the world and the impermanence of things having been most poetically expressed, life is described as the source of eternal misery. "What is the use of the satisfaction of desires," asks Bṛhadratha, "in this foul-smelling and unsubstantial body, which is merely a coglomeration of ordure, urine, wind, bile and phlegm, and which is spoilt by the content of bones, skin, sinews, marrow, flesh, semen, blood, mucus and tears? What is the use of the satisfaction of desires in this body which is afflicted by lust, anger, covetousness, fear, dejection, envy, separation from the desired, union with the undesirable, hunger, thirst, old age, death, disease and grief? Verily all this world merely decays. Look at the flies and the gnats, the grass and the trees, that are born merely to perish. But what of these? The great oceans dry up, the mountains crumble, the pole-star deviates from its place, the wind-cords are broken, the earth is submerged, and the very gods are dislocated from their positions" (S. 5. b.). Contemplating such a situation, Bṛhadratha entreats Śākāyanya to save him "as one might save a frog from a waterless well." This pessimistic attitude of Bṛhadratha is the logical outcome, only carried to an excess, of the anti-hedonistic attitude put into the mouth of Nachiketas.

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8. Closely connected with pessimism is the theory of asceticism and its monastic practices. Unless a man begins to feel the interest in life waning for him, he does not see the necessity of harbouring the ascetic virtues. It is only when his heart begins to be set on the Eternal that he wishes to adopt the life of renunciation. It was in this way, we are told by the Bṛhadāraṇyakopanishad, that the wise men of old began to feel that there was no use for them of any wealth or fame or progeny. "What shall we do with progeny," they asked, "if it does not bring to us nearer the Eternal?" In this manner did they leave all ambition for progeny and wealth and fame and adopt the life of an ascetic (S. 6. a). The Kaushītaki Upanishad goes even further, and by a curious analogical explanation advocates the attitude of Satyāgraha. "Just as Prāṇa which is identical with Brahman is served by the mind as its messenger, the eye as its guard, the ear as its informant, the speech as its tire-woman, and just as all the senses bring offerings to Prāṇa even though it does

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not solicit them, similarly all these beings will bring offerings to a man who knows this secret even though he does not solicit them. For him the rule of life is ‘Beg not’. When he has gone to alms in a village and does not find any, he may sit down with the resolve that he shall not partake of anything that may be offered to him, and those who had formerly refused him shall come near him and speak to him good words—for this is verily what happens to a man who does not solicit alms—and bring offerings to him and say they shall give” (S. 6. b). This passage from the Kaushītaki enjoins upon an ascetic the attitude of non-begging in the firm belief that when he does not beg, things will come to him of their own accord. The Bṛihadāraṇyakopanishad gives further characteristics of the ascetic life, inasmuch as it tells us that “a Brahmin ought to grow disgusted with all wisdom, and lead a life of child-like simplicity” (S. 7. a); believing in the quietistic life, “he should never give himself up to too many words, for that is verily a weariness of the flesh” (S. 7. b).

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9. There is, however, a positive side to the quietistic life taught in certain Upanishads. The Muṇḍakopanishad tells us that “we should verily leave away all words, but should devote ourselves to the knowledge of the Ātman, for the Ātman is the bund of immortality. Meditate upon the Ātman with the help of the symbol Om; for thus alone may it be possible for you to go beyond the ocean of darkness. Sages see Him by the help of the light of knowledge, for he manifests himself, the Immortal One, in the form of bliss” (S. 8. a). We must therefore remember that even though we are told that we should lead a quietistic life, that is only as a sort of recoil from the unreal and empty world of sense; within itself, however, it may contain the marrow of self-realisation. "It was thus," says the Bṛihadāraṇyakopanishad, "that one who lived a peaceful life, of self-control, of cessation from activity, and of patient suffering, having collected himself, saw the Ātman within himself, saw in fact everything as verily the Ātman. Evils cease to have any power over him, for he has overcome all evil. Sin has ceased to torment him, for he has burnt all sin. Free from evil, free from impurity, free from doubt, he has become properly entitled to the dignity of a Brāhmaṇa" (S. 8. b). The Muṇḍakopanishad makes a more positive assertion by telling us that "a man who has left off all argument in the superiority of his spiritual illumination begins to play with the Ātman, and to enjoy the Ātman, for that verily constitutes his action. Thus does he become foremost among those who have known Brahman" (S. 8. c). Here we are told that though, to all appearances, such a person may be leading a life of freedom from the bustle of society, alone to himself in the privacy of spiritual solitude, he still has an object to play with, an object to enjoy, namely the Ātman. In fact, his life in Ātman is a life of intense spiritual activity, and not, as it may seem to others, a life of retirement and quietude.

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10. Contrasted with this kind of Activism, however, stands that other kind of Activism, with which alone people are ordinarily familiar, namely, what we may call Phenomenal Activism. The Īśopanishad tells us that "a man should try to spend his life-span of a hundred years only in the constant performance of actions. It is thus only that he can hope not to be contaminated by actions" (S. 9. a). It is important to note that even though this passage from the Īśopanishad tells us that we should spend our life-time in doing actions, the actions that are here implied have no further range than possibly the small circumference of "sacrifice"; and further, the way in which, even in the midst of a life of action, freedom from contagion with the fruit of action may be secured is not here brought out with sufficient clearness. It is only later, when we come to the days of the Bhagavadgītā, that we see how even in the midst of the life of action actionlessness may be secured, only if attachment to action is annihilated once for all and no calculating desire is entertained for the fruit of action. The Īśopanishad does not supply these two links between the life of action and the goal of actionlessness and point out that actionlessness may be secured in the midst of action only through freedom from attachment to action, and the annihilation of any desire for the end of action. But, at any rate, it is evident that the Īśopanishad goes very much beyond the other Upanishads when it tries to reconcile the life of action with the life of knowledge. "To pitchy darkness do they go," it tells us, "who pursue the path of ignorance, namely the path of action. To greater darkness still do they go who devote themselves to the life of knowledge for its own sake. Sages have told us from very ancient times that knowledge leads to the one result, while action leads to the other. But he alone who can synthesise the claims of knowledge and action is able by means of action to cross the ocean of death and by means of knowledge to attain to immortality" (S. 9. b). In this way does the Īśopanishad try to reconcile the claims of knowledge and action, telling us that the life of bare contemplation and the life of bare activity are alike fraught with evil; but that he alone may be said to attain the goal of life who knows how to harmonise the two different paths. Thus we may see how the later claims of Aristotle for the contemplative life, and of Bacon for the active life, are prophetically reconciled by the philosopher of the Īśopanishad.

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11. When the phenomenal side of Activism is thus recognised, it is not very difficult to deduce from it a theory of the moral ideal which must needs take account of phenomenal good. The moral good may not be regarded as the Summum Bonum, and the worldly good may come to be recognised as at least on a par with it in the formation of the conception of the Summum Bonum. On the other hand, the verse from the Śvetāśvataropanishad which comes at the end of its fourth chapter is an echo of the spirit of Vedic prayer, where worldly good is craved for as being even a superior moment in the conception of the highest good. "Make us not suffer in our babies or in our sons," says the Upanishad; "make us not suffer in lives, or in cows, or in horses; kill not our powerful warriors, O Rudra, so may we offer to thee our oblations for ever and ever!" (S. 10. a). When the eye of the moral agent is not turned inwards, the good he seeks is evidently the external good only. On the other hand, when as in the case of the Taittirīya Upanishad, the internal good comes also to be recognised as of no meaner value, we are asked to choose both Truth and Law which have moral, along with Happiness and Prosperity which have material value (S. 10. b). It was thus that even that great idealistic philosopher Yājñavalkya, when he went to the court of King Janaka and was asked as to whether he desired wealth and cattle, or victory and controversy, said he wanted both: he wanted the cows along with their golden coin, as well as victory in the argumentative battle with the other philosophers in Janaka's court. The apology which Yājñavalkya apparently offered for his conduct was that " he was enjoined by his father not to take away any wealth without having imparted spiritual instruction " (S. 10. c). It is evident that Yājñavalkya desired both material as well as spiritual good ; and in spite of his otherwise supremely idealistic teaching, he possibly wanted to set an example by showing that the consideration of external good cannot be entirely ignored even by idealists as constituting a moment in the conception of the highest good.

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12. The author of the Taittirīyopnishad goes even a step further, and tells us that probably there is no distinction of kind between physical good and spiritual good, and that we may thus regard the two as commensurable in terms of each other. In a famous passage he makes for us an analysis of the conception of bliss. Physical good to him is itself an aspect of " bliss," as spiritual good constitutes the acme of "bliss"; and according to that author, there is a scale of values connecting the so-called physical bliss on the one hand with the highest spiritual bliss on the other. What, according to him, is the unit of measurement ? We are told that the unit of measurement may be taken to be "the happiness of a young man of noble birth and of good learning, who is very swift and firm and strong, and to whom is granted the possession of the whole earth full of wealth. Of a hundred such blisses is made the bliss of the human genii ; of a hundred blisses of these genii is made the bliss of the divine genii ; of a hundred of these latter blisses is made the bliss of the fathers ; of a hundred blisses of the fathers is made the bliss of the gods who are born gods ; of a hundred of these is made the bliss of the gods who have become gods by their actions; of a hundred such blisses is made the bliss of the highest gods; of a hundred blisses of these gods is made the bliss of Indra; a hundred blisses of Indra constitute the bliss of Bṛhaspati; of a hundred such blisses is made the bliss of Prajāpati; and a hundred blisses of Prajāpati make the bliss of Brahman: and each time we are told that all the blisses, severally and progressively, belong to the Sage who is free from all desires" (S. 11). It is important to note that there is here no distinction of kind brought out between physical good on the one hand and spiritual bliss on the other, unless of course it were intended by the author that the physical good may be taken to be as good as naught before the highest bliss. That, however, does not seem to be the trend of argument by which the beatific calculus is arrived at after such labour by the author of the Taittirīyopanishad with the help of a physico-mythological scale of measurement. It is also equally important to remember that all these various blisses are said at all times to belong to the Sage who is free from all desires. If, in short, desirelessness is to constitute the highest bliss, there is no meaning in saying that the highest good could be measured in terms of the unit of physical good. In any case, it does not seem possible that spiritual good can be of the same kind as physical good: the two are probably entirely incommensurate, differing not in degree but in kind. The bliss of the Sage, who has realised Brahman, cannot be measured in terms of the physical happiness of any beings whatsoever, however highly placed or however divine they may be.

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13. Indeed, there cannot be any physical scale for the measurement of spiritual values. The bliss of Self-realisation is entirely of its own kind, absolutely *sui generis*. But

Self-realisation

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to cavil at the theory of Self-realisation by saying that the Self "is realised" already, and that therefore there is no necessity of "realising" the Self seems to us to be merely a listless evasion of the true significance of Self-realisation. When Canon Rashdall says that the Self is realised already, he is speaking about a metaphysical fact. On the other hand, when it is said that the Self is to be realised, we are asked to take into account the whole ethical and mystical process by which the allurements of the not-Self naturally ingrained in the human being are to be gradually weaned out, and the Self to be made to stand in its native purity and grandeur. It is in the doctrine of Self-realisation that the ethical and mystical processes meet, a fact to which we shall have to allude presently. It need hardly be said that by Self-realisation, as the Upanishadic seers understand that expression, is meant the unfoldment and the visualisation of the Ātman within us, instead of the incipid and soul-less realisation of the various "faculties" of man, namely, the intellectual, the emotional and the moral, in which sense Bradley and other European moralists have understood that expression.

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The Bṛhadāraṇyakopanishad tells us that the Ātman, who constitutes the Reality within us as without us, is and ought to be the highest object of our desire, higher than any phenomenal object of love, such as progeny, or wealth, or the like, because, the Upanishad tells us, the Ātman, being the very kernel of our existence, is nearmost to us. "If a man may say there is another object of love dearer to him than the Ātman, and if another replies that if there be God overhead he shall destroy his object of love, verily it shall so happen as this man says. Hence it is that we ought to meditate on the Ātman as the only object of desire. For him who worships the Ātman in this way, nothing dear shall ever perish" (S. 12. a). There is a further reason why, according to the same Upanishad, the Self should be regarded as the highest object of desire; because, when one has attained the Self, there are for him no desires left to be fulfilled, and he becomes entirely desireless (S. 12. b). But the Upanishadic doctrine of Self-realisation implies more than that the Ātman is the sole object of desire.

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In a very celebrated conversation between Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī in the Bṛihadāraṇyakopanishad, we are told that when Yājñavalkya wanted to make a partition of his estate between his two wives, Kātyāyanī and Maitreyī, Maitreyī chose rather the spiritual portion of her husband's estate, saying "Supposing I obtain the possession of the whole earth full of wealth, by that I shall never attain to immortality." "Verily not," replied Yājñavalkya, "thy life will be only like the life of those who have all kinds of convenience for them; but there is no hope of immortality by the mere possession of wealth." Maitreyī thereupon replied: "What shall I then do with that by which I may not grow immortal?" "Verily most dear to me art thou, my wife, who art talking thus," said Yājñavalkya, "Come, I shall instruct thee in spiritual wisdom. It is not for the sake of the husband, that the husband is dear, but for the sake of the Ātman; it is not for the sake of the wife that the wife is dear, but for the sake of the Ātman; it is not for the sake of the children that the children are dear, but for the sake of the Ātman; it is not for the sake of wealth that wealth is dear, but for the sake of the Ātman....It is not for the sake of everything that everything is dear, but for the sake of the Ātman. This Ātman, O Maitreyi, ought to be seen, ought to be heard, ought to be thought about, ought to be meditated upon;

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for it is only when the Ātman is seen and heard and thought about and meditated upon does all this become verily known" (S. 13). It is important to remember that this passage is not to be interpreted in the interest of an egoistic theory of morals, as some have done, but only in the interest of the theory of Self-realisation. We have not to understand that the wife or the husband or the sons are dear for one's own sake, interpreting the word Ātman in an egoistic sense. The word Ātman which comes at the end of the passage in the expression Ātmā vā are drashtavyo forbids an egoistic interpretation of that word in the previous sentences. We are thus obliged to interpret the word Ātman throughout the passage in the sense of the Self proper, the Ultimate Reality, and, therefore, to understand that the love that we bear to the wife or the husband or the sons is only an aspect of, or a reflection of, the love that we bear to the Self. It is, in fact, for the sake of the Self that all these things become dear to us. This Self the Bṛihadāraṇyaka enjoins upon us to realise by means of contemplation.

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14. The ethical and mystical sides of Self-realisation are fused together nowhere better than in that celebrated passage from the Chhāndogya Upanishad, where having started an inquiry as to what it is that induces a man to perform actions, and having answered that it is the consideration of happiness which impels him to do so,—for, we are told, had he experienced unhappiness in his pursuit, he would not have gone in for the actions at all,—the author of the Chhāndogya Upanishad comes to tell us that real happiness is the happiness that one enjoys in the vision of the Infinite, and that every other kind of happiness is only so-called, and of really no value whatsoever as contrasted with it. It thus comes about that, according to the author of that Upanishad, there are two radically different kinds of happiness, namely what he calls the Great and the Small. Great happiness consists in seeing, hearing, and meditating upon the Ātman. Little happiness consists in seeing, hearing and meditating upon other things besides the Ātman. Great happiness is immortal; Little happiness is perishable. If the question be asked, in what this Great happiness consists, the answer may be given, in Herakleitean fashion, that it consists in its own greatness, and possibly not in its own greatness! People say that cows and horses, elephants and gold, servants and wives, lands and houses—these constitute greatness. No, says the author, these rest in something else, but the Infinite rests in itself. Great happiness is experienced when the Infinite is seen above and below, before and behind, to the right and to the left, and is regarded as identical with everything that exists; when the Being, that calls itself the I within us, is realised above and below, before and behind, to the right and to the left, and is regarded as identical with everything that exists; when the Ātman is seen above and below, before and behind, to the right and to the left and is regarded as identical with everything that exists. He who thus realises the triune unity of the Infinite, the I, and the Ātman, and experiences the truth of the sentence *So Aham Ātmā*, is alone entitled to enjoy the highest happiness. One who comes to see this, and think about this, and meditate on this, really attains Svārājya: he loves his Self, plays with his Self, enjoys the company of his Self, and revels in his Self (S. 14). In this way, according to the Chhāndogya Upanishad, the ethical Summum Bonum consists in the mystical realisation of the triune unity as the goal of the aspirant's one-pointed endeavour.

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15. We must not fail to take account, however, of a phase of the theory of the moral ideal as propounded in the Upanishads. This is the theory of what we may call Supermoralism, the state of being beyond good and bad, the ethical counterpart of the metaphysical theory of Absolutism. There is, however, a distinction between the supermoralism of Bradley and Nietzsche on the one hand, and the supermoralism of the Upanishads on the other. Neitzsche's supermoralism affects only the superman, who, in the possession of absolute strength, defies, and therefore rises above, all conceptions of good and bad. The Bradleyan supermoralism affects only the Absolute, which in its absoluteness is to be regarded as being beyond both good and bad. On the other hand, the Upanishadic supermoralism affects the Individual as well as the Absolute, and the Individual only so far as he may be regarded as having realised the Absolute in himself. The passage from the Kathopanishad which tells us that "the Absolute is beyond duty and beyond non-duty, beyond action and beyond non-action, beyond the past and beyond the future," supported likewise by the passage from the Chhāndogya Upanishad which tells us that "the bodiless Ātman is beyond the reach of the desirable and the undesirable" (S. 15. a), has its counterpart in the passage from the Muṇḍakopanishad which tells us that "the Moral Agent shakes off all conceptions of merit and demerit, that is, in other words, goes beyond the reach of virtue and vice, and good and bad, when he has attained to divine assimilation after realising the golden-coloured Being who is the lord and governor of all" (S. 15. b). Similarly, we are told in the Bṛihadāraṇyakopanishad that the Ātman who lives in the citadel of our heart, and who is the lord and protector of all, grows neither great by good actions nor small by evil actions (S. 16. a), while he who contemplates upon this Ātman himself attains a like virtue, when his greatness ceases to grow by good actions, or diminish by bad actions (S. 16. b). These passages tell us that the Moral Agent goes beyond the reach of good and bad, when and only so far as he has attained to likeness with, or becomes merged in, the Ātman, who is himself, metaphysically speaking, beyond the reach of good and bad.

III—Practical Ethics

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16. We have discussed hitherto the theories of the Moral Standard and the Moral Ideal which have been advanced in the Upanishads. We shall now go on to a consideration of the practical side of Ethics, namely the enumeration and inculcation of certain virtues in the various Upanishads. And first, about the three cardinal virtues which are enumerated in the Bṛhadāraṇyakopanishad. There we are told how "once upon a time the gods, men, and demons all went to their common father, Prajāpati, and asked him to communicate to them the knowledge which he possessed. To the gods, Prajāpati communicated the syllable Da, and having asked them whether they had understood what he had said to them, received the answer that they had understood that they were asked to practice self-control (Dāmyata), upon which Prajāpati expressed satisfaction. To the men he also communicated the syllable Da, and after having asked them whether they had understood what he had said to them, received the answer that they had understood that they should practise charity (Datta), upon which Prajāpati said he was satisfied. To the demons likewise, Prajāpati communicated the syllable Da, and having asked them whether they had understood what he had said to them, received the answer that they had understood that they should practise compassion (Dayadhvam), upon which Prajāpati expressed satisfaction again" (S. 17. a). Even though thus Prajāpati gave the same instruction to the different inquirers, they understood the import of the instruction according to their different capacities, and learnt what was for them the right thing to do. We are told by the author of the Upanishad that "when the celestial voice, the Thunderbolt, repeats Da, Da, Da, it intends to communicate the three different sets of virtues, namely, Self-control, Charity, and Compassion." These, then, are the three cardinal virtues for people who are born with the Sāttvika, the Rājasa and the Tāmasa elements predominating in them. To those who, like the gods, occupy an elevated position, the divine voice says: "Be self-controlled, for otherwise, out of your elation, you might do acts of unkindness." To those who are in the position of men, equals among equals, the divine voice says: "Be charitable, and love your fellows." To those, again, who, like the demons, have in them the capacity of doing infinite harm, the divine voice says: "Be compassionate. Be kind to those with whom you would otherwise be cruel." Thus we are told in the above passage that Self-control, Charity, and Compassion constitute the three different cardinal virtues for the three different sets of people, each one of them having a certain predominating psychological temperament.

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17. So far about the Bṛhadāraṇyakopanishad. In the Chhāndogya Upanishad we meet with a different list of virtues in the conversation between Ghora Āṅgirasa and Kṛishṇa, the son of Devaki.

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Who this Krishna was, and what the purport of the instruction which Ghora Āṅgirasa imparted to Kṛṣṇa might be taken to be, we have had occasion to consider in a previous chapter. At present we are concerned merely with the list of virtues that are enumerated there, and their ethical significance. We are told that the chief virtues of man are austerity, charity, straightforwardness, harmlessness, and truthfulness : these according to Ghora Āṅgirasa constitute the chief virtues of man (S. 17. b). We have already seen the analogy which the enumeration of these virtues bears to the enumeration of a similar list of virtues in the Bhagavadgītā (XVI. 1. 2). Then, in the Chhāndogya Upanishad again, a little later on, we find the mention of the five chief different sins of which man is capable. We are told there that “he who steals gold, he who drinks wine, he who pollutes the bed of his teacher, he who kills a Brahmin, all these go down to perdition ; likewise also he, who even associates with them” (S. 17. c). In this passage we are told what were regarded, by the Upanishadic seers, the five chief different kinds of sin. The thief, the drunkard, the adulterer, the Brahmocide, and the man who associates with them, are all regarded as worthy of capital punishment : this is very much like the later injunctions in Manu and Yājñavalkya (III. 5. 227), where the same crimes are described as the greatest of all sins.

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18. The Taittirīya Upanishad is evidently the most hortatory of all the Upanishads. It adopts a deliberately didactic tone, and impresses a number of virtues to be observed, the study and teaching of the Sacred Scriptures forming the burthen of the discourse. We are asked to respect the Law, to tell the Truth, to practise Penance, Self-control, and Tranquillity, to offer ceremonial as well as daily Oblations to the Fire, to receive guests with Hospitality, to practise Humanity, and to Increase and Multiply. We are also told the opinions of three different moralists, each of whom insisted upon a special virtue. The sage Satyavachas Rāthītara taught the virtue of Truth. The sage Taponitya Pauruśiṣṭi insisted upon the virtue of Penance. Finally, the sage Nāka Maudgalya said that there was no virtue higher than the Study and Teaching of the Sacred Books, for that, he said, constituted penance—that verily constituted penance (S. 18.). On the other hand, a little further on, we have in the same Upanishad a direct moral advice imparted by the teacher to the out-going pupil. When the pupil has finished the course of his studies at his master's house, the master by way of a parting advice, tells him to speak the Truth, to respect the Law, and not to swerve from the Study of the Vedas; after having offered to the preceptor the kind of wealth he would choose, he should go out into the world to marry and to produce children, so that the family lineage may not be broken. The pupil is further advised not to swerve from the duties that are due to the Gods and the Fathers; to regard the Mother as his god; to regard the Father as his god; to regard the Preceptor as his god; to regard the Guest as his god. In general, the pupil is advised only to perform those actions which might be regarded as faultless by the society. Those, says the Spiritual Teacher, who are higher than ourselves in Brahminhood, should be respected "by giving a seat"—an expression which is otherwise interpreted as implying also that "in the presence of such, not a word should be breathed by the disciple." Finally, the Teacher imparts to his disciple the various conditions of Charity : Charity should be practised with Faith, and not with Un-Faith, with Magnanimity, with Modesty, with Awe, and with Sympathy (S. 19). We thus see how the author of the Taittirīya Upanishad enumerates the different virtues that are necessary for practical life.

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19. More, however, than any of the other virtues, Truth seems to find particular favour with the Upanishdic seers. Illustrations of this virtue are scattered in the various Upanishads. When audacious potentates speak from the viceregal chair that in Indian Scriptures there does not seem to be any consideration made of the supreme virtue of Truth, it were much to be wished that they had studied the Upanishads, where Truth is inculcated as the supreme virtue, before they made their daring statements. In a famous passage of the Chhāndogya Upanishad we are told how Satyakāma, the son of one Jabālā, who had led a wanton life in her youth, asked his mother when he came of age, as to who it was from whom he was born, how the mother answered that she could only tell him that he was born of her though she was not quite sure from what father he was born, how when Satyakāma went to his spiritual teacher in order to get himself initiated, he was asked by the teacher as to what family it was from which he had come, how the youth Satyakāma gave a straightforward reply saying that he did not really know from what family he had come, but that he only knew his mother’s name, and that she had told him that she did not know from what father he was born, herself having led a very wanton life in her youth. “Heigh!” exclaimed the spiritual teacher to Satyakāma, “these words could not come from a man who was not born of a Brahmin.

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Come, I shall initiate you, because you have not swerved from the Truth" (S. 20). This story tells us how even the son of a wanton girl could be elevated to the position of a Brahmin merely for having told the pure and unadulterated Truth. Then, again, in that same Upanishad, we are told how Truth has the power of saving a man even from death, for Truth, we are told, is merely the counterpart of Reality. "When a man who has committed theft is brought handcuffed to the place of trial, they heat an axe for him, and if he has really committed the theft, then he covers himself with untruth, catches hold of the axe and is burnt to death. On the other hand, if he has not committed the theft, he covers himself with truth, catches hold of the axe, and is not burnt at all, but acquitted" (S. 21). This is how they used to distinguish the culprit from the true man in ancient times. Whatever may be said in modern times of the efficacy of such a trial, the fact remains that underlying the idea of this trial, there lies an unshakable belief in the power of Truth. Be true and fear not. Your strength would be as the strength of ten, if only your heart is pure. On the other hand, if you hide the canker of Untruth in your bosom, in mortal fear you shall walk even in the midday sun. Of like import is the utterance of Bhāradvāja in the Praśnopanishad where we are told that if a man may tell the Untruth he shall be dried up from the very roots; hence it is, he says, he dare not tell the Untruth (S. 22. a). On the other hand, the Muṇḍakopanishad tells us, that Truth alone becomes victorious in the world, and not a lie; by Truth is paved the path of the gods, by which travel the sages, who have all their desires fulfilled, to where lies the highest Repository of Truth (S. 22. b). This is how the practice of Truth as a moral virtue enables one to reach the Absolute. Finally, in the conversation between Nārada and Sanatkumāra, when Nārada had gone to his teacher to receive instruction from him in regard to the nature of Truth, the teacher answered it was only when a man had realised the Ultimate that he might be said to tell the Truth, while other truths were truths only by sufferance (S. 22. c). This is verily in the spirit of the jesting Pilate who asked what truth was, and would not stay for an answer. While, however, Pilate expressed a doubt as to the nature of truth, Sanatkumāra gives a more positive interpretation of it when he says that ultimate Truth is to be found only in the attainment of Reality. What people call truth is really no Truth at all. It is Truth only by sufferance. Thus we see how Truth is regarded by the Chhāndogya Upanishad as the ultimate moral correlate of the realisation of the Absolute.

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20. We next come to the treatment of the problem of the Freedom of the Will. It may be easily admitted that a proper discussion of this problem requires a very high stage in the development of moral philosophy; hence there is not much wonder if the treatment of the problem of the Freedom of the Will in the Upanishads is but scanty. There are, however, a few remarks showing a rather acute insight in regard to the problem, and we must not fail to give the credit for them to the Upanishadic philosophers. The Bṛihadāraṇyakopanishad tells us that man is merely a conglomeration of desire, will, and action: "as his desire is, so is his will; as is his will, so is the action that he performs; as his action is, so is the fruit that he procures for himself"(S. 23). There is here a very clever discussion of the relation between desire, will, action, and the effect of action—a contribution indeed of the Upanishadic sages to the Psychology of the Moral Self. In the Kaushītaki Upanishad, again, we have the enunciation of a theological determinism, inasmuch as we are told there that man is but a puppet in the hands of God, who makes him do good actions if he wishes him to rise, and bad actions if he wishes him to fall (S. 24. a). This is a regular denial of the freedom of man, and we are told that man does not possess true freedom at all as moral philosophy understands that expression. On the other hand, in the Chhāndogya Upanishad, we are told that even though true freedom cannot be said to belong to man before the realisation of Ātman, still we can say that it does belong to him after that realisation. Man in the foolishness of the contemplation of his small success regards himself to be the lord of all he surveys; he believes that he may be the master of any situation in which he may be placed, and that he may compel nature any time to bend to his sovereign will; but events in life prove that these are after all false expectations, and that even though a little freedom may be granted to man in small matters, he is yet not free in the highest sense of the term. Pent up within the gaol, he thinks like a prisoner that he is free; but he is free only to drink and eat and not to move about. Like a falcon to whose foot a string is tied, he can only fly in the limited sphere described by the length of the tether, but he is bound beyond that region. Similarly, man may vainly imagine that he is free to do any actions he pleases, but his freedom is the freedom of the tethered falcon. The Chhāndogya Upanishad tells us that it is only when we have known the Ātman that there is freedom for us in all the worlds; but if we have not known the Ātman, there is no freedom for us at all (S. 24. b). The same Upanishad tells us again a little later, that when we have known the Ātman we can obtain any object we please, thus testifying to the sovereignty of man’s will over nature, which proceeds from the realisation of the Ātman (S. 24. c). Finally, even though there is no discussion in the early Upanishads of the conflict of motives which leads to the moral choice, still in the Muktikopanishad we have a passage where we are told that the river of desire runs between the banks of good and bad, but that, by the effort of our will, we should compel it to move in the direction of the good (S. 25)—a contribution, though a belated one, to the psychological aspect of the problem of freedom.

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21. What is now the Ideal of the Upanishadic Sage? It may be seen by reference to the progress of the argument in the Chapter that moral values are by the Upanishadic seers almost invariably linked with mystical values and that just as there can be no true mysticism unless it is based upon the sure foundation of morality, so morality to be perfect must end in the mystical attitude. In the Upanishads, there is no mere moral agent whose morality does not consummate in mystical realisation. Thus, the Upanishadic Sage differs on the one hand from the Stoic Sage, who represents in himself the acme of moral perfection connected with an intellectual contemplation instead of a mystical realisation of the Absolute. On the other hand, he differs from the Christian Sage, who no doubt sticks rightly to the triadic norm of conduct, faith, hope, and charity, but who centres his hopes for mystical perfection in a *heteros*—Jesus Christ—and not in himself. The Upanishadic Sage believes in the possibility of greater or less mystical realisation for every being according to the greater or less worth of his character, belief, and endeavour: he sees the Ātman in all, and sees the Ātman alone. The Īśopanishad tells us that “for a man to whom all these beings have become the Ātman, what grief, what infatuation, can there possibly be, when he has seen the unity in all things?'' (S. 26. a). He has gone to the end of sorrow, and has torn asunder the ether-like skin of desire that had so long enveloped him in darkness and despair (S. 26.b). All his desires have been at an end, because he has attained to the fulfilment of the highest desire, namely the realisation of the Ātman (S. 26. c). As drops of water may not adhere to the leaf of a lotus, even so may sin never contaminate him (S. 26. d). There is no feeling of repentance for him : he never bethinks himself as to why it was that he did not do good actions, or why he did only evil ones (S. 26.e). He has come to learn of the nature of Reality, and has thus gone beyond the reach of these duals (S. 26. f). If ever anybody may intend evil to him, or try to persecute him, his hopes will be shattered, as anything dashing itself against an impenetrable rock may shatter itself to pieces, for, verily, the Sage is an impenetrable rock (S. 27). He has attained to eternal tranquillity, because as the Upanishad puts it, he has "collected" the Godhead (S. 28. a). All his senses along with the mind and intellect have become motionless on account of the contemplation of the Absolute in the process of Yoga (S. 28. b), and having realised the Ātman, he has found eternal happiness everywhere (S. 28. c). How this mystical perfection can be attained, and how morality may thus culminate in mysticism, will form the theme of our next Chapter.

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1 यान्यस्माकं सुचरितानि तानि त्वयोपास्यानि नो इतराणि ।...। ये के चास्मच्छ्रेयांसो ब्राह्मणाः...। अथ यदि ते कर्मविचिकित्सा वा वृत्तविचिकित्सा वा स्यात्, ये तत्र ब्राह्मणाः... संमर्शिनः अलूक्षाः धर्मकामाः स्युः यथा ते तत्र वर्तेरन् तथा तत्र वर्तेथाः । एष आदेशः । एष उपदेशः । एषा वेदोपनिषत् । तै. I. 11.

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2 महद्भयं वज्रमुद्यतं य एतद्विदुरमृतास्ते भवन्ति । भयादस्याग्निश्च तपति भयात्तपति सूर्यः । भयादिन्द्रश्च वायुश्च मृत्युर्धावति पञ्चमः ॥ क. II. 6. 2-3. भीषाऽस्माद्वातः पवते भीषोदेति सूर्यः । भीषाऽस्मादग्निश्च इन्द्रश्च मृत्युर्धावति पञ्चम इति ॥ तै. II. 8.

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3 (a) मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत । छां. III. 18. 1.
(b) मनो ह्यात्मा...मनो हि ब्रह्म मन उपास्स्वेति । छां. VII. 3. 1.

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4 (a) अन्यच्छ्रेयोऽन्यदुतैव प्रेयस्ते उभे नानार्थे पुरुषं सिनीतः । तयोः श्रेय आददानस्य साधुर्भवति हीयतेऽर्थाद्य उ प्रेयो वृणीते ॥ श्रेयश्च प्रेयश्च मनुष्यमेतस्तौ संपरीत्य विविनक्ति धीरः । श्रेयो हि धीरोऽभिप्रेयसो वृणीते प्रेयो मन्दो योगक्षेमाद् वृणीते ॥ क. I. 2. 1-2.
(b) स त्वं प्रियान्प्रियरूपांश्च कामानभिध्यायन्नचिकेतोऽत्यस्राक्षीः । नैतां सृकां वित्तमयीमवाप्तो यस्यां मज्जन्ति बहवो मनुष्याः॥ क. I. 2. 3.

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⁵ (a) अजीर्यताममृतानामुपेत्य जीर्यन्मर्त्यः क्वधस्थः प्रजानन् । अभिध्यायन्वर्णरतिप्रमोदानतिदीर्घे जीविते को रमेत ॥ क. I. 1.

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²⁸ (b) भगवन्नस्थिचर्मस्नायुमज्जामांसशुक्रशोणितश्लेष्माश्रुदूषितविण्मूत्रवातपित्तकफसंघाते दुर्गन्धे निस्सारेऽस्मिञ्छरीरे

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किं कामोपभोगैः । कामक्रोधलोभभयविषादेर्ष्याव्यसनवियोग- निष्टसंप्रयोगक्षुत्पिपासाजरामृत्युरोगशोकाद्यैरभिहतेऽस्मि- ञ्शरीरे किं कामोपभोगैः । सर्वे चेदं क्षयिष्णु पश्याम यथेमे दंशमशकादयस्तृणवनस्पतय उद्भूतप्रध्वंसिनः ... । अथ किमेतैर्वाऽन्यानां शोषणं महार्णवानां शिखरणां प्रपतनं ध्रुवस्य प्रचलनं वश्रनं वातरज्जूनां निमज्जनं पृथिव्याः स्थानादपसरणं सुराणां इत्येतद्विधेऽस्मिन्संसारे किं कामोपभोगैः । मै. I. 2-7.

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6 (a) एतमेव प्रवाजिनो लोकमिच्छंतः प्रव्रजन्ति । एतद्ध स्म वै तत् पूर्वे विद्वांसः प्रजां न कामयन्ते किं प्रजया करि- ष्यामो येषां नोऽयमात्माऽयं लोक इति । ते ह स्म पुत्रै- षणायाश्च वित्तषणायाश्च लोकैषणायाश्च व्युत्थायाथ भिक्षा- चर्यं चरन्ति । बृ. IV. 4. 22.

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(b) प्राणो ब्रह्मेति ह स्माह कौषीतकिः । तस्य ह वा एतस्य प्राणस्य ब्रह्मणो मनो दूतं, चक्षुर्गोप्तृ, श्रोत्रं संभाषयितृ, वाक्परिवेष्ट्री । तस्मै वा एतस्मै प्राणाय ब्रह्मण एताः सर्वा देवता अयाचमानाय बलिं हरन्ति । एवं हैवास्मै सर्वाणि भूतन्याचमानायैव बलिं हरन्ति य एवं वेद । तस्योप- निषन्न याचेदिति । तद्यथा ग्रामं भिक्षित्वाऽलब्धोपविशे- न्नाहमतो दत्तमक्षीयामिति त एवैनमुपमंत्रयन्ते ये पुरस्ता- त्प्रत्याचक्षीरन् । एष धर्मोऽयाचतो भवति । अश्दास्त्वैवैनं उपमंत्रयन्ते ददाम त इति । कौ. II. 1.

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7 (a) एवं वै तमात्मानं विदित्वा ब्राह्मणाः पुत्रैषणायाश्च वितै- षणायाश्च लोकैषणायाश्च व्युत्थायाथ भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्ति ... । तस्माद् ब्राह्मणः निर्विद्य बाल्येन तिष्ठासेत् । बृ. III. 5. 1.

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(b) तमेव धीरो विज्ञाय प्रज्ञां कुर्वीत ब्राह्मणः । नानुध्यायाद् बहून् शब्दान् वाचो विग्लापनं हि तत् । बृ. IV. 4. 21.

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8 (a) तमेवैकं जानथात्मानं अन्या वाचो विमुंचथ अमृतस्यैष सेतुः । ओमित्येवं ध्यायथ आत्मानं स्वस्ति वः पराय तमसः

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परस्तात् । तद्विज्ञानेन परिपश्यन्ति धीराः आनन्दरूपममृतं यद्विभाति ।

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(b) तस्मादेवंविच्छान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तितिक्षुः समाहितो भूत्वा आत्मन्यात्मानं पश्यति । सर्वमात्मानं पश्यति । नैनं पाप्मा तरति, सर्वं पाप्मानं तरति, नैनं पाप्मा तपति, सर्वं पाप्मानं तपति, विपापो विरजोऽविचिकित्सो ब्राह्मणो भवति । बृ. IV. 4. 23.

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(c) प्राणो ह्येष यः सर्वभूतैर्विभाति विजानन्विद्वान्भवते नातिवादी । आत्मक्रीड आत्मरतिः क्रियावानेष ब्रह्मविदां वरिष्ठः ॥ मुं. III. I. 4.

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9 (a) कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि जिजीविषेच्छतं समाः । एवं त्वयि नान्यथेतोऽस्ति न कर्म लिप्यते नरे ॥ ई. 2.

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(b) अंधं तमः प्रविशन्ति येऽविद्यामुपासते । ततो भूय इव ते तमो य उ विद्यायां रताः ॥ अन्यदेवाहुर्विद्ययाऽन्यदाहुरविद्यया । इति शुश्रुम धीराणां ये नस्तद्विचचक्षिरे ॥ विद्यां चाविद्यां च यस्तद्वेदोभयं सह । अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययामृतमश्नुते ॥ ई. 9-11.

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10 (a) मा नस्तोकं तनये मा न आयुषि मा नो गोषु मा नो अश्वेषु रीरिषः । वीरान्मा नो रुद्र भामिनोऽवधीर्हविष्मंतः सदमित्वा हवामहे । श्वे. IV. 22.

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(b) सत्यान्न प्रमदितव्यम् । धर्मान्न प्रमदितव्यम् । कुशलान्न प्रमदितव्यम् । भूत्यै न प्रमदितव्यम् । तै. I. II. 1.

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(c) तं होवाच " याज्ञवल्क्य, किमर्थमचारीः, पशूनिच्छन् अण्वन्तानिति " । उभयमेव सम्राडिति होवाच । बृ. IV. I. 1.

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स होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः । पिता मेऽमन्यत न अननुशिष्य हरेतेति । बृ. IV. I. 7.

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11 सैषाऽनंदस्य मीमांसा भवति । युवा स्यात्साधुयुवा- व्यापकः । आशिष्ठो दृढिष्ठो बलिष्ठः । तस्येयं पृथिवी सर्वा वित्तस्य पूर्णा स्यात् । स एको मानुष आनंदः । ते ये शतं मानुषा आनंदाः । स एको मनुष्यगंधर्वाणामानंदः । श्रोत्रि- यस्य चाकामहतस्य । इत्यादि । तै. II. 8.

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(a) तदेतत्प्रेयः पुत्रात्प्रेयो वित्तात्प्रेयोऽन्यस्मात्सर्वस्मादंतरतरं यदयमात्मा । स योऽन्यमात्मनः प्रियं ब्रुवाणं ब्रूयात् प्रियं रोत्स्यतीतीश्वरो ह तथैव स्यादात्मानमेव प्रियमुपासीत स य आत्मानमेव प्रियमुपास्ते न हास्य प्रियं प्रमायुकं भवति । बृ. I. 4. 8.

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(b) तद्वा अस्यैतदाप्तकामं आत्मकामं अकामं रूपं शोकान्तरम् । बृ. IV. 3. 2.

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योऽकामो निष्काम आप्तकाम आत्मकामः । बृ. IV. 4. 6.

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सा होवाच मैत्रेयी "यन्नु म इयं भगोः सर्वा पृथिवी वित्तेन पूर्णा स्यात् कथं तेनामृता स्यामिति " । " नेति " होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः " यथैवोपकरणवतां जीवितं तथैव ते जीवितं स्यात् अमृतत्वस्य तु नाशास्ति वित्तेनेति " । सा होवाच मैत्रेयी " येनाहं नामृता स्यां किमहं तेन कुर्याम् ।...।" स होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यः प्रिया बता रे नः सती प्रियं भाषस एहास्व व्याख्यास्यामि ते ।...। स होवाच न वा अरे पत्युः कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति, आत्मनस्तु कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति । जायायै पुत्राणां°, वित्तस्य°, ब्रह्मणः°, क्षत्रस्य°, लोकानां°, देवानां°, भूतानां°, सर्वस्य° । आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः । आत्म- नो वा अरे दर्शनेन श्रवणेन मत्या विज्ञानेनेदं सर्वं विदितम् । बृ. II. 4. 2-5.

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यदा वै सुखं लभतेऽथ करोति, नासुखं लब्ध्वा करोति सुखमेव लब्ध्वा करोति, सुखं त्वेव विजिज्ञासितव्यम्... । यो वै भूमा तत्सुखं, नाल्पे सुखमस्ति । भूमा त्वेव विजि- ज्ञासितव्यः । यत्र नान्यत्पश्यति नान्यच्छृणोति, नान्य- द्विजानाति स भूमा । अथ यत्रान्यत्पश्यति, अन्यच्छृणोति, अन्यद्विजानाति तदल्पम् । यो वै भूमा तदमृतं अथ यदल्पं तन्मर्त्यम् । स ( भूमा ) भगवः कस्मिन्प्रतिष्ठित इति स्वे

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महिम्नि यदि वा न महिम्नि इति । गोअश्वमिह महिमे- त्याचक्षते हस्तिहिरण्यं दासभार्यं क्षेत्राणायतनानीति । नाहमेवं ब्रवीमि । स एवाधस्तात्, स उपरिष्टात्, स पश्चात्, स पुरस्तात्, स दक्षिणतः, स उत्तरतः, स एवेदं सर्वं इत्य- थातोऽहंकारादेशः, अहमेवाधस्तात्, अहमुपरिष्टात्, अहं पश्चात्, अहं पुरस्तात्, अहं दक्षिणतो, अहमुत्तरतो, अह- मेवेदं सर्वमित्यथात आत्मादेशः । आत्मैवाधस्तात्, आत्मोपरिष्टात्, आत्मा पश्चात्, आत्मा पुरस्तात्, आत्मा दक्षिणतः, आत्मोत्तरतः, आत्मैवेदं सर्वमिति । स वा एष एवं पश्यन्नेवं मन्वान एवं विजानन् रतिरात्मक्रीड आत्म- मिथुन आत्मानन्दः स स्वराड् भवति तस्य सर्वेषु लोकेषु कामचारो भवति ।

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छां. VII. 22-25.

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15 (a) अन्यत्र धर्मादन्यत्राधर्मादन्यत्रास्मात्कृताकृतात् । अन्यत्र भूताच्च भव्याच्च यत्तत्पश्यसि तद्वद ॥

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क. I. 2. 14.

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अशरीरं वाव संतं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः ।

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छां. VIII. 12. 1.

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(b) यदा पश्यः पश्यते रुक्मवर्णं कर्तारमीशं पुरुषं ब्रह्मयोनिम् । तदा विद्वान्पुण्यपापे विधूय निरंजनः परमं साम्यमुपैति ॥

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मुं. III. 1. 3.

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16 (a) य एषोऽंतर्हृदय आकाशस्तस्मिञ्छेते सर्वस्य वशी सर्वस्ये- शानः सर्वस्याधिपतिः स न साधुना कर्मणा भूयान्नो एव असाधुना कनीयान् ।

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बृ. IV. 4. 22.

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(b) एष नित्यो महिमा ब्राह्मणस्य न वर्धते कर्मणा नो कनीयान् ।

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बृ. IV. 4. 23.

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17 (a) अथः प्राजापत्याः प्रजापतौ पितरि ब्रह्मचर्यमूषुर्देवा मनुष्या असुरा उषित्वा ब्रह्मचर्ये देवा ऊचुर्ब्रवीतु नो भवानिति तेभ्यो हैतदक्षरमुवाच द इति व्यज्ञासिष्टा ३ इति व्यज्ञा- सिष्मेति होचुर्दाभ्यतेति न आत्थेत्योमिति होवाच व्यज्ञा- सिष्मेति । अथ हैवं मनुष्या ऊचुर्ब्रवीतु नो भवानिति तेभ्यो हैतदेवाक्षरमुवाच द इति व्यज्ञासिष्टा ३ इति व्यज्ञासिष्मेति होचुर्दत्तेति न आत्थेत्योमिति होवाच व्यज्ञासिष्मेति । अथ

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