The Doctrine of the Jainas, Described after the Old Sources c8.110

c8.110

We have to distinguish between the soul and *āyā*, the I, though the dividing line is not always clearly discernible, thus when the moral monastic duties serve the *āyā* (*āyā sāmāie* (etc.), *āyā sāmāiyassa* (etc.) *aṭṭhe* Viy. 99a), when, furthermore, all bodily and spiritual doings work out in the I (*n’aṇṇattha āyā pariṇāmenti* Viy. 777a), and, especially, when *jīva* and *jio’yā* are explicitly equated with each other (Viy. 723b)¹, The I is more strongly stressed when the *āyā* as such (*daviy’āyā*) as well as in its connexion with passions, activity, cognition, and other abstracts is quoted as *kasāy’āyā, jog’āyā nūp’āyā*, etc. (Viy. 588a), and when all of them prove to occur or either not to occur simultaneously with the individual; comp. also the *ahigaraṇi āyā* Viy. 288b. Cognition, non-cognition, and belief, so it seems, permeate the personality, so that these definitions equal one another: *nāṇe* (nom.) *āyā, annaṇe āyā* (this with one-sensed beings) *damsaṇe āyā* (Viy. 588b). In Viy. 621a, 622b we read that speech and the inward sense both mean something definitely different from the I (*no āyā bhāsā, n.ā. maṇe, annā bhāsā, annā maṇe*), whereas this does not necessarily refer to the body (*āyā vi kāe anne vi kāe*) which may be explained by its external and constant working. The same introductory formulation immediately followed the text of Viy. 588b mentioned above (*āyā bhante Rayaṇappabhā puḍhavī annā R. p. ? Viy. 592b*), but it was intended to serve a completely different purpose. Here *āyā* stands in order to express that an object marked by its inherent qualities has a dialectic reality in contrast a. o. to the case that foreign qualities belonging to another object are attributed to it (*Rayaṇappabhā..* ) *appaṇo ādiṭṭhe āyā, parassa ādiṭṭhe no āyā*. This theory falls into the sphere of Syādvāda (§ 77).