The Doctrine of the Jainas, Described after the Old Sources c8.121

c8.121

§ 73. Cognition comes on through imagination, and so far as it keeps within the frame of the true teaching, Umāsvāti and his successors generally call it by the name of mati-jñāna,¹ whereas in the Canon it appears as ābhiṇibohiya-ṇāṇa. But in connexion with its negation called mai-aṇāṇa, which we shall deal with later (§ 79), it is also defined as mai-ṇāṇa. The other kinds of cognition to which the same assumption pertains, are called suya-ṇāṇa, ohi-n., maṇapajjava-n. and kevala-n. (Viy. 342b; Ṭhāṇ. 347a; Rāyap. 130a). While the Pannav. (525a) does not deal with it systematically, all five kinds are given their locus classicus in the Nandī (65 ff.) where (144a) the ābhiṇibohiya, by the name of buddhi, is being subjected to further subdivisions which, however, we abstain from dealing with here.² Nor can we do so with the other ṇāṇa. The greater importance lies in its close relationship with the suya-ṇāṇa in its meaning of communication or evidence according to cognition. Both are equal in their relative existence (Pannav. 136b), what is more, they only occur together: jattha ābh.-n., tattha suya-n., jattha suya-n., tattha ābh.-n. But this sentence of the Nandī (140a) is immediately restricted by quoting a half-śloka of the āyariya according to which the suya is preceded by the mai, but hot the mai by the suya. Umāsvāti T. 1, 20 and on T. 1, 31 subscribes to this view. There are various ways as to how knowledge from outside the I may be conveyed. But the 14 possibilities of the suya as referred to by the Nandī 187a ff. do not exclude one another (comp. 187a 13 f.). They concern articulated, reasonable and spiritual evidences (the latter pertaining to, and corresponding with, the Jain teaching) and such that are contrary to these qualities. The inward sense serves the transformation of such evidences into cognition, and this seems to be meant in T. 2, 22.