Buddhist Logic v2.c19.s3: § 3. The Comment of Vācaspatimiśra

Buddhist Logic v2.c19.s3

Language: English

§ 3. The Comment of Vācaspatimiśra

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Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā, Vizian. ed. pp. 12. 16 ff., Benares ed. (1925), pp. 17. 16 ff.

(12. 16). There is a theory (of the Buddhists according to which Perception is Sensation, and Inference is nothing but Conception, they represent two originally independent sources of our knowledge), each apprehends a special, originally independent² (element) in the cognized object. When a reference to them is made in the plural (and not in the dual), their subdivisions are meant. (12. 17). Sense-perception, being produced by a stimulus coming from an object, is intent upon that object, (because it is produced³ by it. But moreover) only that thing is an object of perception whose presence invariably calls forth its image.⁴ (12. 18). A Universal cannot produce the same (results, it neither can exercise a stimulus, nor can it call forth an image of the

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² It is not enough to state that perception and inference have special (*viśiṣṭa*) objects of cognition, these objects represent originally independent (*bhinna*) elements, since empirically there is an element of sense perception when we infer the presence of fire on the hill, and there is an element of constructive thought in every percept, thus *pratyakṣayor anumānayor vā samplave na bādhakam uktam* (*viśiṣṭa-śabdena*), *tathāpi vijātīya - pramāṇa - samplava - nirākaraṇa - paro' yam granthaḥ* (V).

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³ It is not enough to mention that cognition is intent on the object (*artha-gocaras*) in order to imply that it is produced (*artha-sāmarthya-samuttha*) by it. This would be the standpoint of the Naiyāyiks and the Universals would be included among the causes of perception. Therefore emphasis is put upon *artha-sāmarthya*. Only an efficient object, only a particular is a cause (*hetu*) producing perception. This again is not enough, because there is always a plurality of causes. Therefore that cause alone is the object which calls forth in our cognition its own image (*ākāra-ādhāyaka*) (V).

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⁴ Lit., p. 12. 17—18. «That object alone is the field of perception which obliges its own knowledge-reflex to conform with a positive concomitance and its contraposition». — *jñāna-pratibhāsa* = *jñāna-ākāra* (V); *aniyata-pratibhāsa* is meant in the sense of N. b. ṭ., p. 8. 8.

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vibhedaś cej jātaḥ svalakṣaṇāt, the particular is conceived as something unique and inexpressible, because possessing no connotation.

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object), since it is altogether devoid of any kind of (direct) causal efficiency.¹ (12. 19). (Nor can the empirical ² Particular, which is the meeting point of several Universals, do it. But the transcendental) Particular can. This alone is (pure reality), reality in the ultimate sense, (the thing in itself), because the essence of reality (according to the Buddhists) is just the faculty of being causally efficient. (12. 20). It is a point-instant (in time-space, it transcends empirical space and empirical time ³), it is just the thing in itself shorn of all its extensions.⁴ It is not an extended body.⁵ The ultimate reality is not a thing which is one and the same in different points of space.⁶ Nor has it duration through different instants of time. Therefore sense cognition,⁷ (sensation) apprehends the point-instant of reality,⁸ (the efficiency moment, the thing in itself, which alone ⁹ possesses the faculty of affecting our sensitivity).¹⁰

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¹ This is against the Naiyāyiks who admit that sense perception apprehends the particular and the Universals inhering in it as well, thus admitting a complex (samplava), qualified perception which the Buddhist denies as sense-perception; viśiṣṭa-viṣayatvam abhipretya sāmānyasya pratyakṣa-aviṣayatvam uktam (V).

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² sāmvyavahārikam svalakṣaṇam (P), = vyavahāra-mātra-viṣayaḥ=avastavam (V). sāmvyavahārikaḥ = anādi-vāsanā-vāsitaḥ (N. Kandali, p. 279. 15).

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³ artha-kriyā-sāmarthyena eva vastutva-vyāvasthāpanāt, kimartham tasya deśādy-ananugamaḥ? (V). — deśa-kāla-ananugatam vicāra-saham ity arthaḥ (P).

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⁴ asādhāraṇa.

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⁵ adeśātmaka.

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⁶ deśato 'nanugamena.

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⁷ pratyakṣam.

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⁸ svalakṣaṇa = kṣaṇa.

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⁹ artha-kriyā-siddhy-artham tad-abhidhānam (V).

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¹⁰ Lit., p. 12. 20—22. «This alone is its own non-shared (read asādhāraṇam) essence, that there is ultimate reality of the one which possesses an un-spatial Ego by not being extended (ananugama) in space (or by not being repeated in space), and there is momentariness by not running through (ananugama) time».

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(12. 22). That a Particular (of this kind) should also be cognized (by the conceiving, synthetic, faculty of our mind, or) by inference, is impossible. (The sphere of absolute particulars is not the sphere of inference). The latter cognizes relations,¹¹ and relations are of two kinds only, (either logical or real), either Identity or Causation.¹² In an absolute particular no relation can be found: (Uniformally) related ¹³ are always two Universals. (12. 24). (But a real Universal is an impossibility).¹ A thing cannot represent a unity and reside in different places, at different times and in different conditions. (12. 25). (Since Universals are thus illusory realities, and inferential knowledge has to deal with Universals only, does this mean that their knowledge is altogether objectless? ²). The Universals are indeed (not realities ³), they are logical constructions produced by a congenital capacity (of our Reason ⁴); we must admit that their objective existence in the external world, belongs (only) to the domain of our inferential knowledge, it is either a dialectical (superstructure upon reality) or an objectivized image.⁵

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¹¹ gṛhīta-pratibandha-hetukam.

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¹² Causation between «strings of events» (santāna) is also constructed, cp. N. b. ṭ., p. 69.

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¹³ pratibandhaḥ sāmānya-dharmāv āśrayate.

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¹ *paramārthasat sāmānyam vicāra-asaham (P), kārtsnya-ekadeśa-vṛtti-nirāsāt (V); the Buddhists admit a vyāvṛtti-rūpam, alīkam, anādi-vikalpa-vāsanā-vāsitam sāmānyam.*

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² *tat kim, sāmānyasya asattvāt, svalakṣaṇe ca pratibandha-graha-asambhavād anumānam nirviṣayam eva? (P).*

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³ *vikalpādhiṣṭhānam = (vikalpa)-viṣayo 'līkam iti yāvat (V).*

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⁴ *.....adhiṣṭhānam vikalpākārasya vā alīkasya bāhyatvam anumāna-go-caro... V. thinks that alīkabāhyatram and vikalpākāratvam refer to two different ideas (matāntaram), the first refers to an objectivized image, the second, as is seen from the sequel, — to a dialectical superstructure, having indirect reality.*

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⁵ Lit., p. 12. 23—26. «That indeed is caused by the apprehended mark of a (uniform) tie. And the tie consisting in identity-with-that and origination-from-that cannot be grasped in a particular as its object, it thus reposes on two Universals. And the one Universal cannot reside in different places, times and conditions. Therefore it is the place of construction originating from a beginningless Force, it must be assumed that the sphere of inference is the externality of a (dialectically) constructed form or an objectivized image (alīkasya)».

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(12. 26). Their essence,⁶ indeed, (is not positive, but relative, since they always contain) a correlative negation.⁷ (This is proved by three⁸ facts), 1) (reality is not their essential attribute), they are positive and negative,⁹ 2) (although internal mental constructions they have) resemblance with external reality, and 3) they are *distinct* ¹⁰ images, (i. e., they contain a sharp distinction from, or negation of, all other things).

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⁶ *niṣṭhā = svarūpam.*

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⁷ *anya-vyāvṛtti=apoha, anya-vyāvṛtti-niṣṭham=pratiyogi-niṣedha-svarūpam.*

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⁸ Cp. the somewhat different formulation of the three points Tātp., p. 340. 6 ff., translated in Appendix V.

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⁹ Cp. Bain, Logic, I. 54 ff. — Existence, is not their essence, their asādhāraṇa-dharma, in contradistinction from an ultimate particular (svalakṣaṇa) in which existence is inherent, which is only positive, since we cannot say «something is not», because this «something» is nothing but mere existence, pure reality. Cp. Tātp., p. 338. 1 and F. Brentano, Psychologie, II, p. 49 ff.

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¹⁰ *niyata-pratibhāsa = niyata-ākāra* as in N. b. ṭ., p. 70. 6, = *anya-vyāvṛttyā*; it is exactly the opposite of *niyata-pratibhāsa* in N. b. ṭ., p. 8—9, where it is = *arthena, indriyena vā, niyamita.*

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(As regards the first point the argument can be thrown into the form of the following syllogism).

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(Major premise). Whatsoever can alternately be affirmed and denied (has no existence in itself, but becomes existent relatively), as distinguished from something else.

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(Example). As, e. g., the fact of not being a body of limited dimensions.¹ It is found in consciousness (which is not impenetrable and) exists, and in the horns on the head of a hare which do not exist (and therefore are also not a body).

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¹ amūrta.

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(Minor premise). A (Universal, being) a mental construction,² can be alternately affirmed and denied, «there is a jar», «there is no jar».

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² vikalpa-gocaro.

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(Conclusion). («Jar» is not existence «in itself», it exists relatively to other things).

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(Verification). If «jar» were existence in itself,³ the words «it is» would never be used, being superfluous; nor would the words «it is not» be possible, because they would contradict (the existence which would then be included in the thing «jar»). If it were non-existence in itself, the same consequence would follow.⁴

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³ asādhāraṇo-bhāvo.

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(13.⁴). (As to the second point, it should be noticed that the Universal) is devoid of every direct efficiency, it is an (imagined) illusive Ens. There is no sameness between it and the point of absolute reality (represented by the element «this», so as to produce the perceptual judgment «this is a cow»), except the fact that both exclude⁵ the negation («non-cow»).⁶

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⁴ Cp. Bradley, Logic, p. 121, «It may be, after all, that everything «is» just so far as «it is not», and again «is not» just so far as «it is».

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⁶ Cp. Bradley, ibid. «If everything thus has its discrepant in itself, then every thing in a sense must be its own discrepancy».

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(13.⁵). (As to the third point, it must be noticed that) the distinct image of «a cow», and the definite connotative designation «a cow», would never be possible without (having present in the mind its) distinctions⁷ from horses or other (animals).⁸ (13.6). Therefore the Universal is nothing but the Negation of the Correlative,¹ it is (therefore) an internal² (mental construction, but related to external reality, since in our behaviour) we do not notice the difference,³ it is quasi-included in external reality⁴ and thus gives reality⁵ to our (conceptual, or) inferential knowledge. (13.7). Being thus indirectly connected with external reality, it has efficacy,⁶ it becomes consistent experience.⁷ Although it is an illusion of reality, it is nevertheless a source of right knowledge, in so far it belongs to a man who thinks (and acts) consistently.⁸

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⁵ Instead of manyate’ nya-vyāvṛtteḥ read anyato’ nya-vyāvṛtteḥ or anyatra vyāvṛtteḥ.

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⁷ Cp. Bradley, ibid. «Everything is determined by all negation».

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⁸ Lit., p. 13. 5. «And the definite idea and designation «cow» not without the exclusion of horse etc.». — What is here called niyatā buddhiḥ refers to the same

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¹ anya-vyāvṛtti-rūpam.

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² abāhyam.

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³ bāhya-bheda-agrahāt, i. e., we do not think that «a cow» is not an external object.

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⁴ bāhyatvena avasīyamānam.

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⁵ pravartayati.

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⁶ prāpayat.

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⁷ saṃvā dakam sat.

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⁸ Our conceptual knowledge is thus a dream accompanying real facts. This theory will be expounded with more detail in Appendix V. — Lit., p. 13. 6—8. «Therefore the Universal whose essence is distinction from the different (anya-vyāvṛtti), being non-external, being plunged in the external through non-perception of the difference from the external, directs inference towards the external; and by being indirectly tied up to the external, it makes us reach the external; being consistent, although wrong, it is, by being located in the cognizer, a means of right knowledge».

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(13.9). Thus it is that the particular (as the ultimate reality) is not the object on which inference (or conception) is intent. That sensation, on the other hand, is not intent on Universals, has already been pointed out. Nor is there any other source of knowledge (except these two, sensation and conception). Whatsoever (has a claim to be) a source of right cognition is included in these two, or, if it is not included in them, it is not a source of right knowledge. Nor is there any other object of cognition different from the particular, (viz. the ultimately particular) and the Universal, (there is no mixed entity in the cognition of which) both sources of our knowledge could participate.

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thing which above p. 12. 27 was designated as niyata-pratibhāsa. It is evident that niyata is here used in the sense of «distinct», niyata-pratibhāsa = niyatā buddhiḥ = niyata-ākāra, not in the sense of «limited» niyata = arthena indriyena vā niyamita as in N. b. ṭ., p. 8. 9 and 8. 20, cp. above, p. 505 n. 10.

Cites (1)

Nyāyabinduṭīkā (Vinītadeva) — Classical Tibetan