The University of Nalanda c10.127

c10.127

Śāntarakṣita adduces the following arguments against the Sāmkhya doctrine: Those causes which they have set forth for proving the prior existence of the effect in the cause can be adduced to prove its non-existence in the cause. He then explains how this is possible. First, if effects are already in the cause, what is there for the cause to produce? For instance, if curds are already existent in milk what is there for the milk to produce? To state it more clearly: The effect, since it is existent, is not to be produced by any cause. Hence, says Śāntarakṣita, the postulation of cause is not at all necessary, since like the other (*Puruṣa*) it cannot accomplish anything. The Sāmkhyas might reply that there is something for the cause to perform, *viz.*, that it has to make the effect manifest (even though it is existent in the cause) and therefore it is not redundant. Śāntarakṣita replies: If the effect was existing formerly then the objection is not met at all. If it was not existent how can the non-existent effect be produced from the cause? Hence as there is nothing to be performed there is no necessity of the material cause; of the assumption that certain effects can be obtained from certain fixed causes; of the assumption that only capable causes can produce things that are possible to be created; of the assumption of the activity (of the Pradhāna). ' Even the designation as 'cause' is also untenable.