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The University of Nalanda c10: Chapter IV. Studies of Nālandā

The University of Nālandā c10

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Chapter IV. Studies of Nālandā

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IN the preceding Chapters we reviewed the conditions under which Nālandā had sprung up, and the curricula that were prevalent before its rise. In this Chapter we propose to discuss (i) the curriculum that was actually followed at Nālandā, and (ii) the efforts that the University made to impart knowledge in the various items of that curriculum.

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In stating the curriculum that was followed at Nālandā we have to be very cautious, for the reason that we meet with statements which, unless they are properly scrutinized, would seem contradictory. Hiuen Tsiang¹ says, for instance, that one (a student) must have studied deeply both old and new (books) before getting admission (at Nālandā). By "old and new books" Hiuen Tsiang evidently refers to works such as *Vēdas*, *Upaniṣads*, works of different systems—*Sāṃkhya*, *Vaiśeṣika*, *Nyāya* and all the works of Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna Buddhism. Thus we find that a student was supposed to have knowledge of these subjects before he sought admission at Nālandā.

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¹ o.c., II, p. 171.

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His biographer,² however, seems to contradict him. He says that students in Nālandā study the Great Vehicle and also (the works belonging to) the eighteen sects, and not only these, but even ordinary works, such as the *Vēdas* and other books, the *Hetuvidyā*, *Śabdavidyā*, the *Cikitsāvidyā*, the works on Magic (*Atharvavēda*), the *Sāṃkhya*; besides these they thoroughly investigate the "miscellaneous" works. That these subjects were taught at Nālandā is beyond doubt, because Hiuen Tsiang himself studied the *Yogaśāstra*, the *Nyāya-Anu-* sāra-śāstra, Hetuvidyā-śāstra, the Śabdavidya and works on Mahāyāna such as the Koṣa, Vibhāṣā, etc., at Nālandā from Śīlabhadra and others.¹

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² Hwui Li, o.c., p. 112.

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¹ Ibid., p. 121.

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Now the question naturally arises: How do you explain that a student was supposed to have knowledge of these subjects before he joined the Nālandā University and also that these subjects were taught there?

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The only way to solve this problem is to suppose that Nālandā was essentially a teaching University because students were instructed in all the varied branches of learning as we are told by Hwui Li. But those scholars who came from other centres of learning had to undergo a strict test of their knowledge before they could prosecute their studies at Nālandā. These outsiders were eager to pass the examination and obtain the Nālandā degree. This will be clear from a study of Hiuen Tsiang's and I-Tsing's records.

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Hiuen Tsiang says, "Learned men from different cities, who desire quickly to acquire a renown in discussion, come here in multitudes to settle their doubts, and the streams (of their wisdom) spread far and wide."²

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² o.c., II, p. 170.

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The method in which the University conducted the examination is very interesting. The examiners, we are told, were no other than the keepers of the gate. They were very learned men, and those who wanted to get admission in the University had to enter into a discussion with these gate-keepers who often-times put to them very hard questions. The chances of their success depended upon their ability to please and satisfy the examiners by hard discussion.³

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³ Ibid.

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I-Tsing also fully corroborates what his predecessor had noticed. He writes⁴, "Thus instructed by their teachers and instructing others they (students) pass two or three years, generally in the Nālandā monastery in Central India or in the country of Valabhi in Western India. There eminent and accomplished men assemble in crowds, discuss possible and impossible doctrines, and after being assured of their excellence of their opinions by wise men, become far-famed for their wisdom."

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⁴ o.c., p. 177.

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Thus the examination consisted of "any process of enquiry", as Rashdall says¹ of the method followed in the European Universities, "into the candidate's fitness as well as direct testing of his scholastic attainments."

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¹ o.c., p. 442.

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The University adopted this method only in the case of persons who, says Hiuen Tsiang, "come from other quarters", or again "students who come as strangers,"²

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² Hiuen Tsiang, o.c., II, pp. 170-171.

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We have thus shown that there were two classes of students studying at Nālandā and hence the seeming contradiction as regards the curriculum followed at Nālandā.

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The curriculum of the University was very exhaustive and embraced many of the subjects of the pre-Nālandā period.

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Now the students did not take up all the subjects that have been enumerated. But there were some subjects which almost all the students had to study, which in a sense were "compulsory" as we now understand the term.

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Being primarily a religious institution, Nālandā had made Theology compulsory for all the students.³ And knowledge of Theology meant a thorough grasp of all the works on Mahāyāna besides acquaintance with all the eighteen schools of Buddhism.⁴ Mahāyāna, by the time the University had sprung up, consisted, on its philosophical or metaphysical side, of at least two schools, viz., Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda or Nihilism and Idealism.

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³ Cf. the words of Hwui Li who says, "All study the Great Vehicle," o.c., p. 112.

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⁴ Ibid., n. 1.

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Of these doctrines that came to be propounded and subsumed under the general term Mahāyāna, the one that became more popular than others at Nālandā was the "Sky-flower" doctrine.¹ This doctrine was fully explained in the Śuraṅgama Sūtra. The Sūtra was composed at Nālandā and was probably the work of Dharmapāla. There was another Sūtra of the same name, but it was totally different from the one in question. For it was translated by Kumārajīva and recited by Fa-hien at the Vulture Peak near Rājagṛha. This Sūtra was brought to China and translated in A.D. 705. The commentary on the Sūtra says, "This Sūtra was brought from India and belongs to the Murdhābhishikta school."²

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¹ See Hwui Li, o.c., p. 159.

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² See Hiuen Tsiang, o.c., II, p. 110, n.

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The doctrine is simply this: that all objective phenomena are only like sky-flowers, unreal, and vanishing.³

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³ See Hwui Li, o.c., p. 159, n.

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It is not difficult to identify this doctrine with the general principles of Mahāyāna, for, we are told, that the priests of Orissa all studied the Little Vehicle and did not believe in the Great Vehicle. They said that it was a system of the "Sky-flower" heretics, and was not delivered by Buddha.⁴ Hīnayānists looked upon this doctrine with such a great contempt that they went to the length of even identifying it with that of the Kāpālika sect.⁵ Harṣa in order to defend this doctrine sent for four distinguished pandits of Nālandā, which was then the centre of the "sky-flower" doctrine. The University, in response to the king's request, sent four eminent pandits: Sāgaramati, Prajñāraśmi, Siṃharaśmi and the Master of the Law (Hiuen Tsiang).

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⁴ Ibid.

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⁵ Ibid.

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Though the doctrine as such has been proved to belong to Mahāyāna, it is not easy to say to what particular branch of Mahāyāna doctrines it belongs, whether to that of Nāgārjuna which believes in "All Void", or to that of the Idealists, who believe that only the ideas exist, *i.e.*, nothing exists except in our idea: that objects have existence only when they are cognised.

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The idea of a sky-flower connotes unreality. If by this unreality is understood that everything is unreal, the doctrine is nothing but nihilism: the one that was propounded by Nāgārjuna. But, if it suggests that all objects are unreal except when they are perceived by our cognitive faculty, then naturally the doctrine can be identified with that of the Idealists, viz., the Ālaya Vijñāna of Maitreya and Asaṅga.

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Leaving this doctrine and its interpretation here we shall refer to some of the works composed for the propagation of Mahāyāna by the paṇḍits of the University, and incidentally the interpretation they put on Mahāyāna.

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Sthiramati in his Mahāyānābhidharmasaṃyukta-saṅgīti-śāstra thus speaks of Mahāyāna, "In the Mahāyāna, there are four secrets which include all kinds of truths that Buddha has preached." In another place, in the same work, we find him upholding the Mahāyāna which he calls Bodhisattva-piṭaka and running down the Hīnayāna (Śrāvakayāna). Says he, "The question is; if the Śrāvaka-piṭaka and Bodhisattva-piṭaka, etc., are equally derived from the Dharmakāya, then, why the people offering Bodhisattva-piṭaka with fragrances and wigs, produce great, limitless fortune and why it is otherwise in the case of Śrāvakayāna? Answer: because, the Bodhisattva-piṭaka is the foundation of the divine favour and is the source of pleasure for all people."¹

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¹ See Bundle, Vol. 8, p. 78 b-a, of Chinese Tripitaka; Kimura, o.c., pp. 187-188.

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This extolment of Mahāyāna, first seen by us in the Prajñāpāramitā-śāstra of Nāgārjuna had been carried on by almost all his followers adding perhaps nothing of their own in the development of philosophy. Their main aim appears to be no other than the refutation of the heretic systems, be they Buddhist or Brāhmaṇic. Statements of like nature we find in Dharmapāla's Vijñaptimātrasiddhi-śāstra where he says, "The 5th *Pravartana* stage is low and inferior; that is to say, the stage of two *yāna* (*Śrāvaka* and *Pratyeka Buddha yāna*) is meant only for the self-benefit and for this purpose suffering is depreciated, while search after *Nirvāṇa* and realisation of the truth of *Ātma-śūnyatā* only are advocated."¹

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Śīlabhadra, the successor of Dharmapāla to the Nālandā-throne, we learn from Chinese and Japanese sources,² had made three divisions of the whole Buddhism according to different characters of the doctrine through the three different categories. The three divisions being:

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(i) The doctrine of existence (*Sarvāstitvavāda*).
(ii) The doctrine of *Śūnyatā*.
(iii) The doctrine of middle-path.

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The first doctrine apparently is that of the Hinayānists, while the last two of the Mahāyānists. Kimura tells us that with the help of these three divisions, Śīlabhadra deprecated the Hinayāna and extolled the Mahāyāna.³

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Śāntideva in his *Śikṣā-Samuccaya*, whose summary we give below, makes out a very strong case for Mahāyāna. He quotes from *Niyatāniyatāvatāramudrā-Sūtra* wherein the Master tells the disciple, " Even so, Mañjuśrī, whosoever after producing the thought of enlightenment holdeth not fast, neither studieth the Great Vehicle, but has intercourse with such as follow the Disciple's Vehicle, and is intimate with them and readeth their doctrine, and maketh his study therein, and proveth it, and informeth him thereof, and reciteth its topics . . . . . teacheth them, he thereby becometh dull of wit, and is torn away and cast back from the Road of the Highest Wisdom. And whatsoever organ of wisdom, eye of wisdom this Bodhisatva may have gained through meditating upon enlightenment, this eye becomes dull and obstructed."⁴

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(1) Wang Bundle, Vol. 10, p. 44-a; Kimura, o.c., p. 188.
(2) Kimura, o.c., p. 189.
(3) Ibid.
(4) Śāntideva, *Śikṣā-Samuccaya*, Tr. by Bendall and Rouse, Indian Text Series, p. 7.

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Apart from these praises of Mahāyāna that we have just referred to, Śikṣā-Samuccaya is a very important work. For it is nothing but a collection of all the earlier Mahāyāna Sūtras. Thus it, incidentally, gives us a very exhaustive history of the Mahāyāna literature. The collection of sūtras also shows Śāntideva as a great scholar. He had not only read all the sūtras but mastered them so that he could quote them with ease. The work, as its name suggests, deals with ‘Śikṣā’, that is to say, morality or discipline. The work, thus, is a collection of moral instructions.

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In the opening verse the author says that one should cast off the fear of pain and danger. This will remove egoism, differences like “This is mine, this is his”. He preaches the sacredness of life and exhorts us that it should be preserved. Then we are told that enlightenment of heart will follow if one fixes one’s mind on one’s faith. Speaking on restraint, he says that the Great Way (Mahāyāna) teaches restraint and one must know all its vital points.

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In the next verse he advises people to be charitable in everything, in one’s person, enjoyments and one’s merits. His advice to friends is that good friends should never be left. He exhorts all to study scriptures. To realise inward peace he prescribes that one should avoid fruitless waste, should develop mindfulness and devotion. To win popularity he advises steadfastness and gentle speech which will win over worthy folk.

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He is against complete renouncement of worldly necessities. For he says, “To preserve one’s body one must use raiment and medicine.” But he also strikes a warning, “Indulgence in one’s own desires leads to one’s downfall,” and so he advises the path of the golden mean. Likewise he advises men to perform noble deeds but asks them not to boast of their good deeds.

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His advice when everything is accomplished is to repair to a forest-cell. While to achieve merit he asks people to be merciful and practise the “Void”. We quote the last verses in extenso :

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"With effort first, before all, place,
Settled resolve and purpose firm.
Set mercy to thy face,
And so for thy merit's increase strive."

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The concluding lines are indeed very noble, when he says :

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"Perfection lies in self-denial,
By never leaving watchfulness,
It comes by understanding full,
By mindfulness and deepest thought."

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This work of spreading the doctrine of Vijñānavāda was next taken up by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, two eminent pandits of the University in a work called Tattvasaṅgraha. But, as we have grouped this aspect of the work of the University under a separate heading, we do not speak of their work here.

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After these luminaries ceased to sparkle, there does not appear anybody in the literary firmament who dazzles us with his light, until we come to the eleventh century, when once more we behold a brilliant star who illuminated not only India but like his predecessors, brightened up such distant lands as Ceylon, and Sumatra in the South, and Tibet in the North. This star was the famous Dīpaṃkara Śrījñāna, more popularly known as Atīśa. But, as he belonged more to the sister University of Vikramaśīlā, we do not review his activities here. And as the times of Atīśa bring us almost to the end of Nālandā's career, we pass on to the consideration of the second important item of the curriculum.

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The subject next to Theology and Philosophy which always went together was Logic. Though it was not compulsory, exigencies of those times, when debates and discussions were very frequent, almost made it compulsory for the students.

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This science called Hetuvidyā in Sanskrit, as we have seen in our review of various curricula before the rise of the University of Nālandā, was still in a formative state. Different schools of thought, Buddhist, Jain, Sāṃkhyā and others, had their own systems of Logic. And a student learning at Nālandā had to go through all the systems. For he was expected to defend the Buddhist-systems against others, and this he could not do well unless he knew the principles of other systems.

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Let us now see what the contribution of Nālandā pandits was to the development of Logic. Hitherto, up to about 400 A.D., Logic was mixed up with Philosophy and Religion. With the advent of Diṅnāga in the field, Logic came into prominence. Diṅnāga, as we shall see later on, was one of the greatest pandits of Nālandā.

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Among his many works on Logic, the three important ones that have come down to us are (1) *Nyāyadvāra*, (2) *Nyāyapraveśa*, and (3) *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. I-Tsing however ascribes¹ the following eight works to Jina (Diṅnāga).² These are :—

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¹ I-Tsing, o.c., pp. 186-187.

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² Watters, *On Yuan Chwang*, II, p. 211.

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(1) *The Śāstra on the meditation on the Three Worlds.*
(2) *Sarvalakṣaṇadhyāna-śāstra (kārikā).*
(3) *The Śāstra on the meditation on the object.*
(4) *The Śāstra on the Gate of the Cause. (Hetudvāra).*
(5) *The Śāstra on the Gate of the resembling cause.*
(6) *The Nyāyadvāra-(tarka)-śāstra (ascribed to Nāgārjuna wrongly).*
(7) *Prajñapti-hetu-saṃgraha (?) śāstra.*
(8) *The Śāstra on the grouped inferences.*

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His principal contribution seems to be the rejection of उपनय and निगम as necessary premises even in a *Parārthānumāna*. We said principal because even though he is credited with the following contributions :—

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1. "The proposition, the point of disputation, or the Thesis, is a judgment, not the terms of a judgment."³ 2. Rejection of the five membered syllogism. Maitreya spoke of two kinds of thesis साध्य, आत्मसंबंध and परसंबंध and Vasubandhu described two kinds of syllogism, one of five parts and the other of two,¹ it was Diṅnāga who took the decisive step of rejecting उपनय and निगमन as superfluous even in a Parārthānumāna.

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³ Sugiura, *Hindu Logic*, p. 24.

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¹ Vidyabhusana, o. c., p. 269.

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3. “The significance of the middle term (called *Hetu*) for inference and hence for the theory of reasoning, is for the first time discussed by Diṅnāga and the result of his study is the famous doctrine of the “Three Phases of *Hetu*” त्रैरूप्य or the three essentials of a good *Hetu*, which are enumerated in our text as पक्षधर्मत्वम्, सपक्षसत्त्वम्, and विपक्षे चासत्त्वम्”²

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² Sugiura, o. c., p. 35.

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Lastly “Introduction of a universal proposition to take the place of old analogical examples.”³

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³ Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism*, p. 87. I do not find this statement in Keith. Words to this effect are found in Sugiura, o. c., p. 35 and Vidyabhusana, o. c., p. 295-296.

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Still they have been questioned and shown to be no contributions at all by Dhruva.⁴ His arguments are briefly summarised as under :—

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⁴ A. B. Dhruva, *Nyāyapraveśa*, G.O.S., No. XXXVIII, p. XXIII.

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As regards 1. he says that though the doctrine is found in his work *Pramāṇasamuccaya* Ch. II, yet it does not appear for the first time in his logic or is peculiar to him, because this theory, *viz.*, तद्विशेषणता of the अनुमेय is held by the Brāhmaṇa logicians as well as by Diṅnāga and his school.

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As to 2. he says, “If the logical theory which does away with उपनय and निगमन from the *Parārthānumāna* be sound—of which I am not altogether sure—the credit for the reform evidently belongs to Diṅnāga.”

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With reference to 3. he says that the *Trairūpa* theory is in no way his innovation, because it can be gathered from Vātsyāyana’s *Bhāṣya* on N. S. V, 34.

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As to Keith's view he not only endorses Dr. Randle's opinion that "so far as I know no evidence has yet been produced to show that the doctrine of *Vyāpti* originated in the Bauddha rather than in the *Vaiśeṣika* school," but he adds that there is positive proof in the *Vaiśeṣika* and the *Nyāya Sūtras* and in Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* to say that the doctrine was held by *Nyāya* and *Vaiśeṣika* writers long before the times of Diṅnāga.

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Apart from his contribution to Logic, it is interesting to note how he looks at the whole process of inference. He says, "*Sarvoyam anumānānumeyavyavahāro buddhyārūḍhenaiva dharma-dharmibhāvena na bahiḥsadasattvam apekṣate.*" From this Keith argues that Diṅnāga declares clearly that all the relations of probans and probandum have nothing whatever to do with external reality . . . but depend upon the intellect.¹ We can say thus that he belonged to the Idealist school of Āsaṅga and Vasubandhu, "according to which all appearances are but transformations of the principle of consciousness by its inherent movement, and none of our cognitions are produced by any external objects which to us seem to be existing outside of us and generating our ideas."²

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¹ See Keith, *The Authorship of Nyāyapraveśa*, I.H.Q., IV, p. 19. Cf. also "For Diṅnāga, therefore, the whole of knowledge, despite its contact at one point with an unknowable reality, is made up of ideas involved in both perception and inference. These ideas are the product of our mental activity and are not created by any external cause." *I. L. A.*, p. 102.

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² See Surendra Nath Das Gupta, *Philosophy of Vasubandhu* in *Viṃśatikā*, and *Triṃśikā*, Ibid., p. 36. Cf. also Śaṅkara, *Brahma Sūtra-Bhāṣya*, adhyāya II, pāda II, sūtra 28, specially the phrase "buddhyārūḍha".

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"Dharmakīrti," writes I-Tsing, "made a further improvement in Logic (after Jina)"³. The "improvement" referred to by I-Tsing appears to be the complete formulation of the *Trairūpa* theory. In his *Nyāya-bindu* he says, *anumānam dvidhā svārtham parārtham ca. Tatra svārtham liṅgādanumeya jñānam tadanumānam. Trairūpyam punar liṅgasyānumeya sattvameva. Sapakṣe sattvameva. Asapakṣe cāsattvameva niscitam. Trairūpāṇi ca triṇyeva liṅgam* *anupalabdhiḥ svabhāvakārya ceti*. Inference is of two kinds : For one's own self and for others. Inference for one's self is defined as the knowledge of the inferable derived through the reason or middle term bearing its three forms or characteristics. The three forms of the reason are the following:

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³ o.c., p. 182.

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(1) The middle term must abide in the minor term.

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(2) The middle term must abide only in cases which are homologous with the major term.

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(3) The middle term must never abide in cases which are heterologous from the major term.

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The three kinds of middle term are :—

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(1) Identity (*Svabhāva*).

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(2) Effect (*Kārya*).

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(3) Non-perception (*Anupalabdhi*).¹

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¹ From Vidyabhusana, *History of Indian Logic*, p. 310.

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He does not differ in his division of inference from the Brāhmaṇ or Jain logicians. He makes a departure, however, from the latter logicians when he says that Non-perception, Identity and Causality—these three—form the marks of a syllogism. According to him, then, if, for instance, in the traditional example of fire on a hill, we can show the identity, and causal connection between fire, smoke and the hill and non-perception of the mark in any heterologous instance, we would be justified in inferring that there is fire on the hill because there is smoke.

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But if the arguments that were advanced against Diṅnāga's claim to be the author of *Trairūpa* theory, were to be repeated against Dharmakīrti also, it would be difficult to say what "further improvement" Dharmakīrti made in the then existing Logic.

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We would, however, like to draw the attention of Dhruva to the fact that even the contemporaries and successors of Dharmakīrti regarded Dharmakīrti as the author of the *Trairūpa* theory.¹ This point will be made explicit from the fact that Pātrakesari severely criticised the *Trairūpa* theory, and he in turn was replied to by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, two eminent pandits of Nālandā. This action on Śāntarakṣita's part is very significant. Why should he take up the challenge unless the challenge was directed against a school which he represented? This school, we think, was no other than that of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti.

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¹ For a fuller discussion, see Pathak, *Dharmakīrti's Trilakṣaṇahetu attacked by Pātrakesari and defended by Śāntarakṣita, and Dharmakīrti and Bhāmaha*, A.B.O.R.I., XII, pp. 71-80 and 372-395 respectively, where Pathak has shown almost conclusively that Diṅnāga alias Bhadanta and Dharmakīrti were the real authors of the *Trairūpa* or *Trilakṣaṇa* theory.

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To make the point very clear we lay before the reader the charges and countercharges. Pātrakesari brought the following charge against the *Trairūpa* theory:

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*Anyathānupapannatvam yatra tatra trayena kim.*
*Nānyathānupapannatvam yatra tatra trayena kim.*

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That is to say: what is the use of the three marks where (the conclusion) can be arrived at without them? (Again) of what use are the three marks where you cannot arrive at (the conclusion) in spite of them?

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And he further argues that the fallacy of *Anaikāntika* will follow if we argue with Dharmakīrti that that inference is right which is characterised by Identity, Causality and Non-perception. For instance: If from the fact that the sons of A are brown, we argue that A's future son will also be brown (*sādhya*), because they are related as father and son, because other sons of A are also brown, because the sons of B are not brown,—even then the possibility of the son being born fair and not brown is not excluded.

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To this objection Śāntarakṣita replies that the Opposition has committed a fundamental blunder by assuming a reason (*hetu*) which is no reason at all. The relation of being a son (*Tatputratva*) is not the cause as it is neither Identity, Causality nor Non-perception. Invariable concomitance, therefore, is not possible, that is to say the son may be fair.¹

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¹ I am indebted to Dr. Pathak, *Dharmakīrti's Trilokṣaṇahetu*, etc., *A. B. O. R. I.*, XII, pp. 71-81 for the citations from Pātrakesari, Dharmakīrti and Śāntarakṣita.

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Through this controversy we know incidentally that the line of eminent logicians was not closed after its greatest exponent Diṅnāga. But, right up to the end of about the eighth century, contribution to the development of Logic was continued and Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla were the representatives of the 8th century as Vasubandhu, Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti were of the 5th, 6th and 7th centuries respectively.

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Another way in which the University tried to convey its teachings to the intelligentsia was by composition of encyclopædical works dealing with Theology, Philosophy, Logic, Grammar, etc. One such work that we are fortunate to recover is *Tattvasaṅgraha*² together with a most illuminating commentary on it called the *Pañjikā*. Śāntarakṣita wrote the text, while Kamalaśīla, his pupil, wrote the commentary. While speaking about Nālandā's contribution to the development of Logic we said that Śāntarakṣita was a famous logician of the 8th century A.D. In this work we find him and his pupil as versatile philosophers who not only survey all the past as well as the contemporary philosophical systems but even refute them one by one and thus strengthen the foundations of *Vijñānavāda* laid down by Asaṅga.

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² G. O. S., No. XXX.

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Śāntarakṣita examines no less than 27 different systems or better 26 different schools of thought. They are:

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(1) The *Sāṅkhya*.
(2) *Nyāya* (believing in God).
(3) *Seśvara Sāṅkhya*.
(4) *Svabhāvikajagadvāda* (Theory of Self-Existence).
(5) *Śabdabrahmavāda*.
(6) *Aupaniṣada Puruṣavāda* (Doctrine of Anthropomorphic God).

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(7) Doctrine of Soul (of the Naiyāikas, Vaiśeṣikas, Mimāṃsakas, Sāṃkhyas, Digambara Jains, Advaitins and Vāstiputrīyas, a sect of the Buddhists).

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(8) The doctrine of *Sthirabhāva* (permanent entities).

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(9) The theory of *Karmaphala*, that is relation between action and its results.

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(10) The doctrine of categories (of Gotama and Kaṇāda).

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(11) The doctrine of Qualities.

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(12) The doctrine of Action.

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(13) The doctrine of Generality.

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(14) The doctrine of Particularity.

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(15) The doctrine of Inherence.

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(16) The doctrine of *Śabdārtha* (that is, the word and its corresponding object).

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(17) The theory of Perception.

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(18) The theory of Inference.

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(19) The theories regarding other kinds of proofs, viz., (i) *Śabda* (ii) *Upamāna*, (iii) *Arthāpatti* (presumption), (iv) *Abhāva* (non-existence), (v) *Yuktyanupalabdhivicāra* (affirmative-negative inseparable connection and non-perception), (vi) *Sambhava* (probability), (vii) *Aitihyapratibhā* (tradition and intelligence).

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(20) *Syādvāda* (Doctrine of the perfect knowledge of things).

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(21) *Traikālyavāda*.

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(22) The *Lokāyata* doctrine.

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(23) The doctrine of the external objects.

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(24) The belief in *Śrti* (Revealed Literature).

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(25) The theory of Self-evidence.

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(26) The doctrine of Omniscience.

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In short, Śāntarakṣita takes notice of all the most important philosophies, viz., the *Sāṃkhya*, *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika*, *Mimāṃsa*, *Jaina*, *Lokāyata* and lastly the *Vedānta*.

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In order to acquaint the reader with the nature of these refutations as well as the style of Buddhist writers we have selected Śāntarakṣita's criticism of the *Satkāryavāda* or the doctrine that the effect is existent in the cause. Śāntarakṣita first states the doctrine of the Sāmkhya:

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The Sāmkhyas say that the effect is existent in the cause because of the following five reasons: (*i*) a thing that is non-existent cannot be produced, (*ii*) because of the fact that some material cause is required for producing the desired effect, (*iii*) because of the impossibility of everything being produced (from everything), (*iv*) because only those causes that are capable can produce that which is possible to produce, (*v*) because of the existence of the effect. Moreover, the Sāmkhyas maintain that the *Pradhāna* (Primordial Matter) is the cause because of the measurability or limitations of different objects. (*Bhedānāmtu parimānāt*), because of the power (to produce) and the power of action (*Śaktitaḥ pravṛtteśca*); because of the distinctions between cause and effect (*Kāraṇa kārya vibhāgāt*) and lastly because of the integrity of the universal forms (*Avibhāgādvaiśvarūpyasya*).

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Śāntarakṣita adduces the following arguments against the Sāmkhya doctrine: Those causes which they have set forth for proving the prior existence of the effect in the cause can be adduced to prove its non-existence in the cause. He then explains how this is possible. First, if effects are already in the cause, what is there for the cause to produce? For instance, if curds are already existent in milk what is there for the milk to produce? To state it more clearly: The effect, since it is existent, is not to be produced by any cause. Hence, says Śāntarakṣita, the postulation of cause is not at all necessary, since like the other (*Puruṣa*) it cannot accomplish anything. The Sāmkhyas might reply that there is something for the cause to perform, *viz.*, that it has to make the effect manifest (even though it is existent in the cause) and therefore it is not redundant. Śāntarakṣita replies: If the effect was existing formerly then the objection is not met at all. If it was not existent how can the non-existent effect be produced from the cause? Hence as there is nothing to be performed there is no necessity of the material cause; of the assumption that certain effects can be obtained from certain fixed causes; of the assumption that only capable causes can produce things that are possible to be created; of the assumption of the activity (of the Pradhāna). ' Even the designation as 'cause' is also untenable.

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In the following verses Śāntarakṣita attacks Sāmkhya tenets from other standpoints.

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He says that means of knowledge do two things; first, they remove doubt and ignorance; secondly they inspire or give correct and definite knowledge.

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But this, however, is not possible in the Satkāryavāda. Because of the theory of prior existence neither doubt, etc., can be removed nor definite knowledge can be possible. Consequently, concludes Śāntarakṣita, the whole doctrine is thoroughly untenable. Sāmkhyas cannot maintain that certainty which was existent is caused by means because that would compromise their position nor can they say that the means make the unmanifest manifest, because there is no increase of form because of non-distinction.

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Thus neither there is the possibility of the knowledge of a thing, nor the possibility of destroying the cover which keeps back the acquiring of the object, as the object to be obtained is always there, and secondly the question of cover, etc., is impossible. He then proceeds to attack the doctrine of the Three Gunas.

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As everything cannot produce everything even though all are constituted of the same three Gunas, even so everything cannot produce everything, even though the effect is non-existent.

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The Sāmkhyas might rejoin that the Buddhists—Vijñāna-vādins—cannot postulate fixed powers for the causes because they assume that the objects do not exist (except in the mind).

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But if they do not exist, then the principle of fixed cause will have to be accepted.

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To this objection Śāntarakṣita replies: Not so. Because the external objects do not exist with us and therefore the desigation of fixed cause does not come up at all. While the reality (*Vijñāna*) which is devoid of forms, of disguises, remains untouched.

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(In fact) objects have no names and forms because they are nothing but mere contrivances and denotations. They are of many kinds and operate with regard to an object which has no distinctions, as they are accustomed to act.

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The importance of *Tattvasaṅgraha* can never be overestimated. Concerned as we are with the studies of Nālandā, the work is a very useful finger-post. It points to the fact that Nālandā was not only a Buddhist University, but a University in which all the subjects Buddhist as well as non-Buddhist were taught. Moreover, refutation of so many schools of thought pre-supposes a previous study of them by the teachers as well as the students, who, as we can see from Kamalaśīla's commentary, were required to explain and elucidate what their teachers said briefly and concisely.

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Another most striking and wonderful feature of this encyclopædia is the reference even to the most contemporary views and their authors.¹ References, for instance, are made to Kumārila, Pātrakesari and others who were either the contemporaries of Śāntarakṣita or immediate predecessors. This is suggestive of the fact that there must be such a continuous flow of students going in and out of that Temple of Learning that its pandits could keep in touch with even the latest developments in the realm of thought. And the marvellous and far-reaching effect that could be produced by such an all embracing work like *Tattvasaṅgraha* among the Schoolmen can be better understood than expressed. It would create a new impetus to refute the charges levelled against them—resulting in a further and deeper introspective study of their systems with a view to completely perfecting the imperfections that might have inadvertently crept in their works. It is healthy controversies of this nature that would lead to the promulgation of new ideas. And if, "it is probable that the Tattvasaṅgraha was written mainly to refute the arguments and theories of Kumārila and Uddyotakara", as Benoytosh Bhattacharyya says¹, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the emergence of Śaṅkara as the champion of the old Upaniṣadic Adhyātmavāda was the direct outcome of such works as Tattvasaṅgraha. It is on account of him primarily that India, which since the time of Buddha for centuries was overridden with the doctrines of Nihilism, Non-Soul, etc., was once more made to believe that there was Soul.

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¹ See *Tattvasaṅgraha*, Foreword, G. O. S., No. XXX.

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¹ Tattvasaṅgraha, Foreword, o.c., pp. LXXXII-III.

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The credit for all that Tattvasaṅgraha achieved and contributed to the development of Philosophy, Logic and other kindred subjects must be given to the University of Nālandā, for both Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla were its alumni. So to the Alma Mater must be given the glory of this encyclopædia.

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Besides Tattvasaṅgraha, Śāntarakṣita wrote other works; some of them are given below:

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1. Vajravidāraṇīnāmadhāraṇīṭīkā.
2. Sarvatathāgata pūrva-praṇidhāna viśeṣa vistara sūtrāntopadeśa.
3. Vajradhara-saṅgīta-bhagavata-stotraṭīkā.
4. Aṣṭatathāgata stotra.
5. Hevajrodbhava-Kurukullayāḥ-pañca-mahopadeśa.

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But one work which is not mentioned in the Tibetan Catalogue has been found by Dr. Bhattacharyya. It is a Tāntric work and is entitled Tattvasiddhi. The work formulates the doctrine of Mahāsukhavāda, a development of the Vijñānavāda.² From this work we learn definitely that the Śāntarakṣita was a follower of Vajrayāna, because *Tattvasaṅgraha* only shows him as a *Vijñānavādi*.¹ No fitter epithet than the one given at the end of this work would apply to Śāntarakṣita's erudition and scholarship. It calls him '*Aśeṣa-para sidhānta sāgarapāra*,' "one who has crossed the ocean of all the manifold doctrines formulated by others." And his *Tattvasaṅgraha* truly reveals him as a man who was master of the different schools of Philosophy, Logic, Grammar, etc.

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² Ibid., p. XXI.

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¹ Ibid.

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We shall close our account of the work done by Śāntarakṣita with a few remarks on his style. Śāntarakṣita writes with a charming facility and shows a wonderful mastery over the syllogistic reasoning.² From his refutation of the Sāṁkhya's *Satkāryavāda*, which we have referred to, we get an idea how he meets his opponent. He first tries to understand his position as clearly as possible or which is the other way of putting it he states the case of his opponent. This task he performs so admirably and exquisitely that any one who only reads it would think it is the Sāṁkhya himself who is arguing his case.

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² *Cf.* o.c., verse 15, p. 22.

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Equally charming and instructive are his plans of attack. He never reveals his own views. But, like an impartial tribunal, he points out mistakes and inconsistencies of his opponent's tenets.³ And gradually, he goes on to prove that if the opponent would stick to his arguments it would lead him to an absurd and ridiculous position, and then concludes that his position is thoroughly untenable even from his own point of view. With this done, we see Śāntarakṣita in the garb of a propagandist. He recounts the advantages of his own system, and says that all those faults and inconsistencies which were shown in the opponent's system would never occur in his own.

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³ See, for instance, *Tattvasaṅgraha*, o.c., verses 17-18-19-20.

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Kamalaśīla, though he was known to the Tibetans as a teacher at Nālandā of *Tantra* and Logic and as one who finally laid the roots of Tāntric Buddhism by defeating the Hoshang, to us he appears as a great logician and philosopher primarily through his most learned commentary on the Tattvasaṅgraha. We shall not dilate much upon the value of his work because much that has been said of Tattvasaṅgraha will be true of his commentary.

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However, the one distinct benefit of it (his commentary) is that Kamalaśīla has given us a complete history of philosophers and logicians by giving us the names of the authors whose views are referred to by his guru Śāntarakṣita.

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After Kamalaśīla we do not meet with any famous pandits in the realm of Philosophy or Logic till we come to the eleventh century when we meet Dīpaṃkara Śrījñāna, a pandit equally famous as Śāntarakṣita. But as he belonged more to the sister University of Vikramaśīlā we do not speak of the part he played in the spread of Buddhist culture.

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It appears from the records of Hiuen Tsiang's biographer and also of I-Tsing that there was an astronomical observatory at Nālandā and that Astronomy formed part of the students' curriculum. Hwui Li, for instance, says, "The observatories seem to be lost in the vapours (of the morning) and the upper rooms tower above the clouds."¹ And if we now read the above remark with the following: "From the windows one may see how the winds and clouds (produce new forms) and the soaring eaves the conjunctions of the sun and the moon (may be observed)"² then two interpretations are possible. Either the words are a poetic description of the beauty and grandeur of the place; or they signify, as Havell thinks, that Nālandā was a royal observatory.³ His supposition is also based on another fact, namely, that Nālandā had a Clepsydra, or a water-clock which according to Hiuen Tsiang, says he, gave correct time for all Magadha.⁴

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¹ o.c., p. 111.

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² Ibid.

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³ A Study of Indo-Aryan Civilisation, p. 141.

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⁴ Ibid. Havell seems to be wrong in attributing the statement to Hiuen Tsiang, for nowhere in Hiuen Tsiang's or his biographer's records can we trace the remark. It is I-Tsing, however, who gives a detailed description of a clepsydra, and its working at Nālandā. See o.c., pp. 144-146. Cf. also the following words from Nan-hae-k'i-kwei-nin-fā-ch'uen, Beal, J.R.A.S., XIII (N. S.), p. 571. "This is the only temple in which, by Imperial order, a water clock is kept to determine the right time."

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From references in Tibetan works to Nālandā as a great centre of Tāntric studies, or to a person as a professor of Tantra at Nālandā,¹ and also from a number of books, evidently Tāntric, ascribed to the pandits of Nālandā in the Chinese,² it would appear that Tantra was, perhaps, a very popular subject with the students as well as professors in the Nālandā University.³ Now it would have been sufficient only to have observed that Tantra was taught at Nālandā, and to have mentioned a few books written by the Nālandā pandits, were it not for the fact that Tantra and the whole cult which goes under the name of Tāntrism is even after the publication of many works on it, regarded as "gibberish".⁴ For references, as the one above quoted, cast a slur, even though incidently, on the education that was given by the Nālandā University. In order, therefore, to decide or to come to any conclusion on the value of Nālandā education it is thought desirable to give a short history, and nature of the Tantras or better of the cult, that goes under the name of Tāntrism or Tāntricism.

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¹ Kamalaśila was a professor of Tantras. Vidyabhusana, H.I.L., p. 327.

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² Catalogue du fond Tibetain.

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³ We have even epigraphical evidence to show that Nālandā was a renowned centre of Tāntric studies. We are told by the Nālandā copperplate of Devapāladeva (11.37-42, Ep. Ind., XVII. p. 325.) that "Nālandā was the abode of bhikṣus and Bodhisattvas well-versed in the Tantras".

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⁴ Winternitz, I.H.Q., IX, No. 1, March, 1933, p. 4.

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Tāntrism, particularly that which was prevalent at Nālandā, had its origin amongst the various religious and even philosophical practices that were followed by the Hindus as well as Buddhists. It had something to do with religion and not anything else. This much is conceded by all. But the question is, what is Tāntrism actually? and in what period of Indian history did it spring up? These, however, are the most difficult questions to decide. Winternitz, for instance, says, “The term ‘Tantra’ ought to be restricted to the texts connected with Śakti worship. Tantra texts in this sense cannot be proved to have existed before the 7th century, though some of the elements constituting the *Tantras* may have existed before that time.”¹ Speaking of the elements of the *Tantras*, he says, “Some of these may be traced as far back as the times of the *Yajurveda*, where we already find the use of mystic syllables and words, which play such an important part in the Mantras of Tāntric works. Magic also which is one of the elements of Tantra literature, of course, reaches back to the *Atharvaveda*. But there is no line of ‘evolution’ from *Yajurveda* and *Atharvaveda* to the *Tantras*”.

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¹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

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Bhattacharyya, on the other hand, holds that “the seeds of Tāntric Buddhism were already there in the original Buddhism in the form of *Mudrās*, *Mantras*, *Mandalas*, *Dhāraṇīs*, *Yoga*, and *Samādhi*, as a means to attain happiness and prosperity in this world.”² These elements, together with some of the changes that took place in Buddhism, from time to time, were responsible according to him, for the actual origin of Tāntrism.

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² *See Two Vajrayāna works*, G.O.S., No. XLIV, Introduction, p. X.

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Before we review these changes that Bhattacharyya speaks of, we must needs know, in short, what exactly the nature of Tāntrism was.

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Tāntrism was a form of Buddhsim which unlike the primitive Buddhism, advocated recital of *Mantras* and *Dhāraṇīs*, practice of *Yoga* and *Samādhi*, and lastly worship not only of Buddha in different *Mudrās* but even worship of a host of gods and goddesses. Some of its features which are severely criticised were such pestilent dogmas and practices as quoted below.³

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³ मातृभगिनीपुत्रींश्च कामयेद्यस्तु साधकः स सिद्धिं विपुलां गच्छेत् महायानाग्रधर्मताम् । मातरं बुद्धस्य विभोः कामयन्न च लिप्यते सिध्यते तस्य बुद्धत्वं निर्विकल्पस्य धीमतः ॥ For other practices *see Two Vajrayāna Works*, o.c., p. 23.

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Though Buddhism had spread well in the time of Buddha himself, still continuous efforts were made after his death to make it still more acceptable to the people, because on its philosophical as well as religious side, Buddhism was found wanting. To improve it philosophically, Aśvaghoṣa gave a new interpretation of *Nirvāṇa*¹, Nāgārjuna introduced his theory of *Śūnya*²—and incidentally Mahāyāna—while Vijñānavādins under Maitreyanāth supplemented the element of *Vijñāna*, a positive element, in the original conception of the *Śūnya*, which was pure vacuity. The masses still remained dissatisfied. For even though they led a strictly moral life, and renounced all the pleasures of life, still nothing—not even these new philosophical ideas of Śūnyavādins and Vijñānavādins—could assure the masses that they would enable them to attain cessation from the birth circle and escape from misery.

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¹ See Aśvaghoṣa, *Saundarānanda Kāvya*, referred to by Bhattacharyya, *A Peep into the Later Buddhism*, A.B.O.R.I., X, p. 2-3.

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² Cf. His defininition of *Nirvāṇa* as a condition of mind about which neither existence nor non-existence nor a combination of the two nor a negation of the two can be predicted, expressed in Sanskrit as *astināsti tadubhayānubhayacatuṣ kotivinirmuktam*.

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To satisfy the people on this point, two new doctrines were introduced into Buddhism. These were the *Mahāsukhavāda* and the doctrine of *Karuṇā*. Unlike the previous doctrines—*Śūnyavāda* and *Vijñānavāda*—which were primarily philosophical—these were religious. The followers of the former (*Mahāsukha*) satisfied the masses by holding out a promise that even when *Nirvāṇa* is attained there remains something which is *Vijñāna* and continues to remain in eternal bliss and happiness. The *Śūnya*, they said, is *Nirātmā* and the *Bodhicitta* or Bodhimind, when emancipated plunges itself in *Śūnya* or in the embrace of *Nirātmā* and remains there in eternal bliss and happiness.

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But it was the doctrine of *Karuṇā* that satisfied the masses most. According to this doctrine the Bodhisattva should sacrifice everything, his personal happiness and even his own merits for the suffering humanity. He must strive hard through a continuous chain of births and rebirths for the emancipation of his fellow beings.¹

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¹ The doctrine of Karuṇā was perhaps, first, preached in the Sukhāvatīvyūha, a work of about the first century B.C. It was commented upon by Nāgārjuna in his Daśabhūmivibhāṣāśastra. The doctrine was fully evolved in works like Kāraṇḍavyūha etc. See MaxMuller, Sukhāvatīvyūha, pp. 5-6-7 and p. XIX, also Kāraṇḍavyūha, pp. 21, 22, 84.

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Thus the Buddhists got what up to now they lacked. Through the cult of Bodhisattva and Avalokiteśvara, a personal god was being slowly introduced into Buddhism, though we have nothing to say against the theory of Karuṇā itself. It was, on the contrary, lofty, noble, and ennobling. And, as Dr. Bhattacharyya has rightly said, "The idea of Karuṇā is unique in the history of any religion and Buddhism can well be proud of it."²

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² A Peep into the Later Buddhism, A.B.O.R.I., X, p. 6.

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But sheltered behind this lofty ideal—specially under the doctrine of Mahāsukhavāda—as we shall show later on—the priesthood committed and encouraged some very gross and hideous acts of immorality in the name of religion. And sanction for many of the uncommon and grossly immoral practices was found by the misrepresentation and misuse of these doctrines of Karuṇā and Mahāsukhavāda.

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With a view to find easy acceptance among the people for these views—which were in a sense against the teaching of primaeval Buddhism—their propounders found out a novel way. They preached them in the form of Saṅgītis.³ Almost all Tantras are in this form and are said to have been delivered by Buddha in an Assembly of the Faithful. Thus in a secret yet in a way that was believed to be authoritative, the Tantras and their many practices—good and bad—were handed down from the guru to the śiṣya, till they gradually crept in among the people.

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³ Saṅgīti is the name of a form of Buddhist literature wherein the very opening lines Buddha is introduced in an Assembly of the Faithful in monasteries well-connected with the life of Buddha. In Tāntric Saṅgītis, however, Buddha is introduced in an assembly of women. See Bhattacharyya, A.B.O.R.I., X, p. 5; also Guhyasamāja Tantra, G.O.S., LIII, Introduction.

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Another reason why Tāntrism and Tāntric practices were easily accepted by the Buddhists was that this new cult allowed a liberty of action which was forbidden by the early Buddhism.¹

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¹ Revolts against the moral code are visible even in the Vinaya-pitaka. For a similar revolt—but of a much stronger kind—the Mahā-saṅghikas were expelled from the Church by the Sthaviras who refused to yield on the morel question and make any relaxation in the code.

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Other circumstances were also favourable for the rise of Tāntrism. From very early times belief in superstition, magic and sorcery was prevalent in India. Even Buddha seems to have believed in miraculous powers for we find him in the Vinaya Texts scolding his disciples for making an unwarranted use of his powers.² So when Tāntrism with its various sorts of Mantras, Dhāraṇīs, and other practices held forth miraculous powers it was readily seized upon by the people.

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² Mahāvagga, V, 1. 5. 7; VI, 34. 1, 2.

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To sum up, therefore, the cause of the rise of Tāntrism: It was mainly due to the two inherent defects in Buddhism:

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(1) It did not offer a suitable and convincing and at the same time popular explanation of Nirvāṇa, which was the goal of all Buddhists. Consequently in trying to remedy this, and to find out newer explanations, ideas of Mahāsukha, etc., crept in, which brought about the moral enervation visible in the Tāntric Age.

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(2) There was a revolt against the strict and unnatural discipline enjoined upon his followers by Buddha which was given sanction as it were by the doctrines of Mahāsukha and Karuṇā, according to which salvation was not incompatible with indulgence in worldly pleasures.

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(3) Suitable ground for the spread of Tāntrism was found in the existence of belief in superstition, magic, sorcery, etc.

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It is very difficult to say when this phase of Buddhism actually arose. It began to assert itself and became a living faith in about the 7th century A.D., though traditionally its first promulgation is attributed to Asaṅga, who flourished in about the 3rd or 4th century A.D.¹ Tibetan opinion definitely tells us that Tāntrism is of very ancient origin, and was transmitted in the most secret manner² from the time of Asaṅga down to the time of Dharmakīrti.³ Waddell, too, holds the same view.⁴

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