Pramāṇa · Search · About · API

Vada in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c5: 1. The Nature of Vāda

Vāda in Theory and Practice: Studies in Debates, Dialogues and Discussions in Indian Intellectual Discourses c5

Language
English

Contents

1. The Nature of Vāda

c5.1

The Nature of Vāda

c5.2

Right from a hoary past, debates and discussions have helped Indian society to develop democratic values. As long as there was a scope for logic and reasoning, the possibilities of overthrowing authoritarian tendencies remained. S. Radhakrishnan says:

c5.3

Helped by natural conditions, and provided with the intellectual scope to think out the implications of things, the Indian escaped the doom which Plato pronounced to be the worst of all, viz. the hatred of reason.”¹

c5.4

¹ 1

c5.5

A country where debates do not happen is “a place without gestation”. Authoritarian regimes do not allow debates to happen. The lack of *vāda* (debate, dialogue and discussion) leaves a society in a morbid state. *Vāda* envisages a culture of pluralism and democratic values.

c5.6

B.K. Matilal recognizes two distinct traditions of Indian logic — one is the tradition of *vāda* (debates, dialogues and discussions) and the other is the *pramāṇa* tradition. The former is concerned with dialectical tricks, arguments and sophistry, whereas the latter with criteria for empirical knowledge.² However, Matilal does not define the interconnections between these two traditions. In fact, the *vāda* tradition does not simply subside in sophistry and tricks, it very much effects and enriches the other tradition concerned with epistemology, providing a critique of diverse schools of philosophy. *Vāda* leads to true knowledge which would culminate in salvation (*mokṣa*).³ In fact *pramāṇa* is invariably linked to both *vāda* and *darśana*. There is a popular saying amongst Sanskrit *paṇḍits*—*vāde vāde jāyate tattvabodhaḥ* (after going through the series of *vādas*, true knowledge is acquired). In fact, it is this idea of *tattvabodha* — arriving at the very essence and ultimate truth — that distinguishes the Indian tradition of *vāda* from Western dialecticism. Greek philosophers like Aristotle have given the idea of dialectics primarily in the sense of “the art of discussion, debate, controversy, a method of argument or disputation, the process of discursive or conversational thinking”.⁴

c5.7

² 2

c5.8

³ 3

c5.9

⁴ 4

c5.10

Speech can liberate. Words are illuminators and are capable of enlightening. Creating a theory and purging out the unacceptable theories through *vāda* (proper debate, discussions and dialogue) settles disputes and purifies the self.

c5.11

In some of the orthodox Indian philosophies where the Word was viewed as the world, and the Ultimate Reality (*Brahman*) as well, *vāda* assumed utmost importance. Proper employment of words is equated to spiritual pursuit and would emancipate. *Ānvīkṣikī*, the earliest form of Indian logic, subsisted in *vāda*. It was an amalgam of three philosophies — Sāṁkhya, Yoga and Cārvāka. In fact, *Ānvīkṣikī* is the science of reviewing. Kauṭilya therefore holds that *ānvīkṣikī* reviews and investigates upon the contents of the other three disciplines (see Chap. 2).

c5.12

In the course of time, the concept of *ānvīkṣikī* underwent a change. *Nyāyadarśana* rightly made a claim on it and Gautama in his *Nyāyasūtra* treated his philosophy at par with the Ānvīkṣikī. Rājaśekhara (tenth century ce), in his *Kāvyamīmāṁsā*, revisited the concepts of *vidyās* (branches of learning) and the Ānvikṣikī. According to him:

c5.13

The Ānvīkṣikī is divided into two parts — *pūrva-pakṣa* (the prima facie view) and *uttara-pakṣa* (the rejoinder). Buddhism, Jainism and Cārvāka philosophies are included in *pūrva-pakṣa* and Sāṁkhya as well as Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika in *uttara-pakṣa*. Taken together, they form six argumentative systems.⁵

c5.14

Ānvīkṣikī or Nyāya⁶ has been singularly devoted to arguments and logic. Vijñāneśvara in his *Mitākṣarā* commentary on *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* (I.3) defines Nyāya as *tarkavidyā* (the system of learning based on arguments). But the tradition of *Nyāyadarśana* does not simply regard this *darśana* confined to logic and arguments only. It has been defined as a Pramāṇaśāstra as well as *adhyātmavidyā* both. Rightly does Udayana, one of the greatest Naiyāyikas or experts in *Nyāyadarśana*, give the title to his magnum opus as *Ātmatattvaviveka* (true knowledge of the Self) even though his treatise is mainly devoted to *vāda* (debate) with Buddhists.

c5.15

On the other hand, the systems said to have emphasized over self-realization and pursuing the path of salvation do recognize the importance of critical examination and reasoning. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* says: *ātmā vā are śrotavyo mantavyaḥ* (the Self must be listened to, must be contemplated upon with reasoning). Here *manana* stands for reasoning and rational thinking.

c5.16

A *śāstra* (an authoritative documentation of the theory and practice of any knowledge system) is normally written in the style of debate, discussion and dialogue. There is an imaginary interlocutor, raising objections, demanding clarifications and asking questions. A debate within the mind of the author constantly goes on during the course of the creation of a treatise. A section of a *śāstra* is termed as *adhikaraṇa* or *adhikāra*. Jaimini’s *Mīmāṁsāsūtra* is the first authentic text on the Mīmāṁsā philosophy. The sections of *Mīmāṁsāsūtra* are called *adhikaraṇas* and each *adhikaraṇa* has a fivefold structure involving — *viṣaya* (theme), *saṁśaya* (doubt), *pūrva-pakṣa* (the prima facie view), *uttara-pakṣa* (the rejoinder) and *nirṇaya* (conclusion).⁷ It is true that Mīmāṁsā comprises an exegesis of Vedic rituals. Paul Deussen rightly says that Jaimini’s text is “a methodical handbook treating the various questions arising out of the complicated Vedic ritual”.⁸ But it is also true that Jaimini has designed his aphorisms to form a text in debate and he was able to create a powerful discourse for debate. Veṅkaṭādhvarin in his *Viśvaguṇādarśacampū* (564) goes to the extent of saying that the proponents of all other Śāstras suffer debacles when a battle of debate is carried out by Jaimini’s disciples.

c5.17

The *adhikaraṇa* structure applies more or less to most of the śāstric texts and it invariably invests the texts with a dialogic nature — rooted in some kind of debate.

c5.18

The practice of debating percolated various levels of Indian social life. Royal courts, assemblies of *paṇḍits* and even marriages⁹ provided occasions for debates on issues pertaining to philosophy, ethics, polity, etc.

c5.19

There is some debate on the question whether debate lies at the genesis of Indian world-view. The myth of the Sanakādi brothers brings out the tussle between two tendencies — *karma* (action) and *vāda*. The four boys — Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanātana and Sanatkumāra — were asked to cooperate in the act of creation by Prajāpati (the Lord of Creation), immediately after they were born. They asked why they should employ themselves in the act of creating; first the Prajāpati should reply to their questions. They were banished from the *brahmaloka* immediately because of this questioning spirit.¹⁰ But they are held as great seers and authorities in Āgamas. Interestingly, almost all the Āgama texts are structured in *vāda* as dialogues between two persons, a *guru* and a *śiṣya*, or a Śiva and a Pārvatī; and the text unfolds in resolution to the doubts and replies to the queries of the *jijñāsu* (the seeker of knowledge).

Vāda, Saṁvāda and Vivāda

c5.s1.1

The term *vāda* is derived from the root *vad-* (to speak). The dictionary by Monier-Williams gives the following meanings of *vāda* — speaking of or about, causing a sound, playing, advice, council, speech, discourse, talk, utterance, statement, a thesis, proposition, argument, doctrine, discussion, controversy, dispute, contest, quarrel, etc. The term *śāstrārtha* came in vogue during nineteenth and twentieth centuries for *vāda* in a limited sense (scholastic debate). It is mostly used for debates on public platforms or sometimes debates through the print media. *Vāda* has a wider connotation. It is accepted as a type of *kathā* (discussion) involving debates, dialogues and discussions on a philosophical, religious, social or ethical issue.

c5.s1.2

During Vedic period (before 600 BCE) the term *brahmodya* was used in the sense of *vāda*. K. Satchidananda Murty rightly suggests that “the oldest word used in the Vedic literature for the discussion of philosophical/theological problems is *brahmodya*”.¹¹ *Brahmodya*¹² is the technical name for the assemblies for holding discussions, debates and dialogues on ontological or epistemological issues.¹³

c5.s1.3

*Brahmodya* is not debate in the modern sense of the term, as the answers given by the respondent are known to the disputant and they are not challenged and questioned.

c5.s1.4

The dialogues involving heated discussions and rejoinders were called *vākovākya*. Yājñavalkya includes *vākovākya* in his list of subjects for study.¹⁴ A *vākovākya* is treated sometimes synonymous to *brahmodya*. K.F. Geldner “sees in the *vākovākya* as an essential part of the Itihāsa-Purāṇa, the dialogue or dramatic element as opposed to narrative portion”.¹⁵

c5.s1.5

The assembly for a *brahmodya* was called *brahma-saṁsad*.¹⁶ The term *vāda* came to be used subsequently with the emergence of systems of philosophy. *Milindapañho*, a Pāli text of second century BCE, uses the term *saddhi* for *vāda*. The term *brahma-sabhā* was also used for the assembly were debates or discussions on philosophical issues were organized. Rājaśekhara in the tenth chapter of his *Kāvyamīmāṁsā* directs the king to organize *brahma-sabhās* in his capital to identify and honour the best of the philosophers and scholars. A special vehicle called *brahma-ratha* was arranged for the best debaters of the *brahmodyas*. Rājaśekhara has also informed that *śāstra-parīkṣās* (examinations of the scholars through debate and discussion) used to be organized in the city of Pāṭaliputra (see Chap. 2). The kings presided over the *śāstra-sabhās* in different disciplines. In addition to these, there were institutions in later period organizing *śāstra-sabhās*. The Tripunithura court organized *vākyārtha-sabhās*. In several towns of Kerala *śāstra-sabhās* were held.¹⁷

c5.s1.6

Indian debate has a rich history of three millennia. There have been debates with a view to find out the truth, for a search of harmony and inherent unity of divergent theories. There have also been debates with sharp differences emphasizing the distinctions.

c5.s1.7

*Isibhāsiyāin* (*Ṛṣibhāṣitāni*), a collection of discourses by seers belonging to the Vedic, Ājīvaka, Cārvāka, Buddhist and Jaina traditions, is a unique text building up bridges and creating dialogues between diverse sects and traditions. Compiled around the fourth-third centuries BCE,¹⁸ the text is immensely valuable for understanding the Indian traditions of sharing knowledge systems. Amongst the seers included, twelve belong to Nirgrantha sect or Jainism, five to Buddhist philosophy and as many as seventeen to Vedic tradition. Amongst the remaining seers, Maṅkhali Ghosāla is known as the founder of Ājīvaka sect and while the affiliations of nine others are unknown. The 20^th chapter named Utkala Adhyayana does not give the name of any sage, but it discusses the materialist philosophy through very interesting illustrations. The 21^st chapter cites the *gāthās* of Gāthāpatiputra Taruṇa propounding Ajñānavāda, the philosophy of ignorance.

c5.s1.8

The whole process of *vāda* should lead to conclusion and theory building. Therefore the word *vāda* also came to be used in the sense of theory. Some of the well-known theories in the philosophical systems were named as *vādas*, viz. Ārambhavāda, Prāmāṇyavāda, etc. Some of the treatises dealing with specific theories were named as *vāda granthas*. Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, a well-known Naiyāyika of seventeenth century CE, has written several *vāda* texts, viz. *Vyutpattivāda*, *Śaktivāda*, *Viṣayatāvāda*, *Muktivāda*, *Vidhivāda*, etc.¹⁹ Madhva's works are also known as *vāda granthas*.

c5.s1.9

The word *saṁvāda* is used in *Mahābhārata* in the sense of a highly-profound discussion between two intellectuals that was carried out in past and lives in the collective memory of a race. This kind of *saṃvāda* becomes *itihāsa*. Many such *saṃvāda*s are cited in *Mahābhārata*.

c5.s1.10

In Gautama's system of Nyāya, the term *kathā* is used for all kinds of discussions, conversations, debates and dialogues. *Vāda* is understood as a type of *kathā*. Caraka, the savant of Āyurveda, understands the term *vāda* in the sense of a formal or proper debate, where one party differs with the other and each adopts a position as per their system of thought or discipline. Instead of grouping *jalpa* (wrangling) and *vitaṇḍā* (cavil) as types of *kathā* (as Gautama, the author of *Nyāyasūtra* has done) Caraka defines these two as types of *vāda* (for details see Chap. 3).

Vāda, Protests and Dissents

c5.s2.1

Śvetaketu, who is being discussed in the next chapter here, is the first person to have raised a voice of protest against sexual exploitation of women. He also introduced a revolutionary change in the social practices. The Cārvākas always served as a protestant group that questions the prevailing norms and lifestyles (see Chaps. 2 and 4).

c5.s2.2

The question as to what extent protests and dissents are possible in a society, which has glorified *vāda* to a great extent, needs consideration. To a certain extent, a vigorous tradition of *vāda* has served as an outlet for the release of violence and has helped in keeping the voices of protests and dissents muffled. Pratap Chandra says:

c5.s2.3

Terms like protest, dissent, heterodoxy (in a generalized sense), deviation from the mainstream, etc. are irrelevant in the Indian context. Ideological divergence obtaining in a plural context cannot be expressed in a terminology clearly implying a non-linear situation. It is indeed a pity that a modern scholar has been obliged to point out chinks in a non-existent monolith. But such are the consequences of a failure to critically evaluate the historical model before putting it into use.²⁰

c5.s2.4

But then the dynamics of *vāda* themselves provided occasions for meaningful protests and raising the voices of protests. Śvetaketu, had protested against men’s oppression of women and had told his father: “I raise my voice of dissent against such law. Henceforth no man will forcefully take any woman.” The story of Sulabhā from *Mahābhārata* (see next chapter) brings out a woman’s fight against man’s pretensions and arrogance.

c5.s2.5

It is interesting to note that voices of dissent were raised in the very tradition of Vedānta against the caste system. While Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and even Madhva in their *bhāṣyas* agreed with the injunctions of Bādarāyaṇa in *Apaśūdrādhikaraṇa*²¹ on denying the knowledge of *Brahman* to the lower castes, Rāmānuja, Rāmānanda and several medieval saints, preaching their philosophy, stood against the caste system.

c5.s2.6

The Lokāyatikas, Ājīvakas, the Sikh *gurus*, Kabīr (1398–1448), Vasava and B.R. Ambedkar raised the voices of protest against the system. They fought against hierarchies, feudalism and tyranny also. It is in the literary traditions — poetry, drama and fiction — that we find *vāda* reverberating with notes of dissent and protests. Chap. 6 of this work is devoted to documenting some of the literary pieces voicing such notes. Poets like Bhartṛhari, Bhavabhūti and Bilhaṇa have raised their voices of protest against the kings, as well as social and political institutions. *Mahiṣaśatakam* of Vāñchānātha (also known as Vāñcheśvara, and a descendant of Govinda Dīkṣita) is a powerful text against a ruler, the oppressive system and exploitation.²²

c5.s2.7

*Vāda* worked for erasing boundaries and watertight compartments. Max Weber says:

c5.s2.8

Without becoming a non-Hindu, a Hindu could accept highly important, most characteristic doctrines which every denominational Christian would consider *exclusively* his own. In Hindutva a teaching may be *orthodox* without being blindly valid, indeed the doctrinal fluidity of Hinduism is not incidental, but rather, the central, the central issue of religion, as we conceive it.²³

c5.s2.9

The atmosphere conducive to free dialogues led to equilibrium. *Vādas* also served as platforms for purging the violence in various groups and thus served as catalysts for bringing harmony and peace. Jainism, Buddhism and Ājīvakas arose parallel to the orthodox priestly systems. It could be possible in this system that the *gṛhasthas* (householders) who paid the priests for rituals also gave alms to the Buddhist monks.

c5.s2.10

Suppression of debates and resistance to them leads to the erosion of democratic systems and values. There are standpoints. Sticking to any one of them, may lead to clashes. Truth may emerge from them out of constant dialogues and conversations.

c5.s2.11

The royal courts served as academies and provided a platform for exchange of thoughts and ideas between diverse sects and philosophical schools. The spirit of *vāda* in the broad sense of the term is reflected in the edicts of King Aśoka, which give the message of harmony:

c5.s2.12

King Priyadarśī Devānam Priya, wishes that all [religious] sects should live [harmoniously] everywhere in [his dominions], for all of them want self-control and purity of thought; . . . there is no person who is not devoted to a particular religious sect; [the King] honours all sects. . . .

c5.s2.13

. . . there should be no extolment of one’s own sect or disparagement of other sects . . . other sects should be honoured in every way on all occasions.

c5.s2.14

. . . whosoever extols his own sect and disparages other sects . . . injures his own sect severely. . . .

c5.s2.15

. . . this indeed is the desire of King Priyadarśī Devānam Priya that followers of all sects should be well informed [about others] and acquire benevolent thoughts. . . .

c5.s2.16

. . . all the religious sects have been honoured by me with various kinds of honours.

c5.s2.17

. . . The *dharma-mahāmātras* are occupied with all the religious sects — the brāhmaṇas, the Ājīvakas, Nirgranthas — with these and other sects.

c5.s2.18

— From the Edicts of Aśoka: R.E. VII Shahbazgarhi, R.E. XII, XIII, XI and VII

c5.s2.19

On the other hand, the people belonging to the establishment were afraid of those who indulged in *vādas*. The philosophers like the Lokāyatikas or Cārvākas were also regarded dangerous because they constantly raised questions and debates. The kings were advised not to pay attention to them. When Bharata visits Rāma in Citrakūṭa the later asks him — “O dear one! do you keep away from the brāhmaṇas who are Lokāyatikas? They are skilled in creating disasters, foolhardy and think themselves as very knowledgeable!” (see Chap. 2).

c5.s2.20

So much importance was attached to *vāda* that Kṛṣṇa while enumerating his glorious forms (*vibhūtis*) describes *vāda* as one of his *vibhūtis*: *vādaḥ pravadatām aham* (*Gītā* X.32) — I am *vāda* amongst the disputants. Śaṅkarācārya in his *Bhāṣya* talks about *pravadatām* as implying three forms of *kathā* (discussion) — *vāda*, *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*. Amongst these, *vāda* is the best as it leads to the truth.

c5.s2.21

The tradition therefore respected the *paṇḍits* who promoted *vāda* tradition. This tradition could also carry the spirit of challenge to the highest limits. Udayana a tenth-century philosopher came to be worshipped for having proved the existence of God. But Udayana could also challenge the Lord of Jagannātha when denied access to the temple at Purī. Myths and legends came to be woven around the great practitioners of *vāda*. Śrīharṣa, a well-known philosopher and poet, is said to have entered into debate even with the goddess of learning (Sarasvatī) and ultimately defeated her. Owing to their debating skills, some of the scholars are better known by the titles such as *vādībhasiṁhasūrin* (lion for the elephant-contenders in *vāda*), *prativādibhayaṁkara* (terrific for the respondents) and *vādirāja* (king amongst debaters), and their real names have sunk into oblivion. Siddhasena Divākara is eulogized in the following terms in *Ādipurāṇa*: “He was lion for the opponents in debate who were like elephants before him. He was lion of the theories.”²⁴ Varadācārya alias Alagiya Maṇavala, who flourished in thirteenth century CE was a reputed author in philosophy and Tantra, was known as *vādikesarin* (lion among the debaters).²⁵ Aṇṇagarācārya (14th-15th century CE) was called *prativādibhayaṁkara* (frightful to the opponents in debate). Vedāntadeśika (Veṅkaṭanātha) was given the title of *Kavitārkikacakravartī* (sovereign of poets and logicians).

Reverting the Gaze

c5.s3.1

A thorough understanding of the *pūrva-pakṣa* (the prima facie view) is required to start a *vāda*.²⁶ There are philosophers who could present the opponent’s view with such exact comprehension that we can restore some of the lost philosophical systems only through the debate that was carried on in their refutation.

c5.s3.2

For a real *vāda*, the argument should be meaningful. It is true that there were debates in which facts were distorted, reasoning were mutilated, and arguments were not properly utilized. Kālidāsa had perhaps witnessed debates with meaningless arguments. Duṣyanta in *Abhijñānaśākuntala* says: *kiṁ vṛthā tarkeṇa anviṣyate* (what is to be sought by futile arguments?). Dharmakīrti, a renowned Buddhist philosopher has given an account of futile debates (see Chap. 3). In *Milindapañho*, cited here as an example of one of the most intense and profound debates (see Chap. 2), there are many presumptuous statements by Nāgasena, the great preceptor, with reference to geography and history. In one of his illustrations, Nāgasena describes several rivers like Sarayū and Vetravatī as having streamed from Himalayas (p. 141). Sometimes beliefs into supernatural phenomena are also aired (p. 148). But for more than two millennia, Indian culture has thrived because of real good debates.

Concept of Sabhā

c5.s4.1

Asaṅga has described six types of court rooms for holding the *vādas*: (i) *rājakula* — the royal palace, (ii) *yuktakula* — the residence of some officer, (iii) *parṣatsattvā* — assembly, (iv) *dharmārthakuśala-śramaṇabrāhmaṇa-* vāsa — the places where the śramaṇas are available, (v) residence of brāhmaṇas adept in *dharma* or brāhmaṇas adept in *dharma* are available, (vi) *dharmārthakarmasattvā* — places where persons desirous of learning *dharma* are present.

c5.s4.2

Rājaśekhara has described the assembly hall, arrangements for seats, etc. in it for holding *kāvyakāra-parīkṣās* (examination of poets) and *śāstrakāra-parīkṣās* (examination of scholars). The assembly hall should have sixteen pillars, for doors and eight *mattavāraṇīs*, with one platform with the royal seat for the king (he is supposed to preside in all the *parīkṣās*). The poets, scholars of diverse knowledge systems, artists, etc. are assigned places in the assembly hall. This assembly hall served the purpose for holding all sorts of *vādas* — *vādas* for judging the quality of a new poet or the acquisitions of an emerging scholar. Even when speaking as an *ācārya* of Alaṃkāraśāstra (literary theory) and making recommendations to a poet-king, Rājaśekhara wants the *śāstrakāra-parīkṣās* to be held in between the poets meets, as “wine alone does not taste good, it required some snacks to be combined with”.²⁷

c5.s4.3

*Vādin* (proponent/disputant), *prativādin* (respondent), *prāśnika* (jury) and *sabhya* (member of the assembly) — these are said to be the four pillars of *vāda*.²⁸ A king should employ only those as the members of the *sabhā* who are religious, well tested, and can bear the *dhūḥ* (brunt) of *vyavahāra* (issues for debate/petitions) like good bulls. They should be adept in Dharmaśāstras, should come from good families, should always speak truth, and should consider a friend or a foe as equal.²⁹

c5.s4.4

In fact, *sabhā* came to be known as an institution for the progress of *vāda*-tradition. There is a floating verse about the *sabhā* which says:

c5.s4.5

There is no *sabhā*, if elders are not there. They are not elders if they do not give ruling according to *dharma*. *Dharma* is not *dharma* if it is without truth, and *truth* is not *truth* if it is mingled with cheating.

c5.s4.6

In *Mahābhārata*, Draupadī before initiating her debate, which is being discussed in the next chapter, recites this verse. Nārada in his Smṛti repeats it in the context of a judicial court (see Chap. 5).

Appreciating a Conversation

c5.s5.1

Bhāravi in his *Kirātārjunīyam* has presented a debate between Draupadī, Bhīma and Yudhiṣṭhira involving perennial questions of polity and war. He has also described the qualities of speech for any conversation. They are — brilliance, perspicuity, grace and defined import (*sauṣṭhvodāryaviśeṣaśālinīṁ viniścitārthāṁ* — I.3), reasoning and radiance (*upapattimadūrjitāśrayam* — II.1), free from vagueness, pure, concise but heavily loaded with meanings (*. . . garīyasi . . . bahur alpīyasi dṛṣyate guṇaḥ* — II.4) charming in sense (*rucirārthā* — II.5).

c5.s5.2

Bhīma delivers a discourse on the necessity of quick action against Duryodhana. Yudhiṣṭhira praises Bhīma:

c5.s5.3

Your pure intention is clearly reflected in your speech, which is free from arguments going against reasoning and proof, it is elegant, attractive for the heart as the image reflected in a mirror free from any coating of dust, transparent and charming to the mind and auspicious. (*apavarjitaviplave śucau hṛdayagrāhiṇi maṅgalāspade . . . vimalā tava vistare girāṁ matir ādarśa iva abhilakṣyate.*)

c5.s5.4

He further says:

c5.s5.5

Not that perspicuity from the words was removed, not that the depth of meaning was not attended to, distinctness of every section of speech was brought out, and power of expression never overruled. — II.27

c5.s5.6

In fact, Yudhiṣṭhira in his praise uses the exact terms from Nyāya philosophy to bring out the force of Bhīma’s argumentative discourse — *upapatti*, *āgama*, *anumāna* (inference), *āśaya* (implication), etc. “The *āgama* was not mutilated by the deliberate use of *anumāna* in your speech” — he says (II.28). The commentators understand *āgama* as *nīti* (good policy) only. However, *āgama* has a wider connotation in Bhāravi’s treatment of the qualities of good discourse. It is a paradigm for life.

c5.s5.7

In the eleventh canto of *Kirātārjunīyam*, Arjuna is performing rigorous penances and Indra comes to test his resolve. Arjuna lauds his speech as marked with clarity, charm, force, conciseness, open to questions, embracing wide range and undisturbed. It became like the word of scriptures being unshaken, and was like a flooding deep sea that could not be crossed by common men. It had wealth of meanings and grandeur like the tranquil mind of a seer.³⁰

Ethics of Debate

c5.s6.1

*Mahābhārata* describes one of the greatest debates of our history that occurred when the Kauravas made an attempt to humiliate Draupadī in the presence of her husbands (the Pāṇḍavas). Draupadī raised a question about the legality of staking her in the game of dice. This resulted in a fierce debate involving perennial questions of morality (*dharma*) and also the rights of slaves and women. Vidura, the step-brother of King Dhṛtarāṣṭra, spoke about the norms and ethics of debate in an assembly on this occasion. He said:

c5.s6.2

Knowing the rules of *dharma*, and attending an assembly, he who does not answer a query that is put forward, incurs a half of the demerit that is attached to telling a lie. If a person in the assembly knows the rules of *dharma* and speaks and gives a wrong answer, he incurs the sin of telling a lie.³¹

c5.s6.3

In this connection, Vidura recounted the tale of Prahlāda. Prahlāda was made arbitrator in a quarrel between Virocana and Sudhanvan, the former being his son. Facing a dilemma, Prahlāda approached Kaśyapa and asked him:

c5.s6.4

What are the other worlds in which a man falls if he chooses not to answer a question in a debate/quarrel or if he gives a wrong answer?

c5.s6.5

Kaśyapa told him:

c5.s6.6

A person who knows but prefers not to give an answer gets himself encaged in a thousand nooses of Varuṇa. If a person called as a witness in a dispute speaks carelessly, he also gets himself encaged in a thousand nooses of Varuṇa. Out of these one thousands nooses, one noose is released annually. Therefore a person should speak truth without concealment (whenever there is a dispute or a debate) in the assembly. If *dharma* is entangled with *adharma* in an assembly, it is the duty of each and every member of the assembly to take off the dart, lest they themselves be entangled with that *adharma*. In an assembly where a sinful act is not condemned, half of the demerit of that sinful act clings to the head of that assembly, one-fourth of it to the guilty, and the remaining fourth to the members of the assembly present there.

c5.s6.7

In this way Kaśyapa continued to dwell upon the guilt a person is subjected to, in case he utters a lie during the course of a dispute or debate. After hearing Kaśyapa, Prahlāda told his son the truth: "your contender Sudhanvan is superior to you".

c5.s6.8

In the Śāntiparva of *Mahābhārata*, Bhīṣma establishes *ānṛśaṁsya* (non-cruelty) as a criterion for carrying out a proper discussion. A person hurting the other by his speech is also a cruel person. Using of foul and harsh language is equated with inflicting violence.³² A good speaker is the one who speaks without going against his own intentions and also against the intentions of the hearer.

c5.s6.9

Yājñavalkya in his law book gives a list of persons with whom no debate should be taken up. The list includes parents, guests, brothers, married ladies, in-laws, maternal uncle, an old man (above seventy according to Vijñāneśvara), a child, a patient, an *ācārya* (who has given initiation by sacred thread, according to Vijñāneśvara), a *vaidya* (physician), those who are dependents (for their livelihood), relatives (belonging to both the father's and mother's side), *ṛtvik* (the priest), *purohita* (the person who performs rituals), sons, daughters, wife, servants and real brothers.³³

c5.s6.10

³³ 33

c5.s6.11

The efficacy of *vāda* lies in encouraging the others to speak out and to establish communication. Debate for the sake of debate was never appreciated. Buddha has used the words *kalaha* (quarrel) and *vivāda* (verbal combat) to indicate the negative aspects of human personality. What is the genesis of *kalaha*, *vivāda* (debate), *vilāpa* (lamentation), *śoka* (sorrow), *mātsarya* (jealousy), *māna* (pride), *abhimāna* (ego) and *paiśūnya* (backbiting) — this question is asked to him in *Kalahavivādasutta* of *Suttanipāta*. Buddha says that all these evils are produced by attachment. The question of the propriety of creating controversies through debates is raised again in the next *sutta* (*Cūlavyūhasutta*) of *Suttanipāta*. Buddha is of the view that if a man does not follow the middle path, he gets stuck with a certain view and then he starts declaring that his view alone is right. He has denounced the tendency to enter into debates for creating controversies. Both praise and denouncement are fruits of this tendency. There are persons who would praise their own sects, methods and *dharmas*, and they will just decry the other systems as degraded (*hīna*). In fact, Buddha's discourse on the ethics of debate here is very pertinent:

c5.s6.12

A brāhmaṇa does not depend on others, he transcends the quarrels and verbal duals.³⁴
It is difficult to pacify or bring a person to senses who out of prejudice regards his own view as right and quarrels with others about it.³⁵
Controversies are created by those only who are lacking in true knowledge and understanding. A man who has developed equality of view will not join any debate.³⁶
Those who go to an assembly to join the debate with an intention to prove that their opponents are fools, do so to earn public applaud. They shoot arrows at their opponents to earn praise. When they are defeated, they hide themselves, when they are condemned, they are furious and start searching the faults of the others. In *vāda*–*vivāda*, a man either attacks the other or harms himself. Such debates are of no use except earning praise or abuse. The arrogance that a man develops after emerging victorious in the debates ultimately leads to his downfall. A wise man therefore should avoid indulging in such debates. If the debates do not lead to self-purification, what is the use of nourishing one's own ego through them? A person who is free of ego will not enter into debate with anyone.³⁷

c5.s6.13

³⁴ 34

c5.s6.14

³⁵ 35

c5.s6.15

³⁶ 36

c5.s6.16

³⁷ 37

c5.s6.17

On the contrary, many of the followers of Buddha themselves came to regard *vāda* essential for protecting his message. *Upāyahṛdaya*, a text of pre-Diṅnāga period wrongly ascribed to Nāgārjuna, begins with a *vāda* on the utility of *vāda* and the author of this text argues against the view that the debate only “creates bitterness, strife and hard-heartedness, and so should be avoided”.³⁸

Violence of Speech

c5.s7.1

The history of debates also comprises narratives of very tense moments and violent designs. The very titles of several works composed as debates are suggestive of the acts of smashing, breaking, uprooting, condemning or crushing.

c5.s7.2

*Stuti* (praise) and *nindā* (abuse) are necessary ingredients of the discourses that were delivered in Vedic sacrifices. In Vedic sacrifices such as the Aśvamedha, the priest functions both as an *apagara* (reviler) and *abhigara* (praiser).

c5.s7.3

Debates involve violence in various ways. In one of the most profound and prolonged debates described in the Upaniṣads, Gārgī challenges Yājñavalkya with an attacking stance. She compares her pair of questions with two fatal arrows. Commenting on the episode relating to the debate between Janaka and Sulabhā (which is being discussed in the next chapter), Nīlakaṇṭha, a commentator par excellence on *Mahābhārata*, also uses the metaphor of a battle, where both discussants (Janaka and Sulabhā) fought with *buddhyastra* (the weapon of intelligence) with each other.

c5.s7.4

The law books of Manu, Yājñavalkya, Nārada and others define *vāk-pāruṣya* (harshness of speech) as one of the sins and also prescribe punishment for it. The concept of *vāk-pāruṣya* involves shouting, calling names and throwing abuses. According to Nārada, a statement made out of malice towards a country, a nation or a kin makes a person inflicted with the sin of *vāk-pāruṣya*. Both Manu³⁹ and Yājñavalkya⁴⁰ prescribe penalty for a man who uses humiliating terms for physically disabled persons (Manu prescribes only less than a *kārṣāpaṇa* but Yājñavalkya makes it thirteen and a half *paṇas*).⁴¹ There are severe penalties for a man who speaks dirty words for anyone’s mother, sister or wife. Kauṭilya defines the following categories of *vāk-pāruṣya* — attributing physical deficiency (calling someone blind, deaf, etc.), use of filthy language and condemnation.⁴²

c5.s7.5

Vātsyāyana in his *Kāmasūtra* has discussed *samāja*, *kathā* and *goṣṭhī*.

c5.s7.6

*Samāja* is a community hall. *Kathā* is a discussion which is taken up when a *goṣṭhī* (group, circle) meets. *Kathās* and *goṣṭhīs* could be held in *samāja* or during a trip outside the town. Vātsyāyana has laid down the norms with a view to avoid unsavoury episodes and violence in *kathās* and *goṣṭhīs*. He says:

c5.s7.7

The citizen attains utmost honour in the community by carrying on discussion (on poetry and art) neither very much through Sanskrit nor very much through *deśabhāṣā* (regional language). A wise man should not join circles (*goṣṭhīs*) not liked by the community, and carried on arbitrarily, and which are violent to others. The learned man attains success in the world by joining a circle which is run in accordance with the notions of the community, and which is essentially sportive in nature.⁴³

c5.s7.8

*Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharata Muni is a text against violence of speech. The very first performance of the play *Samudramanthana* (churning of the ocean) generated controversy and debates, and was attacked by demons called *vighnas*, who created a pandemonium when his repertoire was giving a show. They alleged that the performance is humiliating to them. But Bharata Muni was able to calm down the protestors and mischief-mongers to their senses and to see reason by carrying out a *vāda* with them.⁴⁴

c5.s7.9

The devastating nature of the violence of speech is brought in the last chapter of *Nāṭyaśāstra*. Bharata’s sons, trained by him in Nāṭyaveda later on began to perform the *śilpakas* of rustic nature (*grāmyadharmaka*) and presented the life and deeds of the sages residing in the vicinity of Himalayas by the way of *viḍambana* (caricature) and *vyaṅgyakaraṇa* (satire). The sages being laughed at in this way got infuriated and cursed the actors to be expelled from the divine region of the Himalayas and to become *śūdras*. But again Bharata Muni gets his sons reconciled to their predicament through discussion.

Sandhi: Agreement with Disagreements

c5.s8.1

*Viśvaguṇādarśacampū* by Veṅkaṭādhvarin is being discussed as a text of *vāda* in the Chap. 6 of this book. *Viśvaguṇādarśacampū* is a work of fiction. The author makes two *gandharvas*, Kṛśānu and Kṛśāśva, debating with each other on merits and demerits of phenomena. During the course of their debate, Veṅkaṭādhvarin gives dramatic directions like *sārdhāṅgīkāram* (accepting half-heartedly). Veṅkaṭādhvarin also introduces the idea of reaching a compromise by way of agreeing to disagree. He calls it *sandhi*. Viśvāvasu after initial disagreement on the discussion about Rāmānuja and his sect, finally says that he would like to enter into a *sandhi* to felicitate Ramānuja’s contribution.⁴⁵

c5.s8.2

In fact, the whole debate between Kṛśānu and Kṛśāśva in *Viśvaguṇādarśacampū* is an example of agreement on the differences.

Language and Stylistics

c5.s9.1

With a fully developed theory of *vāda* (see Chap. 3), which was reflected in actual practice in debates held in public or through writings, the interlocutors experimented with language and introduced their own idioms.

c5.s9.2

Dharmakīrti, a very serious Buddhist philosopher, displays a rare sense of subtle humour, when he chides his opponents — specially the orthodox Naiyāyikas. He then uses some of the finest proverbial expressions for mockery and satire. Here are some examples revealing Dharmakīrti as a philosopher who can also laugh and rejoice by the way of defeating the opponents in the battle of arguments. In the discussion of the causal property of *svabhāva hetu* (self-nature kind of probans) Dharmakīrti makes fun of his opponent for the view that a incapable cause is seen to produce its effect, by these remarks:

c5.s9.3

Oh how highly powerful is the glance of the highly influential one, that it assigns activities of various kinds to incapable things. Our minds are pained by the worry that when this glance of your stops falling, alas, things will be rendered as having a non-productive character and will be removed from a causal series!⁴⁶

c5.s9.4

Taking into consideration the opponent’s contention that the self-nature characterized by the uninterrupted action remains with the cause even before the final state, Dharmakīrti again finds an occasion to be mused by the absurdity of this argument and laughs at him by saying:

c5.s9.5

[If this is the case], then how is it that someone is a mother and is also a barren lady? Or what is the meaning of this saying — that a thing by its nature possesses uninterrupted action, but does not perform the action?⁴⁷

c5.s9.6

Refuting the opponent’s view of the six characteristics of sound probans, Dharmakīrti says: “why does this poor fellow seek a son after marrying a eunuch?”.⁴⁸

c5.s9.7

Sometimes he is rather harsh on his opponents and hurls accusations on them with remarks such as:

c5.s9.8

They do not deserve any attention, since they are simply crying in distress, their vitals being pierced with the spear of envy (on account of my victory in the arguments)!⁴⁹

c5.s9.9

He calls the followers of Sāṁkhya system as animals.

c5.s9.10

Dharmakīrti rejoices in teasing his opponents and at times becomes quite dramatic in his attacks. This tendency specially surfaces when he enters into an argument with the Sāṁkhya philosophers. In *Vādanyāya*, he refutes their idea of *anupalabdhi*. His acquaintance with the use of the figure of speeches like *vakrokti* and *ukta-pratyukta* in the poetic fancies of his times must have led him to make remarks such as:

c5.s9.11

Wherefrom your honour has learnt this magic without *mantra* and *auṣadha* (herbs) that the same object, with no excess in its nature being generated or destroyed (remaining intact in the same form), sometimes becomes an object of perception, sometimes not, sometimes it is apprehended through inference, and again through perception and by verbal testimony at the same time without any change in its excess of its form and without having any change nature and not having getting any kind of excess?⁵⁰

c5.s9.12

His satires and sarcastic remarks also reveal repulsion against the tenets of Brāhmanism. Dharmakīrti has used some rare idioms, phrases and expressions when laughing at his enemies. In one such context, he has used the term *parvakārin*. A *parvakārin* is a brāhmaṇa performing rites on the occasion of a *parva*, i.e. the 8^th, 14^th and 15^th days of *śukla-pakṣa* (the full moon half month). From *parvakārin* comes the term *parvabrāhmaṇa* which Dharmakīrti has used for a greedy brāhmaṇa demanding more fees after having free food in a *śrāddha* ritual. Dharmakīrti has equated his opponents — the orthodox Naiyāyikas to this *parvabrāhmaṇa* in the context of their insistence on the inclusion of *pratijñā* (statement) in the *pañcāvayava-vākya* (fivefold statement).⁵¹ *Amūlyadānakrayin* (a person trying to purchase things without paying their price) is another such term used by Dharmakīrti in the context of Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeṣikas imputing the difference between the pot and its form.⁵² *Bhaṇḍālekhyanyāya* and *ḍiṇḍikarāga* are other interesting phrases which Dharmakīrti uses to rebuke his opponents. *Ḍiṇḍikarāga* is cited as an instance for the Naiyāyikas who are making argument for the sake of argument only. *Ḍiṇḍikas* are supposed to be the naked Jaina monks. They were known for their habit of writing their names again and again.⁵³ *Bhaṇḍālekhyanyāya* must have been a popular maxim, but it is not listed in the *laukika nyāyas* (popular maxims) in the lexicons and grammar manuals. Dharmakīrti has used this *nyāya* as an illustration for the buffoonery of his opponents⁵⁴ (a *bhaṇḍa* is a buffoon and *ālekhya* is painting.)

c5.s9.13

Jayarāśī was a follower of Cārvāka system (see next chapter). In his *Tattvopaplavasiṁha* he has critiqued all the systems of philosophy and spares none of them from making a fun. He has chided the Buddhists philosophers like Dharmakīrti by using such phrases as — *tad bālavilasitam* (acting like a child, p. 29), *jadaviteṣṭitaṁ* (acting like a fool, p. 32), *tadetan mugdhābhidhānaṁ dunoti mānasaṁ* (this kind of saying like that of a simpleton really hurts our mind, p. 39), *tad bālavalgitaṁ* (that was the chattering of a child, p. 39), *tan mugdhavilasitaṁ* (that was the act by a fool, p. 53), etc. He is still more harsh and sarcastic for the Jaina monks.⁵⁵

c5.s9.14

Śrīharṣa is well known for his wit and sharpness in attacking his opponents in debates. In the discussion on Asatkāraṇavāda (effect being produced without a cause) he remonstrates his opponent by saying:

c5.s9.15

Even this stretching of feet by the way of saying that there are infinite universals will not be for your relief.⁵⁶

c5.s9.16

He further adds on his discussion on *sattā* according to Sadvāda and Asadvāda:

c5.s9.17

This is like the sentry awakening after the thieves have already taken away the loot!⁵⁷

c5.s9.18

The Jaina philosophers theoretically upheld non-violence as the highest virtue, but did not leg behind in indulging in the violence of speech in most sarcastic ways. Nor did they lack in the capacity of boasting about their debating skills. Devasūrin (\textsc{ce} 1186–1269) in his *Syādvādamañjarī* says:

c5.s9.19

I have the power to drown the elephants like Udayana in the sea of my arguments; O Jayanta! Where do you count there — you are just an insect!⁵⁸

c5.s9.20

In the Mīmāṁsakas are laughed at with this interjection on behalf of the followers of Rāmānuja:

c5.s9.21

Who can make such remarks if he leans on the arms of Prabhākara or if Kumārila Bhaṭṭa has extended him his hand?⁵⁹

c5.s9.22

*Mudritakumudacandra*, a play portraying debate between two Jaina monks, gives interesting account on the gusto and airs with which the challenges are given for the debate and accusations are made (see Chap. 6).

The Ego, Prides and Prejudices

c5.s10.1

It is difficult to judge the subtle levels of ego and prejudices that percolate any debate. In *Kāmagītā* of *Mahābhārata*, Kāma (desire) is made to say:

c5.s10.2

No living being can defeat me without any appropriate method, though some try hard to kill me

c5.s10.3

with a weapon they know to be powerful. For them, I emerge anew in that very weapon.

c5.s10.4

When for example some people try to destroy me by means of sacrificial rituals, ceremoniously giving away various kinds of precious gifts, I, Kāma, appear in their minds again, in the form of craving for heaven or reputation, like a pious soul reborn as a living moving sentient creature.

c5.s10.5

When some people try to destroy me by constant contemplation of Veda and Vedānta, I reappear in their philosophical egos, imperceptibly as the elemental soul is present in a subtle form even in immobile plants.

c5.s10.6

. . . The learned one exerts himself to get rid of me by striving to attain liberation (*mokṣa*). I dance and laugh at him, because he sits right in the middle of his burning desire for freedom.

c5.s10.7

Thus I am one Perennial force, never to be killed by any embodied being, unless he adopts appropriate technique.⁶⁰

c5.s10.8

Śaṅkarācārya initially refused to enter into a debate with Bhāratī, the wife of Maṇḍana Miśra, with a male chauvinistic attitude, which was softened when Bhāratī convinced him that debating with her will not be below his dignity — though she is a woman.⁶¹

Types of Debates, Dialogues and Discussions

c5.s11.1

There can be several types of *kathā*, a generic term for all types of debates, dialogues and discussions in the Sanskrit intellectual discourse. While they have been classified into two types according to their nature — friendly or hostile — there can be other norms for classification. Depending on the subject or theme of discussion, debate or dialogue, *kathā* can be philosophical, legal, social or religious. In respect of the occasion and venue, it can be occasioned, pre-planned or impromptu. It may be held on a public platform, in an institution like royal court, a temple or a monastery. There are occasioned debates — a *kathā* may ensue out of a challenge by a person desirous of entering into a scholastic combat or discussion. It may be arranged in an institutionalized form, held regularly in a selected place, or it can be started by a sudden and unexpected turn of a situation.

c5.s11.2

Sometimes out of strange circumstances, a person is forced to enter into the debate. Carried out spontaneously in an instant reaction the debate in such cases presents a human drama. A person is helplessly thrown into a debate out of sheer compulsion of the situation and is either forced to stand for an issue.

c5.s11.3

One such debate occurred when Draupadī in a most humiliating way was dragged into the court of Duryodhana and was asked to become a slave, she started pleading her case. As per the original version, Kṛṣṇa does not appear to supply the chain of *saries*, neither there is an actual attempt to disrobe her. She is teased and molested. She makes an appeal to the elders in the assembly and raises a question — whether her husband was authorized to make her a bet when after putting himself on stake, he had lost and become a slave himself. Draupadī not only pleads her own case, she is able to generate a public opinion in her favour. This whole unsavoury happening was conceived by the authors of *Mahābhārata* as an impromptu debate. The court of Duryodhana became an assembly for debate; Draupadī was the petitioner (*vādin*). Duryodhana and his accomplices became the respondents. This debate is being further discussed in the next chapter.

c5.s11.4

One more instance of a debate having started unexpectedly was the dialogue between Śaṅkarācārya and a *cāṇḍāla* (scavenger, sweeper). It has been described by Mādhava in his *Śaṅkaradigvijaya*, and in several other works like *Bhagavatpādābhyudaya* and *Bṛhacchaṅkaravijaya*.⁶² Going on the way of Varanasi, Śaṅkarācārya with his entourage is confronted by the scavenger. When asked to move away, he points out that ascetic does not practise what he preaches and there is a contradiction between the Vedāntic idea of spiritual unity and the caste notion of untouchability. The sweeper asked him:

c5.s11.5

Do you want to remove the *annamaya* from the *annamaya*, the consciousness from the consciousness by asking me to move away? Are you forsaking the body or the soul by asking me to move away? Does the Sun reflect in the waters of Ganges or in a pond used by the sweepers differ? What is this confusion of difference between a *vipra* and a *śvapaca* (scavenger) in the vast *sea* of bliss?⁶³

c5.s11.6

Śaṅkarācārya had to concede to his admonitions. G.C. Pande has referred to this incidence. *Manīṣāpañcakam* of Śaṅkarācārya was the result of this encounter. Pande says:

c5.s11.7

The incidence could hardly be a fabrication of later times when such a repudiation of untouchability or caste inequality was unthinkable within orthodoxy.⁶⁴

c5.s11.8

The incidence therefore has a historical basis being “too untraditional to have been fabricated in later times”.⁶⁵

Vāda as a Digvijaya

c5.s12.1

With the growth of religion in the organized forms, the abbots and heads of diverse sects assumed political power and started behaving like kings and masters. Debates came to be conducted on war-footing basis. Veṅkaṭādhvarin in his *Viśvaguṇādarśacampū* (564) uses the metaphor *vādāhava* (debate as a battle). A man engaging himself in a series of scholastic debates at different places was projected as a warrior set out for *digvijaya* — a journey for victory throughout the country. The word has been used in the context of *vāda* perhaps for the first time by Śrīharṣa in his *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya* — a text on refutation of all philosophical systems.⁶⁶ In many of the biographies of Śaṅkarācārya, which were written after twelfth century CE, the series of his conquests in debates are described as his *digvijaya*.

c5.s12.2

Swami Dayananda also began his *digvijaya* — the great journey for intellectual victory, and again in hundreds of Caritakāvyas that were composed after him in Sanskrit as well as in vernaculars, this great journey for the intellectual victory has been termed as *Dayānandadigvijaya*.

c5.s12.3

In the Sanskrit play *Mudrārākṣasa* of Viśākhadatta (around fifth century CE), Rākṣasa, the antagonist, compares his fight with his adversary, the great Cāṇakya, to the fight of a disputant with his rival in a debate:

First 134 of 263 passages. Read on

Linked texts (49)