大般涅槃經集解 9
English (machine translation) 9
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- English
9.1
Explaining the meaning of the cause of long life / Relating the matter of Guhyapada the Vajradhara killing the boy / Setting forth the names of the various karmans / Relating the matter of entering rivers and returning to the sea / Applying the simile of the wild cow / Explaining the meaning of dharmatā / Explaining the matter of experiencing bliss in the heaven of non-conception / Explaining the meaning of the single-essence Three Jewels
9.2
"Longevity," Chapter 2, Part 2
9.3
At that time, the Buddha praised Kāśyapa Bodhisattva: "Excellent, excellent!"
9.4
Sengliang states: Although the explanation above was clear, the meaning and purport were not yet complete, so they must be elucidated. Baoliang states: Below this, he first answers the cause of longevity. It is divided into seven sections: first, consenting to explain; second, admonishing the assembly; third, general explanation; fourth, encouraging external conversion; fifth, the Buddha citing himself as verification; sixth, the essence and characteristics of correct action; seventh, resolving doubts. Zhixiu states: This single chapter answers the two questions on cause and effect, forming two distinct parts. In the former part answering the question on cause, there are three sections: first, praising his ability to ask; second, distinguishing the characteristics of the cause of longevity; third, discussing the doctrine. Mingjun notes: Below this, it answers the question on cause. It is broadly divided into two: first, the direct answer; second, Kāśyapa's inquiry and objections. Within the direct answer, there are five turns: first, from here up to "benefiting sentient beings," he first praises his ability to ask. There are three points: first, comparing him distantly as equal to all Buddhas; second, comparing him closely as equal to the great beings; finally, lauding his vast benefit to conclude the praise. Second, from "I have no power of wisdom" up to "for the sake of profound wisdom," Kāśyapa respectfully responds to the praise's purport. This also has three points: first, citing gnats as an analogy, not daring to compare himself up to all Buddhas; second, citing the treasury minister as an analogy, saying that he himself reverently receives and respects it, perhaps sharing some slight similarity with the bodhisattvas; finally, humbling himself by saying, "What I have asked is limited and inferior, how could it bring vast benefit? It can only benefit myself." Third, from "listen attentively" down to "in turn explain it to others, admonishing them to be sincere," he encourages them to transmit the teaching. Fourth, from "Because I cultivated" onward, he cites the present as verification. Fifth, the direct answer to the question has five levels: the ten stages take great compassion as foremost, and the five precepts take non-killing as primary; therefore, at the inception of the question on life, the words begin with the precept, showing that among the mind-precepts of a bodhisattva none is greater than great compassion. Now, having clarified the cause of longevity, first he raises the simile of utmost loving-kindness to clarify self-cultivation. Second, he encourages the practice of non-killing, conferring the ten wholesome actions and five precepts to manifest external conversion. Third, stooping to enter the three wretched destinies, extracting present suffering, extensively clarifying the function of compassion. Fourth, giving rise to the four great vows, consoling the future, extensively clarifying the function of loving-kindness. Fifth is the conclusion. Saying "in heaven" is simply speaking of the distant from the perspective of the near.
9.5
"Good son! You have not yet attained... [up to] ...is equal and no different from the questions asked by the Omniscient One."
9.6
Sengliang states: Below this is the third section, the division of answering the questions. Sengzong states: This question summarizes the grand scope of the entire sūtra and collects the essential mechanism of the myriad practices; reverently expanding the sagely intent, he therefore repeats his praise of "excellent." When you ask and I answer, the illumination of the principle is identical; when all Buddhas proclaim it, how could it be different from this? Therefore it is said to be equal to all Buddhas. Baoliang states: The reality of Kāśyapa is not easily fathomed; judging by traces, how could one discuss his illumination being equal to the Buddha's? But since the principle he questioned is profound and uniquely stands out like a towering peak, for those of shortsighted view this praise is necessary.
9.7
"Good son! When I sat at the bodhimaṇḍa beneath the bodhi tree... [up to] ...then you are able to benefit immeasurable sentient beings."
9.8
Sengzong states: Not only is he reverently equal to all Buddhas, he is also identical to the great beings of the past. Formerly, at the seven places and eight assemblies when the Avataṃsaka and Vaipulya were preached, at that time the great beings of the ten directions gathered like clouds to debate the doctrine, and they also once asked this question.
9.9
At that time, Kāśyapa Bodhisattva said further to the Buddha... [up to] ...the extremely profound meaning of dharmatā and space."
9.10
Sengzong states: Although the Buddha praised him above, his words exceeded what he deserved; by humbly stepping back as one who has not penetrated, the luster of his virtue becomes all the more prominent. The ocean of wisdom has two aspects: first, it is deep and vast; second, it contains treasures. Dharmatā and space are of two kinds: first, the myriad dharmas originally have no inherent nature; second, nirvāṇa is also called dharmatā; this is beyond the reach of the power of thought.
9.11
"World-Honoured One! Just as the bright jewel in the topknot of a king... [up to] ...so that I may broadly attain deep wisdom."
9.12
Sengzong states: This means receiving the intent of the reply and reverently honoring it, just like that treasury minister.
9.13
At that time, the Buddha said to Kāśyapa Bodhisattva... [up to] ...having listened and received it, you should explain it in turn to others."
9.14
Sengliang states: The Dharma of the Mahāyāna is not protected for one person alone; only then should it flow boundless and circulate. Sengzong states: About to answer the matter inquired about, he must admonish and charge him. The central purport is profound and mysterious, not something to be received with a light mind; although the words are addressed to Kāśyapa, the intention is directed to the assembly present.
9.15
"Good son! Because I cultivated and gathered such karma... [up to] ...I now also broadly preach this meaning for others."
9.16
Sengzong states: What is clarified is not in vain, for he cites myself as verification.
9.17
"Good son! Just as when a prince commits a crime and is locked in prison... [up to] ...great loving-kindness, great compassion, great sympathetic joy, and great equanimity."
9.18
Sengliang comments: This first speaks through a simile and later speaks of the Dharma. Bodhisattvas possess both external practices and internal practices. Benevolence is the cause of external practice; just as the eight rivers return to the sea, such is the fruition of external practice. Sentient beings are the cause of internal practice; nirvāṇa and buddhadhātu are the fruitions of internal practice. Next, it speaks of the Three Jewels as one single body, further clarifying that the two fruitions are permanent (nitya). Regarding the king personally turning his carriage: the prison is an impure place and not somewhere a king travels, yet he goes there out of benevolence. The five destinies are suffering and not places where a bodhisattva dwells, yet also out of benevolence, though difficult to reach, he is able to reach them.
9.19
‘He confers the precept against killing and teaches the cultivation of wholesome dharmas […] according to the end of their lifespans they are reborn in the heavens.’
9.20
Sengliang comments: Benevolence fundamentally rescues from suffering; the precepts are the root of rescuing from suffering and the practice that brings benevolence to fruition. Being reborn in the heavens is the present retribution on the causal stage. Sengzong comments: The ten wholesome actions and the four immeasurables are the essential practices; the four great vows are the essential aspirations. In the ten wholesome actions, briefly indicating non-killing as the cause of long life is simply taking its analogous meaning; the remaining nine are omitted for brevity. Baoliang comments: Another sūtra explains that the four great vows correspond to the four noble truths: for those who have not crossed suffering, speaking the truth of suffering to cause them to cross over; for those not freed from bondage, speaking the truth of origination to cause them to be released; for those who have not attained nirvāṇa, speaking the truth of cessation to cause them to realize it; and for those who are not at peace, speaking the truth of the path to cause them to be at peace. Because the mind is vast, it is called ‘great’; because it will certainly be put into practice, it is called a ‘vow’.
9.21
Then Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said further to the Buddha […] ‘truly conceiving the thought of a son toward them, as toward Rāhula?’
9.22
Sengzong comments: This raises actual events as an objection, asserting that [the treatment] is unequal. Sentiments among people see that in the past wrongdoers were repeatedly punished, which seems to harm benevolence; hence it must be clarified. Mingjun comments: From here below is Kāśyapa’s second objection. The objection has two aspects. Following the previous purport, it was said that practicing benevolence and upholding the precepts are the cause, and obtaining a long lifespan is the fruit. Now, this first [aspect] raises an objection, implying there is no benevolence and that the precept against killing is violated, causing the principle of the cause not to stand; later, the second [aspect] adduces the presently visible nirvāṇa to show there is no fruit of long life. If there is a cause of longevity, the fruit cannot be short; if the fruit is definitely not long, therefore we know there is no cause. He turns both gates back and forth to establish his meaning. Within the former gate there are three turns: first, settling the benevolence of the thought of an only son; second, adducing an event, using the vajra-deity to form the objection; third, adducing the principle, using the analogy of anointing and lacerating. This is the first, settling benevolence: does he also conceive the thought of an only son toward the three kinds of evil people, or not? It has two steps: first Kāśyapa establishes it, and then the Buddha answers.
9.23
Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said further to the Buddha […] ‘equal to the thought of an only son, as toward Rāhula?’
9.24
Sengliang comments: Benevolence is indeed not equal, proven by two matters: first, because sentient beings cannot be treated equally, meaning those who break the precepts; second, because the bodhisattva’s acts of benevolence are not equal, as seen in the boy killed by the wrestler. Regarding ‘following the Buddha’s intent’: if even the Buddha is not equal, how much less the bodhisattva! Sengzong comments: The vajra-deity is indeed a bodhisattva. Since he followed the divine intention, then the two sages joined in killing; thus that it is not equal is clear.
9.25
The Buddha told Kāśyapa: ‘You should not now […] equal to the thought of an only son, as toward Rāhula.’
9.26
Sengliang comments: If laypeople who destroy the Dharma are subjected to painful punishment, how much more so the renunciants? Sengzong comments: The giving and taking of the sages and their benefiting of beings have their proper times, not necessarily waiting for transformation; but the matter Kāśyapa raised was actually an apparition. Mingjun comments: From here below, the Buddha’s reply has five steps: first, brushing away traces, revealing that the boy was an apparition; second, clarifying that royal law and the Buddha’s Dharma are distinct in their particulars, thereby proving non-killing; third, using the small to illustrate the great: if releasing a single ray of light already confers fearlessness, how could there be killing?; fourth, raising three parables to clarify that when practicing the Dharma in later times, the four assemblies are able to punish wrongdoers who destroy the Dharma and obtain immeasurable merit; fifth, concluding both purports together: if one does not punish them, one incurs immeasurable guilt, but one who can punish according to the Dharma is my disciple.
9.27
‘Good son! Just as a king […] because all people who commit evil incur retribution.’
9.28
Sengliang comments: The Buddha proves equality through three matters: first, punishing offenses through karmavācanā without terminating life; second, through illumination with light, where light is the fruit of benevolence and confers fearlessness; third, punishing the community brings merit and does not harm benevolence. Baoliang comments: If people still possess faith, one must not terminate their life. Ways of life are myriad; why must one rigidly insist upon this rule? Monks can naturally establish virtue according to the Dharma; why fear criticism and thereby ruin their practice?
9.29
‘Good son! You should know now that the Tathāgata is […] possessing such immeasurable power.’
9.30
Sengliang comments: Regarding obtaining immeasurable merit, it is first illustrated with events. ‘Wishing to destroy it’: if they do not repent, it will be destroyed; if they can repent, it will cease. That king obtained merit because of two matters: first, pitying the people; second, causing the evil to cultivate the wholesome. A monk who administers the Dharma does so, first, to protect the Dharma, and second, to cause them to cultivate the wholesome. Below, pruning trees and pulling out hairs are used as parables specifically for protecting the Dharma.
9.31
‘Good son! If you wish to see the dharmas not yet seen […] they should immediately be expelled, reprimanded, and exposed.’
9.32
Sengliang comments: This cites evidence through the third matter. It clarifies that protecting the Dharma in the future brings immeasurable merit, in order to make clear that there must be profound benefit.
9.33
‘If a good monk sees someone destroying the Dharma […] he is my disciple and a true śrāvaka.’
9.34
Mingjun comments: This is the fifth step, jointly concluding the gain and the loss.
9.35
Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said further to the Buddha […] ‘If one punishes those who violate the prohibitions, these words are invalidated.’
9.36
Sengzong comments: Previously, taking the boy to be an apparition showed that there is no fault of inequality. Yet wrongdoers are still punished, which creates an obstruction to benevolence; therefore, he cites these two matters of anointing and lacerating to pose the question.
9.37
The Buddha told Kāśyapa: ‘Good son! Just as a king […] such instruction brings immeasurable merit.’
9.38
Sengzong comments: Intending to answer the objection, he first raises a simile. The king represents the Buddha, the ministers represent the bodhisattvas who understand the Dharma, the sons represent the four assemblies, and being handsome and well-formed represents understanding of the principle that is impartial. Baoliang comments: It shows that the Tathāgata entrusts the four classes of disciples to those who propagate the Dharma to instruct and bring them to completion. Even supposing that three classes of disciples do not follow the instruction and do not fully attain the Way, yet there remains one assembly, and one cannot refrain from punishing them out of few desires. The reason they do not incur guilt has two meanings: first, having no malicious mind; second, revealing the operation of benevolence.
9.39
‘Good son! The Tathāgata is also like this […] and is also able to know well the events of past lives.’
9.40
Sengzong comments: Joining the simile, using the ordinary to illustrate the holy. Answering the objection, he reveals that the equality of regarding all as an only son is not erroneous.
9.41
Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said further to the Buddha […] ‘the Tathāgata should not speak in this way.’
9.42
Baoliang comments: Intending to speak of the fruit, he uses the fruit to question the cause: if the present fruit is not long, how could the past cause have been equal? Sengzong comments: Although he takes the fruit to trace the cause, the matter lies in challenging the fruit, which precisely answers the question regarding the fruit of long life. Zhixiu comments: It is still an objection to the cause. If the cause is definitely real, the principle calls forth a permanent fruit, and he should not enter nirvāṇa. Now, verifying the cause by the fruit, the cause is not real. Inferring from this, we know it is still an objection to the cause, not yet an answer regarding the fruit. There are two turns: first, the objection; second, the answer. Within the objection there are three steps: first, directly asserting that it should not be the purport of long life; second, raising a simile; third, joining the simile and concluding the objection. This is the first: intending to raise an objection, he first receives the purport.
9.43
‘Why is that? Just as someone who knows the Dharma is able to speak of various […] this person who knows the Dharma speaks and acts in contradiction.’
9.44
Zhixiu comments: This is the second step, raising a simile.
9.45
‘What the Tathāgata says is also like this […] obtaining this short lifespan that does not fill a hundred years.’
9.46
Zhixiu comments: This is the third step, joining the simile and concluding the objection.
9.47
The Buddha told Kāśyapa: ‘Good son! For what reason now do you […] foremost among all permanent things.’
9.48
Zhixiu comments: This is the second turn; the Buddha simply scolds and answers him, nothing more. From what has been clarified above, there should no longer be such coarse words.
9.49
Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said further to the Buddha: ‘World-Honoured One! How does the Tathāgata attain immeasurable life?’
9.50
Sengzong comments: If speaking of the matter, it was only eighty years. Yet saying it is the very foremost among all permanent dharmas cannot be without purpose; therefore, he asks how it is permanent. Zhixiu comments: From here below answers the second question regarding the fruit of long life. Answering questions is not uniform: sometimes one must restate the question to seek an answer; sometimes one asks directly; sometimes one proceeds from the momentum of the preceding answer to provide an answer. In this answer there are three distinctions: first, properly answering the meaning of long life; second, setting up an objection; third, correcting the three refuges. From here up to ‘lifespan is foremost’ properly answers the question. There are two meanings: first, Kāśyapa asks; second, the Buddha answers.
9.51
The Buddha told Kāśyapa: ‘Good son! Just as the eight great rivers […] and all the small streams enter the great sea;’
9.52
Daosheng comments: The reason they return to the sea is that it reaches the lowest place. Taking the multitude of streams as the water of the sea, the water is also called the sea.
9.53
‘Kāśyapa, so too all the lifespans among humans and in the heavens […] all enter the ocean of the Tathāgata’s lifespan.’
9.54
Daosheng comments: What lifespan does the Tathāgata have? He takes the common people as his lifespan, which is called the ocean of life.
9.55
‘Therefore the Tathāgata’s lifespan is immeasurable.’
9.56
Fayao comments: The source of long life reaches to the principle of non-killing. However, the lifespans of humans and devas also contain a partial degree of non-killing; this then enters the partial cause of the Buddha’s lifespan. Therefore it is said that all lives enter the ocean of the Buddha’s lifespan. Sengzong comments: The ocean swallows and receives the multitude of streams without increase or decrease; on the causal stage, the myriad wholesomenesses concentrate in the ultimate fruit, and because the cause is fulfilled, it is permanent. Furthermore, the Śrīmālādēvī Sūtra says: ‘The tathāgatagarbha is itself the buddhadhātu; on the causal stage it is the garbha, and on the fruitional stage it is the Buddha; it has neither beginning nor end, differing only in being concealed or revealed.’ If sentient beings had no [Buddha-]nature, it could also be cut off in between; because the meaning of their nature does not perish, they will definitely become Buddhas, and reaching Buddhahood, it is then permanent. Just as the multitude of streams, reaching the sea, have nowhere else to go, so when defilements are exhausted and practice is complete, attaining Buddhahood is naturally permanent. Baoliang comments: The ocean is a vessel that receives streams; the Tathāgata’s lifespan is the culmination of all lives. Investigating and discerning its meaning, there are three senses in all: two senses are inferred profoundly, and one sense follows the text. First, clarifying that the lifespans of sentient beings are all the Tathāgata’s lifespan, and within the ocean there is nothing that surpasses the Buddha; second, although the lifespans of sentient beings are immeasurable, they transmigrate without stability, and only upon reaching Buddhahood do they abide; third, clarifying that during the days of the bodhisattva on the stage of practice, he bestows life upon sentient beings; with this as the cause, on the day of obtaining the fruit it cannot be brief. However, the sūtra says that sentient beings’ saṃsāra is like a silkworm spinning a cocoon, which is not taught by the sages. Yet now it says that bestowing life is the cause, which is indeed difficult to understand. Furthermore, it is said that sentient beings can be harmed, but those who practice the Way have no harmful intention, which is called bestowing life; this again is difficult to understand. The sage appears in the world precisely wishing to cause people to sever afflictions and extinguish saṃsāra. If following this meaning, it should be taking life; why then is it called bestowing life? Life is called being born, and it is born into true life, and true life is the dharmatākāya. Therefore, the sage causes sentient beings to cultivate the Way to reveal true, permanent life. The sage’s intention lies here; therefore, it is bestowing life.
9.57
‘Furthermore, Kāśyapa! Just as Lake Anavatapta […] so too does the Tathāgata produce all lifespans.’
9.58
Daosheng comments: Taking the lifespan of the common people as his lifespan, when the spiritual resonance occurs [the life] must issue forth. Its issuing forth is necessarily inexhaustible, like ponds and lakes. Fayao says: This explains that the lifespans of humans and gods are all obtained through the Buddha's conversion; hence it is said that all lives issue forth from the Tathāgata's lifespan. Sengzong says: The previous simile illustrated entering; this simile illustrates issuing forth. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra states: 'All gods, humans, great kṣatriya families, and even householders, all are converted by bodhisattvas.' This explains that at the time of the causal stage, [the bodhisattva] bestows all lives, and the merit of conversion must return to the master of conversion; therefore, upon reaching Buddhahood, it is eternal.
9.59
"Kāśyapa! Just as among all permanent phenomena [… is the foremost of all permanent things.]"
9.60
Zhixiu comments: Although the ocean simile above illustrated that the lifespan which conditioned others during the causal stage reaches its culmination in the fruit, it did not yet reveal that it is ultimately inexhaustible; therefore, this simile is used to further clarify that it is inexhaustible like space.
9.61
"Kāśyapa! Just as among all medicines ghee is foremost […] is foremost in lifespan among all living beings."
9.62
Zhixiu comments: This praises the purport of permanence. Understanding arises from the cognitive object and is not without the efficacy of removing delusions; therefore it is compared to ghee.
9.63
Bodhisattva Kāśyapa again said to the Buddha: ["… constantly proclaim the wondrous Dharma like pouring heavy rain."]
9.64
Sengzong comments: Taking advantage of the opportunity, he presents a request. Above it was only explained that the wondrous fruit is eternal, but it was not yet explained that the trace must necessarily be extinguished. Now, prompted by Kāśyapa's request, he explains that the sixteen-foot [manifested body] is not the real; by comparing the lower with the higher, the origin and the traces can be understood. Baoliang says: Having finished explaining the principle, he adduces four matters to verify it: first, using the near to illustrate the far; second, explaining that the name of permanence originally resides in the Buddha; third, citing the dharmatā as proof; fourth, explaining that the single essence of the Three Jewels is the single ultimate, as proof. This is the first. Zhixiu says: Answering the question to reveal permanence was already clarified above; below this, secondly, he further raises three conditions as proof. This is the first: adducing the latent objection. Since it is called eternal, it ought to abide permanently; since it does not abide, it is impermanent.
9.65
"Kāśyapa! You should not now [harbor such an understanding] toward the Tathāgata […] therefore he manifests renouncing it and entering nirvāṇa."
9.66
Baoliang comments: Heterodox practitioners with the five supernormal knowledges can still extend or shorten [their lifespan] at will, how much more so the Tathāgata, who, fully possessing sovereignty, merely manifests as being like a poisonous tree.
9.67
"Kāśyapa! You should know that the Buddha is an eternal phenomenon […] having cultivated and gathered it, expound it extensively for others."
9.68
Zhixiu comments: In this section there are two turns: first the objection, second the answer. In the answer there are two stages: first the direct comparative response, then this concluding exhortation.
9.69
At that time Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: ["… because the subtle atoms and pradhāna also do not manifest."]
9.70
Sengliang comments: Intending to explain the internal practice of cause and fruit, he first questions the permanence of the fruit. If the fruit does not constantly manifest, how can it be distinguished from worldly phenomena? 'Nature' refers to the heterodox reckoning that the unmanifest primal [matter, pradhāna] is the nature of the world. Fayao says: Previously it was explained that the Tathāgata's principle of permanence is luminous, but judging from his presently manifesting entry into nirvāṇa, it appears illusory, which would be the same as what the world teaches. If there is no way to discern the difference, those who are deluded will be numerous. Therefore he raises this question so that a clear distinction may be made. Sengzong says: In answering regarding the fruit, there are four chapters. First, lodging in the contradiction between words and deeds, he reveals that the origin is eternal. Although known to be eternal, heterodox paths also claim to have permanence. Second, he explains that the designations of permanence and self originally resided with the Buddha and were stolen by heterodox paths; now he explains their genuineness and falsity: the genuine is the nirvāṇa of the Buddhadharma, whose essence is eternal, and the eternal is dharmatā. But the nirvāṇa of the past was also called dharmatā; since the two teachings are identical [in name], the matter requires clarification; therefore, third, he distinguishes that the past and present names both clarify dharmatā, yet what they clarify is not the same: past [teachings] clarified dharmatā merely through bare extinction, whereas the present clarifies dharmatā as eternal and wondrously existent. The ultimate fruit's essence is complete, fully possessing the virtues of the Three Refuges; therefore, fourth, he encourages practitioners to take refuge. What difference is there in existence? One truly knows the origin should be so, yet with respect to actual affairs it appears as extinction. Just as heterodox paths also have empty words, both lack experiential verification in actual affairs. Followers who cling to words have no way to gain faith; we pray that the Buddha will explain it, so that the true and the false may be determined. Zhixiu says: Below this is the second point, raising an analogy to repeat the challenge: if they are alike in not manifesting, then both should be impermanent.
9.71
The Buddha told Kāśyapa: "It is like, for example, an elder,"
9.72
Sengliang comments: Because the fruit does not constantly manifest and the traces cannot be distinguished, he relies on a parable to explain it. In this parable there are four parts of meaning: first, it illustrates when the Buddha was in the world, one read, recited, obtained the purport, and cultivated to become a Buddha. Second, it illustrates when the Buddha had just entered extinction, one obtained the Buddha's bequeathed teachings, did not understand the deep meaning, yet still attained [rebirth among] humans and gods. Third, it illustrates using one's own wisdom without compassion, wishing to seek self-deliverance, failing to understand the ultimate, and not accomplishing the fruit of Buddhahood. Fourth, the mind seeking permanence ultimately produces wrong views; if one's views are many, one loses humans and gods, and if few, one does not lose them. 'The elder' illustrates the Buddha. Baoliang's explanation is the same as this, except he combines the fourth into the third; Sengzong opens the fourth parable into a fifth.
9.73
"who had many cows,"
9.74
Sengliang comments: This is the treasury of sūtras. Cows produce the five flavors; the sūtras produce the five fruits.
9.75
"all belonging to a single herd,"
9.76
Sengliang comments: They return to the single liberation. Sengzong says: Although across the twelve divisions the flavor of the principle differs, they are spoken by the same Buddha.
9.77
"entrusted to a herdsman,"
9.78
Sengliang comments: The bodhisattvas who propagate [the teachings].
9.79
"instructed to follow water and pasture,"
9.80
Sengliang comments: Disciples who receive instruction.
9.81
"solely for the sake of ghee, not seeking milk or curds."
9.82
Sengliang comments: This refers to the so-called 'all Buddhas appear in the world for the sake of the one great cause.' Fayao says: Humans and gods are milk and curds; the two vehicles are fresh butter; bodhisattvas are clarified butter; only the Buddha is ghee.
9.83
"That cowherd, having milked them, ate it himself."
9.84
Sengliang comments: Reading, reciting, and obtaining the purport.
9.85
"The elder died,"
9.86
Sengliang comments: The Buddha entered nirvāṇa. Below this is the second parable.
9.87
"and all the cows were plundered by a band of thieves."
9.88
Sengliang comments: Ordinary people do not derive their understanding from the purport of the sūtras, which is compared to plundering. Fayao says: Heterodox paths steal the remnant sūtras and teachings, which is called plundering. Baoliang says: Although they receive and uphold them, their mind grasping at signs is strong, with many corruptions and falsifications, failing to attain the true principle.
9.89
"When the thieves got the cows, they had no women,"
9.90
Daosheng comments: Making ghee was originally something women were capable of; if one received it from them, it would necessarily be accomplished. Now it says 'they had none', illustrating that there are no virtuous friends among the near worthy and noble ones who propagate it, which is why there is no accomplishment.
9.91
"so they milked them themselves and, having obtained it, ate it."
9.92
Daosheng comments: Of ordinary people's misguided graspings, there are altogether three; this is the first of them. Although without a master, relying on the goodness of reading and reciting, they may receive [rebirth among] humans and gods and reckon it as bliss: this is the first misguided grasping. Sengliang comments: Being near to the Holy One in time, they still obtain the provisions of humans and gods. Fayao says: Although lacking the essential path of release, they also obtain a small measure of goodness, which is compared to milking and taking it. Baoliang says: Although lacking the upāya of wisdom, it is not that they do not receive and uphold it with a mind grasping at signs.
9.93
"At that time the band of thieves said to one another: [… 'It is called the foremost, supreme flavor in the world.']"
9.94
Sengliang comments: The third parable. Knowing the general drift of the sūtra, they gradually advance by means of humans and gods, ultimately aiming to become Buddhas. 'By what means can it be obtained?' means knowing themselves to lack understanding and upāya. Sengzong says: Although they obtain the name of permanence, they do not understand the reality of proceeding toward permanence.
9.95
"We have no vessel,"
9.96
Sengliang comments: A bodhisattva takes great compassion as the vessel, forgetting the self to save beings; they examine themselves and find they lack this method. Fayao says: They do not know the method of seeking nirvāṇa. Tanji says: Compassion and precepts are the vessel for the myriad practices; they know themselves to lack them. Sengzong says: It means this body is not a vessel for receiving the Way.
9.97
"and even if we obtain milk, there is nowhere to put it."
9.98
Sengliang comments: It means that even if they obtain humans and gods, this is not the cause for seeking Buddhahood. Sengzong says: Since it says 'even if', there is no principle of obtaining it. Not only is the undefiled [state] of the two vehicles impossible, but even if they were to arrange the goodness of the stages of practice, that too could not be arranged. Zhixiu says: Not only is there nowhere to place the ultimate fruit of nirvāṇa, but even if they obtain slight goodness like milk, they also lack the vessel of right faith as its basis.
9.99
"They further said to each other: 'There is only a leather bag in which it can be kept.'"
9.100
Sengliang comments: Wishing to emulate śrāvakas in receiving a body, like a leather bag receiving water, it cannot hold ghee. Fayao says: Although they know the upāya of nirvāṇa and have the goodness of reading and reciting, it is not correct understanding, and they only attain humans and gods.
9.101
"Although they had a container, they did not know how to churn it;"
9.102
Sengliang comments: Churning with a stick illustrates the wisdom of reflection; rocking illustrates the wisdom of cultivation. Although seeking self-deliverance, they do not give rise to the two wisdoms. Sengzong says: This is precisely the explanation of lacking upāya. The preceding lines were not as clear as this: they merely cling to humans and gods, not knowing how to investigate and seek what is superior to this. Baoliang says: Although wishing to practice the Small Vehicle, they do not know how to engage in the contemplation of nominal designations and the emptiness of phenomena.
9.103
"buttermilk was hard to obtain, let alone fresh butter."
9.104
Daosheng comments: The pure and refined part becomes butter; the remaining liquid is buttermilk. When the two vehicles accomplish the Way, their bodies are what remain. If one does not understand permanence, one deviates far from this; this is the second misguided grasping. Sengliang comments: Advancing toward the fruit is compared to buttermilk; attaining the fruit is compared to butter. Lacking the two wisdoms, both attaining and advancing fail to be accomplished. Fayao says: Since they do not know the churning of understanding and explaining, worldly goodness is still difficult to obtain, how much more so the fruits of the two vehicles! Tanji says: The seven preparatory upāyas among those advancing toward the śrāvaka [fruits] are compared to buttermilk. Sengzong says: From the first stage to the seventh stage is like fresh butter; from the eighth stage to the tenth stage is like clarified butter; buttermilk is not within the limit of the five flavors. Now it clarifies that since they do not know how to churn and seek superior, transcendent goodness, even the defiled goodness of ordinary people prior to the stages is unobtainable, how much less could the fresh butter of the true flavor of the higher stages be obtained? Baoliang says: The five faculties headed by faith are also not established.
9.105
"At that time, for the sake of ghee, the thieves added water to it."
9.106
Sengliang comments: This is the fourth parable. Seeking permanence without ceasing, they ultimately give rise to wrong views. Fayao says: Although they know that this sūtra can attain the eternal fruit, they are unable to know where permanence resides, and further preach various eternal phenomena, which is called 'adding water to it.' Sengzong says: The fourth parable. Ghee as a substance is exceedingly clear; wishing to obtain it quickly, they add water to make it clear. In this case, the clear appearance resembles it, but the flavor differs. Although they know that nirvāṇa is a phenomenon of permanence and bliss, wishing to obtain it quickly, they reckon that this body is itself permanent and blissful: the name is identical, but the reality is different. This is compared to adding water, which spoils the blood-mixed milk; if one reckons the body to be the self, one harms the goodness of humans and gods. Baoliang says: Below this is the third parable: they all give rise to various wrong views.
9.107
"Because there was too much water, the milk, curds, and ghee were all completely lost."
9.108
Daosheng comments: Furthermore, they think that from the sūtra they obtain superior understanding of permanence, but fail to recognize it, further preaching various teachings of wrong permanence. When wrong permanence increases, it ruins the original flavor of permanence, and the five periods are all lost: this is the third misguided grasping. Sengliang comments: Those whose wrong views are many can sever their kuśalamūla, losing both humans and gods; those whose views are few still believe in cause and effect. Fayao says: Adding the water of inverted permanence ruins the true permanence; therefore the five flavors are lost. Sengzong says: In the fifth parable, they ultimately sever their kuśalamūla, and even cause and effect in human and divine realms are abruptly lost.
9.109
"Ordinary people are also like this: although they have wholesome dharmas, they are all remnants of the Tathāgata's true Dharma."
9.110
Daosheng comments: This applies the parable. The Buddha's sūtras lead people to attain morality, concentration, and wisdom; these three dharmas are fundamentally the essential path to attaining buddhahood. Because they grasp worldly pleasures, they lose the root, making it a mere leftover; grasping worldly pleasures is abandoning it.
9.111
"Why is this? After the Tathāgata, the World-Honoured One, enters nirvāṇa, [… up to …] like those thieves who plundered the herd of cows."
9.112
Daosheng comments: Originally they should not have taken it; taking it for worldly pleasure is called stealing. Sengliang comments: This applies the second parable.
9.113
"Although all ordinary people further obtain this morality, concentration, and wisdom, without upāya they cannot attain vimokṣa."
9.114
Daosheng comments: Because they do not understand that morality, concentration, and wisdom are the causal principle of permanently abiding vimokṣa, they cannot expound it; this matches the second perversity.
9.115
"For this reason, they cannot attain [… up to …] because they do not know upāya, they lose the sarpirmaṇḍa."
9.116
Sengliang comments: This applies the third and fourth parables of lacking upāya. Baoliang comments: From 'Ordinary people are also like this' down to here applies the second parable.
9.117
"Furthermore, just as the band of thieves, for the sake of sarpirmaṇḍa, [… up to …] just like that band of thieves who failed to obtain sarpirmaṇḍa."
9.118
Sengliang comments: This separately applies the third parable above. The 'adding much water' spoken of above had not yet been applied. Why is this? Heterodox views have light and heavy degrees: the heavy expound that there are no causes and effects, losing both human and heavenly realms; the light mistakenly conceptualize nirvāṇa, yet may still attain the human or heavenly realms. Sengzong comments: This adduces the fourth parable while first applying the fifth parable. Baoliang comments: This applies the third parable, omitting only the application of the first.
9.119
"These ordinary people have a little pure conduct [… up to …] like the milk to which those thieves added water."
9.120
Daosheng comments: Although they further add permanence, those who have not yet severed their kuśalamūla are still born in the desire realm heavens through minor goodness; this matches the three perversities.
9.121
"Yet these ordinary people truly do not know the cause [… up to …] although they expound it, they truly do not know it."
9.122
Daosheng comments: If they do not even know that worldly goodness leads to birth in heaven, how could they know to take refuge in the Three Jewels? Sengliang comments: These are the ones who add only a little water. As for 'not knowing that it is caused by practicing pure conduct': if they cannot even know the immediate causes of the human and heavenly realms, how could they know the permanent causes that transcend the world? Sengzong comments: 'Cultivating a little pure conduct and experiencing a little pleasure' applies to milking and consuming it themselves, like that band of thieves. 'Milk with added water' again raises the fourth parable. 'Yet these ordinary people truly cannot know it. That it is caused by a little pure conduct' is precisely the adding of water; 'cause' means the reason. Since they conceptualize the body as permanent, how could they comprehend the reason for true permanence? Baoliang comments: Below this explains the teaching. Formerly it was proclaimed that non-Buddhists are born in heaven, which was thought to take heterodox views as the cause. Now it is explained that this is not caused by heterodox views, but because in the past they made offerings to their parents and had the goodness of filial respect as the cause. Since non-Buddhists do not know this principle, how could they know the path to escape saṃsāra? They perversely conceptualize inversions to form great heterodoxy.
9.123
"Therefore, after the Tathāgata appears in the world, [… up to …] the band of thieves retreats and scatters, and the cows suffer no loss of life."
9.124
Daosheng comments: A subsequent Buddha appears in the world and expounds true permanence. Sengliang comments: This illustrates the birth of a subsequent Buddha. Though ordinary people seek perversely, the principle fundamentally abides permanently; the Buddhas of the three periods share the one same path. Sengzong comments: The five parables above explain that non-Buddhists stole the name of permanence without having the reality of permanence. Now it explains that the name of permanence from beginning to end returns to the Buddha. The previous application of the parables was already completed; this meaning arises here.
9.125
"At that time the wheel-turning king immediately took the cows [… up to …] all sentient beings had no affliction or suffering."
9.126
Sengzong comments: This explains that Śākyamuni appeared, and in turn entrusted the permanent Dharma to the bodhisattvas.
9.127
"When the Dharma wheel-turning king appears in the world, [… up to …] skillfully expounds worldly dharmas and supramundane dharmas."
9.128
Daosheng comments: He skillfully expounds worldly goodness, the reason one attains the meaning of permanence; how much more so supramundane goodness! Since ordinary people had discarded it, the Buddha was able to uphold and restore it.
9.129
"For the sake of sentient beings, he causes the bodhisattvas to expound them accordingly."
9.130
Daosheng comments: By entrusting it to the bodhisattvas, he enables them to attain understanding of permanence, his path extending to all under heaven.
9.131
"After the bodhisattva-mahāsattvas have obtained the sarpirmaṇḍa, [… up to …] namely, the Tathāgata's permanence, bliss, self, and purity."
9.132
Sengzong comments: The application has two senses: first, it matches the scattering of the thieves; second, it matches the entrustment to the bodhisattvas.
9.133
"For this reason, good son, [… up to …] it is certainly the Tathāgata, and no other dharma."
9.134
Daosheng comments: Speaking from what has preceded, whether the dharma of permanence is empty or real clearly has its place. Zhixiu comments: This concludes the answer to the objection.
9.135
"Kāśyapa! You should know the Tathāgata's body in this way: [… up to …] follow where I walk and reach where I have reached."
9.136
Zhixiu comments: This is an exhortation to uphold it.
9.137
"Good son! If there are those who cultivate these two words, [… up to …] it is the dharmatā of all Buddhas."
9.138
Daosheng comments: 'Dharma' has the meaning of having no further non-dharma. 'Nature' (dharmatā) has the meaning of ultimate truth without change. Since it is identical with truth and free of change, how could there be extinction? When it is now said that extinction is dharmatā, there is simply nothing that is extinguished. Sengliang comments: Bodhisattvas penetrate dharmatā, attaining buddhahood and nirvāṇa. Dharmatā has no extinction, and nirvāṇa is permanently abiding; this speaks of the meaning regarding the resultant state of internal practice. Ordinary people do not understand emptiness, so they do not attain nirvāṇa; nirvāṇa is realized through emptiness. Baoliang comments: Below this is the third point: verifying the ground of the Buddha's fruition. Because he takes dharmatā as his lifespan, it is long-lasting. Some interpret this characteristic of extinction as the extinction of annihilation. This is said to be incorrect. Why is that? The closing sentence below says: 'it is the dharmatā of all Buddhas'—how could this be the words of annihilation? Now it is explained: if one can take these two words as quiescent cessation, the Buddha for this person truly enters the letter-i nirvāṇa; one should say 'why? It is dharmatā.'
9.139
Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: "World-Honoured One! [… up to …] How should I now understand this meaning?"
9.140
Daosheng comments: It was said just before that extinction is dharmatā, which seems as though the sixteen-foot body still persists. If the sixteen-foot body were real, it would emerge from within non-dharma. Dharmatā has no non-dharma, so how could there be the sixteen-foot body? The body and dharmatā cannot stand side by side, yet that there is a body is not yet understood. Sengliang comments: He raises an objection by grasping at upāya. That which is ultimately true and without change is called dharmatā; one must abandon body and intellect, and only then is it so. Now if the body is not extinguished, and it is again said to be nature, the principles of frost and flame cannot coexist; how can this meaning be understood? Fayao comments: Earlier it was said that nirvāṇa is the Buddha's dharmatā, which seems to imply that utter extinction in nirvāṇa is dharmatā; now it aims to clarify that dharmatā is the permanently abiding essence of the dharmakāya. Dharmatā is precisely the dharmakāya. If complete extinction were taken as dharmatā, it would be nonexistence; how could there be a dharmakāya? If there is a dharmakāya, it is not complete extinction; how could there be dharmatā? The two things cannot stand together. Sengzong comments: This is the second passage. What the present teaching clarifies as dharmatā means: the perfect fruition has nothing wrong, hence it is called 'dharma'; its essence cannot be altered, hence it is called 'nature'. The name is the same as in the past, but the matter must be analyzed.
9.141
The Buddha told Kāśyapa: "Good son! You should not now [… up to …] Dharmatā has no extinction."
9.142
Daosheng comments: Dharmatā is completely luminous, and its principle truly abides permanently; as for responding to capacities, how could it cease for a moment? Sengliang comments: Inferring the root to verify the branch, conditioned things perversely arise and cease. Dharmatā is fundamentally nonexistent, so it has no extinction; the Tathāgata is also fundamentally nonexistent, so how could he have extinction?
9.143
"Good son! For example, in the heaven of thoughtlessness [… up to …] it is not what is known by śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas."
9.144
Sengliang comments: The physical and mental retributions of ordinary people must simply have subtle thoughts. Because the two vehicles do not know them, it is merely called the heaven of thoughtlessness. If an immediate matter with outflows is not your domain, how much less so the outflow-free? Sengzong comments: According to what this sūtra clarifies, even the four formless realms all have form. Now the heaven of thoughtlessness is the highest of the four ordinary heavens among the fourth dhyāna; below the anāgāmin heaven, there is this ground. Although they have a physical form, because their minds are subtle and they have no thoughts of form, only the Buddha knows this, and no others can comprehend it.
9.145
"Good son! One should not say that the Tathāgata's body [… up to …] is not reached by śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas."
9.146
Sengzong comments: How much less could the Tathāgata's wondrous culmination be known? Formerly, isolated extinction was pointed to as dharmatā; that was provisional, not real.
9.147
"Good son! You should not now deliberate [… up to …] the various upāyas are inconceivable."
9.148
Zhixiu comments: This is an admonition and exhortation.
9.149
"Furthermore, good son! You should cultivate and collect [… up to …] one who cultivates the perception of permanence has a refuge."
9.150
Sengliang comments: The Buddha truly does not perish. If after his nirvāṇa one does not hear this sūtra, forms the conception of real extinction, and renounces home to receive the precepts relying on separate substances for the Three Jewels, one does not accomplish the pure, complete three refuges. If one hears the sūtra and does not believe, although one renounces home, one cannot achieve the fruition. Sengzong comments: This is the fourth passage. Just above, it was clarified that if dharmatā is not isolated extinction, then there is wondrous existence to take refuge in. If one can settle the mind in non-nonexistence, one recognizes the true fruition; therefore, the three refuges are raised to direct intention toward a goal. Baoliang comments: There is only one ultimate stage, hence it is permanent. Clarifying that these three dharmas are one essence and not three is called having 'no different characteristics'. Because the essence is toweringly steadfast, it is said to have 'no impermanent characteristics'. Because it is not shifted by the three marks, it has 'no changing characteristics'. The 'Three Jewels of one essence' precisely analyzes the three meanings of the one Buddha-essence. The first name corresponds to the essence of the dharma, while the myriad concepts are all nominal meanings; there is no separate essence named awareness, only the meanings differ. Therefore, the Buddha jewel corresponds to the essence, while the rest—Dharma and Saṅgha—pertain to nominal meanings. Formerly it was said that the three essences of the Three Jewels were each separate; now the past Dharma and Saṅgha are drawn onto the Buddha, hence it is called the Three Jewels of one Buddha-essence. With the meaning of awareness it is the Buddha jewel; because the essence has no non-dharma and is replete with all virtues, it is called the Dharma jewel; because the essence does not obstruct beings and is necessarily in harmony with principle, it is named the Saṅgha jewel. If one cultivates differently with regard to these three dharmas, you should know that this person does not achieve a pure refuge. Since they consider the Buddha jewel not to be ultimate, how could they attain complete precepts? It does not mean the number is reduced, but that the precepts are not of the highest grade. If one relies upon the permanently abiding three refuges, one attains complete precepts. Practice arises from the ground of faith; now that faith is not yet complete, how could the precepts attained be complete? The Buddha formerly said of himself: 'I acted as the two vehicles.' Now, if one relies on differentiated Three Jewels, one cannot even attain the near fruition of my acting as a śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha, let alone enter the rank of the true outflow-free noble ones without relying on the permanently abiding three refuges! Thus we know that those who grasp literal teachings to explain sūtras are bound to err. Zhixiu comments: This is the third major idea in the answer to the question below. Because the past clarification of the Three Jewels was incomplete in meaning, the mind taking refuge was not correct. Now, analyzing dharmatā, the essence is fully equipped with the Three Jewels and endures permanently without extinction. Thus the mind taking refuge must be altered; hence this chapter reveals the correct refuge. There are three rounds: first, the Buddha himself clarifies the principle to exhort beings to take refuge; second, Kāśyapa raises an objection and the Buddha replies; third, Kāśyapa expresses the purport and the Buddha praises and confirms it. The Three Jewels have no separate essence, hence it is said they are 'not different'; because they do not fluctuate, they are 'not impermanent'; because there is no further changing ignorance into wisdom, they are 'not mutable'.
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Linked texts (1)
- 大般涅槃經集解 — Classical Chinese