大般涅槃經義記 3

English (machine translation) 3

Language: English

3.1

Expounded by the śramaṇa Shi Huiyuan of Jingying Monastery under the Sui

From here below, third, distinguishing the characteristics of liberation. Kāśyapa first requests: "We only pray that you will explain it again"; in contrast to the preceding discernment of the essence, it is described as "again". Below, the Buddha first praises, and later analyzes and explains it according to the flow of meaning. Within this there are ninety-four clauses, which, when finely subdivided, comprise one hundred and nine clauses: in the twenty-second, "free from affliction", there are seven distinct clauses; in the twenty-third, the meaning of "unmoving", there are four distinct clauses; in the twenty-fifth, the meaning of "rare", there are two clauses; in the twenty-sixth, the meaning of "vacuous and quiescent", there are also two clauses; in the thirtieth, the meaning of "profound", there are also two clauses; in the fifty-first, the meaning of "equal", there are also two clauses; in the sixty-seventh, "without narrowness", there are three clauses; the rest each constitute one; therefore, when differentiated, there are one hundred and nine clauses.

3.3

Clause by clause there should equally be five [elements]: 1. listing the name, 2. explaining, 3. concluding, 4. "is none other than the Tathāgata", 5. for those difficult to understand, further differentiation. However, in the present text the number is variable: some have the beginning without the end; some have the end without the beginning; some have the middle without beginning or end. In the explanations, some are purely doctrinal expositions, while some combine metaphors. Metaphors have direct and inverse forms: for direct metaphors, liberation is also like this; for inverse metaphors, liberation is not like this. In the correspondence between doctrine and metaphor, precedence is not fixed: some have doctrine first, next metaphor, and conclude later; some have metaphor first, next doctrine, and metaphor later; some have doctrine first, metaphor later, and then stop; the phrasing of the text is not fixed.

3.4

Now in the first clause, it first lists its name: called "separated from bonds". Next it explains its characteristics: two metaphors and two correspondences, omitting a concluding passage. Next, "is none other than the Tathāgata": to set apart from the liberation of the two vehicles mentioned previously, it is therefore "none other than the Tathāgata", as in the text below it is also none other than nirvāṇa, space, buddha-nature, definitive bodhi, and all buddha-dharmas; taking that to analogize the rest, the rest are all likewise so, and cannot be tediously elaborated, so the preceding clauses solely state "is none other than the Tathāgata". From "Like spring" below reveals it once again, first with metaphor and later with correspondence; the rest can be known by analogy; it is called "severing all conditioned dharmas".

3.5

"Giving rise to all uncontaminated wholesome dharmas" is the eighty-ninth, clarifying departure from all views. It first lists its name: "severing conditioned dharmas" clarifies departure from wrong views; "giving rise to uncontaminated dharmas" clarifies being endowed with right views. Next it explains its characteristics: first explaining the severing of taints: "cutting off and blocking all paths" generally clarifies the severing of taints; severing all wrong views possessed by non-Buddhists is called severing all paths. Below it reveals them specifically: "if self" is the view of existence; "no-self" is the view of emptiness; "neither self nor no-self" is the view of neither existence nor non-existence. This explanation resembles the truth, but because their fixed attachment does not accord with the principle of dharmas, they must be severed. "Only severing grasping and attachment, not severing the view of self" explains the preceding giving rise to uncontaminated wholesome dharmas. What is termed "buddha-nature" reveals what is not severed. This phrasing is deficient; if complete, it should say "knowing and understanding buddha-nature". "The nature is none other than true liberation" concludes it in summary.

3.6

Below, "is none other than the Tathāgata, called not empty-empty" is the ninetieth, clarifying that it is distinct from the liberation attained by non-Buddhists. It first lists its name: the liberation of non-Buddhists is illusory and without reality, named "empty-empty"; the true is not like that, named "not empty-empty". Next it explains its characteristics: first explaining empty-empty: saying "empty-empty means having nothing at all" explains its meaning of emptiness; "it is none other than the liberation of the non-Buddhist Nirgrantha" criticizes in terms of the person; "yet this Nirgrantha in reality has no liberation" explains emptiness in terms of the person; "the true is not like this" clarifies that it has a distinct emptiness. The conclusion can be known.

3.7

"Named the fruit that is not empty" is the ninety-first [section], explaining the transcendence of existence and non-existence; its name is listed first. The name is abbreviated; fully stated, it should say "named the non-empty empty," but to distinguish it from the previous approach, it simply says "not empty." Next, its characteristics are explained. In this explanation, it first illustrates the Dharma by means of a metaphor; from "when that vessel meets with conditions, it breaks" onward, it distinguishes the Dharma from the metaphor. The former contains three parts: First, positing the metaphor to illustrate the Dharma. "Vessels for water, wine, and curds" adduces the metaphorical entities, and below this, the metaphorical characteristics are distinguished. Therein, it first explains emptiness and non-emptiness in terms of the vessels for water, wine, and so forth: "although devoid of water" and so forth expresses the meaning of emptiness; "it is still entitled a vessel for water and so forth" expresses the meaning of non-emptiness. Because the entity of the vessel exists, it is called not empty, not meaning that having remnants of water, wine, and so forth is called not empty. This is similar in meaning to the passage above explaining that although the lamp is extinguished, the lampstand still remains. From "such a vessel" onward, it explains that emptiness and non-emptiness cannot be one-sidedly determined. From "if one says it is empty" onward, it refutes the others' understanding of emptiness. If one says it is definitely empty, then there could not be the visible form, fragrance, flavor, and tangibility of the vessel's entity, thus refuting its definitive emptiness. "If one says it is not empty, yet it lacks water and so forth" refutes definitive non-emptiness. Second, applying the metaphor to illustrate the Dharma: "Liberation is also like this" corresponds to the entity of the vessel above. Below, it corresponds to the metaphorical characteristics: "It cannot be said to be form or non-form" corresponds to the earlier statement that although it lacks water, wine, and so forth, it is still entitled a vessel for water, wine, and so forth. "It cannot be said to be empty or non-empty" corresponds to the earlier statement that it cannot be said to be empty or non-empty. From "if one says it is empty" onward corresponds to the earlier statement that if it were empty, there could not be visible form, fragrance, flavor, and tangibility, and if one says it is not empty, it yet lacks water and so forth. From "therefore" onward is the conclusion. Third, broadly distinguishing the Dharma and metaphor in mutual correspondence. Therein, it first explains emptiness in terms of the Dharma: "Emptiness means being devoid of the twenty-five states of existence" explains the absence of the fruit of suffering; "and all afflictions" explains the absence of the cause of delusion; "free from all suffering and all marks" further explains the absence of the fruit, for because there is no fruit of the twenty-five states of existence, one is far removed from the multitude of sufferings and also free from the marks of impermanence, non-self, and so forth, hence it is spoken of as being free from all suffering and all marks. The statement "free from all conditioned formations" explains the absence of the cause of karma, for wholesome and unwholesome karma are called conditioned formations. The initial word "free" (無) runs through all the phrases. "Just as a vessel lacks curds" adduces the metaphor to match this. Next, it explains non-emptiness in terms of the Dharma: "Meaning real wholesome form, permanence, bliss, self, and purity"; the faculties and major and minor marks are called wholesome form. From "just as the vessel" onward adduces the metaphor to match this. "Therefore liberation is like that vessel" concludes the correspondence of Dharma to metaphor. Up to here, liberation has been distinguished by relying on the metaphor. People might think liberation is entirely identical to that metaphor, so below the difference is distinguished: "When that vessel meets with conditions, it is broken and destroyed" explains how the metaphor differs from the Dharma; "liberation is not like this" distinguishes how the Dharma differs from the metaphor. The conclusion can be known.

3.8

"Named freedom from craving" is the ninety-second [section], explaining freedom from craving and doubt; because the name is abbreviated, it only says "freedom from craving." First, the name is listed; next, its characteristics are explained. First, an opposing metaphor is established; below, the difference is explained: Having attained great bodhi, there is nothing further to seek, which is why there is freedom from craving; regarding the fruit, one has decisive understanding, which is why there is no doubt. Below, the conclusion that "this is the Buddha" reiterates and clarifies this, as can be known.

3.9

"Severing all craving for existence" is the ninety-third [section], explaining the profound departure from the causes and fruits of birth and death. First, its name is listed: "Severing existence" explains the departure from the fruit of birth and death; "severing craving" explains the departure from the cause of birth and death. Next, its characteristics are explained, with six distinct phrases. The first two show it briefly: "Severing all marks" reveals the earlier severing of existence, meaning severing all marks such as impermanence and suffering; "severing all bondages" reveals the earlier severing of craving. The subsequent four show it broadly: "severing all afflictions" explains severing the cause of delusion; "all birth and death" explains severing the fruit of delusion; "all causes and conditions" explains severing the cause of karma; "all retributions" explains severing the fruit of karma. The initial word "severing" (斷) runs through all the phrases. The concluding phrasing is omitted. Below, it is identified with the Tathāgata and identified with nirvāṇa.

3.10

From "all beings" onward is the ninety-fourth [section], explaining freedom from fear and the attainment of peace and bliss. Within this approach, it first explains, next concludes, and then identifies it with the Buddha and so forth. What is difficult to understand is analyzed again below. In the first part, the Dharma comes first, though the text is concise and incomplete. Fully stated, it should say that because all sentient beings fear birth and death, they receive the three refuges, and because of the three refuges, they attain the experience of peace and bliss. Next, it is illustrated by a metaphor: "a deer fearing a hunter" illustrates beings fearing birth and death and afflictions; from "having escaped" onward illustrates receiving the three refuges; "attains the experience of peace and bliss" illustrates what they were lacking. The application below can be known. "Bliss is liberation" concludes it overall.

3.11

Below, liberation is identified with the Tathāgata and so forth, for the Buddha-dharmas are immeasurable; yet here they are mutually identified in terms of seven approaches for the moment. "Exhaustless" is the empty space of dharma-nature; "decisive" is wisdom. Truly because these share the same essence while being distinguished in meaning, they can be mutually identified. Since this approach is so, the ones above should also be like this, but they are not discussed exhaustively. What is difficult to understand is clarified again below. What is difficult to understand? Earlier, it was proclaimed that receiving the three refuges appears to be distinct, yet it is also said that liberation is the Tathāgata and so forth, appearing to be one. Unity and difference are mutually contrary, hence this must be explained. Furthermore, it was said earlier that on account of the three refuges one attains peace and bliss, which might be confused with feelings of pleasure; hence the difference is clarified below. There are two questions and answers: the first question and answer explains and clarifies the meaning of unity and difference regarding the three refuges; the second question and answer clarifies that bliss is not a feeling.

3.12

Regarding the first question below: "If nirvāṇa, buddha-nature, the decisive, and the Tathāgata are of one meaning, why speak of three?" This clings to unity and doubts the three. Earlier, seven dharmas were proclaimed to be mutually identical, but now only four are adduced; this question is incomplete. Fully stated, it should ask: Since the refuges are distinct, how can they be identical to that nirvāṇa and so forth? Following the answer, this ought to be present; it merely raises one side, and the other side can be known.

3.13

The Buddha's answer has three parts: first, discussing unity in terms of the three; second, from "there are dharmas whose names are one" onward, distinguishing the three in terms of unity; third, from "the Tathāgata sometimes speaks of the one as three and the three as one" onward, praising both the one and the three to show their profundity. In the first part, it first explains that "all sentient beings seek the three refuges out of fear," hence there is the distinction of three. Because of the three refuges, they realize and know the buddha-nature, the decisive, and nirvāṇa; because what is realized is of the same essence, they are able to be one. In the second section, it first manifests by principle that the three are distinct; from "therefore I" onward, it cites past teaching to prove their distinction. In the former part, it first broadly clarifies the unity and difference of names and meanings among all dharmas. In applying names to correspond to dharmas, there are only two approaches: first, name and meaning are both one; second, name and meaning are both different. Dharmas have essence and function, general and particular, identity and difference. Applying names in terms of essence, the general, and identity, name and meaning are both one; applying names in terms of function, following the particular, and pursuing difference, name and meaning are both different. Discussed mutually in terms of the hidden and manifest, there are four propositions: First, name and meaning are both one. Second, name and meaning are both different, fully as distinguished just now. Third, the name is one but the meanings are different: applying names in terms of essence, the general, and identity, subsuming meaning under the designation is called unity of name; applying names according to function, particularity, and difference, subsuming the designation under the intended meaning is called difference of meaning. Fourth, the meaning is one but the names are different, which can be known by reversing the previous one. Now, among the four, two approaches are presented for the moment: "there are dharmas whose names are one and meanings are different" is the third approach; "there are dharmas whose names and meanings are both different" is the second approach.

3.14

Next, their characteristics are distinguished. In explaining the first approach, it first cites the text and then explains it: The Buddha and the others are all permanent; applying names based on permanence, subsuming the intended meaning under the designation, it is therefore called unity of name. The meanings of the Buddha and the others are distinct; subsuming the designation under the intended meaning, it is called difference of meanings. From "this is named" onward is the conclusion. In explaining the second approach, it first cites the text and then explains it: The doctrinal aspects of the Buddha, Dharma, Saṅgha, and so forth are each different; applying names based on them, the names are also not the same, hence all four are different. "The Buddha is named Awakened" is the translation of the name, which is itself the explanation of the meaning. "The Dharma is named Unawakened" is neither a translation of the name nor an explanation of the meaning, but an expression distinguishing it from the Buddha. "The Saṅgha is named Harmony" translates the name and explains the meaning. "Nirvāṇa is named Liberation" is its explanation of meaning, not a translation of the name. "Emptiness is named Non-virtuous" is an expression of distinction, neither a translation nor an explanation. The empty space of dharma-nature is not the same as practicing virtue, hence it is named non-virtuous. "Unobstructed" distinguishes it from others and also distinguishes its characteristics. From "this is" onward is the conclusion.

3.15

Below, based on the previous meaning, it manifests that the three refuges are distinct and not one. Within citing the teaching below to prove their distinction, it first adduces a past teaching; "therefore the three refuges cannot be one" concludes the establishment of their distinct meaning. In the former part, it first tells Prajāpatī that making offerings to the Saṅgha is itself making offerings to the three refuges. Prajāpatī was the Buddha's maternal aunt; seven days after his birth, his mother passed away, and Prajāpatī nursed and raised him. When the Buddha later went forth, Prajāpatī longed for him with affectionate remembrance and personally wove a fine cloth of gold thread with her own hands, intending to offer it to the Buddha when he returned to the palace. When the Buddha later returned to the kingdom, Prajāpatī offered it, and the Buddha said to her at the time: "Giving out of affection brings no great merit; you should make offerings to the Saṅgha. If you make offerings to the Saṅgha, that is making offerings to the three refuges." Thus it is adduced now. Prajāpatī then asked, and subsequently the Buddha explained it for her: because the three meanings are distinct, therefore they are not one. Earlier, the meaning of unity was distinguished; next, the meaning of difference was distinguished. From here, the third part concludes and praises both unity and difference to show their profundity: "The Tathāgata sometimes speaks of the one as three" repeats the later section above where the buddha-nature and so forth are one, and in terms of this proclaims the distinction of the three refuges; "speaks of the three as one" repeats the earlier section above where, in terms of the three refuges, the unity of the buddha-nature, nirvāṇa, and so forth is proclaimed. "Such a meaning is the Buddha's realm" and so forth praises it to show its profundity.

3.16

Up to here, the meaning of the unity and difference of the three refuges and so forth within the earlier liberation has been explained; next, it explains that the peace and bliss attained previously is quiescence and not a feeling. Kāśyapa first asks: "As the Buddha has spoken of ultimate peace and bliss as being named nirvāṇa, what is the meaning of this?" directly requesting its characteristics, requesting that quiescent bliss be manifested. From "now, nirvāṇa" onward, he raises a challenge to refute bliss as a feeling. Below, the Buddha answers him, with four distinct phrases: First, addressing the initial request, manifesting that his nirvāṇa is solely quiescent bliss; second, from "severing all" onward, addressing the later challenge, explaining that his nirvāṇa is not the bliss of feeling; third, from "if one says" onward, raising a challenge to refute bliss as a feeling to confirm the previous second point; fourth, from "therefore" onward, concluding the earlier quiescent bliss to be the meaning of nirvāṇa and liberation.

3.17

In the first part, the metaphor comes first, containing four phrases: First, the metaphor of escaping birth and death by oneself: "A person" illustrates the Buddha. In the past, when on the causal stage, the Buddha gave rise to karmic afflictions, which is called "having eaten"; experiencing suffering, his "heart was oppressed"; seeking to escape the three realms and sever fetters and karma is called going out and "wishing to vomit"; being truly able to sever them is called having managed to vomit. Second, the metaphor of manifesting transformations in accordance with beings: having escaped birth and death oneself, condescending to respond in accordance with beings is called "returning again." Third, the metaphor of revealing virtues through a provisional question: bodhisattvas practicing together are called "companions"; asking the Tathāgata whether birth and death have been exhausted is called "having recovered or not"; "and yet returning here" expresses wonder that the Buddha is in the midst of suffering. Fourth, the metaphor of revealing virtues through a provisional answer: all sufferings having been exhausted is called "answering that he has recovered"; realizing quiescence and everlasting peace is called "attaining peace and bliss."

3.18

Next, applying the metaphor: "The Tathāgata is also like this, being ultimately far removed from the twenty-five states of existence" corresponds to the initial phrase above; from "forever attaining" onward corresponds to the fourth phrase, that the body attains peace and bliss.

3.19

In the second section: "Severing all feelings is named being without feeling" means that the five feelings are all severed. "Such absence of feeling is named permanent bliss" praises it to reveal its excellence.

3.20

Question: Below it is stated, "Having eliminated impermanent form, one attains permanent form; feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness are also like this." Why is it said that the Buddha is without the pleasure of feeling? Explanation: Among feelings there are two kinds: first, feeling objects of sensory realms, whether adverse or agreeable; second, realizing the Dharma and concordantly taking in the true Dharma, which is therefore called "feeling." Now, when it is said to be "without," it is without the former feeling; below, when it is said to "attain," one attains the latter feeling, so the two statements do not conflict. The latter two are understandable. [This completes the section] from "We only pray that you will again condescend to explain broadly" above.

3.21

The third major section clarifies the characteristics of liberation. From here down, the fourth [section] brushes away the expressions and analogies. Why must they be brushed away? Previously, analogies were borrowed to compare and liken [things] to liberation, and people thought that liberation was completely equivalent to those analogies; therefore, below, they are brushed away. Herein there are two parts: first, clarifying that the analogies established previously are non-analogies taken as analogies; second, from "Why does the Tathāgata make two kinds of statements?" downward, clarifying that analogies are non-analogies, and cannot be spoken of definitively. In the former part there are three points: first, clarifying that the previous analogies are non-analogies taken as analogies; second, from "One of true liberation has no peer among all humans and devas" downward, clarifying the reason why they are non-analogies taken as analogies; third, from "Just as something peerless..." downward, demonstrating by analogy the characteristics of non-analogies taken as analogies. Within the first point, it first clarifies that they are not analogies, and from "The Tathāgata, at times, due to causes and conditions..." downward, reveals how they serve as analogies.

3.22

In clarifying non-analogy, there are four questions and answers: First, Kāśyapa asks, "Is non-arising and non-ceasing liberation?" The Buddha answers that it is. Second, Kāśyapa grasps the analogy as identical to the Dharma: "If non-arising and non-ceasing were liberation, then empty space in the world is also without arising and ceasing, so it ought to be liberation." The Buddha answers that it is not so. Third, Kāśyapa asks, "Why is it not so?" The Tathāgata asks in turn, "Is the sound of a kalaviṅka identical to that of a crow or magpie?" Fourth, Kāśyapa replies correctly according to principle, and the Tathāgata praises him. In Kāśyapa's reply, "No" is the general answer. Below he explains it specifically, with four distinct clauses: First, "Comparing the sound of a crow or magpie to a jīvañjīvaka and the like, no comparison can be made," clarifies the inferior not matching the superior. Second, from "Kāśyapa said: A kalaviṅka..." downward, clarifies the superior meeting the inferior; within this, Kāśyapa first clarifies it surpassing the inferior, and next rebukes the Tathāgata, where from "no different..." downward reveals that the Buddha ought not [to make such a comparison]. Third, from "The Buddha and empty space..." downward, applies the analogy to reveal the Dharma. Fourth, from "The sound of a kalaviṅka can serve as an analogy for the Buddha..." downward, analyzes the analogy to reveal the Dharma. The kalaviṅka is an analogy for the Buddha, not for crows and magpies, revealing the wondrousness of its voice; because its voice is wondrous, it is used to liken to liberation. Not comparing it to empty space, the Buddha's praise can be understood.

3.23

The preceding section broadly clarified non-analogy; from "The Tathāgata, at times, due to causes and conditions..." downward clarifies how it serves as an analogy. The so-called "at times" refers to causes and conditions of transforming others. Adducing empty space as an analogy for instruction, that which is analogized is the Buddha's virtues, and thus is the Tathāgata. This concludes the first point. From here down, the second explains the reason why non-analogies are taken as analogies. "One of true liberation has nothing surpassing them" explains the previous non-analogy; from "For the sake of transforming sentient beings..." downward explains the previous serving as an analogy; "for the sake of transforming" reveals the aforementioned presence of causes and conditions. From here down, the third point analogously reveals the characteristics of non-analogies taken as analogies: it first cites the type, stating, "A non-analogy is like a peerless thing for which no analogy can be adduced," briefly citing non-analogy; "Because there are causes and conditions, an analogy may be adduced," briefly cites serving as an analogy. From "Just as in the sūtra..." downward, it points to the matter and critiques it. Below, applying this to reveal the Dharma: "One cannot use an analogy to analogize true liberation" clarifies non-analogy; from "For the sake of transforming sentient beings..." downward clarifies serving as an analogy; from "Using various analogies..." downward clarifies that all the aforementioned analogies are non-analogies taken as analogies.

3.24

The above first [part] clarified that the preceding analogies were non-analogies taken as analogies; from here down, the second [part] clarifies that analogies are non-analogies and cannot be spoken of definitively. Kāśyapa first asks: "If it is an analogy, one should speak exclusively of an analogy; if it is not an analogy, one should speak exclusively of it not being one. Why does the Tathāgata make two kinds of statements?" Below, the Buddha answers, clarifying that phenomena are not determinate, and therefore cannot be spoken of definitively. There are four distinct sections of text: First, the analogy of harming the Buddha clarifies that the Buddha's dharmakāya is a non-analogy taken as an analogy, and cannot be spoken of definitively. Second, the analogy of harming the mother clarifies that the Buddha's saṃbhogakāya is a non-analogy taken as an analogy, and cannot be spoken of definitively. Third, from "Due to these causes and conditions, I speak of various analogies..." downward concludes the previous second [part], taking advantage of the phrasing. Fourth, from "Or there are causes and conditions under which it can also be an analogy..." downward concludes the previous first [part].

3.25

Within the first, there are four points: 1. the Tathāgata sets up the analogy; 2. he questions Kāśyapa in return; 3. Kāśyapa answers correctly; 4. the Tathāgata praises him. In setting up the analogy, he adduces that the Buddha's dharmakāya cannot be killed, analogously clarifying non-analogy; "desiring to harm and incurring sin" analogously reveals it serving as an analogy. Initially, "there is a person" is an analogy for the Buddha's nirmāṇakāya; internally possessing the four unobstructed knowledges is called "holding a knife and sword"; speaking of the real with an angry intention is called "with an angry mind"; desiring to use manifold analogies to liken to the Buddha's dharmakāya, and speaking of characteristics to approach the real, is called "harming the Tathāgata"; the dharmakāya is equanimous and does not change along with characteristics, hence it says "the Tathāgata is harmonious and has no appearance of anger." Next is the counter-question: "Would this person succeed in destroying the Tathāgata's body?" is one question; "Would they incur a heinous offense or not?" is the second question. In Kāśyapa's reply, he first analyzes the characteristics of the analogy, and later applies it to reveal the Dharma. In the analogy, he first addresses the previous first question, clarifying that the Buddha cannot be killed, revealing the establishment of non-analogy. "Merely with an evil mind" addresses the subsequent question, clarifying that because of the evil mind one incurs [retribution in] the Avīci [hell], revealing the establishment of serving as an analogy. In the former, first saying "No" generally answers that the Buddha cannot be killed, hence saying "No." From "Why?" downward explains why he cannot be killed. "The Tathāgata's bodily realm cannot be destroyed" analyzes and explains in response to the question. The nature of the body is called "realm" (dhātu); the demarcation of a human body is also called "bodily realm." The dharmakāya is free from marks, hence it cannot be destroyed. From "why?" onward, it further explains the reason for its indestructibility, questioning why the Buddha's body specifically cannot be destroyed. "Because of having no body" clarifies that the body is free from marks, and therefore cannot be destroyed. From "Only dharmatā..." downward clarifies that the substance of the body is tranquil, and therefore cannot be destroyed. From "This person..." onward concludes its indestructibility. In answering the latter question, "merely with an evil mind one incurs Avīci" means that the intent to transform contrary to the real is called an "evil mind"; bringing about the matters of parabolic speech is called "incurring Avīci"; the meaning of Avīci will be discussed separately later. Below, applying this to reveal the Dharma: "Due to these causes and conditions, adducing various analogies to know the true Dharma" specifically applies to the latter clause, clarifying it serving as an analogy. Because of this evil mind, one also incurs the causal condition for Avīci. The Buddha adducing various analogies can enable the great assembly to know the Buddha's true Dharma; one should also apply the former to clarify its non-analogy, which is omitted and not clarified. The Buddha's praise can be understood.

3.26

In the second section, the text also has four points: 1. the Tathāgata sets up the analogy; 2. he questions Kāśyapa in turn; 3. Kāśyapa answers correctly; 4. the Tathāgata praises him. In the first, "an evil person" is an analogy for the Buddha's nirmāṇakāya; speaking of marks encroaching on the real is therefore called "an evil person"; desiring to use various analogies to display the saṃbhogakāya, the analogy's marks approaching the real is called "harming"; the real being the basis of transformation is called "mother"; transformation existing in the three realms of existence is called "dwelling in the wild fields"; being amidst various marks is called "beneath a tree/thicket." The reward Buddha, through the power of his great vow of compassion, provides for transformation without interruption, which is called "the mother sending food"; the nirmāṇakāya Tathāgata internally perceiving the true virtue is called "having seen"; then giving rise to the intention to speak is called "giving rise to an evil mind"; fully possessing the four unobstructed knowledges is called "whetting the knife beforehand"; the saṃbhogakāya Tathāgata clearly perceiving the intention to transform is called "the mother having known"; complying with transformation and following marks is called "entering the thicket"; responding with sharp eloquence and broadly speaking of the true virtue according to the analogy's marks is called "chopping around the thicket"; expressing the sacred mind of transformation is called "having chopped, rejoiced"; having conceptualized and spoken is called "giving rise to the thought of killing"; the true substance being free from marks is called "coming out from the thicket"; resting securely in the limit of reality is called "reaching home." The counter-question can be understood. In Kāśyapa's reply, he first analyzes the characteristics of the analogy, and later applies it to reveal the Dharma. In the analogy, first saying, "It cannot be spoken of definitively; if one says it exists, the mother's body should be destroyed; if the body is not destroyed, how can one say it exists?" clarifies that there is no sin, revealing the establishment of non-analogy. From "If one says it does not exist..." downward clarifies that there is sin, showing that it serves as an analogy. From "Due to these conditions..." downward applies the analogy to reveal the Dharma, specifically applying to the latter clause to clarify the existence of the analogy, while the former is omitted and not discussed. The Buddha's praise can be understood.

3.27

From here down, the third concludes the previous second: "Due to these causes and conditions, I speak of various analogies for true liberation" concludes the existence of analogy. Chopping all around the thicket is called "speaking of various [analogies]"; from "Although using immeasurable asaṃkhyeyas..." downward concludes the nonexistence of analogy. Below, concluding the first: "Or there are causes and conditions under which it can also serve as an analogy" concludes the existence of analogy; "Or there are causes and conditions under which it cannot be an analogy" concludes the nonexistence of analogy.

3.28

From "What is called nirvāṇa?" above to this point, taken together, is the second [major section], opening up the virtues of liberation. From here down, the third [major section] concludes with praise to reveal supremacy. Within this there are three points: The first two praise the virtues of liberation that follow. "Therefore, liberation accomplishes such immeasurable virtues" concludes with praise with respect to the Dharma. Endowed with the aforementioned hundred virtues, it is therefore called "immeasurable." "The one who proceeds toward nirvāṇa, the Nirvāṇa Tathāgata, also has such immeasurable merits" concludes with praise with respect to the person. The Tathāgata is the person who seeks nirvāṇa, and is called "one who proceeds toward nirvāṇa"; having realized Mahāparinirvāṇa, he accomplishes the Tathāgata's body, and is therefore called "the Nirvāṇa Tathāgata." The previously analyzed liberations are all identical to the Tathāgata, and therefore the Tathāgata also has such immeasurable merits. The final clause concludes the first [section on] the place of liberation: because of possessing such virtues of liberation, it is called Mahāparinirvāṇa.

3.29

From here down is the fourth [section], Kāśyapa's expression of understanding. "I now for the first time know that the place to which the Tathāgata arrives is without end" reiterates his understanding of the aforementioned place of liberation. In the previous broad analysis of the place of liberation, Kāśyapa understood that such nirvāṇa is the place of the Tathāgata, permanent and unaltering, and therefore now reiterates it. "I now for the first time know that the place to which the Tathāgata arrives is without end": contrasting with former ignorance, it is called "now for the first time"; "without end" is identical to the previous meaning of "permanently abiding." "If the place is without end, one should know that his lifespan is also without end" expresses understanding of the virtues of liberation. Because the Dharma is without end, it brings the person to be without end; this reiterates the aforementioned virtue of liberation wherein the Tathāgata has no birth, aging, illness, or death, which is termed "lifespan without end."

3.30

From here down is the fifth [section], concluding with praise and exhorting study. "Excellent, you are able to protect" is words of praise, praising the previous expression of understanding. From "If there are those who desire..." downward is words of exhortation to study.

3.31

Up to this point in the chapter "Long Life," the essence of practice has been clarified; from here down, the second part analyzes the basis of practice. Within this, it first correctly clarifies the basis, and below speaks of the correct and erroneous to stay away from what is not to be relied upon. In the former, it analyzes and clarifies that the bodhisattvas of the four reliances are the persons to be relied upon; this answers the previous [questions], "How does one obtain what is vast to act as a reliance for the assembly?" and "Truly not being an arhat, yet being together with arhats," etc. What was that question? "How does one obtain that person who is vast to act as a reliance for the assembly?"; although not yet identical to the buddhas and arhats, those whose transformative efficacy is identical to those buddhas and arhats are ones I wish to rely upon; therefore, he now answers it, clarifying that there are four persons who can serve as a place of reliance for sentient beings, no different from a buddha, who are worthy of being relied upon.

3.32

In the text, first it directly clarifies the four persons as places of reliance. Next, from 'rely on the four dharmas' onward, as the Buddha taught, it synthesizes and reconciles this with the Dharma; this also directly clarifies the Dharma upon which one's practice relies. In the former part there are two: first, clarifying the characteristics of the virtuous conduct of the four persons; second, from 'I now do not rely on these four persons' onward, exhorting people to rely on them and instructing people to make offerings to them. In the first part there are four: first, generally raising the four persons and generally praising their virtue; second, separately listing the four persons and generally praising their virtue; third, separately taking up the four persons and distinctly revealing their virtue; fourth, generally concluding the four persons and generally praising their virtue. In the initial section, it first raises the four persons. Because these four persons accomplish their virtue by relying on the sūtra, and furthermore are proclaimed within this sūtra, it therefore says: 'In this *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* there are four kinds of persons.' Below, praising their virtue, 'protecting the Dharma, establishing the Dharma, mindful recollection, and the correct Dharma' are universal practices regarding the Dharma, which are for one's own benefit. Being able personally to defend and protect it so that others do not belittle, slander, or disparage it is called protecting the correct Dharma. As extensively explained above, being able orally to establish and accomplish it is called establishing the correct Dharma; holding it in mind without forgetting it is called mindfully recollecting the Dharma. From 'able greatly' onward is practice that benefits others, which is benefiting others. 'Able greatly to benefit' refers to supramundane dharmic transformation; 'pitying the world,' etc., refers to mundane dharmic transformation. Pitying the world is the mind to benefit others; from 'serving as a reliance for the world' onward is the practice of benefiting others. Persons serve as reliances for beings, the Dharma can bring peace and bliss, and humans and devas are capable of being transformed; therefore it discusses them specifically. Alternatively, 'pitying' means being compassionately mindful of the three wretched realms, while 'serving as a reliance for the world,' etc., immediately benefits humans and devas.

3.33

In the second section, it first lists the four persons. 'What are' raises the question; 'there is a person who appears in the world possessing the nature of afflictions,' etc., distinguishes and lists their designations. The meaning of the four reliances is extensive, as in the separate chapter; now I shall briefly explain the terms. 'There is a person who appears in the world possessing the nature of afflictions is named the first' refers to a person on the stages of lineage, understanding, and practice. The *Benevolent Kings Sūtra* states that from the lineage onward one can be a Dharma master, and prior to that one is not yet able; thus we know this is not prior to the lineage. The subsequent text proclaims that only by having made offerings to Buddhas [equal to the sands of] five Gaṅgās does one become competent to be a reliance; therefore it is not the [mere] stage of favorable destinies. The text states that possessing the nature of afflictions means this is not the eighth person, making clear that it is not on the bhūmis. Appearing after the Tathāgata's extinction to manifest transformations and benefit beings is called 'appearing in the world'; not having exclusively eliminated any among the afflictions of the five entrenchments is called 'possessing afflictions.'

3.34

Question: The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* proclaims that the lineage is endowed with the two purities; why then does it now say 'possessing afflictions'? Explanation: The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* speaks of the two purities in relation to the two vehicles; here, contrasted with the bhūmis, it is named 'possessing afflictions.'

3.35

'Srotāpanna and sakṛdāgāmin are named the second': *srotā[panna]* is named in this land 'stream-enterer' (reversing the stream), reversing the stream of birth-and-death; it is also called 'clearing the debt', clearing the debt of the three wretched realms; and it is also called 'cultivating and accumulating the undefiled'. Where is its stage located? Srotāpanna has three: first, maintaining the fruit, which is the culminating mind of the first bhūmi; second, including the cause, which is everything from the initial mind of the first bhūmi onward; third, advancing toward, which means all the way up through the second bhūmi is called srotāpanna. Combining the former two, they are called srotāpanna; therefore, the *Daśabhūmikā-vibhāṣā* proclaims the first bhūmi to be the path of seeing. *Sakṛdāgāmin* is named here 'once-returner', returning again to be born in the realm of desire; it is also called 'dwelling in attenuation'. According to the Hīnayāna, on the path of cultivation in the desire realm, out of the nine grades of afflictions six are severed and three remain; hence it is called 'dwelling in attenuation'. If according to the Mahāyāna, the afflictions of cultivation in the three realms are all attenuated; therefore the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* says that the bonds of desire, form, and existence, the bonds of ignorance, and so on are all made slight and thin. Where is its stage located? In distinction there are three: first, maintaining the fruit, which is on the third bhūmi—therefore the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra* proclaims that on the third bhūmi all bonds are slight and thin; second, including the cause, from the second bhūmi downward, gradually severing the afflictions of cultivation, which is collectively called sakṛdāgāmin; third, advancing toward, which extends upward through the seventh bhūmi. Combining these three, it is collectively called sakṛdāgāmin. Why are these two combined into one reliance? Because the practice and effort of these two persons are similar, and in making offerings to Buddhas and understanding the meaning they surpass the preceding and are inferior to the subsequent; therefore they are combined.

3.36

'Anāgāmin' is named here 'non-returner'. According to the Hīnayāna, one is no longer reborn in the desire realm, hence it is called non-returner; if according to the Mahāyāna, one does not return to giving rise to the affliction of attachment to the Buddha, hence it is called non-returner. Where is its stage located? In distinction there are three: first, maintaining the fruit, which is on the eighth bhūmi, because the affliction of attachment to the Buddha is severed here; second, including the cause, from the fourth bhūmi onward they are collectively called anāgāmin, because of cultivating the conformity-forbearance to advance toward the eighth bhūmi; third, advancing toward, extending upward through the ninth bhūmi. Combining the latter two, it is called anāgāmin. Because at this place they equally relinquish effort, and in making offerings to Buddhas and understanding the meaning they surpass the preceding and are inferior to the subsequent, they are therefore made into one.

3.37

'Arhat' is named here 'unattached', because the causes of existence are severed; it is also called 'non-arising', because the fruits of suffering are exhausted. Where is its stage located? In distinction there are three: first, maintaining the fruit, which is on the tenth bhūmi; second, including the cause, from the ninth bhūmi onward they are collectively called arhat; third, advancing toward, extending upward through the vajra[-like concentration]. Combining the latter two, it is called arhat, because these are equally on the ultimate ground. In actual principle, it is the Buddha who is extolling these persons, and thus they share the Buddha's epithet. Since these are all bodhisattvas, why are they named using the designations of śrāvakas and ordinary people? Although these are bodhisattva stages, they broadly correspond to those of the Hīnayāna; in order to cause the ordinary people, two-vehicle persons, and others to be transformed in the future to understand the great by standard of the small, these names are therefore used.

3.38

In praising virtue below, it specifically praises benefiting people, which is similar to the preceding; universal practice regarding the Dharma is not discussed.

3.39

Next, the second part separately takes up and separately praises them, first distinguishing the first reliance. Therein, first is the question, next the distinction, and finally the conclusion. From 'not the eighth' onward distinguishes it from the rest. Within the distinction there are four: first, 'able to uphold,' etc., is the practice of self-benefit: upholding the precepts to abandon evil, and establishing the Dharma to cultivate good; second, from 'from the Buddha' onward is understanding of self-benefit; third, from 'in turn for' onward is the practice of benefiting others: expounding the eight awarenesses for them to cause them to advance in goodness, and instructing them to repent if there are transgressions to cause them to abandon evil; fourth, from 'well knowing' onward is understanding of benefiting others: thoroughly comprehending the bodhisattva's deportment of skillful transformation is called 'knowing the expedient and esoteric dharmas'. 'Called an ordinary person' is the general conclusion. Ordinary persons comprise internal and external; this is an internal ordinary person: among the remaining retributions of delimited succession in the six destinies, there is no exclusive elimination anywhere, hence called an internal ordinary person. In distinguishing differences below, 'not the eighth person' distinguishes it from the preceding. Who is the eighth person, such that it says 'not'? According to the *Vibhāṣā*, a srotāpanna is called the eighth person, contrasted with the seven expedient stages prior to the path of seeing. Hence that treatise asks, 'What are the eight persons? Namely, those resolute in faith and those resolute in dharma.' Dull-rooted persons entering the path of seeing the truths are called resolute in faith; sharp ones are called resolute in dharma. According to tradition transmitted from foreign lands, there are said to be another eight: first, persons of initial resolve, who have not yet undertaken practice; second, those of practice with marks, who loathe birth-and-death and delight in cultivating good dharmas; third, persons of markless practice, who learn to contemplate the principle of emptiness and overcome joy and revulsion, having no anger in their minds when seeing someone commit evil and having no rejoiceful delight when seeing someone cultivate good; fourth, persons of expedient practice, who although seeing that dharmas are empty, constantly follow phenomenal existence to give rise to all good practices—these four are on the stages of favorable destinies; fifth, the stage of practice lineage; sixth, the stage of nature lineage; seventh, the stage of understanding and practice; eighth, the stage of noble lineage. The first reliance is prior to the bhūmis and has not yet equaled the noble lineage, and therefore is not the eighth person. 'The eighth person is not called an ordinary person' displays how the subsequent differs from the preceding. 'Not called an ordinary person' distinguishes it from the first reliance; 'called a bodhisattva' discusses it according to its specific mark; 'not called a buddha' distinguishes it from what follows.

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Linked texts (1)

大般涅槃經義記 — Classical Chinese