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大般涅槃經義記 6

English (machine translation) 6

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6.1

Composed by the Śramaṇa Shi Huiyuan of Jingying Monastery under the Sui

6.2

Below, he clarifies the fruit of equanimity; the text has three parts: first, a brief distinction by question and answer; second, an extensive explanation by question and answer; third, below "abiding in this ground, one has no obstruction regarding all dharmas", he explains and reveals the name of the ground. In the brief [distinction], Kāśyapa first summarizes what came before, and asks in order to initiate what follows. "Cultivating loving-kindness, compassion, and sympathetic joy, one attains the ground of an only child" summarizes what came before; "cultivating equanimity, what does one attain?" asks what follows. Below, the Buddha first praises, and then explains for him: "Cultivating equanimity, one attains abiding in the equal ground of emptiness" introduces the topic in general terms; "just like Subhūti" reveals it in terms of the human category; "what the bodhisattva attains surpasses Subhūti" uses the coarse to illustrate the subtle, and merely speaks of it as "like." Alternatively, Subhūti was truly a bodhisattva whose realization of emptiness was deep and abstruse, and so he pointedly referenced him.

6.3

Below, he reveals it specifically, wherein there is first the doctrine, next a simile, and then the application. In the doctrine: "abiding in emptiness, one does not see father..." and so forth is the emptiness of sentient beings; "not seeing the aggregates..." and so forth is the emptiness of dharmas; "sentient beings, life span..." again clarifies the emptiness of sentient beings. How does it differ from the former? The former is free from the nature of sentient beings, attained prior to the emptiness of dharmas; this is free from the mark of sentient beings, attained after the emptiness of dharmas. Relying on what dharmas constitute, the nominal sentient being is also non-existent. The text of the simile can be known. In the application: "All dharmas are also like this: there are no parents, up to life span" applies it in terms of dharmas, clarifying the meaning of their emptiness; "the bodhisattva" sees below, applying it in terms of the person, clarifying the attainment of the ground of emptiness.

6.4

In the extensive [explanation], he asks first: he asks only about the principle of emptiness, not about that which is able to see. Below, the Buddha answers, and the text has four parts: first, clarifying the meaning of emptiness; second, explaining contemplation in relation to emptiness; third, below "From the bodhisattva attaining such...", based on the latter section he concludes by clarifying the benefit of contemplation; fourth, below "I now speak among this assembly...", based on the former first section he concludes by clarifying the benefit of speaking.

6.5

In the first [part], the opening and combining of the meanings of emptiness is not single; here, based on one approach, eleven are temporarily discussed: the first ten are emptiness of marks, and the last one is true emptiness. Clarifying the meaning of emptiness in terms of dharmas grasped by deluded sentiment is called the emptiness of marks; explaining the meaning of emptiness in terms of the true consciousness is called true emptiness. One may also say that the first ten are emptiness of objects, and the last one is emptiness of wisdom: the emptiness of true wisdom. Within the domain of delusion, there are dharmas external to sentiment; refuting them reveals quiescence, hence the first ten kinds clarify emptiness in terms of objects. When investigated according to reality, there are no dharmas outside mind; all dharmas are just the true mind, and the substance of the true mind is quiescent, hence the last one speaks of emptiness in terms of wisdom. Therefore the Daśabhūmivyākhyāna states: 'The suchness of all dharmas is said to be empty in its own substance; this is called wisdom being empty of itself.'

6.6

Within the first ten: the first eight take non-existence to refute existence as emptiness; the ninth takes existence to dispel non-existence as emptiness; the tenth, by neither existence nor non-existence, doubly refutes existence and non-existence, naming it emptiness; these are identical to the ten equalities in the Daśabhūmika Sūtra.

6.7

Within the first eight: the first seven clarify that sentient beings and dharmas are empty because they lack intrinsic nature; the last one clarifies that sentient beings and dharmas are empty because they lack marks. Within conditional nominality, lacking a fixed nature is called emptiness of non-nature; within ultimate emptiness, lacking the marks of causes and conditions is called markless emptiness.

6.8

Within the first seven: the first six clarify that sentient beings' lack of intrinsic nature is the emptiness of sentient beings; the last one clarifies that all dharmas' lack of intrinsic nature is the emptiness of dharmas.

6.9

Further, within the first six: the first five contemplate emptiness in terms of the present; the last one contemplates emptiness in terms of the past. Within the present: the first three contemplate the principle of emptiness in terms of internal and external matters; the latter two contemplate emptiness in terms of the characteristics of conditioned and unconditioned dharmas.

6.10

Regarding the first three: sentient beings are internal, and insentient things are external. Regarding internal phenomena, contemplating the absence of a spiritual master, sentient being, and life-span is called 'internal emptiness'; it does not yet empty the substantial entity of dharmas. Contemplating those external phenomena as not being self or belonging to self is therefore called 'external emptiness'. Furthermore, contemplating that things such as houses, groves, and vehicles are fictitious and without reality is also called 'external emptiness'; it does not yet empty the substantial entity of dharmas. Contemplating the internal and external together is called 'internal and external emptiness'. Why is it necessary to combine them? There are two explanations: First, distinguishing according to the person. There are three types of persons: first, those whose attachments to the internal are excessive must be taught to contemplate the internal; second, those whose attachments to the external are excessive must be taught to contemplate the external; third, those who are attached to both internal and external must be taught to contemplate them together. Second, distinguishing in terms of the beginning and end of contemplative practice: ordinary people originally claim that there is a self within, so they first contemplate the internal; when they do not find it within, they claim it exists without, so they next contemplate the external. Previously, contemplating the internal did not reach the external, and when contemplating the external, it did not reach the internal, and between these two they still suspected that there is a self; therefore, they must contemplate them together.

6.11

Question: Knowing all phenomena collectively is easy, but knowing them distinctively is difficult; hence persons of the two vehicles can only know suffering and so forth in their collective marks, but cannot know them distinctively, whereas only bodhisattvas can know their differentiations. Why then here does one proceed first distinctively and then collectively? Explanation: Phenomena are of two kinds: first, identical marks; second, distinct marks. Emptiness, non-self, and so forth, viewed uniformly across all phenomena and comprehensively, are called 'identical marks'. The differing phenomenal marks of form, feeling, conception, and so forth are called 'distinct marks'. Between these two, if one wishes to trace identity in order to know distinction, the collective is easy while the distinctive is difficult, so one first contemplates the collective and then the distinctive; if one wishes to trace distinction in order to know identity, the distinctive is easy while the collective is difficult, so one first contemplates distinctively and then collectively. Here, following the latter approach, one proceeds first distinctively and then collectively. These preceding three kinds clarify emptiness in terms of affairs; the conditioned and the unconditioned clarify emptiness in terms of dharmas. Suffering, impermanence, and other categories of arising and ceasing dharmas are the conditioned; space, analytical cessation, non-analytical cessation, and the like are the unconditioned. Among conditioned dharmas, the absence of self and what belongs to self is called 'conditioned emptiness', not the emptying of the substantial entity of dharmas; among unconditioned dharmas, the absence of self and what belongs to self is called 'unconditioned emptiness', and here too the substantial entity of dharmas is not yet emptied.

6.12

Question: In the preceding treatment of internal, external, and so forth, there was a threefold division of separation and combination; why is this not the case here with conditioned and unconditioned dharmas? Explanation: Analytically establishing it would also not do harm to the principle, but here, in order to clarify that the two dharmas, internal and external, are both existent, combining them in contemplation is easy; therefore the third is the collective contemplation of internal and external. Conditioned and unconditioned differ in status as existence and non-existence, so combining them in contemplation would be difficult; hence there is no collective [contemplation].

6.13

These preceding five kinds contemplate emptiness in terms of the present. As for 'beginningless emptiness', there is no distinct dharma; it is simply contemplating the preceding five emptinesses in terms of the past that is called 'beginningless emptiness'. Why not speak of 'endless emptiness' in terms of the future? Analytically established, it should be permissible, which is why in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* all three times are contemplated together; but here, it is to clarify that past dharmas are the root from which afflictions arise, the locus of clinging since beginningless time, and therefore must be contemplated. Since past and present are already empty, the future may be understood by analogy; hence it does not speak of 'endless emptiness' in terms of what comes after. Moreover, dharmas of the three times arise successively: the past is the root of the present, and the present is the root of the future; present dharmas are easy to contemplate, so they are contemplated first. Because the present arises from the past, beginningless emptiness is spoken of in terms of its root. When the root is destroyed, the branch follows; therefore endless emptiness is not spoken of in terms of what comes after.

6.14

Another question asks: If so, should one within the six superknowledges also only know the past and present, so what use is the divine eye to know the future? Explanation: They are not analogous. The six superknowledges know phenomenal affairs, and affairs of the three times differ, so they must be known distinctly; this contemplation is of the principle of emptiness, and since the principle is identical, it can be inferred, so it is not treated distinctly.

6.15

The above six kinds clarify the emptiness of sentient beings; next the emptiness of dharmas is explained. As for 'emptiness of nature', contemplating that dharmas are fictitious and have no self-nature is called 'emptiness of nature'.

6.16

The above seven approaches are the emptiness of lack of nature. As for 'non-existence', seeing that the marks of causes and conditions are also non-existent is called 'emptiness of non-existence'; this is markless emptiness. Hence it is said below: 'Just as a person without a son is called empty, not that emptiness of lack of nature is clarified in terms of a son; and also just as a poor person without possessions is called empty, not that emptiness of lack of nature is clarified in terms of possessions.'

6.17

The above eight emptinesses use non-existence to refute existence; 'ultimate emptiness' uses existence to refute non-existence. It designates the preceding eight emptinesses as the ultimate truth: all dharmas are empty yet constantly existent, hence they are not definitively non-existent; because they are not definitively non-existent, there is no self-nature of the ultimate truth that can be apprehended; therefore it is called ultimate emptiness.

6.18

The above nine emptinesses individually refute existence and non-existence. The tenth, 'emptiness of emptiness', dispels both existence and non-existence. Furthermore, the preceding nine emptinesses dispel the natures of existence and non-existence, while the tenth dispels the distinct marks of existence and non-existence; the preceding existence and non-existence are both empty, hence it is called 'emptiness of emptiness'. What is the meaning of this? Dharmas of causes and conditions share the same substance in terms of existence and non-existence; because they share the same substance, nonexistent dharmas are existent, and existent dharmas are nonexistent; because non-existence is existence, existence is precisely non-existence; because existence is non-existence, non-existence is precisely non-nonexistence; neither existent nor nonexistent, hence it is called 'emptiness of emptiness'. These preceding ten approaches refute and dispel mental marks in order to clarify the principle of emptiness.

6.19

The eleventh emptiness explains emptiness in terms of the real: the true mind is free from marks, hence it is called empty. Furthermore, within the true consciousness, the dharmadhātu's Ganges-sands of buddha-dharmas are vastly complete; these buddha-dharmas are of the same single nature and substance, mutually integrated, without any single gate separately retaining its own self-nature; therefore it is said to be empty. If the dharmadhātu is entirely empty, how could emptiness not be great? Hence in terms of the real, it is spoken of as 'great emptiness'. However, in terms of the real, the sūtras explain it differently: in the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra*, it is discussed in terms of concealment, and therefore it proclaims the ālayavijñāna as great emptiness. Here it is in terms of manifestation, and therefore prajñā is spoken of as great emptiness; it is precisely that true consciousness manifested as prajñā, not the prajñā of conditional illumination that rectifies delusion; because the substance of prajñā is quiescent, it is called 'great emptiness'.

6.20

The above clarifies emptiness; below, the contemplation is explained in relation to it. First is contemplating internal emptiness, wherein there is first a question, next an explanation, and finally a conclusion. In the explanation there are three meanings, and in the text there are distinctly four parts. As for the three meanings: first, contemplating that within the internal there are no falsely conceptualized sentient beings, life-spans, permanence, bliss, self, or purity; second, within this emptiness there are no external objects; third, within this emptiness there are no Buddha, Dharma, Saṅgha, or buddha-nature. Because this emptiness of marks does not yet reach the real, starting from internal emptiness down to beginningless emptiness all three are present by analogy, differing only in what is absent within the emptiness.

6.21

As for the text having four parts: first, contemplating that within the internal there are no parents, sentient beings, or life-spans, up to the absence of the permanence, bliss, self, and purity sought by deluded feelings. Second, within this emptiness there is no Buddha, Dharma, or Saṅgha. Third, within this emptiness there are no external wealth or objects. Question: The absence of external wealth and objects within the internal should be mutual non-existence; by what meaning is it now spoken of as the emptiness of principle? Explanation: The absence of external wealth and objects within the internal is indeed mutual non-existence, but now within that internal emptiness there are no external wealth and objects, so it is the emptiness of principle. Below, the absence of internal things within external emptiness is likewise the same by analogy, as should be understood. Fourth, within this emptiness there is no buddha-nature; although buddha-nature exists within internal phenomena when exhaustively clarified in terms of reality, that buddha-nature is neither internal nor external, and is spoken of as non-existent in accordance with marks. Here, specifically clarifying that there is no person within the internal without yet explaining other meanings, it is therefore without buddha-nature; herein one should only speak of its nature being neither internal nor external by way of digression.

6.22

From 'For what reason' below is the explanation, first asking and then determining. Because its nature is permanently abiding, it is neither internal nor external; indeed, because internal emptiness is an emptiness that remedies in accordance with dharmas, while buddha-nature is permanent and entirely distinct from it, it is therefore not present.

6.23

Next is contemplating external emptiness. 'The external is also like this' adduces what follows by analogy with what precedes. Because the three meanings are the same as before, it says 'like this'. 'There are no internal dharmas' reveals its distinct meaning. Previously it was proclaimed that within internal emptiness there are no external wealth or objects; now it proclaims that within external emptiness there are no internal dharmas of the aggregates; there is this distinction.

6.24

Next is contemplating the internal and external. 'Internal and external are like this' adduces what follows by analogy with what precedes; because the three meanings are identical, it says 'like this'. From 'Only there is' below explains that the Tathāgata, Dharma, Saṅgha, and buddha-nature are not present in the three emptinesses; therein it first adduces them, from 'Why' below explains, from 'Therefore' below concludes, and 'This is called internal and external' summarizes and concludes it.

6.25

In 'conditioned emptiness', it first cites, next explains, and finally summarizes and concludes. In the explanation, 'the conditioned are all empty' is the general explanation. From 'Namely' below is the specific; in the specific there are three meanings, fully as explained above: first, within conditioned dharmas there are no arbitrarily conceptualized sentient beings, life-spans, permanence, bliss, self, or purity; second, within this emptiness there are no internal or external affairs; third, within this emptiness there are no Buddha, Dharma, Saṅgha, or buddha-nature. In the text, it first clarifies the absence of internal and external affairs; from 'permanence and bliss' below clarifies the absence of falsely conceptualized permanence, bliss, self, purity, sentient beings, and life-span. From 'Tathāgata' below clarifies that within this emptiness there are no Buddha, Dharma, Saṅgha, or buddha-nature; the ultimate truth is still buddha-nature, and because marks do not reach the real, they are therefore all empty. From 'Herein' below specifically explains the meaning of this emptiness lacking buddha-nature; the text is evident and can be understood.

6.26

In 'unconditioned emptiness', it first asks, next explains, and finally summarizes and concludes. In the explanation, 'the unconditioned are all empty' generally marks it out. From 'Namely' below is the specific; in the specific there are three meanings, fully as explained above: first, within unconditioned emptiness there are no arbitrarily conceptualized sentient beings, life-spans, permanence, bliss, self, or purity—herein the substantial entity of unconditioned dharmas is not yet emptied; second, within this emptiness there are no internal or external affairs, nor conditioned dharmas; third, within this emptiness there is the meaning of the absence of Buddha, Dharma, Saṅgha, and buddha-nature.

6.27

Only these three passages have six phrases: first, clarifying that within this emptiness there are no conditioned dharmas of suffering, impermanence, impurity, and non-self—from 'namely' below it lacks the character 'without' (無); if complete, it should say 'namely without impermanence, suffering, non-self, and so forth'; second, clarifying that within this emptiness there are no internal or external affairs of aggregates, realms, and entrances; third, clarifying that within this emptiness there are no sentient beings or life-spans, which are precisely what is emptied; fourth, again in terms of the first phrase clarifying the absence of conditioned and defiled dharmas; fifth, again in terms of the second clarifying the absence of all internal and external affairs; sixth, clarifying that within this emptiness there are no Buddha, Dharma, Saṅgha, or buddha-nature—'the four dharmas such as the Buddha are neither conditioned nor unconditioned' briefly marks it out; from 'nature is wholesome' below explains that because their nature is wholesome they are not unconditioned. In terms of the unconditioned, space and non-analytical cessation are indeterminate in substance, whereas the Buddha and so forth are wholesome, hence they are not among them; among analytical cessations through cutting defilements by worldly wisdom and so forth, although their substance is wholesome, because they are coarse and shallow, the Buddha and so forth are not identical with them—such meanings are now briefly not discussed. That the permanent is not conditioned is readily known in principle; herein one should properly clarify that they are not unconditioned, and conditioned is the counterpart of the unconditioned, discussed by association.

6.28

In 'beginningless emptiness', it first initiates with a question, next explains, and finally concludes. In the explanation, 'saṃsāra from the beginningless is all empty' generally marks it out. From 'Namely' below is the specific; in the specific there are three meanings, fully as explained above: first, clarifying the absence of the permanence, bliss, self, purity, sentient beings, and life-span conceptualized by deluded feelings; second, clarifying that within this emptiness there are no Buddha, Dharma, Saṅgha, or buddha-nature; third, clarifying that within this emptiness there are no internal, external, conditioned, or unconditioned dharmas of any kind. The text only clarifies the absence of unconditioned dharmas, and the rest is omitted without discussion.

6.29

Regarding "emptiness of intrinsic nature": first the question raises it, next it is explained, and finally concluded. In the explanation, "The bodhisattva observes that all dharmas are in their original nature empty" presents the topic in general. "Namely, the aggregates..." and below distinguishes it: stating that the aggregates, realms, and entrances are impermanent, suffering, and so forth brings up conditioned dharmas; permanence, bliss, self, and purity brings up unconditioned dharmas. There are two kinds of permanence, bliss, self, and purity: the first is the permanence, bliss, self, and purity of expedient means, which is cultivated and produced from conditions and originally lacks self-nature; the second is the permanence, bliss, self, and purity of the self-essence, whose nature has emerged from antiquity. Now it is in terms of the first approach that emptiness of intrinsic nature is expounded; the latter approach is subsumed by the great emptiness and is not discussed here. "Regarding such dharmas, one does not see their original nature" explains their emptiness in general: being first assembled from conditions, they originally lack self-nature, and hence are not seen. These statements explain that the essence of dharmas lacks nature; they are not like the previous six, which [spoke of] the absence of a person within dharmas. Although emptiness of nature is spoken of, the marks of conditionally arisen nominal designations have not yet been emptied, and so it is not the same as the subsequent emptiness of non-existence.

6.30

Question: In the preceding six emptinesses, the Tathāgata, Dharma, Saṅgha, and buddha-nature were all excluded; why is that not the case here in this emptiness of intrinsic nature? Explanation: Here, emptiness of intrinsic nature is explained comprehensively in terms of the retributive fruition of permanence, bliss, self, and purity; permanence, bliss, self, and purity are the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha, which is why they are not excluded. Furthermore, the Buddha's retributive fruition of permanence, bliss, self, and purity is also broadly termed "nature"; for this reason, in terms of marks, buddha-nature is not excluded. That they are not excluded in the remaining emptinesses below follows this same pattern.

6.31

Regarding "non-existence": first the question, next the explanation, and finally the general conclusion. In the explanation, it first clarifies that the marks of persons based on nominal designation are originally non-existent; "a foolish person..." and below clarifies that the marks of dharmas based on causal and conditional nominal designation are originally non-existent. In the former, there is first an analogy: "like a person without children saying the house is empty"; the mark of children is also absent, not merely lacking self-nature; through the ultimate observation of emptiness, there is no loved one, which is used to illustrate the dharma. This absence of the mark of a person is not the same as the absence of a personal nature in the preceding six emptinesses. In the latter, there is first an analogy: "foolish persons say the directions are empty" clarifies their difference; although fools say the directions are empty, in the limits of actual matters the directions are truly not empty. "An impoverished person says everything is empty" reveals what is shared; when an impoverished person says there are no things, the marks of things are also absent, not merely lacking self-nature. "Such views are either empty or non-empty" re-explains the preceding analogies: what the impoverished person views is truly non-existent, and so it is called "either empty"; what the foolish person views is in fact truly not empty, which is named "either non-empty". Below, it is applied to illustrate the dharma: "The bodhisattva's observation of emptiness is like the impoverished person's lack of things: everything is empty," which is not like the foolish person speaking of emptiness where there is no emptiness.

6.32

Regarding "ultimate truth": first the question, next the explanation, and finally the general conclusion. In the explanation, it first clarifies the ultimate truth, and afterwards explains emptiness in terms of it. In the former, it first explains emptiness in terms of the eye, and afterwards analogizes to all dharmas. In the latter, it first asks what is called the ultimate emptiness: because there is karma and there is retribution, it is not definitively non-existent; because it is not definitively non-existent, it is the ultimate emptiness. Because nominal existence through causes and conditions refutes non-existence, and does not take existence by intrinsic nature to refute that non-existence, it therefore also says "one does not see an agent." "Such..." and below concludes.

6.33

Regarding "the emptiness of emptiness": first the question, next the explanation, and finally the general conclusion. In the explanation there are four clauses: first, it relies on contrast to reveal its depth, being the point of confusion for śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas.

6.34

Second, it directly explains its character: "This is existence, this is non-existence—this is called the emptiness of emptiness" explains the principle in terms of provisional expression. "This is existence" refers back to the preceding ultimate emptiness; because the ultimate emptiness refutes non-existence through existence, it says "this is existence." Saying "this is non-existence" refers back to the preceding eight emptinesses; because in the preceding eight emptinesses existence is refuted through non-existence, it is called "this is non-existence." It is in terms of this existence and non-existence that the meaning of emptiness is expounded, hence it is called "the emptiness of emptiness." "This is correct, this is not correct—this is called the emptiness of emptiness" refutes provisional expression to reveal the principle. Although the preceding clause explained the principle in terms of provisional expression, it did not retain that expression, and therefore refutes it again: being that existence is correct, being that non-existence is correct—only when both are neither correct is it named the emptiness of emptiness; it does not retain existence and non-existence to speak of the emptiness of emptiness. What does this mean? As already explained above, conditionally arisen dharmas share the same essence in their existence and non-existence; because they share the same essence, non-existence is spoken of as existence, and existence is spoken of as non-existence. Because non-existence is existence, existence is precisely non-existence; because existence is non-existence, non-existence is precisely not non-existence. Being neither existent nor non-existent, it is therefore called the emptiness of emptiness.

6.35

Third, "ten abodes" and below reveals its depth in terms of persons: even bodhisattvas of the ten abodes only penetrate a small part, like a speck of dust, how much less other people?

6.36

Fourth, "Such an emptiness of emptiness is also not the same..." and below relies on contrast to reveal the difference: the treatises speak differently of what is attained by śrāvakas. In the teachings of the Abhidharma, it is said that śrāvakas first observe that the five aggregates are not self or what belongs to self, which is simply called emptiness; afterwards they observe that the preceding wisdom is also not self or what belongs to self, which is called the emptiness of emptiness. In the teachings of the *Tattvasiddhi*, they first observe that beings and dharmas are empty and lack self-nature, which is simply called emptiness; afterwards they observe that the preceding wisdom is also empty and lacks self-nature, which is called the emptiness of emptiness. What is discussed here is free from the marks of existence and non-existence, and is therefore said to be not the same.

6.37

The above ten emptinesses are similar in meaning to the equality of the ten dharmas in the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra*. There, the first one explains emptiness in general terms, and the remaining nine are specific. Among the specific ones, the first seven refute existence through non-existence, matching the first eight here. The eighth there refutes non-existence through existence, matching the ninth here. The last one there refutes both existence and non-existence through neither-existence-nor-non-existence, matching the emptiness of emptiness here.

6.38

Regarding "great emptiness": first the question, next the explanation. The prajñā of cessation and observation of all buddhas and bodhisattvas is free from all marks and free from all natures, and is therefore called empty. Being free from marks is like pure ghee: although its substance is existent, it lacks marks such as blue, yellow, red, and white. It is also like the mental consciousness of all sentient beings: although its substance is existent, it lacks marks such as large, small, long, and short. This is also like that: what kind of marks does it lack? It means neither the mark of existence nor the mark of non-existence, neither the mark of non-non-existence nor the mark of non-non-non-existence, nor the mark of both existence and non-existence together; nor the mark of self, nor the mark of other, nor the mark of neither self nor other, nor the mark of both self and other together; all such conceptual discriminations of the deluded mind do not correspond [with it] at all. Being free from nature means: within this prajñā, the buddha-dharmas as numerous as the sands of the Ganges in the dharmadhātu are vastly provided; these buddha-dharmas share the same single essential nature, and because they share the same essence, not a single dharma individually preserves its own self-nature, and hence it is called empty. This emptiness is profound and vast, and is therefore called great. Furthermore, Nāgārjuna said: "The observation of the eighteen emptinesses is called the lesser gate of wisdom; the prajñā of cessation and observation is called the great gate of wisdom." Because the essence of great wisdom is quiescent, it is called the great emptiness; this meaning is precisely that the self-essence is originally empty in the *Daśabhūmika Sūtra*: wisdom is itself empty. "This is named..." and below concludes.

6.39

The above was the second [section], which broadly explained the observation of emptiness; from here down is the third, which concludes by clarifying the benefits of observation: when practicing this observation, one attains abiding in the ground of emptiness.

6.40

The fourth [section], from "I now..." and below, concludes by clarifying the benefits of the teaching: it means that when emptiness is expounded, bodhisattvas and others as numerous as the sands of ten Ganges Rivers attain abiding in the ground of emptiness; the former was brief, and the next is extensive.

6.41

From here down is the third [section], which explains and reveals the name of the ground. The text has three clauses: the first two are freedom from obstacles, pure like space, and hence named the ground of emptiness; the latter one encompasses virtues, broad like space, and hence called the ground of emptiness. Within the first two, the first is freedom from the view of delusion, and the latter is freedom from greed and anger, both first with an analogy and then the application. In the third clause, there is first an analogy and then the application; the text in each case can be understood.

6.42

From here down next clarifies the fruits of the seven good dharmas: by cultivating the wisdom for transforming others through the seven good [dharmas], the achievement of the virtuous quality of all-knowledge that is world-transcending is their fruit. In this, it first clarifies being endowed with the eight kinds of knowledge and vision; "What benefit is attained..." and below [clarifies] attaining the four unobstructed knowledges. The former eight kinds of knowledge and vision, being broad in what is known, are named all-knowledge; the latter four unobstructed knowledges, being unimpeded in what is known, are named unobstructed knowledge. Distinguishing according to their aspects: through previously knowing the time, knowing contentment, knowing oneself, knowing the assembly, and knowing the superior and inferior, one is endowed with the eight kinds of knowledge and vision; through previously knowing the teaching and knowing the meaning, one attains the four unobstructed knowledges. Broadly speaking, both are attained together.

6.43

Among the eight kinds of knowledge and vision, first general, then specific. "With respect to all dharmas, both seeing and knowing" is the general. Within it, they are distinguished briefly through two approaches: first, explaining the meaning of the identity and difference between knowledge and vision; second, clarifying the distinction in how knowledge and vision apprehend dharmas. Regarding identity and difference: broadly interpreted, knowing and seeing are one; when distinguished, they are different.

6.44

There are five kinds of difference: First, distinguishing their difference in terms of clarity of wisdom, as the text below says: "wisdom fully comprehending dharmas is named knowing; the divine eye illuminating realms of objects is spoken of as seeing." Second, distinguishing in terms of the beginning and end of a single object: initial understanding is named knowing; reaching ultimate realization clearly is only then named seeing. Third, distinguishing in terms of right and wrong regarding a single object, as the text below says: "knowing that there is no possibility that one who practices deviant dharmas attains liberation" is named knowing; "knowing that one who practices deviant dharmas will definitely fall into hell" is spoken of as seeing because what is known is decisive; the others are also like this. Fourth, distinguishing in terms of the coarse and subtle aspects of different objects, as the text below says: "the causes and effects of unwholesome deeds are superficial, coarse, and easily understood, distinctly observed," and are spoken of as seeing; "the causes and effects of wholesome dharmas are subtle and difficult to recognize, difficult to illuminate clearly," and are spoken of as knowing. Just as with wholesome and unwholesome, so too with mundane and supramundane, Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, whether cause or effect. Fifth, distinguishing in terms of the depth and shallowness of different objects: conventional truth is coarse and shallow, and knowing it clearly is spoken of as seeing; ultimate truth is profound and obscure, difficult to see clearly, and is therefore spoken of as knowing. Thus, in the text below, knowing the marks of permanence, impermanence, suffering, bliss, and so forth is named seeing; fully knowing buddha-nature and the Tathāgata's dharmakāya is named knowing. Furthermore, the differences between the two truths are easy to understand and distinctly illuminated, which is spoken of as seeing; the one reality is profound and mysterious, difficult to illuminate and see, which is named knowing. The identity and difference between knowledge and vision is distinguished briefly in this way.

6.45

Next, clarifying the distinction in how knowledge and vision apprehend dharmas: specifically, there are three kinds: First, knowing but not seeing, as the text below says: "knowing that sentient beings practice deviant dharmas, yet not seeing that those persons attain the fruit of liberation," and so on for all such cases. Second, both seeing and knowing, as the text below says: "seeing beings commit evil and fall into the evil destinies; knowing beings cultivate good, are born among devas and humans, and attain liberation," and so on for all such cases. Third, both seeing and knowing, and neither seeing nor knowing, as the text below says: "conforming to conventional speech, there are men, women, and so forth that can be seen and known; if conforming to the words of the holy one's secret treasury, there are no men, women, houses, or the like that cannot be seen or known," and so on for all such cases. Why is "seeing but not knowing" not mentioned? Knowing is easy, while seeing is difficult; wherever there is seeing, there is always knowing, which is why it is not mentioned. There is this distinction in how knowledge and vision apprehend dharmas; here in the general section, it brings up what is essential, and therefore simply says "both seeing and knowing."

6.46

"If practice..." and below is the specific: in the specific, first it sets forth the chapter headings; second, the general conclusion; third, extensive distinction; fourth, the general conclusion. In the preceding opening of headings, according to the conclusion there should be eight headings; however, in the present text one is missing, so if expounded there are only seven.

6.47

Among the eight headings, the first one knows what is wrong, and the latter seven know what is right. In the former knowing what is wrong, "if the conditions of practice": knowing that the conditions of deviant dharmas do not allow one to attain deliverance and liberation, hence called "conditions of practice."

6.48

In the latter knowing what is right, the first two know the principle of cause and effect, and the latter five know the dharmas of practice. In the former two, "whether nature or mark": this single heading knows the principle of the marks of dharmas of the two truths; fully knowing buddha-nature is named "nature"; knowing the differences in the marks of dharmas such as suffering, bliss, permanence, and impermanence is termed "marks." "Whether cause or condition": this single heading knows the facts of causes and effects; knowing that evil causes and conditions lead to falling into the evil destinies, and wholesome karmic causes and conditions lead to birth in good destinies and attaining liberation, is therefore called "causes and conditions."

6.49

Regarding the latter five [gates]: the first is knowing the sequence of cultivating the mind; the next is knowing the person to rely upon; the next two are knowing the practices and deeds that are cultivated; the last one is knowing the Dharma to rely upon. Regarding the first, the sequence of cultivating the mind: "mind" is the sentient being's mind of faith and joy; "faculties" are the sentient being's faculties of the Mahāyāna or Hīnayāna; mundane wholesome dharmas generated by relying on these are called "dhyāna-concentration"; the supramundane noble path generated by relying on these is called the "vehicle." These four know a person's sequence of cultivating the mind as mutually accomplishing from beginning to end, and hence they are combined into one. Next, the one gate concerning the person to rely upon: "if [they know] spiritual friends" means knowing the buddhas and bodhisattvas as good spiritual friends. Next, the two gates concerning what is cultivated: first, "if [they know] upholding precepts" means knowing their conduct in precepts—it explains below that there are bodily precepts and mental wisdom, but here it briefly mentions precepts. The phrase "if [they know] giving" means knowing their practice of giving, which is slightly lower down. The one gate "if [they know] teaching" means knowing practice that relies upon the Dharma.

6.50

Having concluded the distinct explanations above, it summarizes with: "all such dharmas are known and seen."

6.51

Next, it explains them extensively, which is not in the same order as before. First, extensively explaining the initial gate, "if [they know] actions, if [they know] conditions, abiding in this ground, they know but do not see" summarizes and introduces it. Below, it distinguishes their characteristics: first it extensively clarifies knowing, and afterwards reveals not seeing; the text's sense can be understood.

6.52

Next, it skips ahead to extensively explain the third, causes and conditions: "Furthermore, the bodhisattva both sees and knows" summarizes and introduces it. Below, it distinguishes them: practicing evil and falling into wretched realms is coarse, apparent, and easy to understand; observing it clearly is therefore called seeing. Cultivating the good and attaining liberation is subtle, hidden, and difficult to recognize; contemplation and illumination being difficult to clarify, it is therefore not called seeing, but spoken of as knowing.

6.53

Next, it turns back to extensively explain the second gate, nature and marks: "Furthermore, the bodhisattva both sees and knows" summarizes and introduces it. Below, it distinguishes them: permanence, impermanence, and so forth are conventional truth; the marks of dharmas are coarse and apparent, easy to discern and understand, and knowing them clearly is therefore called seeing. Impermanence, suffering, and so forth are dharmas of birth and death; permanence, bliss, self, and so forth are the dharmas of the Buddha's nirvāṇa of expedient means; the Tathāgata's dharmakāya and sentient beings' buddha-nature are profound, subtle, and difficult to fathom; knowing them is difficult to make clear, so it is not called seeing, but merely spoken of as knowing. Therein, it first clarifies knowing the Buddha's dharmakāya, and afterwards clarifies knowing the nature.

6.54

Next, it extensively explains the fourth: mind, faculties, dhyāna, and vehicle: "Furthermore, the bodhisattva both sees and knows" summarizes and introduces it. Below, it distinguishes them: in this gate, knowing through wisdom is called knowing, and seeing with the eyes is called seeing. First, knowing sentient beings' mind, faculties, dhyāna, and vehicle directly expands the previous gate; afterwards, seeing sentient beings' emerging and submerging in birth and death is discussed in contrast to it.

6.55

In the former, there is first a question, next an analysis, and finally a conclusion. In the analysis, "knowing that the generation of the mind of faith is accomplished" explains the previous "if the mind seeks the Mahāyāna"; it cuts off the previous "if the faculties"; relying on faculties to proceed toward dharmas is therefore called seeking. The vehicle and faculties differ, and what is proceeded toward is diverse; here it mentions seeking the Mahāyāna, leaving aside the Hīnayāna. "This person follows [the stream]," and so forth, explains the preceding "if dhyāna, if the vehicle": following the stream is dhyāna; going against the stream, standing upright, and reaching the shore are the previous vehicle. Cultivating the eight mundane dhyānas is the dharma of ordinary persons; conforming to birth and death, it is therefore called following the stream. Cultivating the noble path to transcend birth and death is therefore called going against the stream, up to reaching the shore. The explanation below may be understood.

6.56

In the seeing, there is first a question, next an analysis, and finally a conclusion. In the analysis, the opening statement, "the bodhisattva cultivates pure conduct," clarifies that upon which seeing relies; "with the pure divine eye" adduces that which is capable of seeing. Below, it clarifies what is seen: first seeing sentient beings committing evil and plunging downward, next seeing sentient beings cultivating good and ascending, and afterwards seeing sentient beings transmigrating, emerging, and submerging. Emerging from the three wretched realms and re-entering the three wretched realms is called "entering darkness from darkness"; emerging from the three wretched realms and ascending to be born among humans or devas is called "entering light from darkness"; relinquishing a human or deva body and plunging into the three wretched realms is called "entering darkness from light"; passing from one wholesome realm into another is called "entering light from light."

6.57

From here, it skips ahead to extensively explain the sixth, precepts: previously it simply mentioned precepts, but here it fully clarifies bodily precepts and mental wisdom: "Furthermore, the bodhisattva both knows and sees" summarizes and introduces it. Below, it distinguishes them: first, "knowing that sentient beings cultivate bodily precepts," and so forth, directly expands the previous gate; afterwards, seeing that they do not cultivate bodily precepts, mind, and so forth, is discussed in contrast to it. Regarding the former, knowing: it first analyzes, and then concludes. In the analysis there are two parts: first, seeing that through cultivating our bodily precepts, mental wisdom, and pure conduct, they turn heavy [karmic retribution] into light—bodily precepts and mental wisdom are extensively analyzed below; second, from "how" downward, seeing that through cultivating repentance and deeds that eradicate transgressions, they turn heavy into light—first asking, then analyzing. "Repenting and confessing" is the practice of eradicating transgressions; "never committing them again and perfecting shame and remorse" is the practice of guarding against faults; "making offerings to the Three Jewels" is the practice of taking refuge in the good; "constantly reproaching oneself" is the practice of regretting faults; "due to these karmic conditions," they turn heavy into light. In the seeing, there is first a question, next an analysis, and finally a conclusion. In the analysis there are two parts: first, seeing that through not cultivating bodily precepts, mental wisdom, and pure conduct, they turn light into heavy; second, from "this person has little reflection and cannot repent" downward, seeing that because they do not cultivate the practice of repentance, confession, and eradicating transgressions, they turn light into heavy.

6.58

Next, it turns back to extensively explain the fifth gate, good spiritual friends. Those good spiritual friends are of three grades: first, lower-grade spiritual friends, who know but do not see, referring to the various bodhisattvas from the gotra-bhūmi up to the ninth ground, who know that all sentient beings possess buddha-nature; although they know it, because afflictions cover their minds, they are unable to see it; second, middle-grade spiritual friends, namely, the various bodhisattvas of the ten abodes, who know that all sentient beings possess buddha-nature, but their seeing is not distinct, like seeing at night—this is revealed by metaphor; third, upper-grade spiritual friends, referring to the buddhas, the Tathāgatas, who see that all sentient beings possess buddha-nature, seeing it clearly and distinctly.

6.59

Next, it skips ahead to extensively explain the eighth, teaching: "Furthermore, there is seeing and knowing, and not seeing and not knowing" summarizes and introduces it. Below, it distinguishes them: conforming to worldly language, there are such things as men and women, pots and jars, carts and vehicles, houses and residences, which can be known and seen, which is called seeing and called knowing; relying on the holy ones' secret words that dismantle marks, there are no men, women, and so forth that can be seen or known, which is called not knowing and not seeing.

6.60

Next, it extensively explains the seventh, giving: "there is knowing and not seeing" summarizes and introduces it. Below, it analyzes its marks: relying on the teaching's conventional truth, there is giving that can be understood, and therefore it is called knowing; knowing the wealth relinquished is called knowing what is given; knowing the offering to the Three Jewels is called knowing the place of offering; knowing the person who receives the gift is called knowing the recipient; knowing that giving is the cause and afterwards receiving the fruition and retribution is called knowing cause and effect; knowing such things as these is called knowing giving. In ultimate truth, there is no giving that can be seen, and therefore it is called not seeing, which can be understood as the reversal of the preceding.

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