俱舍論疏 14

English (machine translation) 14

Language: English

On the Śāstra's statement: "Incidental discussions having been completed... to ...the marks of intimation and non-intimation": Up to this point, the two, three, and five karmas as well as the incidental discussions have been explained. From this point below is the second major section of the text, explaining the three [categories of] saṃvara and the rest; it first generally designates the three distinctions, and afterwards explains them separately according to the headings. This half-verse is the first [part], generally designating the three.

14.4

[On the statement] "The Śāstra says: ... to ...neither-saṃvara": This lists the three names.

14.5

On the Śāstra's statement: "Capable of preventing and capable of extinguishing... to ...how many varieties are there": From this point is the second [part], explaining them separately according to the headings. Being about to explain saṃvara, it first explains the name and asks about the number. These three saṃvaras can prevent future unwholesome morality from arising in continuation, and can extinguish already-arisen unwholesome morality, enabling wholesome continuation; hence they are named saṃvara. Non-saṃvara is the opposite of this; "neither" is the negation of both. The question about the number is evident. The half-verse below lists the three types of saṃvara.

14.6

[On the statement] "The Śāstra says: ... to ...namely, the undefiled morality": This points out the names and essential natures of the three. As for the expression "entanglements of desire and so forth," it is like a market entanglement. The prātimokṣa morality is bound to the desire realm, so it is called desire-entanglement morality; dhyāna-saṃvara is bound to the form realm, so it is called form-entanglement morality; the path-born saṃvara is not bound to the three realms, so it is called anāsrava morality.

14.7

On the Śāstra's statement: "What are the distinguishing characteristics of the initial saṃvara?": From this point below there are thirteen sections: 1. explaining the characteristics of prātimokṣa; 2. establishing the four saṃvaras; 3. explaining the multiple names of saṃvara; 4. explaining possession; 5. explaining the acquisition of the three saṃvaras; 6. explaining the limits of wholesome and unwholesome morality; 7. explaining upavāsa; 8. explaining upāsaka; 9. explaining the bases of acquisition; 10. explaining the branches and causes; 11. explaining unwholesome morality and the intermediate; 12. explaining abandonment; 13. explaining bases. This is the first, explaining the characteristics of prātimokṣa.

14.8

[On the statement] "The Śāstra says: ... to ...prātimokṣa-saṃvara": This lists the eight names and subsumes them under the first one. In Sanskrit it is *bhikṣu*, in the Tang language named "mendicant" (*qishi*) and so forth; the old rendering *biqiu* is corrupt. *Bhikṣuṇī*: *ṇī* is the feminine gender. In Sanskrit it is *śikṣamāṇā*, in the Tang language "trainee" (*zhengxue*), meaning one who trains in the six dharmas. The six dharmas are: 1. not engaging in sexual misconduct, 2. not stealing, 3. not killing, 4. not lying, 5. not drinking alcohol, 6. not eating at improper times. In Sanskrit the name is *śrāmaṇeraka*, in the Tang language named "zealous aspirant" (*qince*); the old rendering *shami* is a corrupt abbreviation. "Female zealous aspirant" (*śrāmaṇerikā*) shares the old name: *shamini*, where *ni* is the feminine gender, which is corrupt. In Sanskrit it is *upāsaka*, in the Tang language "attendant" (*jinshi*); the old name *youposai* is corrupt. As for "attendant," the *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 123, says: "Question: Why is it named *upāsaka* ('attendant')? Answer: Because they draw near to and practice all wholesome dharmas. That is to say, their bodies and minds habituate wholesome dharmas, hence they are named attendants. Question: If so, should all who do not sever wholesome roots be named attendants, since their bodies and minds all practice wholesome deeds? Answer: Not so, for this name is established relying on the sublime conduct and wholesome dharmas subsumed under saṃvara. Question: If so, are all saṃvaras named attendants, since they all can cultivate the wholesomeness of saṃvara? Answer: This receives its name from being at the beginning, whereas the other saṃvaras are established on account of other factors. Other masters say: Because they draw near to and serve good persons. Still others say: Because they draw near to and serve the Buddha's teachings." In Sanskrit it is *upāsikā*, in the Tang language "female attendant" (*jinshi nü*); *kā* is the feminine gender, and the old rendering *youpoyi* is corrupt. In Sanskrit it is *upavāsa*, in the Tang language "dwelling near" (*jinzhu*). The *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 124, says: "Dwelling near the arhats, one receives this saṃvara and emulates their training. Some say: Because one dwells near to those who observe the lifelong precepts. Some say: Because this precept is observed for a proximate [short] time, it is called dwelling near. Among these eight, the first five are the renunciant precepts and the latter three are the householder precepts; the first seven are received for life, while the eighth is for one day and night. Question: Why are these established on the basis of prātimokṣa-saṃvara, and not established on the basis of dhyāna and anāsrava-saṃvara? Answer: For these eight kinds of precepts, the recipient's resolve differs in quantity, so through the distinctions of conditions for the precepts they are divided into eight kinds; the persons receiving the training differ. As for the concentrations and the path-saṃvara, they are simply acquired instantaneously in their seven branches for the sake of obtaining that concentration; they are not divided into upāsaka and so forth by virtue of the recipient's resolve and conditions for the precepts. Yet there are distinctions among the four dhyānas and the various fruits, and their meanings each differ; they cannot be treated as identical."

14.9

On the Śāstra's statement: "Although there are eight designations... to ...because their characteristics are individually distinct": This explains that the essence of the eight saṃvaras is only four. The eight are from bhikṣu and bhikṣuṇī through to upavāsa. The four are: the combination of bhikṣu and bhikṣuṇī; the combination of śikṣamāṇā, śrāmaṇera, and śrāmaṇerikā; the combination of upāsikā and upāsaka; and upavāsa alone. The essences of these four saṃvaras are individually distinct.

14.10

On the Śāstra's statement: "Why is that?": This asks the reason for the combination.

14.11

On the Śāstra's statement: "Apart from the bhikṣu-saṃvara... to ...the upāsikā-saṃvara": This explains that because they are identical, there are only four.

14.12

On the Śāstra's statement: "How is it known to be so?": This asks the reason for their identity.

14.13

On the Śāstra's statement: "Due to the alteration of physical gender... to ...they are not distinct from the three essences": This answers the reason for their identity. Since at the stage of the transformation of the sex-faculty one merely loses the designation but does not lose the essence, we know that they are one.

14.14

On the Śāstra's statement: "If from an upāsaka... to ...all arise completely and at once": This questions whether the constituent entities of the upāsaka, śrāmaṇera, and bhikṣu saṃvaras are identical or different. Is it that there are first four branches and later three branches are added, like a single and double coin? Fifty and twenty: on top of the single one is added, which is named double; on top of twenty thirty is added, which is named fifty. Or is it that one first receives four branches, and then receives seven branches, so that the complete seven branches later arise completely and at once, rather than merely supplementing the previous four?

14.15

On the Śāstra's statement: "The three kinds of saṃvara... to ...in accordance with their applicability": This answers that the three each have distinct essences. If one is a bhikṣu, he possesses all three kinds of four branches within his person, and their essences are individually distinct.

14.16

On the Śāstra's statement: "How is that so?": This asks about the circumstances.

14.17

On the Śāstra's statement: "In whatever manner one seeks and receives... to ...the abstinences differ": This answers concerning the circumstances. Because the conditions under which the three kinds of saṃvara are received differ, the essences of the precepts are individually distinct.

14.18

On the Śāstra's statement: "If this were not the case... to ...therefore the three are individually distinct": This is a counter-objection. Since when one is abandoned the other two still remain, we know that their essences are distinct.

14.19

The treatise says: "Yet these three […] would then not be upāsakas and so forth." The preceding [passage] explained that due to differences in conditions, the moral disciplines differ; this [passage] explains that they are not contradictory. One receives a later [discipline] without renouncing an earlier one, so "lest renouncing the monk's precepts should mean one is no longer an upāsaka and so forth" is an answer framed as a reductio ad absurdum. Fascicle 124 of the Vibhāṣā says: "Question: If one who has not previously received the upāsaka-saṃvara directly receives the śrāmaṇera-saṃvara, does he obtain the śrāmaṇera-saṃvara or not? Some say: He does not obtain it, because the upāsaka-saṃvara serves as the gateway, the support, and the preparatory application (prayoga) for this [śrāmaṇera] saṃvara. Some say: It is not fixed. If he does not know that one must first receive the upāsaka-saṃvara and only afterwards receive and obtain the śrāmaṇera-saṃvara, and out of faith in the precept-master he receives this saṃvara, he obtains the saṃvara, while the precept-master incurs an offense. But if he clearly understands that first receiving the upāsaka-saṃvara and afterwards receiving the śrāmaṇera-saṃvara is the correct procedure, yet out of arrogance does not wish to receive and train in the upāsaka-saṃvara, saying: 'What use is receiving these inferior upāsaka precepts?'—then, with his mind bound by arrogance, even if he undergoes the ritual he does not obtain it. As it is said regarding receiving the śrāmaṇera [discipline] without receiving the upāsaka-saṃvara, so it is with receiving the bhikṣu-saṃvara without receiving the śrāmaṇera [discipline]. The detailed explanation is also like this." The Nyāyānusāra says: "If there is a śrāmaṇera who receives the upāsaka-saṃvara, or a bhikṣu who receives the preceding two sets of precepts, do they obtain them or not? Some make this statement: One should not question this. If they already possess them previously, there is no reason to obtain them again, because they were already obtained before. If they did not possess them previously, then they would be neither a śrāmaṇera nor a bhikṣu, because if one has not previously received the upāsaka-saṃvara, there is definitely no principle by which one can obtain the śrāmaṇera precepts; and if one has not previously received the śrāmaṇera-saṃvara, there is also no principle by which one can obtain the bhikṣu precepts; thus neither designation could be established. Inferring in this way, upon receiving [the earlier ones later] one would not obtain them. Other masters say: Even without receiving the preceding saṃvara, there is indeed a principle whereby one can immediately receive and obtain the subsequent precepts. Therefore, the Vinaya-holders recite: 'Although one did not previously receive the śrāmaṇera precepts, one who now simply receives the complete saṃvara (upasampadā) is also said to have properly received the complete saṃvara.' From this, it is possible for a śrāmaṇera to receive and obtain the upāsaka-saṃvara, and it is possible for a bhikṣu to receive and obtain the śrāmaṇera and upāsaka precepts. [Objection:] Is it not the case that a śrāmaṇera should not declare of himself: 'May you bear witness, I am an upāsaka'? The same holds for a bhikṣu: he should not declare of himself: 'May you bear witness, I am [either of] the preceding two.' For apart from such an act of declaring one's designation, there is no principle for obtaining the upāsaka or śrāmaṇera precepts. [Answer:] This objection is unreasonable, because both can be declared. That is, one may declare: 'I am a śrāmaṇera and also an upāsaka; may you bear witness.' A bhikṣu should also speak in this way. Nevertheless, manifesting those two designations in terms of the superior precepts is also without error. If so, a śrāmaṇera and a bhikṣu and so forth should also receive and obtain the upavāsa-saṃvara. Just as they obtain the upāsaka [discipline], what harm is there in admitting [this]? However, because it is inferior, none desire to receive it. (The commentary explains: The former statement agrees with the earlier master in the Vibhāṣā; the latter statement agrees with the later master in the Vibhāṣā. There is no critical verdict in the text. Examining the intent of the Nyāyānusāra, it adopts the position of the latter master.)"

14.20

The treatise says: "Upāsaka, upavāsa […] how are they established?" From here down is a verse, the second [part], which establishes the four saṃvaras.

14.21

"The treatise says: […] fifth, drinking various intoxicating liquors" establishes the upāsaka.

14.22

The treatise says: "If one receives the abstention from eight […] eighth, eating food at improper times" establishes the upavāsa.

14.23

The treatise says: "If one receives the abstention from ten […] as the tenth" establishes the śrāmaṇera.

14.24

The treatise says: "If one receives abstention from all […] bhikṣu-saṃvara" establishes the bhikṣu. The Vibhāṣā says: "Abstaining from applying ornaments, scents, and garlands, and [abstaining from] singing, dancing, and theatrical performances—these two both operate with respect to the locus of adornment; therefore the abstention from the two is combined to form a single branch." Furthermore, the Nyāyānusāra says: "In order to guide household beings who are fearful of numerous training rules and to show that it is easy to observe, two are combined into one among the eight precepts. Just as, for the Vṛjiputra, the training rules were taught in brief as three. (The commentary states: According to this, because the faculties of renunciants are mature, they do not fear numerous training rules, and so they are separated into two. Furthermore, householders attend to worldly affairs to generate a livelihood, so they may also be permitted to store gold, silver, and so forth. It would not be right for this single-day-and-night precept to require renouncing gold and so forth, only to store them up again later. Renunciants support themselves by begging, so not storing gold and so forth is easy, and it is for their whole life. Therefore, they are prohibited from storing gold, silver, and so forth.)"

14.25

The treatise says: "Regarding the various designations of the prātimokṣa-saṃvara…" From here down there is one verse, the third [part], explaining the various designations of the prātimokṣa-saṃvara.

14.26

"The treatise says: […] therefore it is called śīla" is the first, giving the primary names. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Because it is cooling, it is called śīla. Here śīla has the meaning of leveling and correcting (śamana/śīlana); therefore, in treatises on etymology, the explanation is given thus: 'In the sense of leveling and correcting, the precept of śīla is established; because it can level precipitous [bad] karma, it obtains the name śīla.' (The commentary explains: Precipitous karma is bad discipline. Leveling the bad discipline of burning torment, it is therefore called pure.)" It has six names: first, śīla; second, good conduct (sucarita); third, action (karma); fourth, discipline (saṃvara); fifth, individual liberation (prātimokṣa); sixth, course of action (karmapatha).

14.27

The treatise says: "Because the wise praise it, it is called good conduct," explaining the second name.

14.28

The treatise says: "Because it is the intrinsic nature of what is done, it is called karma," the third name.

14.29

The treatise says: "Does not avijñapti […] the intrinsic nature of what is done?" is a question. Because the sūtras say that avijñapti-saṃvara is called non-performing and also called non-doing, since it is called non-doing, how can it be karma?

14.30

The treatise says: "One who possesses shame […] obtains the name 'what is done'" is the answer. Because avijñapti prevents the doing of evil, it is called non-doing; but because it is what is made by manifest volition (cetanā), avijñapti precepts obtain the designation 'what is done.'

14.31

The treatise says: "Other masters explain […] there is no fault in calling it an action," reciting an alternative explanation. Because it arises from an action, it is the effect of an action; because it gives rise to subsequent action, it is the cause of an action. The cause takes the name of the effect, and the effect takes the name of the cause; hence there is no fault in calling it an action. Master Tai explains: "To seek unmanifested [discipline], one initiates active karma—this is the cause of action; at the precise time of generating action, one initiates unmanifested [discipline]—this is the effect of action."

14.32

The treatise says: "Because it guards body and speech, it is called discipline (saṃvara)," the fourth name. Because the power of these precepts guards against evil bodily and verbal [actions] according with proper Dharma conduct, it is called discipline.

14.33

The treatise says: "Thus it should be understood […] without distinction in designations," which explains the two words 'both obtain' in the verse. One should know that these four names—śīla, good conduct, action, and discipline—apply equally to both the initial and subsequent moments.

14.34

The treatise says: "Only in the initial moment […] and the designation 'course of action'," explaining that only in the initial moment are these two designations established.

14.35

The treatise says: "Namely, at the time of receiving the precepts […] the name prātimokṣa is established," explaining prātimokṣa. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Or because it is what ought to be cultivated at the very beginning, it is called prātimokṣa. Or because its initial arising can most effectively transcend the precipitous evil destinies that are like a prison, it is called prātimokṣa."

14.36

The treatise says: "At that very time […] the designation 'course of action' is established," explaining karmapatha. The Nyāyānusāra says: "It also obtains the designation of root course of action (maula-karmapatha). Because it initially guards body and speech, it fulfills intentional action. (The commentary explains: Just as it is easy for people to walk and tread along a path, so it is with courses of bodily and verbal action. The meaning of intentional action walking and traversing is identical, so it is called a course of action.)"

14.37

The treatise says: "Therefore, the initial moment […] the root courses of action," concluding the designations.

14.38

The treatise says: "From the second moment onward […] are called subsequent factors (pṛṣṭha)," explaining why from the second moment onward they are not called courses of action and not called prātimokṣa.

14.39

The treatise says: "Who possesses which discipline?" From here down is the fourth [part], explaining possession (samanvāgama). Within the text there are four parts: first, explaining the persons who possess the three disciplines; second, opportunely explaining the discipline of abandoning (prahāṇa-saṃvara); third, by digression, explaining the discipline of the mental faculty (manas) and sense faculties (indriya); fourth, explaining the divisions of time of possession. This subsequent single verse explains the persons who possess the three disciplines.

14.40

"The treatise says: […] up to the upavāsa" explains the persons who possess the prātimokṣa.

14.41

The treatise says: "Do non-Buddhists have no precepts that they receive?" is a question.

14.42

The treatise says: "Although they have them, they are not called […] because they rely on and cling to existence" is the answer. Because non-Buddhists receive precepts seeking the three realms of existence, they are not called prātimokṣa.

14.43

The treatise says: "Those born in dhyāna […] here it should also be so" explains the persons who possess the dhyāna-born discipline (dhyāna-saṃvara). All who attain dhyāna and the threshold concentration (anāgamya) obtain this discipline.

14.44

The treatise says: "The discipline born of the Path […] refers to the Śaikṣas and Aśaikṣas" explains the persons who possess the path-born discipline.

14.45

The treatise says: "Among those distinguished earlier […] which are the two?" asks about the disciplines that conform to the mind (cittānuvartin).

14.46

The treatise says: "Namely, the dhyāna-born […] not the prātimokṣa" answers: two are, and one is not.

14.47

The treatise says: "Why is that?" inquires why the prātimokṣa does not conform to the mind.

14.48

The treatise says: "Because it continues constantly even during different minds or mindlessness" is the answer. 'Different minds' refers to unwholesome and indeterminate minds. 'Mindlessness' refers to the cessation attainment (nirodhasamāpatti).

14.49

The treatise says: "The two disciplines of dhyāna and anāsrava…" From here down is half a verse, the second [part], explaining the discipline of abandoning (prahāṇa-saṃvara).

14.50

"The treatise says: […] is called the discipline of abandoning" explains the discipline. Because it can permanently abandon the evil discipline of the desire realm's entanglements and the defilements that give rise to it, it is called the discipline of abandoning. Because this discipline is itself abandonment, it is called prahāṇa-saṃvara. Fascicle 117 of the Vibhāṣā says: "There are four kinds of discipline: first, prātimokṣa; second, dhyāna; third, anāsrava; fourth, prahāṇa-saṃvara. That is, taking a portion from each of the two disciplines of dhyāna and anāsrava—the conforming discipline within the nine uninterrupted paths (ānantaryamārga) that abandon the defilement of the desire realm […]. Question: Why is only this called the discipline of abandoning? Answer: Because it serves as the antidote of abandoning (prahāṇa-pratipakṣa) for the breach of precepts and the defilements that give rise to the breach of precepts. That is, the two conforming disciplines in the first eight uninterrupted paths only serve as the antidote of abandoning for the defilements that give rise to the breach of precepts; the two conforming disciplines in the ninth uninterrupted path serve as the antidote of abandoning for both the breach of precepts and the defilements that give rise to the breach of precepts." According to fascicle 17 of the Vibhāṣā, there are five antidotes: first, abandonment (vihāna); second, cutting off (prahāṇa); third, maintenance (dhāraṇa); fourth, distance (dūrībhāva); fifth, disgust (vidūṣaṇā). The initial preparatory path (prayoga-mārga) of the threshold concentration serves as the abandonment antidote against the evil actions of breaking precepts, because upon first entering concentration, one abandons the possession of the evil of breaking precepts. The first eight uninterrupted paths serve as the antidote of cutting off and so forth against the defilements that give rise to the evil of breaking precepts; the ninth uninterrupted path serves as the antidote of cutting off against both the evil of breaking precepts and the defilements that give rise to it. The five higher dhyāna stages serve as the disgust, maintenance, and distance antidotes against the evil of breaking precepts and defilements. The formless realm serves as the distance antidote against the evil of breaking precepts and defilements.

14.51

The treatise says: "Thereby, there may be […] as appropriate, should be understood," which is a fourfold analysis, comprehensible according to the text.

14.52

The treatise says: "If so, regarding the summary precepts spoken by the World-Honoured One…" The lower half-verse is the third [part], explaining by digression the discipline of the mind and the sense faculties. If discipline is exclusively avijñapti-rūpa, why do the summary precepts say even: 'Discipline of the mind is good', and sūtras also speak of the discipline of the eye faculty? "What is the intrinsic nature of this discipline of the mind and sense faculties?" is a question.

14.53

The treatise says: "The intrinsic nature of these two is not avijñapti-rūpa" is the answer.

14.54

The treatise says: "If so, what is it?" is the question. The lower half-verse provides the answer.

14.55

"The treatise says: […] indicates they are not respectively arranged" explains the verse text. When it says that correct knowledge (samprajanya) and correct mindfulness (smṛti) are combined, it means combining this mindfulness and wisdom as the discipline of the mind, and combining this wisdom and mindfulness as the discipline of the sense faculties. The combined phrasing indicates that they do not correspond in sequential order. Correct knowledge is the discipline of the mind, and correct mindfulness is the discipline of the sense faculties; because correct knowledge and correct mindfulness can guard against evil, they are called discipline.

14.56

As for the treatise stating, "Now we should examine informative and uninformative [karma]," from here down is the fourth [major section], which explains time periods. Within the text there are six parts: first, explaining the time periods for possessing wholesome and unwholesome precepts; second, explaining the time periods for possessing the intermediate [uninformative karma]; third, explaining the time periods for those abiding in the two [types of] precepts while additionally possessing intermediate [uninformative karma]; fourth, explaining the time periods for informative [karma]; fifth, in connection with that, explaining the multiple names of unwholesome precepts; and sixth, a fourfold categorization. This text is the first.

14.57

As for "The treatise states […] constantly possesses the present": this explains possession of the present. "An individual abiding in prātimokṣa" clarifies the person who possesses prātimokṣa. "Until it is relinquished, they constantly possess the present世" clarifies that one definitely possesses the present.

14.58

As for the treatise stating, "This prātimokṣa […] flows universally to the subsequent": this explains universally possessing the past. For a person abiding in prātimokṣa, until it is relinquished, in the initial moment they only possess the present; after the second moment, they universally possess the past.

14.59

As for the treatise stating, "There is no uninformative [karma] without distraction […] because its power is weak": this explains the reason for not possessing the future. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Why is it that the prātimokṣa precepts obtained in a previous life, at the initial moment of receiving the precepts in the present life, are not possessed as past like dhyāna-saṃvara? This objection is unreasonable, because these precepts and the mind do not share the same fruit. Minds free from defilement and so forth all share one and the same fruit; therefore those precepts, like the mind, obtain past births. Furthermore, because prātimokṣa has never been obtained before, it should be like superior dhyāna-saṃvara, where one does not obtain past births in the initial moment (Explanation: 'minds free from defilement and so forth' includes all minds possessing precepts and concentration, because they all share the same fruit with the precepts. 'Superior dhyāna' refers to that which has never arisen from beginningless time)."

14.60

As for the treatise stating, "As it is said that one abiding […] also possesses the past": this explains unwholesome precepts. Like the wholesome saṃvara, they are possessed in the present and past [times].

14.61

As for the treatise stating, "All those who have obtained […] because they will certainly re-obtain them": this explains that dhyāna-saṃvara is possessed in the past and future. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Here, one should state a qualification. Because the saṃvara of concentration subsumed under the aids to penetration is not possessed as past in the initial moment. That obtained in another life is relinquished at the time of death, and in the present life there is no possibility of re-obtaining it. Furthermore, it has not been generated by all sentient beings before, for only those who possess the nature of nirvāṇa can have it (Accordingly, those possessing nirvāṇa are those who possess the wholesome [roots] conducive to liberation onward, because prior to the aids to liberation there is no possibility of having the precepts of 'heat' and so forth; thus it should be explained with distinction. If conjoined with 'heat' and so forth, the precepts are not definitively possessed as past, because once relinquished they are not re-obtained. If they are other precepts of concentration, they are possessed as past. This should be stated with a qualification)."

14.62

As for the treatise stating, "All noble ones […] because it has not previously arisen": this explains the precepts of the path. It is only excluded in the initial single moment of the receptive tolerance of dharma-knowledge of suffering, in which one does not possess the past, because at that time there is as yet no past path. All other noble ones, up until they enter [nirvāṇa] without remainder, in accordance with the aforementioned, all possess the past and future.

14.63

As for the treatise stating, "If one currently abides […] one possesses the present": this explains that the precepts of concentration and the path are possessed in the present. The Nyāyānusāra says: "In principle, it should simply be said that when one is in concentration or the path, one possesses the present. With regard to the uninformative [karma] of concentration and the path, one should not say 'abiding'; just as the phrase 'abiding in the fruit' speaks only of the acquisition of the fruit, not of the fruit's actual manifestation. Now by merely saying 'abiding', how is it known that concentration and the path are actually present, rather than merely possessed? Therefore, what was said still gives rise to doubt and cannot definitively prove possession of present uninformative [karma]. Hence one should merely say 'being in concentration and the path'; although the word 'abiding' was spoken, it is an unnecessary labor." Now, examining its intention: the preceding text has already spoken of possessing past and future; this sentence specifically clarifies possession of the intermediate time [the present]. Therefore we know that speaking of 'abiding' indicates its arising, not mere possession. Because it proves possession of the present by not being mere possession; since the uninformative [karma] of concentration and the path follows the mind, when a distracted mind is present, they definitely do not exist.

14.64

As for the treatise stating, "Having explained abiding in wholesome and unwholesome saṃvara": the second half of the verse is the second part, on possessing intermediate uninformative [karma].

14.65

As for "The treatise states […] subsumed under these categories": this explains that the intermediate state mostly lacks uninformative [karma]; if there is uninformative [karma], it is categorized under wholesome or unwholesome.

14.66

As for the treatise stating, "In that initial moment […] is said to possess the present": this explains possession of the present along with the words in the verse.

14.67

As for the treatise stating, "After the initial moment […] uninformative [karma] of two times": this explains possessing the two times, which can be understood from the text.

14.68

As for the treatise stating, "If there are those who abide in saṃvara or asaṃvara": from here down, the third [part], one verse, explains that a person abiding in saṃvara or asaṃvara possesses intermediate wholesome or unwholesome uninformative [karma].

14.69

As for "The treatise states […] unwholesome uninformative [karma]": this explains that one abiding in saṃvara possesses unwholesome uninformative [karma], which can be understood from the text.

14.70

As for the treatise stating, "Abiding in asaṃvara […] various wholesome uninformative [karma]": this explains that one with unwholesome precepts possesses wholesome uninformative [karma].

14.71

As for the treatise stating, "Up to the point where these two minds […] generally possesses the past and present": this explains possessing both times. Regarding these two minds not being cut off, the Miśrakābhidharmahṛdaya says: "Until one is bound by those entanglements, and until they are exhausted, one should know that as soon as these two minds cease, the uninformative [karma] is immediately cut off. This is slightly different from those who do not abide in saṃvara or asaṃvara."

14.72

As for the treatise stating, "Having explained uninformative [karma], how is informative [karma] possessed?": from here down, the fourth [part], one verse, explains the possession of informative [karma].

14.73

As for "The treatise states […] constantly possesses present informative [karma]": this explains that at the very time informative karma is being performed, one constantly possesses present informative [karma].

14.74

As for the treatise stating, "After the initial moment […] as explained for uninformative [karma]": this explains possessing the past and not possessing the future.

14.75

As for the treatise stating, "Defiled and undefiled […] possessed forward and retrospectively": this explains that the two indeterminate states have no possession of past and future, because the power of the phenomenon is weak. "Forward" refers to the future, and "retrospectively" refers to the past.

14.76

As for the treatise stating, "By what is this weakness of power in the phenomenon caused?": this is a question.

14.77

As for the treatise stating, "It is caused by the mind": this is the answer.

14.78

As for the treatise stating, "If so, defiled […] should not possess the past and future": this is an objection. Since the mind capable of generating it possesses the past and future, on what basis does the informative [karma] generated by it only possess the present?

14.79

As for the treatise stating, "This objection is unreasonable […] there is a difference in possession": this is the answer. Informative [karma] is a material phenomenon, [generated by] a dull mind, because informative matter arises dependent on the mind. Mind and the like are not so; indeterminate informative karma arises from an inferior mind, and its power is doubly inferior to that mind which is capable of generating it. Therefore the mind possesses the three times, whereas the informative [karma] only possesses the present.

14.80

As for the treatise stating, "As previously explained, abiding in asaṃvara": from here down, half a verse is the fifth [part], which explains the multiple names of asaṃvara.

14.81

As for "The treatise states […] is called asaṃvara": this explains the multiple names. Because of five different meanings, five names are established.

14.82

As for the treatise stating, "However, the name 'path of karma' […] the remaining four names are established": this explains the general and specific usages of the names, which can be understood from the text.

14.83

As for the treatise stating, "Or possessing informative karma and not uninformative karma, etc.": the following verse is the sixth [part], which explains the fourfold categorization of possessing informative and not uninformative karma, and so forth.

14.84

As for "The treatise states […] the informative karma generated": this explains possessing informative karma and not uninformative karma. For one not abiding in wholesome or unwholesome precepts, giving rise to inferior intention to perform wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate karma, all only possess informative karma and do not possess uninformative karma.

14.85

As for the treatise stating, "Excepting merit with basis and fulfilling a path of karma": excepting merit with basis and fulfilling a path of karma, even with inferior intention one still generates uninformative [karma]. This is the first alternative.

14.86

As for the treatise stating, "Only possessing uninformative […] or having arisen, has been relinquished": this explains possessing uninformative and not possessing informative [karma]. This is the second alternative. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Has not an ordinary person who already obtained dhyāna, when present informative [karma] has not yet arisen and previously arisen [informative karma] has already been lost, also possessed uninformative and not informative karma? Why does the verse only indicate the noble one? If it can also be so for an ordinary person, why does the commentary indicate an ordinary person?"

14.87

As for the treatise stating, "Both possessing and neither alternative should be understood as appropriate": the third and fourth alternatives can be known from the text. The Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle 122, explains this in detail; it would be burdensome, so it is not recorded.

14.88

As for the treatise stating, "Having explained abiding in saṃvara […] by what are they obtained?": from here down, one verse is the fifth major section, which explains obtaining the three saṃvaras.

14.89

As for "The treatise states […] because it is also conjoined with the mind": this explains that at the time of obtaining that mind, one immediately obtains those precepts.

14.90

As for the treatise stating, "The word 'that' is to indicate […] specifically selects the undefiled": this explains the two words 'that noble' in the verse. 'That' refers to the preceding dhyāna, because dhyāna encompasses both defiled and undefiled. 'Noble' specifically selects the undefiled, because the defiled is not the essence of the noble.

14.91

As for the treatise stating, "The six dhyāna levels […] as will be explained later": the four root [dhyānas], the intermediate [dhyāna], and the first unarrived [concentration] are undefiled concentrations, but not the upper three unarrived [concentrations], as will be explained later.

14.92

As for the treatise stating, "Prātimokṣa-saṃvara […] is obtained through the instruction of another": this explains obtaining prātimokṣa. 'Through the instruction of another' means another who is able to instruct; it is not everyone, yet distinct individuals within the ten kinds of assemblies are all others. 'And so forth' includes obtaining the precepts by self-arising nature, and so forth.

14.93

As for the treatise stating, "This is also of two kinds […] the remaining five kinds of precepts are from two kinds of others": this refers to distinct individuals and the saṃgha. Four persons or more are called a saṃgha. Among the eight assemblies of precepts, the three beginning with bhikṣu are obtained from the saṃgha. A 'pudgala' is a distinct individual, meaning the remaining five kinds are obtained from such a person. Śrāmaṇeras and śrāmaṇerīs are obtained from two persons. Upāsakas, upāsikās, and upavasathas are obtained from one person.

14.94

As for the treatise stating, "In various Vinayas […] it further says 'and so forth'": this separately explains the word 'and so forth'.

14.95

As for the treatise stating, "What are the ten?": this is a question.

14.96

The treatise says: "[1] By nature ... to receiving the full precepts through collective assembly." Below is the answer. The Nyāyānusāra says: "'Nature' refers to knowledge; because it is realized without depending on a teacher, one obtains the full precepts at the time of this knowledge." That is, the Buddha and pratyekabuddhas obtain this precept when attaining the knowledge of destruction (kṣayajñāna). "[2] By entering the certainty of rightness (samyaktvaniyāma), namely, the five bhikṣus." The Nyāyānusāra says: "The full precepts are obtained through realizing the path of seeing (darśanamārga)." This refers to Kauṇḍinya and the other five bhikṣus. "[3] By the Buddha addressing them, 'Come, bhikṣu!', at which time the precepts arise together [with the call], namely, Yaśas and others." Yaśas here translates as "Fame" (míngyù). The Nyāyānusāra says: "Due to the power of past vows and the Buddha's august empowerment." "[4] By faithfully accepting the Buddha as the Great Master, obtaining the precepts at that time, namely, Mahākāśyapa and others. [5] By skilful reply, namely, Sudāyi." Sudāyi here translates as "Good Giving" (shànshī). Being only seven years of age, he skilfully answered the Buddha's question, matching the Buddha's intention; although he was not yet twenty years old, the Buddha commanded the monastic Saṅgha to perform the karmavācanā to confer the full precepts on him. Skilful reply was specifically opened as an exceptional case; [the precept] did not arise directly at the moment of the reply. As for the reply: the Buddha asked him, "Where is your home?" Sudāyi replied, "In the three realms there is no home." "[6] By respectfully accepting the eight venerable dharmas (guru-dharma), obtaining the precepts at that time, namely, Mahāprajāpatī." The older translation, Dà'àidào ("Great Path of Love"), is an error. In Sanskrit it is Mahāprajāpatī: mahā translates here as "great"; prajā translates here as "living beings" (shēng); patī translates here as "lord" (zhǔ). It is one of the thousand names of the Great Brahmā King; because sentient beings are manifold, they are called "great offspring" (dàshēng). The Brahmā King can produce all sentient beings and is the lord over these great offspring, hence named "Lord of Great Offspring" (Dàshēngzhǔ). She took her name after the deity to whom prayers [for her birth] were offered. Mahāprajāpatī was the Buddha's maternal aunt. The Buddha dispatched Ānanda to explain the eight venerable dharmas for her; she respectfully accepted them and at that moment obtained the precepts. These eight are rules honoring the elder bhikṣus, hence called "eight venerable dharmas." The older translation called them "eight respects." She was the very first to go forth among the community of bhikṣuṇīs, as detailed in the Vinaya. "[7] By sending a messenger, obtaining the precepts, namely, the nun Dharmadinnā." The nun's name was Dharmadinnā (Fǎshòu). This nun was shapely and upright; when she wished to go to the Saṅgha, she feared difficulties on the road. When receiving the full precepts, she did not face the Great Saṅgha [directly]; the Great Saṅgha dispatched a nun who received the dharma and in turn conferred the precepts upon her. Therefore it is called obtaining the full precepts by sending a messenger. To protect her from peril, this exception was specifically granted. "[8] With a Vinaya master as the fifth person, namely, in border regions." Because of the absence of monks, at the very least five persons are still required. Since the preceptor (upādhyāya) is not counted among the quorum, the remaining four constitute the assembly; any fewer does not constitute an assembly. Among the five persons, one must certainly be entrusted as a Vinaya master to conduct the karmavācanā; hence it is said "a Vinaya master as the fifth." Fewer than five fails [to confer ordination], while more is not prohibited. "[9] By an assembly of ten, namely, in the central regions." Where monks are numerous, at the very least ten persons are still required; more is also not prohibited. "[10] By three recitations of taking refuge in the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha, namely, the assembly of the sixty bhadravargīyas." The Buddha sent arhats to explain the three refuges for them, and they obtained the full precepts.

14.97

The treatise says: "The [prātimokṣa-saṃvara] thus obtained ... arises from bodily or vocal informative action (vijñapti-karman)." The author of the treatise restricts the above acquisition of precepts as not necessarily depending on informative action to produce non-informative action (avijñapti). The Vibhāṣā, fascicle 122, says: "If one abides in the prātimokṣa restraint or in non-restraint (asaṃvara), currently there is no bodily informative action. There are two theories. The first says: from the second moment onward [it is so], for that first moment must have informative action. The second says: that first moment is also what is spoken of, because there is the acquisition of non-restraint with currently no bodily informative action, and because the full precepts are obtained within the cessation attainment (nirodhasamāpatti)." The explanation says: acquiring non-restraint with currently no bodily informative action refers to obtaining non-restraint through committing to a business [of evil deeds]. Obtaining the full precepts within the cessation attainment refers to such cases as the novice monk Nāśa entering the cessation attainment during the third karmavācanā. It also admits such cases as the aforementioned seeing of the truths through dharma to obtain the precepts. Between these two theories, the latter is correct, because when entering mindless absorption there is no informative action. When the Vibhāṣā says, "If one abides in prātimokṣa restraint or non-restraint, currently there is no bodily informative action," this is based on there currently being no bodily informative action. If produced dependent on past preparatory informative action, it can also be currently without bodily informative action; it cannot definitively be that Desire-realm non-informative action arises dissociated from informative action. Fascicle 42 of the Nyāyānusāra says: "Other masters say: it is not the case that all non-informative actions in the Desire realm arise dependent on informative action, as when the five bhikṣus and others obtained the fruit." According to the later master's explanation, the former must say that Desire-realm non-informative action definitely arises from informative action. In resolving the citation of proof by the other master, the Nyāyānusāra says: "However, previously they definitely possessed informative action." According to this passage of the treatise, the Nyāyānusāra definitively holds that Desire-realm non-informative action definitely arises from informative action, and if there is no primary [informative action], it arises from the preparatory [informative action]. However, these two theories differ from the Vibhāṣā. The Vibhāṣā says, "If one abides in the prātimokṣa restraint, currently there is no bodily informative action"; one theory is based on subsequent moments, while the other admits that the initial [moment] may lack it—it does not say that arising from preparatory action can also be abiding in restraint without bodily informative action, meaning it cannot be that it arises dissociated from informative action. Someone mistakenly explained it as identical. In this treatise it says: "The prātimokṣa restraint thus obtained does not necessarily arise dependent on informative action." The treatise also says: "If the seven paths of wholesome action arise from receiving [the precepts], they must possess both informative and non-informative action, because morality arising from receiving [the precepts] must depend on informative action. The prātimokṣa precepts of the Buddha and the five bhikṣus do not arise from receiving [precepts], hence they do not depend on informative action." The author of the treatise preserves this, hence saying that it does not necessarily arise dependent on informative action. The masters of the Nyāyānusāra do not accept this doctrine, therefore saying: however, those five bhikṣus and others previously definitely had informative action continuing unbroken, and upon attaining the fruit it arose from that. Furthermore, the author of the treatise also says that Desire-realm non-informative action does not arise dissociated from informative action; thus we know that the author of the treatise maintains that the Buddha and the five bhikṣus also possessed bodily informative action when obtaining the prātimokṣa [precepts]. The commentator's explanations here contradict themselves before and after; we must re-examine the text and reconcile the explanation, for a single treatise cannot contradict itself.

14.98

The treatise says: "Furthermore, what is spoken of here ... undertakes it by setting a fixed period." From here below is the sixth major section, explaining the two limits. Within the text there are two parts: first, explaining the prātimokṣa precepts; second, explaining evil precepts. This text is the first.

14.99

"The treatise says ... the limit of a day and night": this clarifies that the prātimokṣa precepts have only two limits.

14.100

The treatise says: "Repeatedly declaring a day and night amounts to half a month, and so forth." This resolves a latent objection. The objection asks: If there are only two limits, why does the sūtra state, "receiving the upavāsa precepts for half a month or for one month"? The resolution states: mentioning half a month and so forth refers to repeatedly receiving the day-and-night precepts, completing half a month and so forth being named "half a month and so forth"; it does not mean that a single reception spans half a month or the like. Just as the Amitāyus Sūtra says, "Thus day after day receiving the royal eight precepts," it means receiving them day by day, spanning half a month and so forth.

14.101

The treatise says: "What entity is the designation 'time'?" This asks about the substantial entity of time.

14.102

The treatise says: "It refers to the designation of conditioned formations ... establishing the names day and night." This is the answer. "Designation" (adhivacana) is name; that is, the names day and night are established on the illuminated and dark phases of conditioned phenomena.

14.103

The treatise says: "Between the two limits ... could it not also arise?" This is the Sautrāntika's objection. For the limit of a lifetime, there are three principles whereby the precepts do not arise subsequently: first, because the basis [physical body] is different; second, because within that different basis there is no preparatory exertion; third, because there is no recollection of what was to be restrained and guarded against at the time of receiving them. After one day and night, at the time of five or ten days and nights and so on, what dharma acts as an obstacle to cause the precepts to terminate?

14.104

The treatise says: "There must surely be a dharma ... because [the sūtra specifies] only one day and night." This is the Sarvāstivādin's answer. The nature of dharmas is subtle and known only to the Buddha. Since the sūtra explicitly speaks of only one day and night, there must be a dharma capable of acting as an obstacle.

First 104 of 237 passages. Read on

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俱舍論疏 — Classical Chinese