俱舍論疏 16
English (machine translation) 16
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- English
16.1
Composed by the Śramaṇa Fabao.
16.2
Chapter 4: Karmanirdeśa, Part 4.
16.3
The Śāstra says: "Moreover, it is said in the sūtras […] what are their characteristics?" From this point downward, in four and a half verses, the eighth [section] explains the four karmas mentioned in the sūtras: dark-dark, and so forth. In the text there are three parts: first, explaining the substance of the karmas; second, explaining the differences in abandonment; third, setting forth alternative views. These one and a half verses explain the substances of the four karmas, first asking and then answering. This is the question.
16.4
"The Śāstra says: […] speaks of the four: dark-dark, and so forth"—this explains the intention in establishing the four karmas. "The nature of the karma and the fruit differ" refers to the three karmas: dark-dark, and so forth. "The antidoted and the antidote are distinct": defiled karma is the antidoted, and undefiled is the antidote. "Nature" is intrinsic substance, and "category" is variety; because nature and category differ, they are divided into four karmas.
16.5
The Śāstra says: "All unwholesome karma […] because it is disagreeable"—this explains dark-dark karma. Because the cause is defiled it is called dark; because the fruit is disagreeable it is called dark.
16.6
The Śāstra says: "Wholesome karma of the form realm […] because it is agreeable"—because the cause is free from evil it is called bright; because the fruit is agreeable it is called bright.
16.7
The Śāstra says: "Why is it not said […] then it is stated, not others"—this explains the reason why, although both the cause and fruit of the formless [realm's] wholesome [karma] are bright, it is not mentioned.
16.8
The Śāstra says: "However, in the sūtras […] because it is mixed with disagreeable fruit"—this explains dark-and-bright karma. Because the cause is mixed with evil, and because the fruit is mixed with the disagreeable.
16.9
The Śāstra says: "This designation 'dark and bright' […] because they mutually contradict"—this explains the name 'mixed'. The phrase "dark and bright" is established with respect to a continuity; it is not that a single karma is both dark and bright, nor that a maturation is both agreeable and disagreeable, because wholesome and unwholesome, agreeable and disagreeable, mutually contradict each other. However, because within a continuity it is mixed with the dark, karma of the desire realm is called dark and bright.
16.10
The Śāstra says: "Would not the fruit of bad karma […] be called bright and dark?"—this is an objection. If the wholesome is mixed with bad karma and the wholesome is called dark and bright, then when the bad is mixed with wholesome karma, the bad ought to be called bright and dark.
16.11
The Śāstra says: "The fruit of unwholesome karma […] because the evil prevails over the wholesome"—this is the answer. In the hells, the fruit of unwholesome karma is not mixed with the fruit of wholesome karma. The wholesome fruits of the desire realm are definitely mixed with the fruits of unwholesome karma, because within the six desire heavens there are unwholesome fruits. Since in the unfocused realms of the desire realm evil prevails over the wholesome, evil necessarily mixes with the wholesome, but the wholesome does not mix with evil. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "This objection is unreasonable. Because in the desire realm the unwholesome occurs frequently and has the power to overpower the wholesome, its painful fruit mixes with the pleasurable maturation. Wholesome [karma] in the desire realm is weak and has no capacity to encroach upon and subdue the unwholesome; therefore, its pleasurable fruit also has no capacity to mix with the painful maturation. Hence, the fruit of bad karma receives the name 'purely dark'."
16.12
The Śāstra says: "All anāsrava karma […] bright maturation"—this explains the fourth karma; it can be understood according to the text.
16.13
The Śāstra says: "This phrase 'not bright' […] because their natures contradict"—this resolves a doubt and objection. The statement "not dark" is of definitive meaning, whereas the statement "not bright" is of intentional meaning: because it cannot invite a bright maturation, the sūtra intentionally states that it is "not bright karma". According to the sūtra and the root treatise, it is a purely bright phenomenon.
16.14
The Śāstra says: "All anāsrava karma […] if not so, how?" From here on, in two verses, the second [part] explains differences in abandonment.
16.15
"The Śāstra says: […] only exhausts the purely dark"—this explains the abandonment of dark-dark karma. This is because the four Dharma-knowledge patiences abandon the unwholesome karma abandoned by [the path of seeing] the four truths of desire, and the intention of the first eight grades abandoned by the cultivation of desire abandons only unwholesome karma. These twelve above are all abandoned through intrinsic nature, not abandoned through object of cognition.
16.16
The Śāstra says: "Freeing oneself from the defilement of the desire realm […] because of unwholesome karma"—this one grade of intention abandons two karmas. Abandoning a part of the dark, it abandons the mixed karma in its entirety; abandoning the dark is abandonment through intrinsic nature and through object of cognition, whereas abandoning the bright is abandonment only through object of cognition. Abandonment through intrinsic nature is abandoned grade by grade, whereas abandonment through object of cognition is abandoned at the ninth grade.
16.17
The Śāstra says: "Freeing oneself from the four dhyānas […] purely bright karma is exhausted"—this explains the abandonment of bright-bright karma. Because this is abandoned only through object of cognition, it is abandoned only at the ninth grade of its own stage. Although abandonment applies to what is associated and co-existent, because karma is being analyzed here, intention is spoken of.
16.18
The Śāstra says: "For what reason in the various stages […] is it able to abandon, and not the others?"—this is a question.
16.19
The Śāstra says: "Because all wholesome dharmas […] because they have not yet been detached from bondage"—this is the answer. Abandonment through intrinsic nature means the fettering dharmas, the dharmas of a single fruit of the fetters, and their acquisitions: when one severs their acquisitions, it is called abandonment; once abandoned, they can no longer arise and be present. Abandonment through object of cognition means when that which can cognize is completely severed, it is called abandonment; once abandoned, they may still be permitted to arise and be present. Hence, dark-dark karma is abandoned grade by grade separately, whereas the mixed and bright karmas are abandoned at the ninth grade, only through object of cognition.
16.20
"The verse says"—below is a one-line verse, the third [part], setting forth an alternative view.
16.21
"The Śāstra says: […] is called dark-and-bright karma"—the intention of this master is: because the hells are induced solely by the unwholesome, karma conducive to experiencing [fruit] there is called purely dark. Because the remaining destinies of the desire realm encompass both maturations, the wholesome and unwholesome karmas conducive to experiencing [fruit] in them are called mixed karma. These two karmas are named 'dark' and 'mixed' according to the fruit rather than the cause.
16.22
On the text, "Some other masters say [...] therefore it is called combined karma": This master's view is that because [karma] abandoned by the vision path in the desire realm is not mixed with the wholesome, it is called purely black karma. What is abandoned by the cultivation path in the desire realm is a mixture of the wholesome and unwholesome, so it is collectively called combined karma. The *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 114, says: "Those who speak thus [hold that] all unwholesome karma is called black-black-vipāka karma, because in the desire realm the unwholesome is intense and powerful, and is not encroached upon or mixed with by wholesome dharmas, since unwholesome dharmas can suppress and sever the wholesome of their own sphere. Wholesome karma is weak and frail, and is encroached upon and mixed with by the unwholesome, because the wholesome of the desire realm cannot sever the unwholesome." The *Nyāyānusāra* refutes the former master, stating: "What has been said thus was already rejected before, meaning that the wholesome cannot mix with the unwholesome." It refutes the latter master, stating: "This is also illogical. For among both kinds of [karma] to be abandoned, there is karma that cannot ripen into a vipāka result (namely, volition associated with the view of individuality and extreme views in the vision path, and neutral karma in the cultivation path, cannot ripen into a vipāka result)."
16.23
On the text, "Furthermore, in the sūtra it is said that there are three types of silence (mauna)": The verse below is the ninth part, explaining the three silences and the three purities.
16.24
On the text, "The treatise says [...] they are inferred from the two karmas": This explains the reason for establishing the three silences. *Muni* (牟尼) is translated here as "silence" (寂默). The bodily and vocal karma of the non-learner (aśaikṣa) are called bodily and vocal silence. Mental silence is the non-learner mind, not mental karma. Because true silence is solely the mind, and bodily and vocal karmas are inferred from the mind, that which infers and that which is inferred are collectively called silence. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "Because bodily and vocal karma are separated from all evils, they can be inferred. Since mental karma has no function of being that which infers among them, how could only that which can infer and that which is inferred together be established as silence?"
16.25
On the text, "Furthermore, bodily and vocal karma [...] therefore they are called silence": This is the second explanation. Because bodily and vocal karmas have unmanifest [form] (avijñapti), they are called abstention. Because mental karma is not an abstention, it is not called silence.
16.26
On the text, "Why does silence reside only in the non-learner?": This is a question.
16.27
On the text, "Because an arhat [...] is eternally tranquil": This is the answer. The word "afflictions" means that the non-learner is completely free of them, which is not the case for learners.
16.28
On the text, "All bodily, vocal, and mental [...] are called purity": This explains the second [topic], the three purities, which are the three types of good conduct (sucarita). If they are undefiled (anāsrava), they are called purity because they are eternally free from the defilements of all misdeeds and afflictions; if they are defiled (sāsrava), they are called purity because they are temporarily free from the defilements of all misdeeds and afflictions. The *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 117, says: "Question: What is the distinction between good conduct, purity, and silence? Another master says: In meaning there is also a distinction; that is, the meaning of skillful execution is the meaning of good conduct, the meaning of the substance being pristine white is the meaning of purity, and the meaning of freedom from delusion and confusion is the meaning of silence. Still another says: Being able to produce a pleasant fruit is called good conduct, not being mixed with afflictions is called purity, and ultimate quiescence is called silence." The *Nyāyānusāra*'s second explanation says: "Or else, by its power it can induce undefiled ultimate purity, and therefore the name 'pure' is established. If one claims that this can also induce the defilement of afflictions—meaning it acts as an immediate condition for afflictions—and thus should not be called purity: this too is illogical. When a wholesome mind arises, it does not undertake preparation for a defiled mind to arise. Immediately after a defiled mind, the undefiled does not arise. A defiled wholesome mind can induce the undefiled; therefore defiled wholesome [karma] acquires the name 'purity', because in conforming to the undefiled mind it can eliminate impurities."
16.29
On the text, "These two are taught [...] because of false purity": This explains the intention of the teaching.
16.30
On the text, "Furthermore, in the sūtra it is said that there are three misdeeds (duścarita)": The verse below is the tenth part, explaining the three misdeeds and the three good conducts.
16.31
On the text, "The treatise says [...] because they possess a distinct substance": This explains the substance of the three misdeeds. "All unwholesome bodily, vocal, and mental karma" generally includes karmas such as drinking alcohol, as well as their prior and posterior preparatory stages (sāmantaka); therefore it says "all". "Bodily, vocal, and mental karma" excludes all that is not karma. There are further three kinds that are not mental karma. "Covetousness, malice, and wrong view" indicates that among what is not karma, only covetousness, malice, and wrong view are taken.
16.32
On the text, "The Dārṣṭāntikas say [...] to be mental karma": This presents an alternative view. That master cites the *Cetanā-sūtra* to prove that covetousness, malice, and wrong view are mental karma.
16.33
On the text, "If so, then [...] would merge into a single entity": The Sarvāstivādins object. Both schools agree that covetousness, malice, and wrong view are afflictions. If these were karma, then karma and affliction would merge into a single entity; ignorance (avidyā) would be formations (saṃskāra), craving (tṛṣṇā) and grasping (upādāna) would be existence (bhava), and the karmic obstacle (karmāvaraṇa) would be the affliction obstacle (kleśāvaraṇa).
16.34
On the text, "Allowing that there are afflictions [...] what fault is there in this?": The Dārṣṭāntika asks the Sarvāstivādin master in return.
16.35
On the text, "The Vaibhāṣikas say [...] would entail great faults": This cites the Vaibhāṣikas pointing out the faults. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: "What is the correct principle? If afflictions were karma, there would be no distinction between the twelve links of dependent origination or the three obstacles. From this we know that covetousness and the like are not karma."
16.36
On the text, "However, as for what the sūtra says [...] because it operates as a gateway": This resolves [the citation of] the *Cetanā-sūtra*; the text is easy to understand. The *Nyāyānusāra* resolves it by saying: "Because they are the provisions for karma, they are also called karma, just as the provisions for outflows are also called outflows, and so forth."
16.37
On the text, "Because they can produce [...] they are therefore called misdeeds": This explains the name. This is a karmadhāraya compound.
16.38
On the text, "The three good conducts [...] non-malice, and right view": This explains the three good conducts. Inverting the three misdeeds produces the three good conducts. That is, "all wholesome karma" refers to refraining from drinking alcohol, praising, and so forth, apart from the prior and posterior preparatory stages as well as the root karmas. The *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 117, says: "Question: Do the three good conducts subsume the three silences, or do the three silences subsume the three good conducts? Answer: One should form a fourfold proposition. There is good conduct that is not silence: excluding the bodily and vocal good conduct of the non-learner, the remaining bodily and vocal good conduct and all mental good conduct. There is silence that is not good conduct: the mind of the non-learner. There is that which is both good conduct and silence: the bodily and vocal good conduct of the non-learner. There is that which is neither good conduct nor silence: excluding the aforementioned characteristics. Do the three good conducts subsume the three purities, or do the three purities subsume the three good conducts? Answer: In accordance with their facts, they reciprocally subsume each other. Do the three purities subsume the three silences, or do the three silences subsume the three purities? Answer: One should form a fourfold proposition. There is purity that is not silence: excluding the bodily and vocal purity of the non-learner, the remaining bodily and vocal purity and all mental purity. What is this further? It refers to the bodily and vocal purity of learners and neither-learners-nor-non-learners, and the three kinds of mental purity, because mental silence is solely the mind of the non-learner. There is silence that is not purity: the mind of the non-learner, because it is not of the nature of karma. There is that which is both purity and silence: the bodily and vocal purity of the non-learner. There is that which is neither purity nor silence: excluding the aforementioned characteristics."
16.39
On the text, "Right view and wrong view [...] how do they constitute wholesome and unwholesome?": This is a question.
16.40
On the text, "Because they are the roots of benefit and harm": This is the answer. Due to right view, one subsequently benefits sentient beings. Due to wrong view, one subsequently harms sentient beings.
16.41
On the text, "Furthermore, in the sūtra it is said that there are ten courses of karma": The verse below is the eleventh part, explaining the ten courses of karma. First, explaining the substance of the karma; second, explaining the name of the courses of karma; third, incidentally explaining the severing of the wholesome; fourth, explaining the concurrent arising of courses of karma; fifth, establishing karma in terms of locus; sixth, explaining the three results of the courses of karma. Within explaining the substance of the karma: first, properly explaining the substance of the courses of karma; second, explaining the varieties of the courses of karma. This single verse explains the substance of the courses of karma.
16.42
On the text, "The treatise says [...] subsume the preceding misdeeds": This sets forth the substance of the ten courses of karma. "Coarse and easily known" refers to the root courses of karma.
16.43
On the text, "What kind of misdeeds and good conducts are not subsumed?": This is the question.
16.44
On the text, "To begin with, among the unwholesome [...] because it causes them to abstain": This speaks of bodily karma that is not subsumed.
16.45
On the text, "The unwholesome vocal courses of karma [...] posterior, and slight": This speaks of vocal karma that is not subsumed. "Slight" refers to the time of a cakravartin, the people of the Northern Continent, singing with an impassioned mind, harsh speech in an uninhabited place, or failing to constitute [a course of karma] due to incomplete conditions, and the like.
16.46
On the text, "The unwholesome mental courses of karma [...] and slight covetousness and the like": This explains the mental courses of karma. Volition is the karma itself, not the course of volition. "Slight covetousness and the like" refers to the covetousness and so forth at the time of a cakravartin and among the people of the Northern Continent; because it is not coarse or prominent, it is not called a course of karma.
16.47
On the text, "Among the wholesome courses of karma [...] giving, making offerings, and the like": This explains the substance of the ten wholesome courses of karma. Among the wholesome bodily courses of karma, one part of bodily good conduct is not subsumed, namely preparatory and posterior stages, as well as other wholesome bodily karma, which refers to abstaining from drinking alcohol, severing living grass, giving, making offerings, and the like.
16.48
On the text, "The wholesome vocal courses of karma [...] refers to affectionate speech and the like": This explains vocal karma.
16.49
On the text, "The wholesome mental courses of karma [...] refers to all wholesome volitions": This explains mental courses of karma. The *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 112, citing the *Saṅgītiparyāya* and the *Prajñaptiśāstra*, says: "Question: Do the three bodily misdeeds subsume all bodily misdeeds? Or do all bodily misdeeds subsume the three bodily misdeeds? Answer: All subsumes the three; the three do not subsume all. What is not subsumed? It refers to beating sentient beings with hands, sticks, etc., without taking life; engaging in impure conduct with those with whom one ought to engage, which is not sexual misconduct; initiating heedless karmas such as drinking alcohol; consuming food and drink with non-proper knowledge and loss of mindfulness; and failing to avoid those who break the precepts. Such bodily karmas arising from these are not subsumed by the three. Question: Precept-breakers are boundless; how can one avoid them? Even if one abandons this one, one still nears that one. Answer: They are everywhere; wishing to be free of them is indeed difficult, but being able not to follow their defilement is true avoidance. Therefore it is said: Even if the body is far away, if one follows their habits, that is called being close; even if the body is near, if one does not follow their habits, that is called abstention. Question: Do the four vocal misdeeds subsume all vocal misdeeds? Or does all subsume the four? Answer: All subsumes the four; the four do not subsume all. It refers to when someone dwelling alone in a quiet place speaks thus: 'There is no giving, there is no affection, there is no sacrifice'—such vocal misdeeds are not understood by sentient beings in the world, and are not subsumed by the four. Question: Do the three mental misdeeds subsume all mental misdeeds? Or do all mental misdeeds subsume the three mental misdeeds? [...] As for what is not subsumed, it refers to sensation, perception, formations, and consciousness co-arising with covetousness, malice, and wrong view, which are not subsumed by the three." In that treatise, mental misdeeds subsume the intrinsic nature of the four skandhas, and thus the intrinsic nature of the five skandhas is designated as all misdeeds. "Question: Why are they called misdeeds? What is the meaning of misdeed (duścarita)? Answer: Because they are blameworthy and deplorable, they are called bad (duṣ-); because they are that which one travels and treads upon, they are called conduct (-carita). 'Because they are blameworthy and deplorable, they are called bad'—just as people speak of bad wives and children, bad food and clothing, etc. 'Because they are that which one travels and treads upon, they are called conduct'—namely, taking life, harsh speech, and malice traversing the sphere of sentient beings, and so forth." Wholesome mental courses of karma do not subsume a part of mental good conduct, namely all wholesome volitions, that is, non-covetousness without manifest expression, etc. The text should be checked further. Someone proposed three interpretations, none of which hit the mark.
16.50
On the text, "Among the ten courses of karma, the first seven courses of karma": The second part below explains the varieties of the courses of karma. In it there are five [topics]: first, explaining in terms of manifest and unmanifest; second, explaining in terms of the three roots; third, explaining the bases of the courses of karma; fourth, distinguishing by questions and answers; fifth, explaining the characteristics of the courses of karma. Regarding the first, there are two parts: the preceding verse explains that the root has manifest and unmanifest; the subsequent three lines explain that the preparatory and posterior stages have manifest and unmanifest. This single verse is the first text.
16.51
[On the verse passage] from "The Śāstra says" up to "because one's own manifest [action] is absent": this explains the six unwholesome karmapathas. If one dispatches another to act, there is non-manifest [action] alone.
16.52
The Śāstra [states], from "If one acts oneself" up to "the other then dies, and so forth": this clarifies that when acting oneself, there are definitely both manifest and non-manifest [action].
16.53
The Śāstra [states], from "[if] the other dies later, and so forth" up to "because there is only non-manifest [action]": this clarifies that when death occurs later, there is non-manifest [action] alone, because the prayoga was the preparatory expedient.
16.54
The Śāstra [states], from "Sexual misconduct alone" up to "just as one experiences delight oneself": this clarifies that sexual misconduct necessarily possesses both.
16.55
The Śāstra [states], from "The seven wholesome karmapathas" up to "because it necessarily relies on manifest [action]": this clarifies that among wholesome actions, if they arise from reception [of precepts], they definitely have both manifest and non-manifest [action]. Saying "arise from reception" excludes those not arising from reception, as well as the matter of the Path and meditative absorption. Arising from reception is of two kinds: first, intermediate, namely the specific reception of abstention, which definitely has manifest and non-manifest [action]; second, receiving the saṃvara, which may arise neutrally. However, it definitely arises in reliance upon the manifest action of one's own body, so one's own body definitely has manifest and non-manifest [action].
16.56
The Śāstra [states], from "Dhyāna and anāsrava" up to "because they are obtained and arise": this clarifies that those arising from absorption and the Path are non-manifest alone.
16.57
The Śāstra [states], "Are prayoga and pṛṣṭha like the maula?": the subsequent three lines clarify manifest and non-manifest action in the prayoga and pṛṣṭha.
16.58
[On the passage] from "The Śāstra says" up to "otherwise there is none": this explains that during the prayoga, if the mind is serious, there is non-manifest [action], whereas otherwise there is no non-manifest [action]. Its manifest action is definitely present, because without manifest action it would not be a prayoga.
16.59
The Śāstra [states], from "The pṛṣṭha is the reverse of the previous" up to "otherwise it is absent": this explains that during the pṛṣṭha, non-manifest [action] is definitely present, because the maula karmapatha produces non-manifest [action] without discriminating between light and heavy. Manifest action is not fixed: if one undertakes subsequent acts like butchering and carving, there is manifest action; if one does not undertake them, manifest action is absent.
16.60
The Śāstra [states], from "In regard to this meaning" up to "the stage of the pṛṣṭha?": seizing on the context, this inquires about the stages of prayoga and pṛṣṭha.
16.61
The Śāstra [states], from "First, among unwholesome actions" up to "the prayoga of taking life": this clarifies the stage of the prayoga of killing.
16.62
The Śāstra [states], from "Consequent upon this manifest action" up to "second, due to the fulfillment of the result": this clarifies the maula karmapatha. As for stating, "The manifest and non-manifest karma at this very moment of that [creature's] actual death is called the maula karmapatha of taking life": first, it is due to the prayoga, namely moving the hands and feet, and so forth; second, it is due to the fulfillment of the result, namely the severed life of the one being killed.
16.63
The Śāstra [states], from "After this moment" up to "the pṛṣṭha of taking life": this clarifies the pṛṣṭha.
16.64
The Śāstra [states], from "The remaining six karmapathas" up to "should be explained by analogy": this explains the remaining six by analogy, which can be understood according to the model.
16.65
The Śāstra [states], from "Greed, malice, and wrong view" up to "distinctions of pṛṣṭha": this clarifies that the three mental karmapathas lack prayoga and pṛṣṭha. The Nyāyānusāra states: "Other masters say: When greed, malice, and wrong view are actively present, they are precisely called karmapathas; therefore, they have no distinctions of prayoga and pṛṣṭha. Those who speak thus [should know that they] also possess the three divisions, because there is unwholesome volition that can serve as an auxiliary function prior to and subsequent to greed, malice, and so forth."
16.66
The Śāstra [states], from "Here it should be stated" up to "or after death?": this is a dilemma inquiry.
16.67
The Śāstra [states], "If so, what is the fault?": this is a counter-question. Whether it is accomplished at the moment of death or after death, what is the fault in either case?
16.68
The Śāstra [states], "Both have faults": this demonstrates the faults in both alternatives.
16.69
The Śāstra [states], from "If the sentient being to be killed" up to "that karmapatha is accomplished": this demonstrates the fault in the karmapatha being accomplished while abiding in the moment of death. Why is the karmapatha not accomplished at this time? Because while the one being killed abides in the moment of death, life still remains.
16.70
The Śāstra [states], from "If the sentient being to be killed" up to "maula karmapatha": this demonstrates the fault in the karmapatha being accomplished afterwards. Herein there are two [points]: first, the fault of contradicting the earlier explanation; second, contradicting the explanation of the Vibhāṣā. This is the first fault. The Nyāyānusāra resolves this: "It is determined that the karmapatha is only accomplished after death. Yet what was stated earlier about 'actual death' is a usage of present phrasing for a past event. It is like when a great king has already arrived from afar, one asks, 'From where do you come now?' Alternatively, this is a metaphorical designation of the result in terms of the cause: when the one being killed is actually dying, the prayoga manifest action of the killer has efficacy regarding the killing, but is not the manifest action of the karmapatha. This manifest action of the karmapatha arises in continuation from the prayoga, and because it is induced by it, it is termed the result of the prayoga. However, the cause has superior efficacy regarding the killing; therefore, the result is metaphorically designated in terms of the cause, and although it is not truly the karmapatha, the term karmapatha is used. Is it not that at this time the manifest action has efficacy, so this precisely should be established as the karmapatha? It is not necessary that efficacy be required to accomplish the karmapatha, lest non-manifest action lose the designation of karmapatha. What function does that have in killing? As with non-manifest action, the manifest action should likewise be so. Furthermore, it is unreasonable to establish the prayoga manifest action as the karmapatha itself, because at the stage of the one being killed's death, life still remains. The prayoga manifest action and the life of the killed being must cease simultaneously; after that death-existence, there is no life of the same category, and within a single moment, manifest and non-manifest karma can accomplish the karmapatha. Manifest action in this subsequent moment has no efficacy regarding the killing; it is not yet taking life, much less an offense. Only non-manifest action should obtain the designation of karmapatha, because although it lacks the capacity to kill, it is the result of killing. Is it not that subsequent manifest action should reasonably be so as well, because it is induced with the manifest action of killing as its cause? That is, when the result is fulfilled through the prayoga, both of these become the maula karmapatha. Although these two lack efficacy regarding the severing of the other's life, they function to grasp an undesirable future result, and because they give expression to the volition to kill, they are called the karmapatha of killing."
16.71
The Śāstra [states], from "Furthermore, it would contradict" up to "because the maula has not yet ceased": this is the second fault. If the killer's karmapatha is accomplished only after life has ceased, it contradicts the Vibhāṣā's explanation of the root treatise. Since the Vibhāṣā speaks of the pṛṣṭha using the term prayoga, we know that the maula was already accomplished earlier. If one were to say it was not yet accomplished earlier, but rather is accomplished as the maula at this stage, the Vibhāṣā ought to have said that the maula is spoken of using the term prayoga.
16.72
The Śāstra [states], from "As there is no fault" up to "it speaks using the term prayoga": the author of the Śāstra corrects the Vibhāṣā, and the text of the explanation is clear. The Nyāyānusāra states: "As the root treatise says: 'Is there a case where life has already been harmed, yet the taking of life has not ceased?' It says: 'There is. For instance, when life has already been severed, but his prayoga has not ceased.' What does this mean? The meaning here is that when taking life, the prayoga undertaken to kill is threefold in sum: first, solely through internal means, namely striking with fists, and so forth; second, solely through external means, namely hurling stones, and so forth; third, through both together, namely swinging a blade, and so forth. Among these three kinds of prayoga to kill, there are cases where the life of the being killed has already been severed, but the killer has not yet relinquished the notion of it being alive, and therefore does not abandon the prayoga toward killing. Hence, the root treatise speaks in this way: 'For instance, when life has already been severed, but his prayoga has not ceased.' Applying the term 'taking life' to the prayoga of killing, it can therefore be said that 'taking life has not ceased.' This is also after the karmapatha; how can it be called a prayoga? The masters of the Vaibhāṣika explain it thus: 'This speaks of the pṛṣṭha using the term prayoga. Why? Because the killer's notion of the prayoga of killing has not yet ceased, and the notion that the one killed has already died has not yet arisen; therefore, the designation prayoga is established.' Why say only that this refers to the pṛṣṭha? One should say: and to the maula as well. Why is this? Because in the single moment immediately following the death-existence of the one killed, and for many moments after this, the killer's prayoga may well not have ceased in all cases. Therefore, one should say: this speaks of the pṛṣṭha and the maula using the term prayoga. There is no need to add 'and the maula,' because the term 'subsequent division' also subsumes the maula. Only subsequent to the death-existence of the one killed does the killer accomplish the maula of taking life. Are not both the maula and the true subsequent division, since both arise subsequent to the death-existence of the one killed, capable of being called the subsequent division of taking life? Therefore, one should trust that the masters of the Vaibhāṣika have explained the words of the root treatise exceedingly well."
16.73
The Śāstra [states], from "If so, at that time" up to "maula karmapatha": this is an inquiry.
16.74
The Śāstra [states], "Why is it not accomplished?": this is a counter-question.
16.75
The Śāstra [states], "Because it is of no utility": this is the answer.
16.76
The Śāstra [states], from "non-manifest [action] in this [case]" up to "maula karmapatha": this answers by citing an analogy.
16.77
The Śāstra [states], from "Furthermore, the karmapathas" up to "as the prayoga of taking life": this clarifies the ten karmapathas serving as the prayoga of taking life.
16.78
The Śāstra [states], from "Having killed the enemy" up to "the pṛṣṭha of taking life": this clarifies the ten karmapathas serving as the pṛṣṭha of taking life.
16.79
The Śāstra [states], "The remaining karmapathas should be understood accordingly": this explains the remainder by analogy.
16.80
The Śāstra [states], from "Greed and so forth ought not" up to "because they have not performed action": this explains that the three mental karmapathas are not prayogas. The Nyāyānusāra states: "Other masters say: Greed and so forth ought not to be able to act as prayoga; a prayoga is not accomplished merely by the arising of mind, because they have not performed action. Those who speak thus [should know that], although greed and so forth are not of the nature of performed action, when that greed and so forth arise with an object as condition, they are not without causal efficacy. Through having causal efficacy, they obtain the designation prayoga, because they expediently induce the various karmapathas." In accordance with the Nyāyānusāra, taking greed and so forth as also serving as prayoga is correct.
16.81
The Śāstra [states], from "Furthermore, in the sūtra it is said" up to "the inquiry into the rest is also like this": this inquires about the three roots giving rise to the ten karmapathas.
16.82
The Śāstra [states], from "Are not all karmapathas" up to "how are they not the same?": this is an inquiry. The three lines below form the second section, clarifying their arising from the three roots.
16.83
[On the passage] from "The Śāstra says" up to "therefore it is said thus": this generally clarifies that each and every unwholesome karmapatha arises from the three roots.
16.84
The Śāstra [states], from "The prayoga of taking life" up to "all arise from delusion": this clarifies that taking life arises from the three roots.
16.85
The Śāstra [states], from "The prayoga of stealing" up to "gives rise to the prayoga of stealing": this clarifies that stealing arises from the three roots.
16.86
The Śāstra [states], from "The prayoga of sexual misconduct" up to "arisen from delusion": this clarifies that the three roots serve as the prayoga for sexual misconduct.
16.87
The Śāstra [states], from "False speech and so forth" up to "should be stated by analogy to the preceding": this clarifies the four vocal actions. Greed and malice are analogous to the preceding. From "arisen from delusion" downward is a specific explanation.
16.88
The Śāstra [states], from "However, false speech" up to "gives rise to false speech": this clarifies that false speech arises from delusion.
16.89
The Śāstra [states], from "Divisive speech and so forth" up to "the prayoga arises from delusion": this clarifies that the remaining three vocal [actions] arise from delusion.
16.90
The Śāstra [states], from "The three, greed, malice, and so forth" up to "from the three is also thus": this clarifies that the three, greed and so forth, arise from the three roots.
16.91
The Śāstra [states], "The unwholesome arising from the three roots has been explained": the half-verse below is the second section, clarifying that wholesome karmapathas arise from the three wholesome roots.
16.92
[On the passage] from "The Śāstra says" up to "because they are mutually associated": this clarifies that the prayoga, maula, and pṛṣṭha of wholesome karmapathas all arise from the three wholesome roots, because they are all originated by a wholesome mind. Because they are originated from the causal mind, they are called wholesome; and because a wholesome mind is associated with the three wholesome roots, all wholesome karmapathas therefore arise from the three roots.
16.93
The Śāstra [states], "What are the characteristics of these three wholesome stages?": this is an inquiry.
16.94
The Śāstra [states], from "Namely, abstaining from the previous" up to "is the wholesome pṛṣṭha": this is the reply. This contains two senses: first, abstaining from unwholesome prayoga means abstaining from the prayoga of taking life is called wholesome prayoga, and the maula and pṛṣṭha are likewise; second, abstaining from unwholesome prayoga refers to the preparatory expedients for abstaining from unwholesome deeds, such as when wishing to receive the precepts, the preparatory expedients for abstaining from unwholesome deeds are coming into the ordination platform and bowing all around to the Saṅgha, and so forth, and the maula and pṛṣṭha are likewise.
16.95
The Śāstra [states], from "Now, as for a novice" up to "all are named subsequent arising": this explains by pointing to the concrete matter. "Preceptor" is called upādhyāya in Sanskrit. Karmavācanā is translated here as "carrying out the affair." The four resources are: always begging for food, sitting under trees, wearing rag robes, and using fermented urine as medicine. Furthermore, the rest of the manifest and non-manifest karma—such as performing actions, upholding precepts, and so forth—that arise and operate subsequently in reliance upon the earlier maula, are all called pṛṣṭha.
16.96
The Śāstra [states], "As previously stated, not all karmapathas": from here on, a verse and a half clarifies that the three roots bring unwholesome karmapathas to completion.
16.97
[On the passage] from "The Śāstra says" up to "these three are accomplished": this clarifies that malice and greed bring the three karmapathas to completion.
16.98
The Śāstra [states], from "Wrong view is brought to completion" up to "because it is accomplished when active": this clarifies that delusion brings the karmapatha of wrong view to completion.
16.99
On the Śāstra's passage: "From 'Lying, divisive speech...' to '...because these three are accomplished'": This clarifies that the three vocal karmapathas are brought to culmination by the three roots. Certain masters give three explanations: the first says they are proximate-cause-originated; the second says they are moment-originated; the third says they apply to both origins. [The author's] own evaluation states: "Among the three explanations, the first explanation is unreasonable, while the latter two explanations may both be correct." Now, examining the intention of the Śāstra, it is moment-originated and does not admit the other explanation. How is this known to be so? In [the discussion of] "co-functioning of intention", where it speaks of "two co-functioning", it means that at the time of a hateful mind, the karma of killing is brought to culmination, and if at a stage where greed arises, taking what is not given or sexual misconduct is accomplished. Where it speaks of "three co-functioning", it means that with a hateful mind toward what belongs to another, killing and stealing are simultaneously brought about. If so, what was said—that the karmapatha of stealing is brought to culmination by greed—would logically not be established. Because it is said that it is brought to culmination by an act performed with the same mind, it is stated thus; you should know that this is a definitive rule. In accordance with the above text of the Śāstra, culmination is precisely the time of co-functioning. Furthermore, the Nyāyānusāra states: "The three, greed, hatred, and so forth, are each brought to culmination by the root of delusion, because these three do not arise for one who is free from delusion. Others explain this by saying: It is said that this dharma is brought to culmination by this [root] because its very self, upon arising, is itself the karmapatha. Because their reasoning was exhausted, they made such an explanation; yet in truth, precisely when greed and the rest are present, fortunately there is the root of delusion that is able to bring it to culmination. For what reason is grasping the self-entity not accepted? Because in the other karmapathas, it is brought to culmination by another." In accordance with the above text of the Śāstra, being simultaneous with the karma is called culmination. All these refer to doing it oneself with the same mind, not to dispatching another or becoming the same mind after acting oneself, and so forth. In accordance with the above text of the Śāstra, the moment-originated is called culmination. All these are what the verse refers to: "Hatred is brought to culmination by hatred; greed is brought to culmination by greed." This differs from the first master of the Nyāyānusāra and agrees with the second master.
16.100
On the Śāstra's "Where do the evil karmapathas arise?": The following half-verse is the third [section], clarifying the loci where the karmapathas arise.
16.101
From the Śāstra's "It is said in the treatise..." to "...they arise in four loci": This explains the verse in general. That is, among the aforementioned karmapathas brought to culmination by the three roots, the four groups of three, three, one, and three arise, respectively in order, in the loci of sentient beings (sattva), implements of life, name-and-form (nāmarūpa), name-sets (nāmakāya), and so on.
16.102
On the Śāstra's "That is to say, the three, killing and so forth... to ...arise in the loci of name-sets and so on": This is the specific explanation. Killing necessarily accomplishes the karmapatha of killing with the notion of a sentient being; it takes nominal sentient beings as its object, not name-and-form and so on. Harsh speech issues utterance solely taking sentient beings as its object, scolding and so forth, wishing to wound their very heart. Hatred refers to the mind of antagonism and injury toward sentient beings accomplishing its karmapatha; it does not accomplish the karmapatha toward non-sentient things (asattva). For this reason, these three karmapathas arise in the locus of sentient beings. Stealing refers to stealthily taking another's property; that is, conceiving the notion of another's belongings toward another's implements of life. Misconduct refers to [misconduct] toward wives, concubines, and so forth, which are also implements of life. Greed refers to the notion that another's belongings belong to oneself, which are also implements of life. Therefore, these three karmapathas arise in the locus of implements of life. The karmapatha of wrong view repudiates cause and effect; it does not take nominal sentient beings as its object, nor implements of life, but takes solely the five skandhas, the four truths, and cause and effect as its object; therefore it is said to arise in the locus of name-and-form. Lying and the rest all take different names, phrases, and syllables as objects to cause another to form a different understanding; therefore it is said that they arise in the locus of name-sets and so on. These are all stated in terms of the majority; it is not that a small portion does not also take other dharmas as objects.
16.103
On the Śāstra's "If one undertakes the prayoga... to ...the fault of the karmapatha?": The following is the fourth [section], an analysis through questions and answers.
16.104
From the Śāstra's "It is said in the treatise..." to "...dies at the same time or dies beforehand": This explains why the karmapatha is not accomplished.
16.105
On the Śāstra's "For what reason is it so... to ...it should not logically be so": This explains why the karmapatha is not accomplished; it can be understood according to the text.
16.106
On the Śāstra's "If many people... to ...the karmapatha of killing": The second half-verse below clarifies that another's killing accomplishes one's own karmapatha.
16.107
From the Śāstra's "It is said in the treatise..." to "...also accomplishes the sin of killing": This explains that another's killing of living beings accomplishes karma for oneself.
16.108
On the Śāstra's "Except only if there is... to ...therefore there is no sin of killing": This clarifies that another's killing of living beings does not accomplish it for oneself. It can be understood according to the text.
16.109
On the Śāstra's "Next, we should now distinguish... to ...the characteristics of killing": Below there are four half-verses clarifying the characteristics of accomplishing unwholesome karma. This half-verse clarifies the characteristics of accomplishing the karmapatha of killing. Having three conditions accomplishes killing: first, by deliberate intention; second, by the notion of another; third, by killing without mistake. Or it may be expanded into four, with taking life as one condition. The *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* says: "There is a mind desiring to kill living beings," which corresponds to "deliberate intention" in this treatise. "The notion of a sentient being" corresponds to "the notion of another" in this treatise. "The third condition, taking life" differs from this treatise. This treatise says "killing without mistake." If one simply speaks of taking life without specifying a mistake, merely severing the life of the one before oneself, combined with the above two conditions, immediately accomplishes the sin of killing. This is based on a mind without discrimination. "Killing without mistake" is like someone who wishes to kill a strong person but mistakenly kills a weak person, which does not accomplish the karmapatha. This is based on killing with discrimination. Because the senses they rely on differ, the meanings do not conflict.
16.110
From the Śāstra's "It is said in the treatise..." to "...the karmapatha of killing": This is based on killing with a discriminating mind, where only if there is no mistake does it accomplish the karmapatha.
16.111
On the Śāstra's "There is also killing with doubt that accomplishes the karmapatha": This is killing without a discriminating mind; simply killing a sentient being accomplishes the karmapatha. The *Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya* relies on this and merely speaks of taking life.
16.112
On the Śāstra's "With regard to momentarily perishing skandhas, how is killing accomplished?": This is a question by the Sammatīya school. The meaning of the question is: As the Sarvāstivādin school says, conditioned skandhas perish of themselves in an instant, without waiting for an extrinsic cause. How can killing be accomplished? For the past has already perished, the present perishes of itself, and the future has not yet arrived.
16.113
On the Śāstra's "The breath-wind is called life... to ...the sound of a bell is called killing": This is the reply. The breath-wind is called life; causing the breath of subsequent moments not to continue is called killing; it is not that causing the prior moment to perish is called killing. As for "destroying the lamp's light and the sound of a bell is called killing": the Sammatīya likewise accept that the flame of a lamp and the sound of a bell perish of themselves in an instant without waiting for an extrinsic cause; blowing out a lamp to extinguish it or holding a bell to stop its sound merely causes subsequent moments not to arise, not that it causes prior moments to perish. Therefore, a commonly accepted [phenomenon] is cited as an analogy.
16.114
On the Śāstra's "Or again, what is born... to ...affected by the sin of killing": This is the second explanation. The life-faculty (jīvitendriya) is life. The latter explanation is correct, because it agrees with the Sammatīya and others. The *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 118, says: "Question: Killing which skandha is called killing living beings? Is it past, future, or present? The past has already perished, the future has not yet arrived, and the present does not abide; none of them have the meaning of being killed. How is it called killing? Answer: It kills future skandhas, not past or present. Question: The future has not yet arrived; how can it be killed? Answer: While abiding in the present, one obstructs the future aggregation of the skandhas; this is called killing. Because one obstructs the causal conditions for the arising of the aggregation of other skandhas, one incurs the sin of killing. Some say: One kills present and future skandhas, but not past ones. Question: The future may be so. But the present does not abide; even if one does not kill it, it naturally perishes; how can it be killed? Answer: Severing its functional capacity is called killing. Why is that? Although the previously present skandhas perish without abiding, they are not able to cause subsequent skandhas not to continue. Now the present skandhas perish without abiding, and this is able to cause subsequent skandhas not to continue; therefore, one also incurs the sin of killing with regard to the present skandhas." Since there is no critical evaluation, the meaning applies to both. Furthermore, the *Vibhāṣā* says: "Question: Among the skandhas, which skandha can be killed so that one incurs sin toward it? Some say: The form skandha (rūpaskandha). Why is that? Because form alone can be struck by a staff and so forth. Some say: All five skandhas. Question: The four skandhas are without contact; how can they be killed? Answer: They operate relying on form; when the form skandha is destroyed, they cease to operate; therefore it is also called killing. Just as when a jar is broken, the milk and other contents are also lost. Furthermore, one raises an evil mind toward all five skandhas to kill; therefore one incurs the sin of killing toward them." Furthermore, the *Vibhāṣā* says: "Question: If one kills someone whose lifespan is exhausted, does one incur the sin of killing or not? Answer: If the lifespan of that moment was destined to end, and one does harm at that very moment, one does not incur the sin of killing. If, through harm, even a single moment of lifespan that was to abide does not arise, in all such cases one incurs the sin of killing, how much more so for many moments!"
First 114 of 192 passages. Read on
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- 俱舍論疏 — Classical Chinese