俱舍論疏 3

English (machine translation) 3

Language: English

3.2

Chapter Two: Analysis of the Faculties, Part One.

In elucidating the meaning of the faculties and the like, the establishment of the title differs. This treatise calls it the "Chapter on the Faculties" (Indriyanirdeśa); the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya calls it the "Chapter on Samskāras" (*Saṃskāravarga); the Nyāyānusāra calls it the "Chapter on Distinctions" (*Viśeṣanirdeśa). However, the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya combines the "Chapter on the Faculties" and the "Chapter on the World" of this treatise and designates them collectively as the "Chapter on Samskāras," because saṃskāra has two meanings: first, condition; second, what is produced. Causal activity refers to the causes; what is produced refers to the effects; hence the Saṃyuktābhidharmahṛdaya combines them into the "Chapter on Samskāras." Because causal activity signifies superior functioning, this treatise combines it with the faculties into the "Chapter on the Faculties." Moreover, because it explains the faculties first, it is named the "Chapter on the Faculties." As the root treatise explains the functioning of the worldly supreme dharmas and so forth, these are precisely the distinctions among dharmas; therefore the Nyāyānusāra names it the "Chapter on the Analysis of Distinctions." Although the titles differ, the meanings are not contradictory. Question: Why is the "Chapter on the Faculties" explained after the "Chapter on the Elements"? Answer: Because the elements are intrinsic natures, primary entities, and the supporting bases, they are explained first. The faculties are functional activities and distinctions, and they are that which depends [on the bases]; therefore they are explained afterward. To explain the chapter title: that which is most supreme, sovereign, and brilliant is called a "faculty"; since this chapter explains them at the beginning, it is named the "Chapter on the Analysis of the Faculties."

3.4

On the Śāstra's: "Having thus [analyzed the elements] based on the elements ... what is the meaning of faculty?": In this chapter there are seventy-four stanzas in total, divided into three sections: first, twenty-two stanzas directly analyzing the faculties; second, twenty-seven stanzas analyzing simultaneous arising; third, twenty-five stanzas analyzing causes and conditions. Within the first section, there are again three parts: first, six stanzas establishing the faculties; second, two stanzas explaining the intrinsic characteristics of the faculties; third, fourteen stanzas analyzing thematic perspectives. Within the first six stanzas: the first stanza recounts the establishment by the master of the Vibhāṣā; the second three stanzas recount the establishment by Dharmagupta; the third one stanza recounts Dharmagupta's restatement of the characteristics of the faculties; the fourth one stanza recounts the establishment by other masters. Within the first text, there are five parts: first, concluding the preceding and asking about the subsequent; second, answering the meaning of faculty; third, reiterating the question; fourth, citing the stanza to answer briefly; fifth, the prose explanation. This is the first text. Master Paramārtha says: "Regarding 'what is the meaning of faculty?': Previously, the eighteen elements were expanded into the twenty-two faculties, but the meaning of 'faculty' has not yet been explained. 'Faculty' has two meanings: first, the meaning of the designation; second, the doctrinal meaning. The meaning of the designation is the reason for establishing the name; the doctrinal meaning is the meaning of having outflows, being free of outflows, and so forth." Now examining this: here, inquiring into the meaning of faculty is specifically asking about the meaning of the designation—due to what meaning are these twenty-two dharmas designated as "faculties"?

3.5

On the Śāstra's: "supreme and sovereign […] the meaning of a faculty is predominance": this is the second [section], answering the meaning of "faculty" (indriya). The Nyāyānusāra says: "This meaning of predominance is established and manifested by the meaning of the verbal roots (dhātu). The verbal root is id, or it is ind. 'Supreme and sovereign' is the meaning of the root id; 'shining and brilliant' is the meaning of the root ind." Now, when examining verbal roots, they have many meanings. The intent of the Nyāyānusāra is: supreme sovereignty is the meaning of the verbal root id; shining brilliance is the meaning of the verbal root ind. "Flourishing brightness" is the suffix (pratyaya), which assists the designations of the two verbal roots id and ind. The meaning of supreme sovereignty and shining brilliance transforms to be named "predominance" (adhipatya), and predominance is precisely the meaning of faculty (indriya). In this Śāstra, supreme sovereignty is the meaning of the verbal root id, and brightness is the suffix, which assists the meaning of supreme sovereignty of the root id, transforming to be named "predominance"; the meaning of predominance is called "faculty". Therefore the Nyāyānusāra says: "This meaning of predominance is established and manifested by the meaning of the verbal roots." Its intent is to comprehensively demonstrate that the twenty-two faculties have predominant efficacy among all assemblages. Question: Since all dharmas have their own respective predominant efficacy with respect to one another, should they not all be called faculties? Answer: These are exceedingly predominant; thus the meaning is established with a distinctive designation, just as a lion king, a village headman, and the like are exceedingly predominant over beasts, villages, and the like.

3.6

On the Śāstra's: "With respect to what does this predominance exist, and in relation to what?": this is the third [section], repeating the question.

3.7

On: "The verse says: […] respectively exercise predominance": this is the fourth [section], replying again.

3.8

On: "The commentary says: […] four uncommon activities": this is the fifth [section], explaining the text of the verse. Within it there are three parts: first, explaining that the five faculties have four kinds of predominance; next, explaining that four faculties each have two kinds of predominance; and last, explaining that thirteen faculties each have one kind of predominance. This, then, lists the four predominant functions.

3.9

On the Śāstra's: "First, the eye and ear faculties […] because of the distinction in hearing sounds": this explains the two kinds of predominance of the eye and the ear.

3.10

On the Śāstra's: "The nose, tongue, and body faculties […] because of odors, tastes, and tangibles": this explains the predominant functions of the latter three faculties.

3.11

On the Śāstra's: "The female, male, life, and mental faculties […] capable of exercising predominance": next, this explains that the four faculties each have two kinds of predominance.

3.12

On the Śāstra's: "First, the female and male faculties […] distinctions such as breasts": this explains the two kinds of predominance of the female and male faculties. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Regarding the two kinds of predominance of the female and male faculties: the first is the difference of sentient beings (sattva-bheda); the second is the difference of distinctions (vikalpa-bheda). 'Difference of sentient beings' means: at the beginning of the kalpa, the forms and types of sentient beings were all equal; once the two faculties arose, there were distinctions in the forms and types of male and female. 'Difference of distinctions' refers to the structured distinctions in deportment, vocal pitch, breasts, topknots, and so forth. Some say: Because there are distinctions between bravery and timidity, it is called difference of sentient beings; because there are distinctions in clothing and adornments, it is called difference of distinctions."

3.13

On the Śāstra's: "Some say that with respect to […] all pure dharmas": this recounts an alternative explanation. "Ṣaṇḍha" refers to having no faculty or having an impaired faculty. "Paṇḍaka" refers to having no potency or having impaired potency. "Both sexes" (ubhayavyañjanaka) refers to being fully endowed with both faculties. The first, because of lacking the faculty or being impaired, has no predominant efficacy with respect to defilement or purification. The second, because of lacking potency or being impaired, likewise has no predominance with respect to defilement or purification. The last, being endowed with both faculties, is endowed with two sets of defilements, and therefore is also not predominant in defilement or purification. Both ṣaṇḍha and paṇḍaka include both the innate (jāti) and the impaired (upahata); hence it is said, "innate and impaired ṣaṇḍhas and paṇḍakas". Among ṣaṇḍhas, there are those entirely lacking the faculty and those partially lacking the faculty; among paṇḍakas, there are those entirely lacking potency and those partially lacking potency. Where various sūtras and śāstras say that a ṣaṇḍha is without a faculty, it is because lacking entirely and lacking partially are both equally called "without". In the Vibhāṣā, fascicle ninety, explaining the four propositions on being freed from desire being called a 'man' (puruṣa), it says: "Or one may possess the male faculty and yet not be called a man, such as a ṣaṇḍha, a paṇḍaka, and the like." This intent refers precisely to partially lacking the faculty. Some people provide numerous interpretations, yet have failed to resolve the objection. However, this latter interpretation does not match that of the former masters. Why so? Because although those with two faculties have no predominant efficacy with respect to defilement and purification, they still obtain the name "faculty". Thus we know that the statement concerning defilement and purification is not a definitive proof.

3.14

On the Śāstra's: "Regarding the two of the life-faculty: […] capable of continuing and capable of sustaining": this explains the two kinds of predominance of the life-faculty. The Nyāyānusāra says: "That the life-faculty has predominance with respect to two means: on account of this, the various faculties and the distinctions among faculties are designated, because when this exists, that exists, and when this is absent, that is absent. Alternatively, it is capable of continuing and sustaining the generic conformity (nikāyasabhāga). In the formless realm, there must be a life-faculty before there can be that which is generated, because the place is fixed. When they generate wholesome, defiled minds, and so forth of their own stage, or generate other minds, it is not because life has ended." The old translation of the Kośa says: "It is predominant in association with and in holding fast to the generic conformity." Paramārtha explains: "As when born into the human destiny, one is able to abide in the human category; hence it is called 'association'. When life is destroyed, one is then born into a different destiny and is no longer of the human category. Furthermore, why is this body able to abide in continuation? It is necessarily because the presence of life holds it fast and causes it to abide."

3.15

On the Śāstra's: "Regarding the two of the mental faculty: […] all follow along with it at will": this explains the two kinds of predominance of the mental faculty. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Some say that the mental faculty has predominant power with respect to the categories of defilement and purification; hence it says 'with respect to two'. As the sūtra states: 'Sentient beings are defiled because the mind is defiled; sentient beings are purified because the mind is purified.'"

3.16

On the Śāstra's: "The five feeling faculties of pleasure and the rest […] joy, sorrow, and equanimity": last, this explains that the thirteen faculties each have one kind of predominance. With pleasure and joy, attachment increases in accordance; with pain and sorrow, aversion increases in accordance; with the feeling of equanimity, delusion increases in accordance. The eight faculties of faith and the rest are all able to generate and increase pure dharmas. Regarding "pleasure and the rest are also predominant with respect to purification": to show that there are two senses, it therefore includes the word "also". That is to say, they can cause defilement, and they can also cause purification. The sense of defilement is as stated above; what is the sense of purification? As the sūtra states: "Because of pleasure, the mind is concentrated; pain is the support for faith; joy, sorrow, and equanimity are the supports for the six renunciations." Concentration, faith, and renunciation are all of the pure category: the feeling of pleasure is predominant for concentration; the feeling of pain is predominant for faith; and joy, sorrow, and equanimity are predominant for renunciation with respect to the six sensory objects.

3.17

On the Śāstra's: "The Vaibhāṣika masters transmit the teaching thus": the fourth [section] concludes that what was stated above is [the view of] the Vaibhāṣika masters. The Nyāyānusāra says: "The initial statement 'transmit the teaching' indicates a preference for the subsequent explanation—namely, what some say regarding being able to guide and nourish the body, and so forth." The commentary states: This reveals that Master Vasubandhu preferred the subsequent explanation.

3.18

On the Śāstra's: "Other masters say: […] because of receiving coarse food": from here down is the second [major section], recounting the establishment of the faculties by the Dharmaguptakas. Paramārtha says: "The Sautrāntikas. Within this there are three parts: first, refuting the Vaibhāṣika masters' establishment of the twenty-two faculties; second, establishing the twenty-two faculties with three verses; third, the prose commentary. This refutes the five faculties' guiding and nourishing the body, saying that this is [the function of] consciousness, not the function of the faculties."

3.19

On the Śāstra's: "Functions such as seeing visible forms […] distinct predominant functions": this refutes [the view that] the eye and the rest have seeing forms and so forth as uncommon activities, [arguing that] the functions such as seeing visible forms belong to consciousness, not to the faculties.

3.20

On the Śāstra's: "Therefore, it is not on this account that the eye and the rest constitute faculties": this summarizes and concludes the refutation. The other points are largely the same with minor differences, and thus are not refuted.

3.21

On the Śāstra's: "If so, how is it?": the Vaibhāṣika masters ask: If you do not accept our view that they are called predominant functions because the eye guides and nourishes and has uncommon activities, then you, Sautrāntika master, how do you explain its meaning?

3.22

On: "The verse says: […] predominance over nirvāṇa and so forth": the second [part], replying with verses to establish the faculties.

3.23

On: "The commentary says: […] each is established as a faculty": this explains the text of the verse. That is, because the faculties such as the eye serve as the basis for consciousnesses such as eye-consciousness, they have predominant efficacy with respect to the consciousnesses such as eye-consciousness; therefore, they are established as faculties.

3.24

On the Śāstra's: "Would not visible forms and the rest […] should be established as faculties?": an external objection.

3.25

On the Śāstra's: "The object with respect to consciousness […] the same is also true for mental phenomena": resolving the objection. Predominant function refers to supreme sovereignty. The eye is supremely sovereign within eye-consciousness; therefore it is called predominant. There are two senses: first, it serves as the common basis for many consciousnesses apprehending blue and so forth; second, the supported consciousness varies in clarity or obscurity in accordance with the supporting faculty. Due to these two senses, the faculty has the meaning of supreme, sovereign predominance with respect to consciousness. As for "Visible forms are not like this, because the two are contrary": first, a blue form is only the objective support for discerning blue form, not for discerning yellow form and the like. Second, when a visible form undergoes change and destruction, the consciousness does not change and destruct along with it. Because these two aspects of visible form run contrary to the two aspects of the faculty, it is not established as a faculty. This applies up to the mental faculty, which also possesses both; sounds and the rest are also like this.

3.26

On the Śāstra's: "From the body, furthermore, are established […] because they possess predominance": this explains the third and fourth lines of the verse.

3.27

On the Śāstra's: "The substance of the female and male faculties […] are separately established as two": this text explains the reason for the female and male faculties. That is, taking a portion of the body as their substance, these two differ slightly from the body faculty in other locations. Because they are capable of exercising predominance over female and male, they are established as two separate faculties apart from the body faculty.

3.28

On the Śāstra's: "The female bodily form and type […] predominance over the two sexes": this explains the female and male sexes, and shows that the two faculties exercise predominance over these two sexes.

3.29

On the Śāstra's: "With respect to generic conformity […] each can constitute a faculty": this explains the second verse. The statement "The life-faculty has predominant efficacy with respect to the abiding of the generic conformity" explains the life-faculty. The statement "With respect to defilement […] because ignorance increases in accordance" explains the predominant efficacy of the five feeling faculties. The statement "With respect to purification […] because they lead to the noble path" explains that the five faculties of faith and the rest have predominant efficacy. The statement "The word 'should be known' […] each can constitute a faculty" explains the words "should be known" in the verse.

3.30

On the Śāstra's: "The three untainted faculties […] have predominant efficacy": this explains the third verse.

3.31

On the Śāstra's: "The phrase 'likewise so' […] each can constitute a faculty": this explains the phrase "likewise so" in the verse.

3.32

On the Śāstra's: "That is, the faculty of having not yet known what is to be known […] because one is able to attain parinirvāṇa": this explains [the phrase] in the verse: "predominance over attaining the subsequent paths, nirvāṇa, and so forth."

3.33

The Śāstra states: "The word 'and so forth' is to show ... because they are the bliss of liberation." This explains the word "and so forth" in the verse. "The word 'and so forth' is to show that there is yet another manner of exposition" explains the sovereign function. The Nyāyānusāra states: "This statement is unreasonable. For the sabhāga-faculties [in their inactive phase, i.e., tatsabhāga] would not be faculties (because they are not bases of consciousness, they would not be faculties). Might it not be that you too incur this fault? (The Sautrāntika objects in turn: 'You hold that uncommon functions and the like have seeing, hearing, and so forth as their sovereign function; when the tatsabhāga eye no longer sees visible forms, it should not be a faculty.') We do not incur this fault, because we explain that it has a sovereign function in adorning the body (though the tatsabhāga eye lacks the other three sovereign functions, it possesses the sovereign efficacy of adorning the body and so forth). Furthermore, not all [eye faculties] are a universal cause for the consciousnesses that cognize all visible forms, because eye faculties perish from moment to moment, and consciousnesses cognizing visible forms do not arise simultaneously [with them]. If you say that the category of the eye has no distinctions, visible forms should also be the same, for their category is not different. If you claim that blue and yellow belong to distinct categories, the eye should also be likewise, because there are different kinds arising from maturation and produced by nourishment (according to this, the eye faculties that see blue and yellow forms are not distinct). As for consciousness merely having clarity or dullness depending on the faculty, this too is not the reason, for only after the essence of consciousness has arisen can it be clear or dull in accordance with the faculty (before it has arisen, it cannot be said to follow the faculty). As for the sovereign power to cause what has not yet arisen to arise, if either one is lacking, it does not arise (in causing what has not yet arisen to arise, if either visible form or the faculty is lacking, consciousness does not arise; this refers to the faculty and the object being equal)." If a master of the Kośa were to refute this: It is precisely because the faculty that causes what has not yet arisen to arise is clear or dull that consciousness arises as clear or dull following the eye faculty; who says that consciousness must first reach the present before being said to follow it? Moreover, the present period is only a single moment; how could it transform clarity into dullness, or shift dullness into clarity? Or, since consciousness has clarity or dullness in accordance with the faculty, the meaning of guiding and sustaining the body should be acknowledged to reside in the faculty. If the function of the eye increases, it gives rise to a superior consciousness, which can avoid dangers and guide and sustain the body. If the function of the eye is weak, it gives rise to an inferior consciousness, which cannot discern dangers and causes the body to stumble and fall. Therefore, guiding and sustaining the body resides in the faculty, not in consciousness. To refute this: avoiding danger and guiding the body is directly accomplished by consciousness; now to cast aside the direct and establish the remote, how mistaken is that! The Nyāyānusāra further states: "Furthermore, what slight difference is there in this? The previous approach already showed that the faculties such as the eye give rise to consciousnesses such as the eye-consciousness and associated mental factors; now in this approach, a portion of that is omitted—since it is not one's own insight, how could it be worthy of joy? Since there is no distinct meaning, it should not be stated again." That is, it merely reduces a portion from what we previously explained, and what is not omitted still repeats our explanation; how could this give rise to joy? The faculties mentioned below are likewise said to agree with our explanation.

3.34

The Śāstra states: "If because of sovereign efficacy ... because of their sovereign function," the author of the treatise provisionally sets up host and guest to resolve the objection. Herein there are two parts: first, positing the objection; second, properly resolving the objection. Within the objection, it first presents the objection from its own school, and next presents the objection from the Sāṃkhya. This is the first, presenting the objection from its own school. The Nyāyānusāra states: "If things are established as faculties because of sovereign efficacy, then among the defilements in the category of craving and views, the two dharmas of feeling and perception have a sovereign function; perception, like feeling, should also be established as a faculty. Furthermore, the defilements have a sovereign function in being able to destroy wholesome factors and the like, so they should constitute the entity of a faculty. Furthermore, since faculties are established because of being supreme, and among all dharmas nirvāṇa is the most supreme, for what reason is nirvāṇa not established as a faculty?"

3.35

The Śāstra states: "Also, the organ of speech and so forth ... have a sovereign function." This is the second, presenting the objection from the Sāṃkhya. That treatise has the doctrine of twenty-five principles. As for the twenty-five: First, the self (puruṣa). They posit that the eternal self has consciousness as its essence; by nature it is merely an experiencer and not an agent. The remaining twenty-four principles are what are experienced by the self. Second, primordial nature (prakṛti), which has sattva, rajas, and tamas as its essence, also called suffering, pleasure, and delusion, or sorrow, joy, and darkness. These three are like the ministers of the self: when the self desires to experience objects, they transform for the sake of the self; when they have not transformed, each abides in its own nature, hence the name "primordial nature." Third, from primordial nature arises the great (mahat). When the self contemplates and desires to experience the various sense spheres, the three factors immediately know it. Because its substance is vast when in motion and transformation, it is called "the great." Fourth, from the great arises ego-consciousness (ahaṃkāra), so named because it takes that self as its object. Fifth, from ego-consciousness arise the five subtle elements (tanmātra), namely visible form, sound, smell, taste, and tangibility, making nine when added to the preceding. Sixth, from the five subtle elements arise the five gross elements (mahābhūta), namely earth, water, fire, wind, and space, making fourteen when added to the preceding. Visible form produces fire, because fire is red. Sound produces space, because there is sound in space. Smell produces earth, because there is much smell in earth. Taste produces water, because there is much taste in water. Tangibility produces wind, because it can touch the body. Seventh, from the five gross elements arise the eleven faculties (indriya), namely eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind, hand, foot, anus, genitals, and the organ of speech, which is the physical tongue, making twenty-five principles when added to the preceding. Fire can produce the eye, which in turn can see visible forms; space can produce the ear, which in turn can hear sounds; earth can produce the nose, which in turn can smell scents; water can produce the tongue, which in turn can taste flavours; wind can produce the body, which in turn can perceive tangibles. The five gross elements together can produce the mind, hands, feet, anus, genitals, and the organ of speech. They posit that the physical heart is called the mind. The entities held by that school are permanent, just as when transformed gold is made into bracelets, armlets, and the like, the colour of the gold does not change, though the forms of the bracelets and the like are different. When the self desires to experience objects, from primordial nature arises the great, from the great arises ego-consciousness, from ego-consciousness arise the five subtle elements, from the five subtle elements arise the five gross elements, and from the five gross elements arise the eleven faculties. When the self does not experience objects, from the eleven faculties it returns into the five gross elements, from the five gross elements it returns into the five subtle elements, from the five subtle elements it returns into ego-consciousness, from ego-consciousness it returns into the great, and from the great it returns into primordial nature. Now, the objection is raised concerning the five faculties of action (karmendriya) among the eleven faculties of that school: The organ of speech, namely the physical tongue, has a sovereign function in speaking; the hand has a sovereign function in grasping; the foot has a sovereign function in walking; the anus has a sovereign function in expelling excrement; the genitals have a sovereign function in the pleasurable activity of sexual desire. Since all of these possess sovereign functions, they should be established as faculties.

3.36

The Śāstra states: "Such things ... have such characteristics." In the following single verse, the author of the treatise thirdly establishes the faculties for the Dharmaguptakas. Because the organ of speech and the remaining other factors lack the characteristics of a faculty, they are not established as faculties.

3.37

"The Śāstra states: ... are the root of sentient beings" explains the basis. The six internal āyatanas are the root of sentient beings, and therefore are the basis of the mind; the six external āyatanas are not the root of sentient beings, and therefore are not the basis of the mind. As for "the root of sentient beings," the six internal āyatanas are entirely sentient beings, whereas of the six external āyatanas only a portion is sentient. It is due to the six internal āyatanas that the four sense spheres supporting the faculties exist; therefore, the faculties are their root.

3.38

The Śāstra states: "The distinctions in their characteristics," and below, explains the functions of the remaining faculties. "Their" refers to the above six faculties. It cannot refer to "these sentient beings," because sentient beings have no real entity, having the six āyatanas as their entity. Nor can it be said to refer to "these minds and mental factors," because the sexual distinction between male and female is predominantly physical form. Paramārtha and others state: it refers to these six āyatanas. The distinction of characteristics and the maintenance of life can be understood from the text. "Their becoming defiled is due to the five feeling faculties": defilement is of two kinds: first, being defiled because of association with defilements, which is the mental faculty; second, being defiled because of being bound by being an object of defilements, which applies to all six faculties.

3.39

As for the Śāstra's statement: "Their provisions for purification are due to the five [faculties] beginning with faith," the provisions for the purification of the eye and the other [faculties] are the five beginning with faith.

3.40

The Śāstra states: "Their becoming pure is due to the last three faculties." This has three kinds: If it is called pure because its essence is anāsrava, then it is solely the mental faculty; if it is called pure because of freedom from the bondage of its own defilements and because of cessation, then it applies to the six faculties, the eye and the rest.

3.41

The Śāstra states: "Thus, the establishment of faculties is completely exhaustive," concluding the above establishment of the faculties.

3.42

The Śāstra states: "Therefore, one should not ... because of their sovereign function." This shows that the other factors are not included among the faculties. The Nyāyānusāra states: "One should not further establish perception and the like as faculties. Among the defilements, the fault of craving is the gravest; therefore, feeling alone is established as a faculty for it. That the fault of craving is the gravest is because the sūtras state that craving is the cause of the arising of the six āyatanas. Furthermore, perception is not the cause of the arising of the defilement of views; after an erroneous view has arisen from other causes, the false discriminative perception sustains it in continuity, and without the correct antidote it cannot be severed or destroyed; therefore, this perception is said to be the cause for that [view]. Feeling is the cause for craving and universally pervades both kinds. Because feeling is the cause of the gravest defilement and because it pervades both causes, it alone is established as a faculty."

3.43

The Śāstra states: "There are yet other masters who explain the characteristics of the faculties differently." In the following single verse, it thirdly recounts the establishment of the twenty-two faculties by other masters. Because the twenty-two faculties are stated in the sūtras, the various masters make no addition or reduction. The establishment of their number is the intention of the masters of the treatises, which is why the various explanations differ.

3.44

"The Śāstra states: ... the twenty-two faculties" explains the word "or" in the verse to show the position of the other masters. Faculties are established in terms of being the most supreme basis for the transmigration and cessation of saṃsāra, and having sovereign function in their arising, maintenance, and enjoyment. The continuity of birth and death is the meaning of transmigration; the cessation of birth and death is the meaning of cessation, which is the ultimate cessation of the six āyatanas. The Nyāyānusāra states: "The continuity of birth and death is the meaning of transmigration; the cessation of birth and death is the meaning of cessation, which is the ultimate cessation of the six āyatanas." Fascicle 100 of the Vibhāṣā states: "Transmigration means undergoing rebirth again; cessation means progressing toward nirvāṇa."

3.45

The Śāstra states: "The basis of transmigration refers to the six beginning with the eye." This says that the six faculties are the basis of transmigration.

3.46

The Śāstra states: "Arising is due to female and male, because one is born from them." The intention here specifically refers to womb-born and egg-born beings in the desire realm. Here there is an objection: Walking and grasping have functions with regard to the mouth and stomach; because these are not invariable, the hands and feet are not established as faculties. In arising, there are also beings that do not depend on the male and female faculties; this too is not invariable, so they should not be faculties.

3.47

The Śāstra states: "Abiding is due to the life faculty, because they abide relying on it." This says that the six faculties, the eye and the rest, abide relying on the life faculty.

3.48

The Śāstra states: "Enjoyment is due to the five feelings, because experiencing is caused by them." The intention here is to show that feeling has sovereign efficacy.

3.49

The Śāstra states: "The former fourteen faculties are established in terms of this," which is a conclusion.

3.50

The Śāstra states: "In the state of cessation ... the latter eight faculties are established." This also establishes the latter eight in terms of the four meanings.

3.51

The Śāstra states: "The basis of cessation refers to the five beginning with faith." The Nyāyānusāra explains: "The cessation of birth and death is the meaning of cessation, which is the ultimate cessation of the six āyatanas. The basis for the acquisition of this refers to the five beginning with faith (this acquisition is the acquisition of analytical cessation; or it is the non-arising of the six āyatanas, which is the acquisition of non-analytical cessation), because they are the most supreme cause for the growth of all wholesome roots."

3.52

The Śāstra states: "Among the three anāsrava [faculties] ... enjoyment is due to the last." The Nyāyānusāra explains: "The first anāsrava faculty can produce this acquisition, because this is what first arises among those who have entered the stage of correctness (samyaktvaniyata). The second anāsrava faculty causes this acquisition to abide, because it arises continuously over a long period. The last anāsrava faculty causes one to enjoy abiding in pleasant dwelling in this very life, because it is manifested by that."

3.53

The Śāstra states: "By this, the number of faculties is neither deficient nor excessive," concluding that the number is definitively fixed.

3.54

The Śāstra states: "It is precisely for this reason that the sūtras establish the sequence." This clarifies that the sūtra first speaks of the six internal āyatanas; next speaks of the female and male; next speaks of the life faculty; next speaks of the five feelings; next speaks of the five faculties beginning with faith; and next speaks of the three anāsrava faculties. It does not mention the sequence of the treatise, because in the treatise the mental faculty is spoken of after the life faculty, and does not follow this sequence.

3.55

Regarding the passage in the treatise from “The vocal organ should not [be established as a faculty]” onwards: This refutes the non-Buddhists who establish eleven faculties. Some of these are the same as [those of] the Śākyan [tradition], while others differ from them. Those that are the same as the former are not refuted, while those that differ are promptly refuted. As for the statement, “The vocal organ should not [be established as a faculty] … up to … because speech is accomplished [only through training]”: just as being able to see visible form does not depend upon training to be accomplished, so too, if the tongue had a predominant function with regard to speech, it should naturally be capable of speech without depending on training to be accomplished. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: “Furthermore, the vocal organ and so forth are also not called faculties, because of the faults of indefiniteness, confusion, and excessive over-extension. As for the fault of indefiniteness: which vocal organ is established as the faculty of speech? That which can emit vocal sounds is called the vocal organ, which is the tongue. If that were so, then dharmas such as inquiry (vitarka) and investigation (vicāra), as well as the various winds that can produce vocal karma, should also be established as faculties, because they can produce speech. Moreover, inquiry, investigation, and so forth are superior causes in the emission of vocal sounds. If it is claimed that the discernment of visible form also occurs by means of speech, and thus the eye alone should not be established as a faculty, this principle is definitely not so. This is because people blind from birth, even though they hear descriptions of visible form, do not discern the distinctive characteristics of blue and so forth.”

3.56

Regarding the passage in the treatise, “Hands and feet should not … up to … be established as faculties”: This refutes hands and feet. “Different locations” refers to movement. “Different characteristics” refers to extension and bending. The remaining text is easily understood. The above explains the faults of indefiniteness and confusion.

3.57

Regarding the passage in the treatise, “The organ for evacuation … up to … because such pleasure arises”: The former objection involves the fault of confusion, and the latter objection shows that there is no distinct predominance.

3.58

Regarding the passage in the treatise, “Furthermore, the throat, teeth … up to … should not be established as faculties”: This is the fault of excessive over-extension. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: “As for the fault of excessive over-extension: the faculties established by them would have no limit, and so forth.” Question: Among the seventy-five dharmas, why is it that among material forms only five are faculties, the primary mind is fully included, among the universal [mental factors] only four—sensation, mindfulness, concentration, and discernment—are taken, among the wholesome [mental factors] only the two dharmas of faith and diligence are taken, and among the non-associated [dharmas] only the life faculty is taken, with the remaining dharmas excluded? Answer: According to other masters, these thirteen dharmas have superior functions in [the processes of] transmigration and cessation, and are therefore established as faculties, whereas the other functions are not superior and are not established as faculties. According to the Dharmaguptakas, these very thirteen dharmas are the bases of the mind: this differentiates it, this sustains it, this defiles it, this provides its provisions, and this purifies it; therefore they are established as faculties, whereas other dharmas are not such and are not established as faculties. The *Nyāyānusāra* states: “Question: Since dharmas mutually have distinct predominant functions, should they all equally be called faculties? Answer: These are exceedingly predominant; their distinct statement is justified. It is like a lion king or a village chief.” This text was already cited earlier. Question: Here, when the superior efficient cause (kāraṇahetu) is correlated with the sovereign fruit (adhipatiphala) to be established as a faculty, how could it be that what is directly a causal condition (hetupratyaya) correlated with a fruit is conversely not established as a faculty?

3.59

Regarding the passage in the treatise, “Herein, the eye and so forth … up to … will also be extensively analyzed”: The preceding six stanzas established the twenty-two faculties; the following two stanzas constitute the second [part], explaining the essential characteristics of the faculties. Within this, there are two parts: first, indicating the remaining faculties [to be explained later], and second, explaining the five sensations and the three undefiled [faculties]. This is the first.

3.60

Regarding the passage in the treatise, “The five sensations of pleasure and so forth … up to … based on nine, three faculties are established”: This is the second part, explaining the five sensations and the three undefiled faculties. Sensation is of three kinds: first, beneficial; second, harmful; third, neither harmful nor beneficial. Furthermore, there are two kinds: first, bodily sensation, namely, associated with the five consciousnesses; second, mental sensation, namely, associated with the mental consciousness. Bodily sensation that is beneficial and mental sensation in the third dhyāna that is beneficial are called pleasant sensations; bodily sensation that is harmful is called painful sensation. Mental sensation below the second dhyāna that is beneficial is called joy sensation; when harmful, it is called sorrow sensation. That which is present in both body and mind and is neither harmful nor beneficial is called equanimity sensation.

3.61

“The treatise says: … up to … is called the faculty of pain”: This explains the painful sensation.

3.62

Regarding the passage in the treatise, “What is meant by gratification … up to … mental gratification is called pleasure”: This explains the pleasant sensation.

3.63

Regarding the passage in the treatise, “This very mental gratification … up to … is called the faculty of joy”: This explains the joy sensation.

3.64

Regarding the passage in the treatise, “In the third dhyāna … up to … is called only the faculty of joy”: This explains the reason why it is called pleasure in the third dhyāna, but called joy in the lower stages.

3.65

Regarding the passage in the treatise, “Associated with the mental consciousness … up to … is called the faculty of sorrow”: This explains the sorrow sensation.

3.66

Regarding the passage in the treatise, “The neutral is what is neither gratification … up to … should be said to pertain to both”: This explains the equanimity sensation.

3.67

Regarding the passage in the treatise, “For what reason are these two collectively established as a single faculty?”: This is a question. For what reason are gratification and non-gratification given distinct names in body and in mind, whereas that which is neither gratification nor non-gratification is combined into [a single] equanimity sensation in both mind and body?

3.68

Regarding the passage in the treatise, “This sensation in body and mind … up to … body and mind are unified”: This resolves the objection.

3.69

Regarding the passage in the treatise, “Furthermore, painful and pleasant sensations … up to … therefore they are collectively established as a single faculty”: This is a further re-explanation.

3.70

Regarding the passage in the treatise, “Mind, pleasure, joy, equanimity … up to … establish the faculty of one who has fully known”: This explains the three undefiled faculties. Within this, there are two parts: first, establishing the nine faculties as three faculties across the three paths; second, explaining the reasons why the three faculties acquire their names. This is the first.

3.71

Regarding the passage in the treatise, “Because of what are these three names established?”: From here on, the names of the three faculties are explained; first a question, then an answer. The question asks: “Because of what is it named the faculty of one who will come to know what is not yet known, and so forth?”

3.72

Regarding the passage in the treatise, “Namely, on the path of seeing … up to … is named ‘will come to know what is not yet known’”: This explains the name of the first undefiled faculty. Knowledge (jñāna) is called ‘knowing’ (jñā), whereas receptivity (kṣānti) is not knowing. On the path of seeing, at the stage of the receptivity to the dharma-knowledge of suffering, there is an activity [of mind regarding] ‘will come to know what is not yet known’ for the eight truths; at the stage of the dharma-knowledge of suffering, there is an activity of ‘will come to know what is not yet known’ for the seven [truths], and so on up to the receptivity to the subsequent-knowledge of the path, where there is an activity of ‘will come to know what is not yet known’ for the truth of the path in the form and formless realms. Therefore, all fifteen moments of mind are called the faculty of one who will come to know what is not yet known.

3.73

Regarding the passage in the treatise, “If on the path of cultivation … up to … is named ‘one who has known’”: This explains the name of the second undefiled faculty. Upon reaching the subsequent-knowledge of the path, one has already known the truths exhaustively; there is no unperceived realm of the noble truths that one gives rise to the noble path in order to seek to know; rather, merely to sever the afflictions of the path of cultivation, one repeatedly discerns the realm of the four truths again, and therefore it is said to be named ‘one who has known.’ The *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 143, states: “The sixteenth thought-moment should be like the [preceding] seven knowledges; why is it spoken of uniquely as the faculty of one who has known, and not ‘knowing what has already been known’? Answer: This is also spoken of from the majority perspective: although the first moment is similar to the seven knowledges, all subsequent moments are different from them. Spoken of from the majority perspective, they are all called the faculty of one who has known, because they are of a uniform nature.” According to this treatise text, the preceding seven knowledges last for only a single moment. “The subsequent-knowledge of the path definitely has multiple thought-moments in the two vehicles, or when an assembly of śrāvakas emerges [from meditation], it definitely has multiple thought-moments.” According to this, repeatedly knowing is called ‘known.’ Some say: After this, there is no longer any path of not-yet-known that overshadows or covers it, not allowing the lower to oppress the higher and cause it to lose self-mastery, for it must certainly be so. Referring to knowing as ‘already known’ is like referring to the time of going as ‘already gone’; it is just like that. According to this treatise text, the path of not-yet-known is lower, and the path of already-known is higher; receptivity is lower, and knowledge is higher; what comes before is lower, and what comes after is higher. Although the preceding seven [knowledges] could also be named ‘known’ in the sense of ‘speaking of known with respect to knowing,’ the subsequent receptivity to the subsequent-knowledge of the path is called ‘not yet known,’ and is thus called ‘the lower oppressing the higher.’ Although all eight knowledges can be named ‘known,’ because the seven knowledges have what is lower above them, they are not named ‘known,’ whereas the eighth has nothing lower above it and is therefore named ‘known.’ Although the subsequent-knowledge of the path cannot know itself and is only known by knowledge upon reaching the second moment, it is like a single dust mote on Mount Sumeru or a single drop in the great ocean. Furthermore, the formulation is established with respect to the truths, not with respect to moments. Question: In the path of cultivation, one contemplates the truths in order to sever afflictions, as well as to refine the faculties, for the bliss of the Dharma, and so forth; why is it only said to be for severing afflictions? Answer: After the path of the first fruit, one must give rise to the path of the higher fruit, and that path of the higher fruit is precisely the preliminary application for severing afflictions. Furthermore, refining the faculties and so forth are done out of fear of falling back due to afflictions, and experiencing the bliss of the present Dharma is also the superior path of progression for severing afflictions. Therefore, by merely speaking of severing afflictions, the meaning encompasses the rest; because of this, the author of the treatise speaks only of severing afflictions.

3.74

Regarding the passage in the treatise, “On the path of the adept … up to … and so on at length”: This explains the name of the faculty of one who has fully known. “Knowing that one has already known” refers only to the knowledge of exhaustion (kṣayajñāna), which pertains to dull faculties. That is, having attained the knowledge of exhaustion, one knows: “I have already known suffering, known the origin,” and so forth; or having attained the knowledge of exhaustion, one knows: “I have already known suffering, severed the origin,” and so forth. “Or one who has cultivated this knowing until it has become one's nature” refers to having attained both the knowledge of exhaustion and the knowledge of non-arising (anutpādajñāna); this pertains to sharp faculties who attain both knowledges: “I have already known suffering” is exhaustion; “not to be known again” is the knowledge of non-arising. “And so on at length” means “I have already severed the origin, not to be severed again,” and so forth. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: “The entity of the third faculty, that of one who has fully known, is called ‘knowing’ because it knows what it has already known, or because it has cultivated knowing into its nature, or because it can protect knowledge.” The *Notes* explains: “That is, on the path of the adept, saying ‘Suffering has already been known by me,’ and so forth, is called knowing what one has already known. This is called knowing. ‘Having cultivated it so that it has become one's nature’ refers to the initial attainment, namely the knowledge of exhaustion. ‘Or being able to protect knowledge’ refers to the subsequent stage, namely the knowledge of non-arising. Having completed it and being able to protect it, it is therefore called ‘complete’ (ājñā). The *Kośa* also says: ‘Taking the former as possessing knowledge, and the latter as having cultivated it into one's nature.’ The one capable of possessing and cultivating it is called ‘one who has fully known’ (ājñātāvin). The faculties belonging to one who has fully known are called the faculty of one who has fully known (ājñātāvīndriya).” Examining these two treatises, there is a difference in intention: if, according to this treatise (*Nyāyānusāra*), the discernment of the three paths is named ‘one who will know what is not yet known’ and so forth, then that discernment itself is the faculty, explained as a karmadhāraya compound; in that case, the meaning of ‘that is the faculty’ consists solely of discernment. If, according to the *Kośa*’s intention, those three names designate the practitioner capable of accomplishing the practice, it is explained as a tatpuruṣa compound: the faculties possessed by that [practitioner] are named ‘that [practitioner]’s faculties,’ which fully encompasses the nine dharmas. The *Nyāyānusāra* says: “Nine faculties associated together accomplish this matter; therefore, mind and the other eight also obtain this name.” The *Vibhāṣā* reviews the inclusion and exclusion among the seventy-five dharmas, but for fear of prolixity it is not related here; however, it does not exceed the criteria established previously. What lacks the preceding meanings is not established as a faculty.

First 74 of 192 passages. Read on

Linked texts (1)

俱舍論疏 — Classical Chinese