俱舍論疏 9

English (machine translation) 9

Language: English

9.2

Chapter Three: Exposition of the World, Part Two.

[On the] Śāstra's [words], "To which destiny will it proceed... what is its shape?": below, the third section has five verses that analyze intermediate existence through conceptual categories. Within this, the first verse explains the destiny to which intermediate existence proceeds and its shape; the next two verses explain its vision by the divine eye and its supernormal powers; the last two verses explain the entering of the womb by intermediate existence. This is the first. Before the verse, there are two questions: first, asking to which destiny it will proceed; second, asking what its shape is.

9.4

[On the text], "The commentary says... the shape of its future prime existence": this explains the first two lines, answering both questions together. Because karma is able to project the destiny to which one is to go, that same karma attracts the intermediate existence that is able to go. This clarifies that intermediate existence and existence at birth share the same karma. Because their karma is identical, the destiny to which one is to go is identical and the shape is identical.

9.5

[On the] Śāstra's [words], "If so, in one... burn the mother's womb": this is an objection. If one says that intermediate existence is like the shape of prime existence (pūrvakālabhava), then the intermediate existence of hell should also be like hell; raging fire should accompany it, and when the intermediate existence arises, it should burn the mother's womb.

9.6

[On the] Śāstra's [words], "While dwelling in prime existence... how much less in intermediate existence": this is the reply. Within this, there are three points: first, at the time of intermediate existence, there is not yet raging fire; second, because intermediate existence is extremely subtle; third, answering by following the objection. Due to karmic power, although the intermediate existences of the five destinies are in the same location, they do not burn or touch each other. This is the first point. Even in prime existence in hell it is not constantly burning, how much less in intermediate existence.

9.7

[On the] Śāstra's [words], "Even granting that it could burn... what was objected to is unreasonable": this is the second point. Even if intermediate existence immediately burned, just as one does not yet see the intermediate existence of hell, one's body also does not touch the fire of hell, because the body of intermediate existence is extremely subtle.

9.8

[On the] Śāstra's [words], "The intermediate existences of the various destinies... because they are blocked by karma": this is the third point. Even granting that the intermediate existence of hell is immediately accompanied by fire, the intermediate existences of other destinies are not burned by the fire because they are obstructed by karma. This explains the reason.

9.9

[On the] Śāstra's [words], "The size of intermediate existence in the desire realm... the four great continents, etc.": because of explaining that the shape and size resemble the place where one is to be born, it concurrently explains the size of shape in the two realms. Although ordinary beings and bodhisattvas are both in the desire realm, ordinary beings are like small children, while bodhisattvas are like those in the prime of life, etc.

9.10

[On the] Śāstra's [words], "If so, why is it that... entered her right flank?": this is a question. If the intermediate existence of a bodhisattva is like one in the prime of life illuminating a hundred koṭis [of worlds], why did the mother of the bodhisattva dream of a young white elephant coming and entering her right flank?

9.11

[On the Śāstra's statement:] "This auspicious omen […] not as it was seen": This is the answer. The Bodhisattva, since ninety-one kalpas ago, had long abandoned [birth as] an animal; that his mother saw a white elephant was an auspicious sign. Just as the ten things seen in King Kṛki's dreams indicated the future and were not as they were seen. "Kṛki" is Sanskrit, translated here as "Zuoshi" (maker of deeds); he was the father of Kāśyapa Buddha. At night he dreamed of ten things and reported them in full to the Buddha. The Buddha said: "These portend the advance omens of the disciples in the future bequeathed Dharma of Śākya[muni]." The king dreamed of seeing a large elephant shut in, with no door except a small window; through expedients the elephant got its body out, but only its tail was obstructed by the window and could not get out. This portends that disciples in the bequeathed Dharma of Śākya will be able to abandon parents, wives, and children to leave household life and cultivate the Way, yet amidst this will still harbor [desire for] fame and profit and be unable to abandon them, just as the tail was caught in the window. As for the well, the king dreamed of seeing a thirsty person seeking water to drink, and there was a well possessing the eight virtues that followed the thirsty person, yet he would not take it to drink. This portends that the religious and lay disciples in Śākya's bequeathed Dharma will be unwilling to study the Dharma; those who understand the Dharma will, for the sake of fame and profit, pursue them to preach it to them, yet they still will not study it. As for the roasted flour, the king dreamed of trading a sheng of genuine pearls for a sheng of roasted flour. This portends that disciples in Śākya's bequeathed Dharma, seeking profit, will expound the Buddha's true Dharma for others, hoping for their material wealth. As for the sandalwood, the king dreamed of taking sandalwood incense to trade for ordinary wood. This portends that disciples in Śākya's bequeathed Dharma will trade internal true Dharma for external texts and the like. As for the wonderful garden, the king dreamed of a wonderful garden with flourishing flowers and fruits, destroyed by mad thieves without anything remaining. This portends that disciples in Śākya's bequeathed Dharma will eradicate the garden of the Tathāgata's true Dharma. As for the young elephants, the king dreamed of small elephants driving a large elephant out of the herd. This portends that bad factions of precept-breaking bhikṣus among disciples in Śākya's bequeathed Dharma will drive out and expel precept-holding, virtuous bhikṣus from the assembly. As for the two monkeys: the king dreamed of seeing a monkey whose body was smeared with excrement and filth rushing boldly through its troop, so that all who saw it avoided it. This portends that precept-breaking persons among disciples in Śākya's bequeathed Dharma will plot to slander good persons with evil deeds, so that all who see them keep far away. The king also dreamed of seeing a monkey who had no actual virtue, yet the troop together supported and upheld him, anointed his head with sea water, and established him as their king. This portends that precept-breaking bhikṣus among disciples in Śākya's bequeathed Dharma, having no actual knowledge, will, for fame and profit, be supported and upheld by bad factions to be made heads of the assembly. As for the wide and durable robe, the king dreamed of a wide and durable robe, of which eighteen people each took hold of a small piece, pulling from the four sides in contention, yet the robe was not torn. This portends that disciples in Śākya's bequeathed Dharma will divide into eighteen [schools], showing that the Dharma they study has its respective followers, and with differing school tenets they will give rise to mutual strife. This indicates the persons capable of studying the Dharma. What was dreamed like this merely portended the omens of other future events, not as it was seen. Therefore one knows that when the Bodhisattva's mother saw a white elephant in a dream, it merely portended an auspicious sign, and was not as it was seen. [On the Śāstra's statement:] "Furthermore, all intermediate existences […] the former is smaller and the latter larger": Because of the Bodhisattva entering the womb from the right flank, it explains thereupon that all other intermediate existences enter through the birth canal, not that it intends to prove that the Bodhisattva's intermediate existence enters through the birth canal. If explaining size in terms of the time of birth, the one born earlier is larger; if explaining size in terms of receiving the embryo, the one conceived later is larger. According to this text of the Śāstra, it speaks only of the fixed case; if karma is different or reception in the womb is long or short, then it is not fixed. Someone says: "This text intends to prove that the Bodhisattva enters through the birth canal"—this is incorrect. This text should prove that the Bodhisattva enters through the right flank, because the Bodhisattva is born from the right flank. The *Vibhāṣā*, fascicle 70, states: "Question: At what place does the Bodhisattva's intermediate existence enter the womb? Answer: He enters through the right flank, entering the womb with right awareness, regarding his mother as mother, because he is free from lustful desire. Another says: He enters through the birth canal, because this should be the rule for all womb-born and egg-born beings. Question: At what place does the prior intermediate existence of a wheel-turning king or a pratyekabuddha enter the womb? Answer: They enter through the right flank, entering the womb with right awareness, regarding the mother as mother, because they are free from lustful desire. Another says: They enter through the birth canal, because this should be the rule for all womb-born and egg-born beings. Another master says: Because the merit and wisdom of a Bodhisattva are exceedingly superior, when about to enter the womb he has no inverted perception and does not give rise to lustful desire. Although wheel-turning kings and pratyekabuddhas have merit and wisdom, they are not exceedingly superior; when about to enter the womb, although free from inverted perception, they still give rise to lustful desire; therefore, when entering the womb, they necessarily enter through the birth canal." Furthermore, the *Nyāyānusāra* says: "In principle, the intermediate existence actually enters the womb as it wishes and not necessarily through the birth canal, because of absence of obstruction; however, it is constrained by the womb through the power of karma." The *Nyāyānusāra* differs from the other treatises. This treatise's statement, "Furthermore, all intermediate existences", does not definitely refer to the Bodhisattva.

9.12

[On the Śāstra's statement:] "Dharmasubhūti said […] sleeping like a ṛṣi secluded in the forest": This again cites Dharmasubhūti's verse to raise an objection.

9.13

[On the Śāstra's statement:] "It is not necessary to resolve […] there is no error in composing the verse": This resolves the objection.

9.14

[On the Śāstra's statement:] "The intermediate existence of the form realm […] because shame and dread of blame are predominant": The above clarified the size of the desire realm; this clarifies the form realm. Because shame and dread of blame are predominant, they are born together with clothing.

9.15

[On the Śāstra's statement:] "The Bodhisattva's intermediate existence is also together with clothing": Like that of the form realm.

9.16

[On the Śāstra's statement:] "The bhikṣuṇī Śuklā […] because they lack shame and dread of blame": Clarifying that through the power of vows, she is constantly accompanied by clothing; while in secular life it is secular clothing, and when leaving household life it transforms into Dharma robes. Except for the Bodhisattva and the bhikṣuṇī Śuklā, all remaining intermediate existences, because they lack shame and dread of blame and lack the power of vows, are without clothing.

9.17

[On the Śāstra's statement:] "Therefore, what is the entity of prior existence?": This is the question.

9.18

[On the Śāstra's statement:] "It refers to after the death-existence […] they are the five grasping skandhas": This is the answer.

9.19

[On the Śāstra's statement:] "Among these states, the distinctions are […] the intermediate lacks, having three": This immediately clarifies the four existences along with the distinctions among realms. The *Nyāyānusāra* states: "For what reason is there no intermediate existence in the formless realm? Because karma [conducive to] that [realm] cannot induce an intermediate existence. For what reason is karma [conducive to] that [realm] incapable in this regard? Because one is born there only after arising fetters are severed." Many explanations are given like this. "Another master says: An intermediate existence is posited in order to go to the place of rebirth and manifest the shape of the destiny; it is not that the formless realm has a place or a shape. If so, then when one dies and is reborn inside one's own corpse at the place where the physical faculty ceases, without going elsewhere, of what use is an intermediate existence? Here an intermediate existence is posited to manifest the shape of the destiny, since one of the two conditions previously explained is present. This defense is illogical, because manifesting the shape of the destiny has no superior function regarding rebirth in that destiny. However, the Sthavira said: If one is reborn at the very place of death, the intermediate existence would be absent. His statement is not good; it is not that the intermediate existence is induced only at the stage of the death-existence—how could one say that if one is born at the place of death, an intermediate existence is not induced? One has definitely already performed and increased the karma that feels an intermediate existence beforehand; who can now be an obstacle preventing the fruit of intermediate existence from arising in the present? Or again, the intermediate existence and the birth-existence are fruits of the same karma, and the intermediate existence is also the beginning of a single life-span's rebirth; if the intermediate existence did not exist, the birth-existence could not continue, just as one certainly cannot bypass the kalala and produce the arbuda, because it is the beginning of that. However, regarding the determined characteristics spoken of for the intermediate existence: there is no birth-existence without having abandoned attachment to the desire and form realms; [birth-existence] does not arise except after the intermediate existence; nor is there an intermediate existence whose fruit is not pulled by the same karma as the destiny to which it goes; nor can an intermediate existence enter non-mind, become a bodily witness, attain liberation in both parts, or give rise to a worldly heterogeneous mind. While abiding in the intermediate existence, there is no changing of physical faculties, nor is one able to sever defilements to be severed by seeing, nor does one sever the latencies of the desire realm to be severed by cultivation. Such avenues should all be contemplated." Fascicle 68 of the *Vibhāṣā* states: "Question: If one dies in this place and is reborn in this same place—just as it is heard that some die and are reborn inside their own corpses—since there is no going or coming, why is an intermediate existence required to link the two existences continuously? Answer: When sentient beings die, some are born in evil destinies and so forth. For those born in evil destinies, consciousness ceases at the feet. For those born among humans, consciousness ceases at the navel. For those born in the heavens, consciousness ceases at the head. For those who attain parinirvāṇa, consciousness ceases at the heart. For those who, after dying, are born inside their own corpses as worms and the like, before they died they mostly cherished their own faces; therefore, after dying, they are born on their own faces. Since one comes from the feet to be born on one's own face, if there were no intermediate existence, who could connect them? There is no case of dying in this place and being reborn in this same place, because discarding a body and receiving a body necessarily involves displacement. Question: When one dies in the formless realm and is born into the desire or form realm, since the intermediate existence appears right according to the place of prospective birth, and there is no coming and going, of what use is an intermediate existence? Answer: They have previously created karma that feels an intermediate existence; although there is no coming and going, they still undergo an intermediate existence, because what is drawn by karmic power must inevitably arise."

9.20

[On the Śāstra's statement:] "Having explained the shape and size, the remaining meanings will now be analyzed": The two verses below are the second section, clarifying vision and supernormal powers, etc.

9.21

[On the statement:] "The commentary says […] because it is extremely subtle": This clarifies seeing with the eye. Because this is extremely subtle, only eyes of the same category can see each other, and those who possess the cultivated divine eye can see it, not the birth-acquired eye. According to this text of the Śāstra, the birth-acquired divine eye of a higher stage is inferior to the cultivated divine eye of a lower stage. Furthermore, mutual seeing among those of the same category is itself a distinct meaning, not merely due to subtlety. If the eye of an intermediate existence in heaven is not inferior to that of a lower destiny, why does it not see? Therefore, one knows the meanings are distinct.

9.22

[On the Śāstra's statement:] "Other masters say […] one's own and below, excluding the above": This relates differing explanations.

9.23

[On the Śāstra's statement:] "Among all supernormal powers […] because it is the most powerful": This clarifies superior and inferior. This Śāstra says: "The intermediate existence is fully endowed with the swiftest karmic supernormal power; up to the World-Honoured One, none can hinder or restrain it, because the force of karma is the most powerful." According to this text of the Śāstra, there are two meanings: first, the meaning of being the swiftest; second, the meaning of being unhindered. Fascicle 70 of the *Vibhāṣā* states: "Question: Between the supernormal power of psychic transformation and the movements in the state of the intermediate existence, which is swifter? The stated position is: the movement of psychic transformation is swift, not that of the intermediate existences. Question: If so, why does the sūtra say that the power of karma is superior to the supernormal power of psychic transformation? Answer: This statement was made based on the absence of hindrance, not based on the speed of movement. Namely, the Buddha's supernormal power can hinder the supernormal powers of all sentient beings; a pratyekabuddha [can hinder all] except the Buddha; Śāriputra [can hinder all] except the two; Mahāmaudgalyāyana [can hinder all] except the three—they can hinder all sentient beings. No Buddha, pratyekabuddha, any śrāvaka, or the spells and medicines of other sentient beings can hinder an intermediate existence from proceeding to the place where it should be reborn. Rather, it definitely goes there and links up with birth according to its category. Hence, the sūtra states that the power of karma is superior to supernormal powers. If one were to make an analysis based on speed of movement, one should say that supernormal powers surpass the intermediate existence." According to this text of the Śāstra, there is only one meaning. The *Nyāyānusāra* also cites this sūtra to prove that karmic supernormal power is swift. That treatise says: "Because the functioning of this supernormal power is fast, it is called swift; the intermediate existence possesses this swiftest karmic supernormal power, and among the rapid movements of all supernormal powers, none can surpass it." The meaning of the *Nyāyānusāra*'s text agrees with the *Abhidharmakośa*; according to this, it differs from the meaning in the *Vibhāṣā*.

9.24

[On the Śāstra's statement:] "All intermediate existences are fully endowed with the five sense faculties": This clarifies completeness of faculties. The *Nyāyānusāra* states: "According to the stage, all faculties are fully possessed in intermediate existence. Although it is said that the intermediate existence has the shape of the prior existence, the initial maturation is the most excellent. Furthermore, because it seeks existence, there is none that does not possess all faculties."

9.25

[On the Śāstra's statement:] "Resistance means obstructive resistance […] because worms are born there": This clarifies unobstructedness. This cannot be blocked by adamantine rock and the like; therefore it is called non-resistant.

9.26

On the Śāstra's 'It must go to that destination... definitely does not go elsewhere': this clarifies certainty. Thus the Vibhāṣā says: 'The Dārṣṭāntikas say that the intermediate state can change [its destination]. The Abhidharmikas say: Regarding realm, destination, and place of birth, the intermediate state can never change, because the karma that projects the intermediate state is exceedingly forceful.' The Nyāyānusāra says: 'Regarding realm, destination, and place of birth, none can change. That is, it is definite that there is no case where an intermediate existence of the form realm ceases and an intermediate existence of the desire realm is born, nor vice versa, because this and the birth existence are projected by one single karma.'

9.27

On the Śāstra's 'The body of an intermediate existence of the desire realm... the name gandharva': this clarifies what it feeds upon.

9.28

On the Śāstra's 'Among verbal roots... because it is abbreviated, there is no fault': this explains the abbreviation of the phoneme a. The Nyāyānusāra says: 'Because among verbal roots meanings are not single. Although this root av primarily denotes going, within it there is also the meaning of eating; because it feeds on fragrance, it is called a gandharva. As for its short vowel, it is like śakandhu and karkandhu; because it is abbreviated, there is no fault. Some say: the intermediate existence relies on fragrance to sustain its body, and because it moves seeking fragrance, it is called a gandharva.' According to this text of the treatise, av is the verbal root (dhātu), and gandha is the nominal affix/word. The compound gandhāva has a long vowel, whereas gandharva has a short vowel. Although long and short differ, this is translated as 'seeking fragrance'. Seeking fragrance is the meaning of going, but within it there is also the meaning of eating. Saying 'seeking fragrance' is because it feeds on fragrance. That is to say, because the root av has two senses, it is both due to the sense of going and due to the sense of eating. Omitting the sound a in the verbal root is also without fault, because it is pronounced with a short vowel. Just as in śakandhu and karkandhu, śakan and karkan are the nominal elements, and dhu is the root element. The root element should have two syllables, but because it is pronounced with a short vowel, one syllable is omitted, and it is merely called dhu.

9.29

On the Śāstra's 'Those with little merit... take fine fragrance as food': this recounts differences in food.

9.30

On the Śāstra's 'Such an intermediate existence... a death-existence should be posited': this clarifies the duration of its dwelling. Vibhāṣā 70 says: 'Such an intermediate existence stays for a short time and must go to link birth, because it swiftly seeks birth. Venerable Śamathadatta says: The intermediate existence dwells at most for seven times seven days, because within forty-nine days it definitely links birth. Venerable Vasumitra says: The intermediate existence dwells at most for seven days, because that body is frail and cannot dwell long. Question: If within seven days the conditions for birth are assembled, it can link birth; if so, when the conditions for birth are not yet assembled during that time, could it be interrupted and destroyed? Answer: It is not interrupted or destroyed; that is, during the state when the conditions for birth are not yet assembled, that intermediate existence repeatedly dies and is born without interruption or destruction. The Bhadanta says: There is no fixed limit to this; that is, for one whose conditions for birth swiftly assemble, this intermediate body dwells for a short time; if its conditions for birth have not assembled for a long time, this intermediate body dwells for a long time, until the conditions assemble and only then can it link birth; therefore, the intermediate body's dwelling has no fixed limit.' The Nyāyānusāra says: 'For all intermediate existences, solely excluding those who attain nirvāṇa in the intermediate state, there are none among the remaining intermediate existences that do not reach the birth-existence before passing away.' This treatise and the Nyāyānusāra agree with the Bhadanta.

9.31

On the Śāstra's 'Even if there were a mass of flesh... gradually waits for this time': this agrees with the Bhadanta's idea that, having not yet met the conditions for birth, it dwells in the intermediate existence. Now examining this explanation: intermediate and birth existences share the same karma, so it also will not be long before it must meet the conditions for birth; it cannot dwell in the intermediate existence for more than a hundred years or the like.

9.32

On the Śāstra's 'From which direction, it is said, does it suddenly come to this place?': this is a question.

9.33

On the Śāstra's 'Although there is no sūtra or treatise... taking the body of a tiny worm': this is the first explanation.

9.34

On the Śāstra's 'Or many sentient beings... this should also be so here': this is the second explanation.

9.35

On the Śāstra's 'Therefore the World-Honoured One said... is inconceivable': this cites scriptural authority as proof.

9.36

On the Śāstra's 'Venerable Vasumitra... swiftly goes to link birth': this recounts an alternative view.

9.37

On the Śāstra's 'If its conditions for birth... in another place, among another class': this clarifies that what is determinate must certainly be brought to assembly, whereas what is indeterminate takes birth dependent on another class. This is the difference in integrating effects (paripūrakaphala); the projecting [karma] is the same as before.

9.38

On the Śāstra's 'Some say that one transforms to receive... the latter four are of the same class': this recounts an alternative view.

9.39

On the Śāstra's 'Would it not be that the intermediate existence... is similar to transforming to receive?': the author of the treatise refutes it.

9.40

On the Śāstra's 'Such an intermediate existence... that is, attachment or aversion': this clarifies the inverted mind. The Nyāyānusāra says: 'Due to this cause and condition, after a male or female is born, they are respectively partial in their gestation toward the mother or toward the father.'

9.41

On the Śāstra's 'Through giving rise to this... it is called having linked birth': this clarifies the time of linking birth. It can be understood according to the text.

9.42

On the Śāstra's 'If a male in the womb... or becomes a non-male': this clarifies dwelling position and facing the four directions.

9.43

On the Śāstra's 'In this meaning... hating the kaṭasī': this clarifies the formation of the sense faculties. Kaṭasī here means craving, and also means 'cauldron of blood'.

9.44

On the Śāstra's 'Other teachers say... there is no fault of contradiction': this is the explanation of the second master, which also does not contradict the sūtra cited earlier.

9.45

On the Śāstra's 'Thus it has been explained for now... the places have pure and impure': this clarifies that moisture-born and apparitional births also take rebirth through craving.

9.46

On the Śāstra's 'Could one also generate attachment toward hell?': this is a question.

9.47

On the Śāstra's 'Due to the mind being inverted... rushes toward it': this is the answer. The treatise has two explanations, which can be understood according to the text.

9.48

On the Śāstra's 'Moreover, the intermediate existence of gods... enjoying tranquility and practicing austerities': this clarifies the manner of movement of the intermediate existences of the destinations. Vibhāṣā 70 says: 'For now it is explained based on those dying among humans. If one dies in hell and is reborn again in hell, one does not necessarily travel head downwards and feet upwards. If one dies among gods and is born among humans, one's head should go downward. For intermediate existences of the two destinations of hungry ghosts and animals, it should be known accordingly depending on the place they go.' This is the correct doctrine.

9.49

On the Śāstra's 'The previously described inverted mind... What are the four?': from here below, two verses thirdly clarify entering the womb.

9.50

'The treatise says... the subsequent necessarily entails the antecedent': this clarifies entering the womb by those who have abundantly accumulated meritorious karma and diligently cultivated mindfulness and wisdom. 'Entering the womb with correct awareness' refers to a wheel-turning monarch (cakravartin). 'Knowing abiding along with entering' refers to a solitary awakened one (pratyekabuddha). 'Knowing exiting along with abiding and entering' refers to the unexcelled awakened one (anuttarasambuddha).

9.51

On the Śāstra's 'There are sentient beings... all are constantly without knowledge': this clarifies entering the womb by those deficient in both merit and wisdom, who lack knowledge in all three states. 'Entering without correct awareness, abiding and exiting must certainly be so'—one should first explain lack of knowledge. 'In accordance with the rules of composing verse, they are explained reversely in four': stating that if one is unaware at the states of entering, abiding, and exiting, the former necessarily entails the latter. As for knowing that the subsequent necessarily entails the antecedent, the Nyāyānusāra says: 'At the state when about to enter, the limbs and faculties are complete and undamaged, strong, and clear, yet one still lacks correct awareness; how much less could one have correct awareness at the time of abiding and exiting when limbs and faculties are damaged, deficient, frail, and obscured? In principle there is no possibility.'

9.52

On the Śāstra's 'How can the egg-born... be spoken of as entering the womb-receptacle?': this is a question.

9.53

On the Śāstra's 'Because the egg-born... there is no fault in speaking of entering the womb': this is the answer. Here there are two senses: first, because one must first enter the womb, it is spoken of as entering the womb; second, because one will be egg-born, it is called egg-born. It is really cooking rice and grinding wheat, but one speaks of 'cooked rice' and 'roasted flour', establishing the name based on what it will become. The production of conditioned dharmas also takes the name of the result.

9.54

On the Śāstra's 'How are the three states with correct awareness and without correct awareness?': this clarifies the differences among the four kinds of entering the womb.

9.55

On the Śāstra's 'Sentient beings... exit from this place': this answers. It is the inverted conception of those of little merit.

9.56

On the Śāstra's 'If their merit is increased... those without correct awareness': this clarifies the inverted conception of those with merit. First they give rise to attachment, and afterward give rise to this inversion.

9.57

On the Śāstra's 'If in the three states... personally know abiding and exiting': this reiterates the previous three who lack inverted conceptions.

9.58

On the Śāstra's 'Furthermore, it specifically demonstrates... designated by what they will become': this points out that the names pertain to what they will become. Here, saying that a wheel-turning monarch, solitary awakened one, or greatly awakened one enters the womb adopts the designation of what they will become, because at the time of entering the womb they are not yet a wheel-turning monarch, solitary awakened one, or greatly awakened one.

9.59

On the Śāstra's 'For what reason is it like this... together forming the fourth': this clarifies the reasons why knowing and not knowing upon entering the womb differ, all due to differences in the presence or absence of karma, merit, and wisdom. What is called 'correct awareness' here means merely lacking inverted conceptions; it is not that they definitely give rise to a wholesome mind with correct awareness and correct mindfulness. Vibhāṣā 70 says: 'Most sentient beings give rise to such inverted conceptions and then enter the mother's womb, with the sole exception of a bodhisattva: when about to enter the womb, regarding the father he conceives the notion of father, and regarding the mother he conceives the notion of mother; although capable of correct awareness, he gives rise to affectionate attachment toward his mother, and by the power of this attachment he enters the mother's womb.' Moreover, fascicle 172, in explaining the bodhisattva's correct awareness, says: 'He then generates affectionate love toward his parents and so forth, and through this links birth.' As for the earlier text saying that he gives rise to affectionate attachment toward the mother, someone says this is stated based on the predominant and majority case. This is not reasonable: the later text says 'and so forth', so it is unfitting to say it is based on the predominant; if all are the same, it is unfitting to say 'the majority'. Now, examining the difference in intention: when ordinary worldlings enter the womb, the inversion has two stages: in the earlier stage, if a female, she gives rise to love toward the father and aversion toward the mother; if a male, he gives rise to aversion toward the father and love toward the mother. In the later stage, they further imagine themselves entering a splendid park or a dense cavern of grass and leaves. When a bodhisattva enters the womb, there are also two stages: in the earlier stage, since there is no defiled mind, he generates affectionate love equally toward father and mother; in the later stage, since he knows he is entering directly into the mother's belly, he therefore gives rise to affectionate attachment solely toward the mother and not toward the father. Because of this, the later text lacks the character fu ('attachment'). Vibhāṣā 172 explains the four kinds of entering the womb with many differing theories; as fully explained there, fearing prolixity, they are not recorded here.

9.60

On the Śāstra's 'Here, non-Buddhists... now, in order to refute them': from here below is the seventh major section, which will explain dependent origination to refute the external attachment to a self.

9.61

'The treatise says... what is the characteristic of the self?': this is a question.

9.62

On the Śāstra's 'Capable of discarding these skandhas... the inner agent (puruṣa)': this is the answer.

9.63

On the Śāstra's 'This definitely does not exist... because it cannot be apprehended': this refutes the attachment of non-Buddhists. The self you assert is not cognizable through direct perception like form and so forth, nor is it cognizable through inference based on function like the eye and so forth; therefore, it definitely does not exist.

9.64

On the Śāstra's 'The World-Honoured One also said... solely excluding dharma-designation': this explains by citing authoritative testimony. 'Discarding these skandhas and capable of continuing other skandhas' is refuted.

9.65

On the Śāstra's 'What is a dharma-designation?': this is a question.

9.66

On the Śāstra's 'Relying on this, there is... extensively explains dependent origination': this is the answer.

9.67

On the Śāstra's 'If so, what kind of self is not refuted?': this is a question. If within dharma-designation, when this exists, that exists, and when this arises, that arises, and there is no real self capable of acting as an agent, there are two assertions of self: first, real; second, nominal/designated. Between the two selves, which is not refuted?

9.68

On the Śāstra's 'Only the skandhas exist... is not refuted': this is the answer. That is, it does not refute the nominal designation of 'self' applied to the skandhas such as form.

9.69

On the Śāstra's 'If so, one should accept... transmigrating to another world': this is an objection. If there is no real self, then it is the skandhas themselves that can transmigrate from this world to another world.

9.70

On the Śāstra's 'The skandhas cease moment by moment... the meaning of entering the womb is established': this is the answer. Just as a lamp flame, though ceasing moment by moment, is said to move to another location in terms of continuity and similarity; the skandhas are also like this: moving to enter the womb and so forth by the power of defilements and karma is established in meaning, and there is also no fault.

9.71

On the Śāstra's 'As projected by karma... transmigrating to another world': this clarifies that transmigration across the three times is due to defilements and the power of karma.

9.72

On the Śāstra's 'That is, not all... gradually growing in sequence': this clarifies the length and shortness of lifespan, due to the strength or weakness of the projecting karma.

9.73

On the Śāstra's 'What is the sequence?': this is a question.

9.74

On the Śāstra's 'As the Noble One said... gradually transforms and increases': this cites scriptural authority as proof.

9.75

The Śāstra says: "Namely, from within the mother's womb … to the stage where the physical form and faculties are complete." This clarifies the gradual development through the stages within the womb. Kalala is translated here as 'mixture', or as 'defilement', or as 'coagulated slime'. Arbuda is translated here as 'vesicle', because it arises like a bubble. Peśī is translated here as 'soft flesh'. Ghana is translated here as 'hard flesh'. Praśākhā is translated here as 'branches and joints'. After that, hair on the head, body hair, nails, and so forth, up to the stage where the physical form of the material sense faculties is complete, all constitute the fifth stage. If relying on the Sammatīya school, from the appearance of hair onwards it is called the sixth stage.

9.76

The Śāstra says: "Arising from karma … they gradually develop and increase." This describes the suffering of birth. "Śālmali" is the name of a plant whose juice is slippery. In this way, because the master of the wheel wishes to cause disgust to arise, he speaks of various faults, which can be understood according to the text.

9.77

The Śāstra says: "Up to the stage of faculty maturation … the cycle is without beginning." This clarifies that the continuum of transmigration has no initial limit.

9.78

The Śāstra says: "If one grasps that there is a beginning … there is definitely no initial [limit]." This refutes the Mahīśāsaka school's view that sentient beings have a beginning, and refutes the non-Buddhists who assert causelessness and those who assert a permanent cause, as already disposed of earlier.

9.79

The Śāstra says: "However, it has a final boundary … a sprout certainly will not arise." This clarifies that it is beginningless yet has an end.

9.80

The Śāstra says: "Such a continuum of skandhas is explained taking three lives as its stages." From here below, the eighth section clarifies conditioned origination (pratītyasamutpāda). Within this there are seven points: first, clarifying the stages of the twelve links; second, clarifying their essential nature; third, clarifying the intention of the teaching; fourth, clarifying the intention of speaking of sentient beings; fifth, grouping them into three and two; sixth, clarifying how the afflictions and the rest correspond to one another; seventh, properly explaining the intention of the sūtra. This single verse is the first, clarifying the stages of the twelve links.

9.81

The text of the Śāstra says: "… to the twelfth, aging and death." This lists the names of the links.

9.82

The Śāstra says: "Regarding the three periods … and the present three lives." This lists the names of the three periods.

9.83

The Śāstra says: "How are the twelve links established across the three periods?" This asks about their establishment.

9.84

The Śāstra says: "Namely, the prior and posterior periods … are in the intermediate period." This answers regarding their establishment.

9.85

The Śāstra says: "Do these eight of the intermediate period … all exist completely [in every being] or not?" This asks why not all sentient beings in the intermediate period necessarily possess all eight. As for why it does not ask about the prior and posterior periods, but only about the intermediate one, it is because the two links in each of the prior and posterior periods are definitely present, whereas the eight links of the intermediate period are not definitely present.

9.86

The Śāstra says: "They do not all possess them completely." This is the answer. There are some who die between consciousness and the link of name-and-form, or upon reaching the six āyatanas and so forth, or some who, having given rise to craving, die before reaching the stage of grasping. There are none who reach consciousness without reaching name-and-form.

9.87

The Śāstra says: "If so, why is it said that there are eight links?" This is an objection.

9.88

The Śāstra says: "It is stated based on a complete … pudgala." This is the answer. Within this there are two parts: first, a brief answer; second, citing scriptural testimony. This is the first. The general meaning of the Vibhāṣā is also the same.

9.89

The Śāstra says: "The Mahānidāna-sūtra … up to extensive explanation." This cites scriptural testimony. The Nyāyānusāra states: "The intention here is that a pudgala who traverses all stages is called 'complete', not one who dies prematurely, nor beings in the form or formless realms, because they lack the stages of kalala and so forth. The World-Honoured One speaks of possessing all twelve only with reference to a small portion of pudgalas in the desire realm, as taught in the Mahānidāna-sūtra. The Buddha asked Ānanda: 'If consciousness were not to enter the womb, could it increase and grow great?' 'No, World-Honoured One!' and so on up to extensive explanation. Therefore, if there is a pudgala who in the immediately preceding lifetime created ignorance and karmic formations, they fully incur the five links in the present—consciousness and the rest. Again, in the present lifetime creating craving, grasping, and becoming, they incur the two links in the immediately subsequent lifetime—birth and the rest. One should know that this sūtra is taught based on such [a person]. If the links of existence were established based on all pudgalas, it would result in confusion. That is to say, some might have their five present links not being the fruit of the ignorance and karmic formations of the immediately preceding lifetime, and the birth and aging-and-death links of the immediately subsequent lifetime not being the fruit of the craving, grasping, and becoming of the present lifetime. None of those are what this sūtra intends to clarify. Do not, seeing that cause and fruit are separated and disjointed, doubt the efficacy of cause and fruit in bringing about retribution. According to this, in a single lifetime there is only one [set of] craving, grasping, and becoming." The Vibhāṣā, fascicle 23, states: "Question: This sūtra states that name-and-form conditions the six āyatanas; this should not encompass sentient beings of all four modes of birth. For those born from a womb, from an egg, or from moisture, the sense faculties arise gradually, so one may say that name-and-form conditions the six āyatanas. For spontaneously born sentient beings, the sense faculties arise all at once; how can one say that name-and-form conditions the six āyatanas? One should only say that consciousness conditions the arising of the six āyatanas. Some say: This sūtra only speaks of three modes of birth in the desire realm, not of the higher realms or spontaneous birth; therefore there is no fault. It should be stated: This sūtra applies generally to the three realms and the four modes of birth. For spontaneously born beings, at the initial moment of taking rebirth, although they possess all sense faculties, they are not yet sharp; later they gradually grow before becoming sharp. At the time when they are not yet sharp, the very first instant is called consciousness; from the second instant onward it is called the link of name-and-form; upon reaching the sharp stage, it is called the link of the six āyatanas. Therefore, this sūtra does not have the fault of failing to encompass them." Furthermore, the Vibhāṣā, fascicle 24, states: "Of these twelve links, how many belong to the desire realm? How many to the form realm? How many to the formless realm? Some say: The desire realm possesses all twelve links. The form realm has eleven links, excluding name-and-form. The formless realm has ten links, excluding name-and-form and the six āyatanas. For the form realm, it should be said: consciousness conditions the six āyatanas, because there is no period there when the four sense faculties have not yet arisen. For the formless realm, it should be said: consciousness conditions contact, because there is no matter or five sense faculties there. Evaluation: It should be said that all three realms possess the twelve links of existence. Question: When born in the form realm, the sense faculties arise all at once; how can there be a stage of name-and-form? When born in the formless realm, there is no matter or five sense faculties; how can there be stages of name-and-form and the six āyatanas? Answer: Although the five sense faculties in the form realm are said to arise all at once, not long after birth the faculties are not yet sharp; at that time they are subsumed only under the link of name-and-form. Although the formless realm lacks matter and the five sense faculties, it has name and the mental faculty. It should be said: consciousness conditions name, name conditions the mind āyatana, and the mind āyatana conditions contact; therefore, all three realms possess all twelve." According to the above two passages of the Vibhāṣā, both conflict with this Śāstra and the Nyāyānusāra. Examining them now, the Nyāyānusāra and the Abhidharmakośa adopt the position of the earlier masters of the Vibhāṣā, yet this conflicts with the evaluating master of the Vibhāṣā. Furthermore, the Vibhāṣā states that "in a single lifetime one creates craving, grasping, and becoming of the nine stages," which also conflicts with the Nyāyānusāra; how are they to be reconciled? Examining them now, the intentions of the two treatises differ, but their meanings do not conflict. The Vibhāṣā is based on indeterminate karma, while the Nyāyānusāra is based on determinate karma; therefore they do not conflict.

9.90

The Śāstra says: "Sometimes it is only said … because they are subsumed under two divisions." This condenses the three times into two divisions, based on the mutual correspondence between prior and posterior causes and effects.

9.91

The Śāstra says: "What dharmas constitute the nature of the links of ignorance and the rest?" The following four verses are the second part, clarifying the nature of the links.

9.92

The Śāstra says: "… collectively called the king's procession." This is the first: the nature of ignorance. Saying "the stage of afflictions" means taking the five skandhas at the time the afflictions arise as the nature, not merely the afflictions alone. Therefore the Vibhāṣā says: "The mental and mental derivative dharmas of five links are defiled, while the rest are defiled or undefiled. The five links are ignorance, consciousness, craving, grasping, and the link of birth." If we follow this text stating, "Because they operate together with ignorance," that is taking all skandhas collectively. When it says, "Because they become manifest through the power of ignorance … it is collectively called the king's procession," it specifically refers to defiled mind and mental derivatives. This means that defiled mind and mental derivatives are collectively called ignorance, and the remaining two skandhas derive their name by association. The Nyāyānusāra says: "Why does the term 'ignorance' refer collectively to the afflictions? Because it is the determinate cause that pulls karmic formations into future existence. Karma is instigated by afflictions and is able to pull toward future existence; if there were no afflictions but there were karma, future existence would not occur. It is not that when all karmic formations pulling future existence arise, attachment and the rest all have function therein; at the stage where those karmic formations arise, they definitely depend on ignorance; therefore the term 'ignorance' refers collectively to the afflictions." If so, why are only the afflictions of a prior life collectively called ignorance, while those of this life are not so? This is a question. Only the afflictions of a prior life resemble ignorance, because before afflictions such as attachment obtain their fruit, their power and function are unimpaired and are said to be clear and sharp. Once they have obtained their fruit, their function of grasping and giving is impaired, and they are not called clear and sharp. Even when the power of ignorance has not yet been impaired, it is still not clear and sharp, because when it is manifest it is also difficult to discern. Since all afflictions of the prior life have already obtained their fruit in the present life, their power is impaired, their characteristics are unclear, and they resemble the category of ignorance; therefore only the afflictions of a prior lifetime can be designated by the term 'ignorance'. It is not that this should also be said identically in the case of karmic formations, because metaphorical designations are applied only to those of the same category. However, the author of the Śāstra says: 'Because they operate together with ignorance, and because they become manifest through the power of ignorance, just as when it is said that the king marches, it does not mean there is no retinue, yet because the king is preeminent, it is collectively called the king's procession' (the above is the text of the Abhidharmakośa; below is the refutation in the Nyāyānusāra). We do not understand the meaning of 'operating together' here: does it mean that the other afflictions follow ignorance, or that ignorance follows the other afflictions? If one takes the former meaning, in principle it cannot be so, because the ignorance associated with other afflictions is inferior; that the superior should follow the inferior cannot hold in principle. If one takes the latter meaning, the entity of ignorance should derive its name from them, because it follows them. It is not the case that what does not follow this can derive its name from this. If it is said that they mutually follow each other, because there is no difference, designating the name based on one side without a determinate cause—how could this give rise to satisfaction? Furthermore, regarding 'because they become manifest through the power of ignorance', is this said with reference to the ignorance that is able to direct, or with reference to the ignorance that conforms and follows? Both alternatives are unreasonable. Ignorance also operates due to attachment and the rest, and because it is associated with others, it is not autonomous; what is not autonomous cannot be said to have strong power. One should only say that ignorance arises through the power of attachment and the rest, because among the dharmas associated with it, the power of attachment and the rest is strong. Just as one cannot say the retinue surpasses the king, how can one say attachment and the rest arise through the power of ignorance? Therefore, neither of the two reasons provides proof. Based on what was said earlier, that reasoning is superior.

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俱舍論疏 — Classical Chinese