中觀論疏 4.24

4.24

From "Furthermore, when seeing has not yet seen" downward: counting by verses, this is the third [verse], the repeated refutation. As for the repeated refutation: the previous three pairs were already complete. The first verse raised oneself to refute the other, and the subsequent verse directly refuted the other; this is the single pair of oneself and the other. Second, the first verse stated the refutation in terms of phenomena (dharma), and the subsequent verse stated the refutation by way of analogy; this is called the pair of phenomena and analogy. Third, the first verse was a direct refutation, and the subsequent verse was a refutation pointing to what came before; thus the three rounds of refutation were finished. Now it refutes it once again; hence it is called a repeated refutation. As for refuting the seeing of the eye in terms of three meanings: the first verse raised its not seeing itself to refute by comparison its seeing other things; the next verse raised the gate of the three times to directly refute its seeing other things—these two refute the eye in terms of the eye itself. Now this third one refutes the eye's seeing in terms of visible form. When the eye does not yet confront visible form, it is not called seeing; only because it confronts visible form is it called seeing. Thus the meaning of seeing lies in visible form and not in the eye. Second: [an opponent] says that the eye is seeing itself and seeing is the eye itself. Since whether it sees or has not yet seen it is always called "the eye," then whether it sees or has not yet seen it should always be called "seeing." Now, since at times it sees and at times it does not see, it would follow that at times it is the eye and at times it is not the eye. Third: if seeing or not seeing it is always the eye, then also whether it is the eye or not yet the eye it should always see. Fourth, the objection states: if the eye is seeing, and yet the eye at times sees and at times does not see, then seeing should also be the eye, and seeing would at times be the eye and at times not the eye; if there is no seeing that is not the eye, then there should also be no eye that is not seeing. Fifth, the objection states: if the eye at times sees and at times does not see, one knows that the eye is not necessarily defined by seeing; you should not say that the eye is definitely defined by seeing. Sixth, the Chapter on Inversions says: "When visible form and the rest have not yet combined with the mind, they are empty and non-existent; just as when visible form has not yet combined with the eye, there is no visible form, and since there is no visible form, there is also no eye." Since prior to combining they are completely non-existent, how could one bring what is non-existent to become existent? Furthermore, how could it be non-existent only when causes and conditions have not yet combined? Even when causes and conditions combine, it is also non-existent: as the eye has seeing because of visible form, seeing belongs to visible form; visible form can be seen because of the eye, so being visible belongs to the eye. If so, how can one say that seeing belongs solely to the eye, and being visible belongs to visible form? Since seeing does not belong to the eye, how could it belong to visible form? Since being visible does not belong to visible form, how could it belong to the eye? Therefore, we know that the eye and visible form have no intrinsic nature, and having no intrinsic nature, they are empty. For this reason the Avataṃsaka-sūtra says: "Observe that the eye is unproduced and without intrinsic nature; it is explained as empty, quiescent, and non-existent." Seventh, objecting according to the text: since the eye is defined by seeing, before it confronts visible form, if it were capable of seeing it could be called seeing; but before it confronts visible form it does not see at all—how then could it come to see when subsequently confronting visible form? The text of the Tattvasiddhi says: "When [the consciousness] of identical nature does not rely [on it], it is the eye yet does not see." "Identical nature" means that the eye that does not yet see and the eye at the time of seeing are identical in eye-nature; when consciousness does not yet rely upon it, it does not see. If so, it sees because consciousness relies upon it, and does not see when it does not rely upon it; thus seeing has no self-substance. Furthermore, if the eye is defined by seeing and yet is called "the eye" even when not seeing, then visible form is defined by obstruction, and what is not obstructed should also be visible form.