中觀論疏 4.32

4.32

From "Question: If apart from matter there is a cause of matter" downward, the second [verse] arises, explaining the primary topic of there being no cause separate from the effect. Regarding this meaning, worldly non-Buddhists, the Hīnayāna, and the Mahāyāna all say that when the effect does not yet exist, the cause exists, which is having a cause separate from the effect. In the answer, the first half directly refutes it, and the second half sequentially refutes it. The prose points back to the previous chapter "Examination of Conditions," which is the concluding refutation among the four conditions, specifically the second verse: "If you say the condition has no effect." From "If matter already exists" downward, the second pair of verses refutes by way of the approach of being with a cause or without a cause. The reason this refutation comes about is that the previous three verses clarified that cause and effect are not separate in order to refute their separation of cause and effect. The opponent then thought that the effect necessarily depends on the cause and the cause necessarily depends on the effect, and thus cause and effect exist. Therefore, we now refute their non-separation. Regarding the text, there are three parts: first, refuting by way of the approach of having a cause; next, refuting by way of the approach of being without a cause; third, the rebuke. The cause is the various parts; the effect is the whole body. If within the parts the whole body already exists, it does not depend on being formed by the parts; if within the parts the whole body does not exist, then although it depends on the parts, it can never be produced. Therefore, neither with a cause nor without a cause can an effect be produced. This refutes the Abhidharma view that within the four great elements matter already exists: if matter exists, it does not need to be created; if matter does not exist, it cannot be created. In the *Tattvasiddhi*, whether the four great elements already exist or originally do not exist within the four subtle objects is also cross-examined in this way. From "Question: If both positions are incorrect" downward, this gives rise to the refutation of causelessness. Having heard that neither the approach of existence nor that of non-existence relies on a cause, the opponent falls into the view of causelessness. Question: In the prose above, three schools of causelessness were already established; why are they established again now? Answer: Previously, the causelessness of permanent dharmas was established; now, the causelessness of impermanent dharmas is established. Question: Above it was said that having matter separate from the cause of matter was also establishing an impermanent dharma without a cause. Answer: Above it merely said "separate"; it did not say "without." Non-Buddhists conceive of the atom adjacent to empty space (paramāṇu) as spherical and permanent, not born from causes. The Abhidharma says that "seven subtle atoms give rise to an aṇu atom"; the aṇu atom has a cause, but the seven subtle atoms, being extremely minute, are uncaused. How this differs from non-Buddhists is: first, they are created by the four great elements, thus having an active cause; second, they are transformed by the four characteristics [of conditioned phenomena], which is a co-existent cause; third, they arise from karma, being born from retributive causes. However, lacking parts in the ten directions is the same as the non-Buddhists. The *Tattvasiddhi* masters have two explanations. One explanation says: if within existence dissection is not exhausted, then what is fine still has what is finer, and causes still follow from causes. This is refuted in the same way as the two approaches of existence and non-existence above. The next explanation says: if broken down, it is exhausted, and there is nothing finer; therefore it is called 'adjacent to empty space' (paramāṇu). It is not created by the four great elements, yet it is transformed by the three characteristics. Because it is extremely minute, it cannot be divided into the ten directions. Yet when east of an object it is called west, and when west of an object it is called east; therefore it is said to have parts in the ten directions. This is having matter without a cause. The first thought of fundamental ignorance arises relying on emptiness; both schools agree on the meaning of the mind being uncaused. Subtle atoms take the mind as their cause; if the mind is uncaused, then atoms are also uncaused. From "Answer" downward, he directly and generally rebukes it. Because in the Buddhadharma there is no doctrine of causelessness, there is no need to refute it. Furthermore, even what has a cause can be refuted, how much more so what is uncaused! Moreover, above it was already said that "uncaused dharmas do not exist in the world"; therefore he merely dismisses it in general. "Therefore, one with wisdom should not conceptualise matter": this is the third part, the rebuke. "Conceptualise" refers to the above separation or non-separation of cause and effect, being with a cause or without a cause, and so forth, down to conceptualising that there definitely exist eleven [faculties] and fourteen [realms]; all of these are now rebuked. The prose states, "Conceptualisation is called an ordinary person": although there are worldly non-Buddhists, Hīnayāna, and Mahāyāna, these four kinds of persons all establish that matter exists and conceptualise it; they are all ordinary persons. "Through ignorance, craving, and attachment": this clarifies that from delusion craving arises, which is the affliction of craving. Thereafter, through wrong views one conceptualises the existence or non-existence of the three times, generating new afflictions upon old confusions. Such a person cannot bring an end to the old and further creates the new, thereby being harmed by the five caṇḍālas. Now, by examining the ultimate emptiness of the five [aggregates], both new and old confusions are immediately severed, and thus liberation is attained.