中觀論疏 5.36

5.36

From "Question" onwards, the third section refutes origination through causes and conditions; this is the refutation through the gateway of cessation (śānti). First is the question, next the reply. To avoid the previous three times, [the opponent] posits origination through causes and conditions; just as the current Masters of Middle and Provisional (zhongjia) and others, having heard that the Sanlun uses the gateway of the three times to refute [origination], thereby avoid the three times and posit that there is origination. Other adherents of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna who harbor attachments, when positing origination, merely posit the three times and do not match the doctrine posited by this present outsider. From "Answer" onwards, the two verses form two parts: the first verse refutes by privation (direct negation); the next verse refutes by concession. The first half of the first verse cites what precedes, while the second half uses that to draw an analogy with what follows. In all, there are five points: First, a general rebuke of the outsider: having failed in your various attempts to posit origination, you should not posit it again now. Second, confusion in terminology: your positing that origination exists when the conditions assemble still belongs to the third time—why do you claim to avoid the three times? Third, causes and conditions do not depart from the three times; once the three times have been refuted, causes and conditions have already been refuted—how could you posit them again? Fourth, if you thereby avoid the three times, you fall into the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), and within the unconditioned there is no origination. Fifth, if you wish to avoid origination in the three times, then origination lacks the three times; since time does not exist, how could phenomena exist? When the prose commentary says "complete or incomplete," "complete" means already existing, and "incomplete" means not yet existing. Furthermore, "complete" is the time of origination, and "incomplete" is the time prior to origination; hence this returns to the same refutation of origination as before. From "Furthermore" onwards, the second verse refutes by concession. Refuting by concession means: above, privation did not allow that origination through causes and conditions exists; now, conceding that you have origination through causes and conditions, it falls into cessation. Moreover, whereas the previous [critique] concerned confusion in terminology, this one concerns confusion in meaning: the meaning of causes and conditions is not as you claim. Whether Hīnayāna or Mahāyāna, inner or outer, upon hearing of causes and conditions, they say there is no intrinsic nature, yet they cling to the existence of this illusory, provisional origination. Now, what the Buddhas and bodhisattvas understand is not like this: when they speak of origination through causes and conditions, there is no origination and no non-origination, no truth and no non-truth, no middle and no non-middle; hence there are no traces and no fixed locations. This elucidates correct causes and conditions and refutes erroneous causes and conditions. This single verse is the cardinal tenet of the Buddha-Dharma, and one must truly bear it in mind. To explain the general purport now: if you recognize that the Buddha-Dharma is causes and conditions, then you must know that origination through causes and conditions is ultimate cessation; if not, then you do not understand the meaning of causes and conditions. These words of advancing and retreating determine the success or failure of [understanding] the Buddha-Dharma. The verse has two parts: the first half is the cessation of cause and effect; the second half is the cessation of time and phenomena. Question: How is origination through causes and conditions cessation? Answer: Others say that origination through causes and conditions is conventional truth, while cessation is ultimate truth; within causes and conditions and cessation, they again give rise to the two views of ultimate and conventional. We now clarify that origination through causes and conditions, just as it appears, is constantly cessation. For instance, because of five fingers there is a fist; the fist has no intrinsic nature. If it had intrinsic nature, it should not depend on fingers; since it relies on fingers, it lacks intrinsic nature. If the fist existed [intrinsically], it could exist from itself or from another: the fist in relation to the fist would be "self," and in relation to the fingers would be "other." Since there is no fist from self, nor is there a fist from other, combining self and other makes "both"; because self and other do not exist, "both" does not exist. These three demonstrate that the fist cannot have a cause. Now, since the fist exists due to fingers, how could it be without cause? Thus we know that this fist is not from self, not from other, not from both, and not without cause; that is, the fist is ultimately empty. If the existence of a fist existed, one could speak of the fist being empty; but originally no existence of a fist is seen, so how could one speak of emptiness? Such is the tetralemma (catuṣkoṭi). Thus we know that while the fist is vividly present, the four propositions are severed; while the four propositions are severed, the fist is vividly present. Therefore it is said that phenomena produced by causes and conditions are of the nature of cessation. As for the cessation of time and phenomena in the second half of the verse: the first half clarifies that the substance of the produced phenomenon is cessation, and the substance of the phenomenon further depends on the mark of origination and additionally relies on time; thus the origination of a single phenomenon must possess these three. Therefore, the second half clarifies that the mark of origination and time are also cessation. "Cessation" means: because it exists due to what is characterized, the characterizing mark is causes and conditions, and because it is causes and conditions, it is cessation. Because there is time due to phenomena, time is cessation. In the prose commentary there are three parts: first, explaining the first half; from "Therefore in the verse" onwards, explaining that the second half is analogous to the first half; from "Although you" onwards, the third part, which concludes with a rebuke. Explaining the first half has four parts: first, the direct explanation; from "Just as due to threads" onwards, the second part adduces an actual case to illustrate it; third, citing fuel and burning to clarify it through metaphor; from "Therefore" onwards, the fourth part, the general conclusion. Since this is the cardinal tenet of the Buddha-Dharma, if we now apply it to one's own body, causing afflictions to become pure, one will attain the fruit of the Path, and it will pervade all Mahāyāna sūtras. For instance, because of the harmonious combination of the causes and conditions of the five aggregates, sentient beings exist. If a sentient being had an intrinsic substance, it would not rely on the five [aggregates] to be accomplished. Since it relies on the five to be accomplished, it lacks an intrinsic substance; because it lacks an intrinsic substance, a sentient being is ultimately empty. Yet it was only in contrast to the existence of sentient beings that we said sentient beings are empty; if sentient beings never existed, how can one say sentient beings are empty? If a sentient being were empty or existent, one could speak of neither empty nor existent; but since neither of these two affirmations has ever existed, how could there be two negations? Therefore, we know that sentient beings of causes and conditions are originally severed from the four propositions; this is the severance of the objective realm. Only if the existence of sentient beings existed could the mind clinging to existence and self arise; if sentient beings have never existed, how could the mind of existence arise? Even more so, since sentient beings have never fallen into the four propositions, how could the mind of the four propositions arise? Thus we know that externally there are no marks of the four propositions, and internally there is no mind of the four propositions. Externally lacking marks of the four propositions, externally there are no objects; internally lacking the mind of the four propositions, internally there is no mind. Externally lacking objects and internally lacking mind, that has already ceased in vast and great impartiality, which is nirvāṇa. Therefore, sentient beings of causes and conditions, just as they appear, are great nirvāṇa. The Lotus Sūtra clarifies that all phenomena are from the beginning cessation, which is nirvāṇa; the present case is also like this. Traversing all phenomena in this way, this is phenomena being unindicable and the marks of verbal expression ceasing. Thus the Wonderful Dharma Lotus is solely this single ultimate, called the purity of the One Path; the Buddhas take this as their body, hence called the Dharmakāya, meaning that the body has no birth or death; the consummate person takes this as lifespan, lifespan having no beginning or end—this is the entire Lotus Sūtra. Losing this purity of the One Path, there are the six destinies in confusion. Because sentient beings have lost the root, from this flows forth all teachings, which is called the Immeasurable Meanings Sūtra (Amitārtha-sūtra). Furthermore, it is the Mādhyamika-śāstra: sentient beings vividly present as cessation is the "Middle"; realizing that sentient beings are originally cessation is "Contemplation" (Mādhyamika); explaining it for beings is the "Treatise" (śāstra). Furthermore, it is the three prajñās: sentient beings originally being cessation is real-mark prajñā; realizing it thus is contemplative prajñā; explaining it for beings is verbal prajñā. Furthermore, it is the five natures of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra: sentient beings vividly present being originally cessation is the objective-fruit Buddha-nature; realizing it thus is the contemplative wisdom-nature; completely penetrating it is the bodhi-fruit nature; when no afflictions are unceased, it is the fruit-of-the-fruit nature; since it is called cessation, words are forgotten and thoughts are stilled—how could there be object and wisdom, or wisdom and severance? This is the correct nature of the Middle Way. Furthermore, it is the four wisdoms of the Lotus Sūtra: sentient beings vividly present being originally cessation is the Tathāgata wisdom; cessation vividly present as sentient beings is Buddha wisdom; knowing effortlessly is natural wisdom; not obtaining it from a teacher is teacherless wisdom. Furthermore, it is the father and mother of the Dharmakāya: understanding that sentient beings are cessation is prajñā the mother; cessation being sentient beings is skillful means the father; the Buddhas of the three times are born from this. Understanding the single phrase of causes and conditions pervades all of the Buddha-Dharma. Question: When the prose commentary says, "Cessation is called lacking this, lacking that, and lacking marks," what does this mean? Answer: Since sentient beings lack intrinsic substance and are ultimately empty, looking toward what could there be "that"? If there were "this" of a sentient being, one could look toward another as "that"; therefore it says "lacking this and lacking that." The characteristics of a sentient being cannot be spoken of, hence it says "lacking marks." "Cutting off the path of language" means: sentient beings are severed from the four propositions, so one cannot speak of sentient beings using the four propositions. "Extinguishing all prapañca" means: since sentient beings are severed from the four propositions, the love-prapañca of the four propositions and the view-prapañca of the four propositions cannot arise; this is the meaning of severing delusion and the great repentance. Furthermore, love and views are themselves causes and conditions, and are also originally severed from the four [propositions]; from where could they arise? Question: Since causes and conditions are like this, why not state it immediately? Answer: The title of this chapter is "Chapter on Causes and Conditions," and the beginning of the Dvādaśamukha-śāstra is entitled the "Gateway of Causes and Conditions"; the intention lies right here. Question again: Why not state it directly at the beginning of this chapter? Answer: It is necessary to first refute completely and without remainder the outsider's various attachments to real intrinsic nature, whether successively or non-successively, before one can briefly reveal the marks of causes and conditions. In the fourth year of Daye (608 CE), [I] formulated another way to explain it: For example, because of five fingers there is a fist; the fist has no intrinsic substance. If it had an intrinsic substance, it should not depend on fingers. Because it depends on fingers there is a fist, so the fist has no intrinsic substance. The fist having no intrinsic substance means there is no fist; therefore the fist is ultimately empty. This emptiness is the emptiness of causes and conditions. If emptiness had an intrinsic substance, it should not depend on existence. Because it depends on existence there is emptiness, so emptiness has no intrinsic substance. Lacking intrinsic substance, there is no emptiness. Because of emptiness and existence, there is both empty and existent: just as due to emptiness there is existence, existence lacks intrinsic substance; due to existence there is emptiness, emptiness lacks intrinsic substance; thus there is neither emptiness nor existence. Because of emptiness and existence, there is neither empty nor existent; if not due to these affirmations, how could there be the negations? Therefore, negations lack intrinsic substance, which means there are no negations. Thus, the fist of causes and conditions originally severs the four propositions of emptiness and existence; when the four propositions are severed, the four minds are cut off, and the four expressions are extinguished. It is something the Buddhas cannot practice and the Buddhas cannot reach; amid the absence of names and marks, it is spoken of according to context for sentient beings, sometimes as the real mark, the Dharmakāya, the Middle Way, prajñā, and so forth. Master Xinghuang always placed causes and conditions at the head of his speech; now, confronting phenomena, one must likewise recognize causes and conditions, and then whatever phenomenon one encounters is nothing other than cessation, and whatever phenomenon one encounters is nothing other than the Way. How could the Way be far! Therefore, the prose commentary cites threads and cloth: putting on the robe is vividly present, yet not a single thread can be worn; lying on the mat is vividly present, yet not a single reed can be slept upon. When one encounters phenomena, they all accord with the real mark.