中觀論疏 5.37

5.37

On "If it is said that the three times are definitely distinct": This is the fourth, refuting arising in the three times. When the opponent heard that arising through causes and conditions is quiescence, he could no longer maintain it, and returned to asserting intrinsic existence. The opponent initially asserted intrinsic nature; once intrinsic nature was refuted, he asserted causes and conditions; the prior refutation of causes and conditions having been made, he now returns to asserting intrinsic nature. Up to this point, his thesis has turned around three times; hence, all propositions do not leave intrinsic nature and provisional designation. Furthermore, logically one ought first to refute intrinsic nature and then refute provisional designation; yet refuting provisional designation first and intrinsic nature later reveals that the illness of delusion has no fundamental orderly sequence. The opponent argues with the treatise master over causes and conditions: the treatise master says that arising through causes and conditions is of the nature of quiescence, whereas the opponent says that arising through causes and conditions is not of the nature of quiescence. Thus, the future has an intrinsic nature, and through reliance on causes and conditions it arises; how could it be quiescence, or ultimate emptiness? How could ultimate emptiness give rise to anything? Hence we know that there is an intrinsic nature of arising, and only then does it arise through reliance on conditions. Moreover, fundamentally there is an intrinsic nature, and only afterwards does it rely on conditions; hence he now returns to establishing the fundamental. The Nirvāṇa Sūtra also contains this statement, saying: "Defiled phenomena have an intrinsic nature of arising, so that arising can give rise [to them]; undefiled phenomena fundamentally have no intrinsic nature of arising, so that arising cannot give rise [to them]." As for "[if] the three times are definitely distinct": if there is ultimately no arising, there should be no distinction among the three times; since there is a distinction among the three times, there must be what has arisen and what has not yet arisen. The future is what has not yet arisen; when conditions unite, there is arising. The Sarvāstivādins hold that the future has intrinsic existence, the present has actual existence, and the past has dormant existence. The Tattvasiddhi says: the past and future are substantially non-existent yet existent in the sense of having-been and will-be; the present is present existence yet existent in the sense of will-not-be. The verse is in two parts: the first half takes up the thesis, and the second half refutes it. If the future is already distinct [from the present] and has already emerged from emptiness into existence, then it has already arisen; why would it need to arise again in the present? If it is not yet distinct from emptiness and not yet emerged into existence, then this is the meaning of non-existence in two times, and he again loses his doctrinal premise. Even if it were non-existent, how could non-existence arise? The Sarvāstivādins refute the Tattvasiddhi by saying: if the future substance is non-existent, since it arises with respect to meaning but its substance does not arise, in the end one [thing that is] existent arises of itself and one [thing that is] non-existent never arises; if both arise, then both are existent, and if existent, there is no arising. In the prose commentary, regarding "Question: Although the future exists, it is not like the characteristic of the present": this clarifies that the future only has intrinsic existence, unlike the actual existence of the present. Regarding "Because of the characteristic of the present, it is spoken of as arising": in the present, it is precisely seen to have actual existence, so it is spoken of as arising; thus one knows that the intrinsic existence of the future cannot be spoken of as arising. Regarding "Answer: The characteristic of the present is not in the future": this clarifies that the characteristic of the present is ultimately non-existent in the future; this means that 'fundamentally non-existent and now existent' constitutes arising—how can one say that the future is existent and therefore can arise? If the characteristic of the present were in the future, it would not be called the future. Furthermore, we ask: if the nature of fire already exists in wood, 'nature' means that which does not alter and is originally ever-present; how could its nature alter to become the actual thing? If it cannot alter, though it is in contact with conditions and they unite, it will never become the actual thing. Moreover, actual fire is not in wood, nor is it in water; then either both should give rise to it or neither should give rise to it. Furthermore, we ask: since there is a fire in nature, there should also be conditions in nature. If actual conditions elicit actual fire, then conditions in nature should also elicit fire in nature. Moreover, the actual relies on the nature; upon what does the nature rely?