成唯識論了義燈 2.4

2.4

Ximing states: Regarding the refutation of the Vaiśeṣika ātman, [the text] says: "It should lack movement/transference." He questions himself: "Their school also accepts that the ātman lacks movement/transference; now to establish that it lacks transference, does this not commit the fallacy of proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana)?" He explains: "There are two interpretations. The first says that both the substance and its functions lack movement/transference. The second says that the functions possess movement/transference. Therefore, the preceding inference has two senses. First, if following the initial interpretation, the author of the treatise, about to refute them, first formulates their inference: 'The substance and function of the ātman in your school should lack movement/transference; because its substance is permanent and omnipresent; like space.' Now, we say this is not so: since they posit that both its substance and function lack movement/transference, why is it necessary to construct an inference? This would be completely superfluous. Because they accept it themselves, one need only specify it as their proposition; there is no need to formulate an inference. Second, if it means that the functions have movement/transference, this explains that the author of the treatise sets forth their school's inference to demonstrate their self-contradiction. The inference would run: 'The functions of the ātman you grasp must lack movement/transference; because its substance is permanent and omnipresent; like space.' This is also not right. Taking 'permanence and omnipresence' as the reason, there would be the fault of both parties not accepting the reason (ubhayāsiddha). Since they accept that the function moves while the substance does not, they hold that the substance is permanent and omnipresent, but the function is neither permanent nor omnipresent. According to the later text of the treatise: 'Function is not separate from substance, so function should always exist,' we know that they accept that function possesses movement/transference and is neither permanent nor omnipresent. Thus, the reason of being permanent and omnipresent does not exist in the function. How could one use the permanence and omnipresence of the substance as a reason to contradict their tenet? If one were to establish it according to the treatise, one should say: 'The function of your ātman should also be permanent and omnipresent; because it is not separate from the substance; just like the substance.' How could one use their 'permanence and omnipresence' as the reason? Therefore, one should rely on what the primary commentator clarified, correcting this treatise as: 'The ātman you grasp should not be able to produce diverse karmas in accordance with the body; because you accept that it lacks movement/transference; like great space.' Because in this text there are three inferences, as there are three reasons: first, permanence; second, omnipresence; third, lack of movement/transference. When the text says 'how could it be' (ruhe), the meaning is 'it is not so' (buyi). The word 'should' (ying) stated above should properly be placed above the two characters 'how could it be' (ruhe). For stylistic ease in the text, it was placed on the reason, which is why the sequence is disturbed; failing to grasp the original intent, [the other master] explained it arbitrarily. This is also like the treatise on hetuvidyā (Nyāyamukha), which says: 'Here, the thesis (pakṣa) refers to that which is extremely well-established (dharmin) and extremely well-established (dharma), because of the nature of differentiation (viśeṣa). What is spontaneously desired to be established as its own property is called the thesis.' Later, Dharma Master Wengui arbitrarily altered the treatise's text, saying: 'it takes differentiation as its nature' (chabie wei xing), taking the character wei (為) to mean 'to make/act as' (zuo), meaning that it takes differentiation as the essential nature of the thesis. If so, having first stated 'here, the thesis refers to...', explaining it as 'taking differentiation as its nature' would have already finished showing the thesis. Why would it need to further say 'this is called the thesis'? The text would be redundant. The original treatise says 'because of the nature of differentiation' (chabie xing gu), which has two meanings. Why? Because through differentiation, the thesis's substance is established, and below 'spontaneously desired' faults are excluded. Now, the character 'because' (gu) is intended to exclude the ancient teachers who took both the dharmin and dharma together as the thesis. Now, excluding the ancient teachers' doctrine, because of the nature of differentiation, mutual incompatibility is the very substance of the thesis. If one said 'takes it as its nature,' there would be no exclusion of the ancient error. Second, it is said that the ancient teachers had five faults of the thesis; now Bodhisattva Dignāga added the latter four. Because both the extremely well-established dharmin and dharma are extremely well-established, they can serve as the locus of the thesis; because the nature of differentiation is the thesis-substance, it is established upon that dharmin and dharma, and only then is it concluded as: 'this is called the thesis.'"