成唯識論了義燈 2.5

2.5

Furthermore, is the grasped ātman one or different? If one says it is different, their substances should intermingle. The Yaoji states the inference: 'Devadatta's true ātman should intermingle with Yajñadatta's ātman in substance; because they mutually pervade one another; like Yajñadatta's ātman.' Now we say: the reasoning in this statement is also rather difficult. If they accept that Yajñadatta's ātman intermingles in substance, then Devadatta's would be likewise, committing the fault of proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana). If they do not accept intermingling, the example lacks the property to be proved (sādhyavikalatā); how could it constitute an inference? Ximing says: 'The reason states "because of mutually pervading one another," which is without fault. Both the ātman of Devadatta and that of Yajñadatta have the meaning of mutually pervading the other, like the reason "because of being produced" (kṛtakatvāt).' The Yaoji says: 'Some say that taking permanence and omnipresence as the reason necessarily requires looking to two phenomena before it can be called mutual pervading.' This too is illogical, because it contradicts the text of the treatise. Some explain: 'It is called mutual pervading in the sense of one ātman being similar [to another].' This too is illogical, because a single substance cannot be said to mutually pervade, which contradicts reason. The Yaoji says: 'A certain explanation is correct: because the ātman of Devadatta and others has the meaning of mutually pervading other ātmans. Just as the reason "being produced" necessarily depends on a maker; even without explicitly showing that it is solely conditioned by the tongue and the like, the reason "being produced" is established.' Now we say this is not so. Why? If one says: 'The ātman of Devadatta and others has the meaning of mutually pervading other ātmans,' then does it intermingle with the other or not? If one says it intermingles, there is the fault of proving what is already accepted; if it does not intermingle, the example lacks the property to be proved, and the example is not established. The intention of the primary commentary is: Yajñadatta's ātman is permanent and omnipresent, yet its substance is one. Therefore, the inference is established: 'Devadatta's ātman and Yajñadatta's ātman' is the subject (dharmin); 'should become one in substance' is the predicate (sādhya-dharma); 'because of being permanent and omnipresent' is the reason (hetu); 'like Yajñadatta's ātman' [is the example]. Yajñadatta's ātman is one, and furthermore permanent and omnipresent. The example is endowed with both things to be established, so it can form an inference. This grasps the intention of the treatise; the wise should believe it, while the rest are inaccurate.