成唯識論了義燈 2.6

2.6

Furthermore, as the previous inference states: 'Take, for instance, other Yajñadattas and the like: when Devadatta performs various actions, they should also perform the actions; because the ātman is one; just like Devadatta and the like.' Other people do not understand this inference, supposing that 'other Yajñadattas and the like, at the time Devadatta performs actions' is taken in its entirety as the subject (dharmin). They then immediately object: 'How can one again take the subject as the example?' This is due to not understanding the intention. The intention is: 'like other Yajñadattas' is the subject (dharmin); 'at the time another, Devadatta, performs actions, also performs the actions' is the predicate (dharma). Specifying that when Devadatta performs actions, Yajñadatta should also perform actions is because the substance of the ātman is one. If one did not say 'at the time Devadatta performs actions, [he] should also perform actions,' then when Devadatta has not yet performed an action such as causing a schism in the Sangha, one could cause Yajñadatta and others to also perform the act of schism, and then the positive example would lack that which is to be proved (sādhyavikalatā). To eliminate this fault, it says 'at the time Devadatta performs actions, [he] should also perform actions,' so that the example possesses both things to be established. Question: The outsider, relying on matter that is non-separate from the same location (sahabhū-rūpa), formulates the fault of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika). He constructs the inference: 'The ātman grasped by me definitely cannot be one in substance; because you accept that they mutually pervade; like the matter non-separate from the same location in your Mahāyāna.' What fault does this have? Answer: This inference has two faults. First, it has the fault of a reason that contradicts the subject's own nature (dharmisvarūpaviparītasādhana). The ātman is also in dispute; because the substance of matter non-separate from the same location is not an ātman, this reason of 'mutually pervading,' by taking matter of the same location as the positive instance, operates solely in the negative instances of the ātman, since there is no other omnipresent thing that is an ātman to serve as a positive instance. Second, it has the fault of a reason that contradicts the intended property of the subject (dharmiviśeṣaviparītasādhana). The ātman as the subject is explicitly stated, whereas a conventional ātman or real ātman is the intended specification of the subject. In the Mahāyāna school, matter non-separate from the same location is precisely a conventional ātman; furthermore, they mutually pervade, so the example possesses both things to be established, but there is no real ātman to serve as an omnipresent positive example. Therefore, one establishes the inference: 'The ātman you grasp should be a conventional ātman and not a real ātman; because you accept that they mutually pervade; like matter non-separate from the same location.' The Yaoji states: 'The Tripiṭaka Master had three explanations. First: non-separateness in the same location in the Yogācārabhūmi follows the provisional perspective of the Sautrāntika, not the definitive Mahāyāna doctrine. Second: it is also the definitive doctrine of Mahāyāna, yet what is transformed by consciousness is conventional and not real; because none of it is separate from mind, they interpenetrate. It is not like their school, where the eye and so on are real entities that do not interpenetrate. Third: the seven physical elements are of different categories, so in the same location they do not intermix; the ātman has no categorical differences, so in the same location they should intermix. The Tripiṭaka Master favored the second.' The Yaoji says: 'Now examining the first explanation, it has the fault of inconclusiveness from the opponent's perspective; relying on the second explanation, although transformed by consciousness and conventional, the seven do not become one, hence it is also inconclusive; relying on the third explanation, external vessels of the same category do not intermix into one in the same location, hence it is also inconclusive. Therefore, now the reason states: "because being of the same category, without increase or decrease, they mutually pervade," so there is no fault of inconclusiveness. "Same category" excludes the seven physical elements; "without increase or decrease" excludes external vessels, for external vessels have increase and decrease, whereas the ātman does not. Alternatively, the reason states: "because being included under either of the two ātmans of Devadatta or Yajñadatta, they mutually pervade," so there is also no inconclusiveness.' Now we say: this explanation does not accord with the correct principle, adding superfluous words to the treatise's text. When the primary commentary stated that one should say 'permanent and omnipresent,' he immediately objected that it had the fault of contradicting the treatise; now, in adding five characters, how could that not be a fault? Moreover, saying 'alternatively, because being included under either of the two ātmans, they mutually pervade' also adds to the text of the treatise. Furthermore, in both explanations, the positive examples lack the property to be established. The faults are as demonstrated before, and there is also the fault of an inconclusive reason counterbalanced by an opposing inference (viruddhāvyabhicārin); one should rely on the primary commentary.