成唯識論了義燈 2.8

2.8

In the syllogism (pramāṇa) refuting the self that is both-negated, the commentary says: If refuting the alternative of "both", the other tradition also says that the self is not the alternative of "both"; hence it incurs the fallacy of proving what is already accepted (siddhasādhana), and furthermore lacks an example of similarity (sādharmyadṛṣṭānta). The meaning is: the other posits a self that is neither identical nor separate, and it also cannot be designated as the alternative of "both self and non-self", because it is ineffable. Just as the Mahāyāna says: the substance of tathatā is not subsumed under the alternative of "both existent and nonexistent", and so forth. Now, if one refutes them saying, "It should be ineffable as self and non-self," it incurs the fallacy of proving what is already accepted, and furthermore lacks an example of similarity. Like the hair of a turtle, although it cannot be designated as a self, it can be designated as non-self; hence it is not an example of similarity. Conditioned and unconditioned as examples are also like this. Furthermore, if one takes both self and non-self together as the probandum (sādhya-dharma), then between conditioned and unconditioned, whichever one is cited can also serve as an example; why is it necessary to cite both conditioned and unconditioned together? Now I assist the explanation by saying: although their intention is that it cannot be designated as self or non-self, they nevertheless admit that the self exists in the ineffable repository, and the self within the ineffable repository cannot be designated as self or non-self. Now we challenge them: since it cannot be designated as self or non-self, one should also not be able to say that there is an aggregate of what cannot be designated as self or non-self, in which the self exists as a member. Why? Just as with the conditioned and the unconditioned, your self cannot be designated as conditioned or unconditioned, so one does not state that there is an ineffable conditioned or unconditioned as an ineffable repository. Since your self cannot be designated as self or non-self, how can you establish that there is an aggregate of what is ineffable as self or non-self as an ineffable repository? Therefore, the conditioned and unconditioned are cited as examples of similarity. Furthermore, it should also follow that although it cannot be designated as self or non-self, you still admit grasping it as a self; so it should also follow that although it cannot be designated as conditioned or unconditioned, you grasp it as conditioned or unconditioned. However, the intent of the commentary is: although that school's postulation of a self does not designate it as self or non-self, permanent or impermanent, conditioned or unconditioned, they nevertheless grasp it as a self. Therefore it says: taking self and non-self merely as an analogy, without stating the rest. The syllogism says: "The self you postulate should be ineffable as a self"—this is spoken based on their original grasp; although it cannot be designated as self or non-self, they nevertheless grasp it as a self, so here it is specifically refuted. Furthermore, the syllogism says: "The self you postulate, in the sense of the aggregate of self and non-self, should also be ineffable," and so on. One should formulate the syllogism: "Your self, within the aggregate of self and non-self, should not be designable as existing therein; because of being ineffable (hetu); like the conditioned and unconditioned (dṛṣṭānta)." The meaning is: "ineffable" does not mean being beyond words and hence ineffable; it simply takes the ineffability of being conditioned or unconditioned, self or non-self, upon the self as the reason (hetu), and like the conditioned and unconditioned as the example. This takes the sense of ineffability as conditioned or unconditioned upon the self as the example, and does not take the separate substance of conditioned or unconditioned as the example of similarity. The general meaning is: it cannot be designated as existing within the meaning of the aggregate of self and non-self, just as it cannot be designated as existing within the conditioned and unconditioned; because of being ineffable, one does not take its substance. Were it not so, the self being the subject (dharmin), what other dharma could be called the aggregate of self and non-self? Therefore, this syllogism is correct. Both Ximing and the Yaoji take the syllogism rejected by the Shuyao as correct. The rejected syllogism runs: "The self you postulate should not be designated as one's own self and not another's self; because you admit it is ineffable; like the conditioned and unconditioned." They take this as correct. Moreover, Ximing says: "The self you speak of should not be designable as one's own self and not another's self; because of being ineffable as conditioned or unconditioned; like a sky-flower." As rejected by the Shuyao, this should not be taken as correct. Furthermore, although their original postulation grasps the existence of a self, it cannot be designated as self or non-self and is subsumed under the ineffable repository. If one designates it as one's own self and not another's, how could it be called ineffable? If one says it is ineffable as conditioned or unconditioned and therefore exists in the ineffable [repository], then those conditioned dharmas are also ineffable as unconditioned and as a self, and should likewise be in the ineffable repository. The Yaoji says: Saying "one's own self and not another's self" merely refutes one master's single self, not all of them. If so, which tīrthikas postulate the self as another's self? The Sāṃkhya's self that experiences the result is oneself and not another; the Vaiśeṣika's postulated agent and experiencer self are all likewise. The statement of the Tripiṭaka Master's syllogism, "one's own self and not another's self," was formulated by others; the Tripiṭaka Master was merely recounting others' views, not giving his own correct explanation. Since the text of the treatise says, "Furthermore, since it is ineffable as conditioned or unconditioned, it should also be ineffable as self or non-self," this is citing an example, not taking it as the reason. If it were taken as the reason, why would it say "it should also be ineffable as self or non-self"? To what does the word "also" refer? Therefore, the original commentary is correct. Question: The Mahāprajñāpāramitā also speaks of five repositories: the three periods of time are three, the conditioned is one called the conditioned repository, and the unconditioned is one also called the ineffable repository—what is the difference between that and this? Answer: The treatise has distinct standards, which can be understood.