因明入正理論疏 2.30

2.30

In the Nyāyamukha, an objection was raised concerning these two examples: "Furthermore, for what reason does the first state that the hetu is followed by the thesis, while the second states that where the thesis is absent the hetu does not exist, rather than saying that where the hetu is absent the thesis does not exist?" The meaning of the objection here is: The preceding verse states: "Stating that the hetu is followed by the thesis, and that where the thesis is absent the hetu does not exist—these two are called examples." Why not analogize the dissimilar by the similar, putting the thesis first and the hetu second, saying that whatever is impermanent is produced, instead of saying that all that is produced is impermanent, stating that where the hetu is present the thesis follows? Why not analogize the similar by the dissimilar, putting the hetu first and the thesis second, saying that whatever is non-produced is seen to be eternal, instead of saying that if anything is eternal it is seen to be non-produced, stating that where the thesis is absent the hetu is likewise absent? That treatise answers: "Because stating it in this way can demonstrate that the hetu is definitely present in the similar class and completely absent in the dissimilar class, and it is not a reversed statement." That is the verse saying: "One would then prove its eternality by non-productness, / Or establish being produced by impermanence; / If so, it would establish what was not stated, / Because of non-pervasion and an undesired [thesis], etc., in the application and negative exclusion." The first three lines answer the pervasive hetu of "being produced"; the last line answers the narrow hetu of "arising from effort." Putting the thesis first and the hetu second in the first similar example, and putting the hetu first and the thesis second in the second dissimilar example—analogizing them reversely in either case is inadmissible. If one analogizes the negative exclusion to the application, putting the hetu first and the thesis second, and says that all that is non-produced is eternal, then one would be using the hetu of non-produced to self-prove eternality, rather than negatively excluding what was previously established by putting the thesis first and the hetu second. If one permits this, one would also be establishing an eternal thesis that was not originally stated. Moreover, that space is eternal is originally established by both the proponent and opponent; if one establishes it again now, it commits the fault of establishing what is already accepted (siddhasādhana). Since it was not originally in dispute, one would conversely establish eternality. Therefore it is said: "If so, it would establish what was not originally stated." If one analogizes the application to the negative exclusion, putting the thesis first and the hetu second, and says: "Whatever is impermanent is produced," then one would be establishing productness by impermanence, rather than establishing the thesis of impermanence by productness. If one permits this, then one would be establishing the thesis of impermanence which was not originally in dispute. Furthermore, the impermanence of sound is not accepted by both sides, whereas the productness of sound was originally accepted by both sides; if one uses the unshared impermanence to establish the shared productness, then the thesis would be already accepted, and the hetu would also be unestablished for one side (anyatarāsiddha). Thus it is said: "If so, one would establish what was not originally in dispute."