因明入正理論疏 1.40

1.40

Direct perception and the other two [epistemic instruments] of the proponent (vādin) have an indirect [capacity] to enlighten another, and hence are called valid proofs (sādhana). Direct perception and the other two of the opponent (prativādin) directly only enlighten oneself, and hence are not valid proofs. Now, Diṅnāga takes the reason and the example as valid proofs and the proposition as that which is to be proved (sādhya). The intrinsic nature and the specific distinction are both thoroughly established (prasiddha); they are merely the bases of the proposition (pakṣa-adhikaraṇa) and do not constitute that which is in dispute. Only when combined to form the inseparable nature of the proposition do they become that which is in dispute; how could [the proposition] constitute a valid proof? Therefore, from among the valid proofs, the proposition is definitively excluded. Question: 'However, according to śabdavidyā, a singular term is called sādhanam, a dual term is called sādhane, and a plural term is called sādhanāni. Now, this valid proof is expressed with the word sādhanāni; since it is plural, why state only the two factors of the reason and the example as valid proof?' Answer: 'Diṅnāga explains: The reason has three characteristics (trairūpya)—one reason and two examples; how is that not plural? It is not necessary to have three distinct substances; on this basis, it is definitively said that the proposition is that which is to be proved.' After Diṅnāga, there are roughly three explanations: One says: The referent expressed by the words of the proposition is that which is to be proved; thus the fifteenth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi states: 'The thesis to be established is of two kinds: first, the intrinsic nature; second, the specific distinction. The factors that establish it are of eight kinds.' Both the words that express the proposition and the words and referents of the reason and so forth are all called valid proof. Because the words of the proposition are established by the reason and the example, though it is also that which is to be proved, why is the proposition stated first in treatises? In order to display first the thesis favoured by oneself, it is also that which is to be proved, but not definitively so, because it has the function of establishing. Just as, because it is established by the reason and the example, it is called valid proof, so the referent expressed by the proposition is definitively only that which is to be proved, uniquely named the thesis to be established. The second says: The totality of all phenomena—their intrinsic nature and specific distinction, whether in teaching or in principle—are all that which is to be proved; treatises call both of them 'meaning' (artha), present according to circumstance. A single portion within the totality put forward against an opponent, whether words or referents, whether intrinsic nature or specific distinction, is collectively called the proposition, which is immediately called valid proof. Although this proposition put to the opponent is also that which is to be proved, because it can establish the totality, it receives the name valid proof. Therefore, when Diṅnāga and others call the proposition that which is to be proved, this does not contradict the principles of the Yogācārabhūmi and other texts, because the Yogācārabhūmi and others do not say that the proposition is exclusively and unreservedly a valid proof. The third says: The referent which is the combined substratum of the intrinsic nature and specific distinction is called that which is to be proved, while the combined proposition that is supported is called valid proof, because the whole establishes the parts. It is not that this combined proposition is definitively only a valid proof; when put forward as a combination against an opponent, because it is established by the reason and example, it is also that which is to be proved. Because it is not definitively that which is to be proved, it receives the name valid proof. Diṅnāga merely uses commonly accepted reasons and examples to establish what the other has not accepted. What the other has not accepted is solely the combined proposition; the proposition is that which is to be proved, while intrinsic nature and specific distinction are merely bases of the proposition, not that which is to be proved. The instruments of proof and the points of view regarding meaning are different, so they do not contradict each other. Otherwise, could it be that Maitreya, Asanga, and Vasubandhu did not understand hetuvidyā, that they spoke of what is proved as a valid proof?