大乘玄論 2.5.3
English (machine translation) 2.5.3
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2.5.3
If it were attained through causes, it would not be fundamentally existing; if it lacked causes, it would be identical to heterodox doctrines. If one says that it is fundamentally existing, why is it called the Middle Way? Furthermore, if this [dharmakāya], free of the four propositions and hundred negations, were originally possessed, the pure Dharma itself ought to dispel inversion; how could it be urgently covered by defilements, such that the understanding of the ten stages cultivated and attained subsequently can still dispel defilements, while the fundamentally eternally settled dharmakāya cannot dispel them, turning out conversely that defilements are cleared away by what has not yet been cultivated and understood? If what is fundamental cannot do so, what is subsequent cannot do so either. Now, the Mahāyāna doctrine of non-attainment explains the three kinds of the Middle Way in terms of the eight negations; although the old and new methods of expression differ, their intent has no divergence. The master of the mountain [Sengquan] formulated this with respect to [the state of] tranquility: speech depends on non-speech, and non-speech depends on speech; speech and non-speech are both dependently co-arisen conventional designations. Therefore, conventional speech is not termed speech, and conventional non-speech is not termed non-speech. Being not termed non-speech does not make it non-existent; being not termed speech does not make it existent—this is the conventional truth Middle Way of neither existent nor non-existent. It is merely a conventional designation through mutual dependence; therefore, where there may be existence, one speaks of arising, and where there may be non-existence, one speaks of cessation; hence arising and cessation together constitute conventional truth. Ultimate truth is also like this: conventional non-speech is not termed non-speech, and conventional non-non-speech is not termed non-non-speech. Being not termed non-non-speech does not make it not non-existent; being not termed non-speech does not make it not existent—this is the ultimate truth Middle Way of neither not existent nor not non-existent. Because it is a conventional designation through mutual dependence, where there may be existence, one speaks of non-cessation, and where there may be non-existence, one speaks of non-arising; this is neither arising nor cessation, and hence they are combined as ultimate truth. As for explaining the Middle Way through combining the two truths: conventional speech is not termed speech, and conventional non-speech is not termed non-speech; being neither speech nor non-speech is simply being neither existent nor not existent, neither non-existent nor not non-existent—this is explaining the Middle Way by combining the two truths. Explaining by combining arising and cessation with non-arising and non-cessation can be understood analogously to this. Now we clarify that it must arise in opposition to the other: if the other possesses an existence that can be existent, then there is an arising that can arise, and a cessation that can cease. If there is an arising that can arise, arising is definitely arising; if there is a cessation that can cease, cessation is definitely cessation. Arising is definitely arising; arising lies outside cessation. Cessation is definitely cessation; cessation lies outside arising. Arising lies outside cessation, so arising does not depend on cessation; cessation lies outside arising, so cessation does not depend on arising. Arising does not depend on cessation, so arising subsists alone; cessation does not depend on arising, so cessation stands in isolation. Such arising and cessation are all intrinsic nature, not the thesis of dependent co-arising. Now, it is not so: there is no existence that can be existent, because of emptiness there is existence; there is no arising that can arise, nor is there any cessation that can cease. It is only because of conventional truth that one conventionally designates and speaks of arising and cessation. As conventional arising, arising is not definitely arising; as conventional cessation, cessation is not definitely cessation. Arising is not definitely arising, so outside of cessation there is no arising; cessation is not definitely cessation, so outside of arising there is no cessation. Outside of cessation there is no arising, so because of cessation there is arising; outside of arising there is no cessation, so because of arising there is cessation. Because of cessation there is arising, so arising does not subsist alone; because of arising there is cessation, so cessation does not stand in isolation. Such arising and cessation are entirely conventional designations of dependent co-arising. Dependent co-arising arises, yet arising does not occur, and therefore it does not arise; dependent co-arising ceases, yet ceasing does not perish, and therefore it does not cease; hence non-arising and non-cessation are called the conventional truth Middle Way. The remaining phrases can be understood by analogy and need not be fully set forth. Next, we clarify that in opposition to the existence of arising and cessation in conventional truth, it is called the non-arising and non-cessation of ultimate truth. Therefore, emptiness and existence serve as conventional truth, with conventional arising and conventional cessation; existence and emptiness serve as ultimate truth, with conventional non-arising and conventional non-cessation. This non-arising and non-cessation is not inherently non-arising and non-cessation; depending on the conventional arising and cessation of conventional truth, one clarifies the conventional non-arising and non-cessation of ultimate truth. Since the conventional arising and cessation of conventional truth are neither arising nor cessation, the conventional non-arising and non-cessation of ultimate truth are also neither non-arising nor non-cessation; hence neither non-arising nor non-cessation is the ultimate truth Middle Way. The remaining phrases can be known without analogy. Next, to clarify the Middle Way combining the two truths: existence serves as conventional truth, having arising and having cessation; emptiness serves as ultimate truth, being non-arising and non-cessation. This non-arising and non-cessation is itself the non-arising and non-cessation of arising and cessation; this arising and cessation is itself the arising and cessation of non-arising and non-cessation. The arising and cessation of non-arising and non-cessation is therefore not arising and cessation; the non-arising and non-cessation of arising and cessation is therefore not non-arising and non-cessation. Therefore, neither arising and cessation nor non-arising and non-cessation is the Middle Way explained by combining the two truths. Since arising and cessation are thus, the remaining phrases should be understood by analogy. Furthermore, the treatise explains neither permanence nor annihilation, the text stating: 'There are people who do not accept neither arising nor cessation, yet believe in neither permanence nor annihilation.' The Tattvasiddhi masters explain the text saying: because of continuity there is permanence, and momentary arising and cessation without regard for oneself is annihilation. Because they see annihilation and permanence, they do not believe in neither permanence nor annihilation. This must be broadly refuted, as discussed before. Regarding the treatise's statement, 'There are people who do not accept neither arising nor cessation yet believe in neither permanence nor annihilation': One explanation says: 'not accepting neither arising nor cessation' means awakening to neither arising nor cessation. Yet, because they have not yet awakened to neither permanence nor annihilation, etc., it says, 'yet believe in neither permanence nor annihilation' because they see the existence of annihilation and permanence. The second explanation says: Master Ying of Chang'an says that it is not that they do not believe in neither permanence nor annihilation, but merely that different people attain awakening differently and their understanding mind is not yet pervasive; although they know that all phenomena are neither arising nor ceasing, they have not yet awakened to neither permanence nor annihilation, as discussed before. We now say that all phenomena are ultimately non-arising, and by principle naturally do not cease. Because they do not arise, how could there be permanence? Because there is no permanence, how could there be annihilation? If judged against the text of the treatise, the latter explanation is superior. The text says: 'Although they hear of neither arising nor cessation and neither permanence nor annihilation, they still say that the four gates constitute all phenomena.' By analogy, although they hear of neither arising nor cessation, those who still say that the six gates constitute all phenomena have not awakened. Therefore, the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra*, 'Chapter on Signs and Practice', states: 'One does not accept practice, nor does one accept non-practice; one does not accept practice and non-practice, nor does one accept neither practice nor non-practice; non-acceptance also is not accepted.' Again, it resembles the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra*, 'Chapter on the Worthies and Nobles', which says: 'One who knows non-action does not believe in action and the like; such a one is called a superior person.' As for neither permanence nor annihilation: if one takes existence to be existent, then permanence is real permanence, and annihilation is real annihilation. Now, because of emptiness there is existence; permanence is not termed permanence, and annihilation is not termed annihilation. Conventional truth conventionally designates and speaks of having permanence and having annihilation. Conventional permanence cannot be permanent, and conventional annihilation cannot be annihilated; this is the conventional truth Middle Way of neither annihilation nor permanence. As for neither unity nor difference: 'not one' can perhaps be opposed to two, up to a hundred or a thousand. Yet the reason it is said in opposition to 'not different' is that outside of the different and the one, two, three, and so forth are all difference; this refers to having unity and difference. However, the Tattvasiddhi masters clarify that conventional and real have the meaning of unity and difference.
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- 大乘玄論 — Classical Chinese