二諦義 3.7

3.7

Next is Longguang's explanation of the mutual identity of the two truths. This master was a great scholar of Kaishan. He said: "Emptiness and form are not separate from each other; this is why emptiness is form, and form is emptiness. As the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa Sūtra says, 'My land is always pure'—this explains that the pure land is right where the defiled land is, and therefore it says this land is pure. It is not that pure and defiled are blended together into a single land. Why? The pure land is a pure retribution, and the defiled land is a defiled retribution; the pure land is elicited by pure karma, and the defiled land is elicited by defiled karma. Since there are pure retribution and defiled retribution, pure karma and defiled karma, they cannot be one; it is simply that their non-separation constitutes identity." Now, these three masters' explanations encompass all people. Why? Kaishan and Zhuangyan assert a single substance, while Longguang asserts different substances. Although explanations are numerous, they do not exceed oneness and difference; hence these three people encompass all people. Longguang asserts different substances, and this doctrine itself contradicts the sūtras, so there is no need to refute it further. For now, let us refute the two houses of Zhuangyan and Kaishan. Zhuangyan says: "Conditioned provisionality is not different from the ultimate, and the four forgettings are not different from the conventional; yet name and mark ultimately do not become the absence of name and mark, and the absence of name and mark does not become name and mark." These words are self-contradictory. If you say that the ultimate is the conventional and the conventional is the ultimate, then name and mark are the absence of name and mark, and the absence of name and mark is name and mark. How could the conventional be the ultimate, yet name and mark cannot be the absence of name and mark? That master says: "My name and mark also have the meaning of being identical to the absence of name and mark." One further challenges: If your name and mark are identical to the absence of name and mark, can conventional truth lack name and mark, and ultimate truth possess name and mark, or not? He says: "Ultimate truth ultimately lacks name and mark, and conventional truth ultimately possesses name and mark." If so, these are ultimately two views, and they cannot be mutually identical. He says: "My substance is always identical; only the names and senses are different." One further challenges: Your conventional substance is identical to the ultimate; is the conventional name identical to the ultimate or not? If name and sense are identical to the ultimate, then since ultimate truth is eternal, name and sense would be eternal; if name and sense are impermanent, the ultimate would also be impermanent. If name and sense are not identical to the ultimate, then name and sense fall outside the ultimate, falling outside the dharma-nature, which is therefore unacceptable. This objection is like the refutation in the Śataśāstra: there is a single substance of a pot, but its name and sense are different. The author of the treatise refutes this: "Your pot is existence. Are the pot's shape, color, the five sense-objects, and so forth also existence or not? If the pot's shape, color, the five sense-objects, and so forth are existence, then since existence is eternal, the five sense-objects and so forth would be eternal; if the five sense-objects are impermanent, existence would also be impermanent." The same applies to the universal and the particular. If one says that the five sense-objects and so forth are not the Great Existence, then the five sense-objects are emptiness, falling outside the Great Existence, so the Great Existence would not encompass all dharmas completely. Refuting his doctrine of the conventional being identical to the ultimate now is just the same. This is Bodhisattva Āryadeva's refutation; how could [ordinary] people resolve it? If someone could resolve it, then Āryadeva's refutation would be ruined, and the meaning of the sūtras would also be ruined. Since Āryadeva's refutation cannot be ruined, this objection cannot be resolved. Next, there are two hurdles in refuting Kaishan. This does not merely refute Kaishan; it refutes universally all the masters who maintain that 'the sūtras have the mutual identity of the two truths,' refuting them collectively. The first refutation says: When form is emptiness, is it that at the time form arises, emptiness arises together with form, so that one says form is emptiness? Or is it that prior to the arising of form, this emptiness already exists, so that one says form is emptiness? If the emptiness identical to form already existed when form had not yet arisen, then this emptiness would be fundamentally existent, whereas form would be newly born. The fundamental and the new being different, how could they be mutually identical? Fundamentally existent emptiness is eternal, whereas newly existent form is impermanent; eternal and impermanent being different, they cannot be identical. If one says emptiness and form arise together, then emptiness and form are both newly existent; both would be fundamentally non-existent and only now newly existent, so both would be impermanent. The second refutation says: When your form is identical to emptiness, are emptiness and form delimited, or are they undelimited? If they are undelimited, they blend into one; if emptiness and form are one, both are eternal or both are impermanent. If, when the ultimate and conventional are one, it is said that the conventional is impermanent and the ultimate is eternal, then by analogy one could counter that since the ultimate and conventional are one, the ultimate is impermanent and the conventional is eternal. If they are delimited, then emptiness and form are different; though identical, they are ultimately delimited and ultimately different. Just as aloeswood and sandalwood, though joined together to make a table, are ultimately delimited and ultimately different. If they are different, the Vaipulya sūtras are destroyed, and the tongue covering the face cannot be established. This concludes the critique of others. Next, our current explanation will be clarified. It is necessary to critique others thoroughly and cleanly before our current understanding can emerge. The Great Master formerly said: "Existence is spoken of as a provisional designation; emptiness is spoken of as a provisional designation. Speaking of existence as a provisional designation is conventional truth; speaking of emptiness as a provisional designation is ultimate truth. Since it is called provisional existence, it is non-existence as existence; since it is called provisional emptiness, it is non-emptiness as emptiness. Non-existence as existence is not an existence different from emptiness; non-emptiness as emptiness is not an emptiness different from existence. An existence that is not different from emptiness is an existence called empty existence; an emptiness that is not different from existence is an emptiness called existent emptiness. Existence is called empty existence, so empty existence is existent emptiness; emptiness is called existent emptiness, so existent emptiness is empty existence." The master's explanation of mutual identity was put in this manner. How should this be understood now? One could also use the previous refutation to challenge it: Your conditioned emptiness and form are not unconditioned; form is emptiness. When form perishes, does emptiness perish or not? Also, like the mutual conditioning of long and short: where there is long, there is short; where there is no long, there is no short. If so, in the mutual conditioning of emptiness and form, where there is form, there is emptiness; and when form perishes, emptiness perishes, and so forth. However, with respect to this meaning, one must grasp its root and understand its general intent. It is only because they fail to grasp the intent that errors arise. Therefore the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā says: "People during the Semblance Dharma have increasingly dull faculties; though they search through the sūtra texts, they only cling to the words." This is losing conditioned existence. It also says: "Hearing the Mahāyāna Dharma speak of ultimate emptiness, they do not understand on what conditioned basis it is empty." This is losing the intent of emptiness. Furthermore, the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, clarifying various disputes, says in each dispute: "These disciples do not understand my intent." It is because they do not understand the intent of the teaching that errors arise. Therefore one must know its general intent and grasp its root. Hence the Lotus Sūtra says: "Knowing the sūtras spoken by the Buddha, their causes, conditions, and order, one explains them according to the meaning." Now, the reason why people have historically failed to understand the mutual identity of the two truths is that, in general, there are two errors causing their lack of understanding. First, they do not recognize the four siddhāntas, and therefore do not understand the mutual identity of the two truths. What kind of siddhānta is the mutual identity of the two truths? The four siddhāntas are the essential technique for penetrating the sūtras. If one understands the four siddhāntas, all sūtras can be penetrated; if one does not understand the four siddhāntas, all sūtras cannot be penetrated. The Great Master explained the meaning of the four provisionalities in terms of the four siddhāntas. The four provisionalities are: conditioned provisionality, opposite-conditioned provisionality, contextual provisionality, and adaptational provisionality. If they do not even recognize the four siddhāntas, how could they understand the four provisionalities? Because they do not recognize the four siddhāntas, they do not understand the meaning of the mutual identity of the two truths. Second, they assert that there is an ontological principle of ultimate and conventional, form and emptiness. That in principle there is form and in principle there is emptiness; and that if there were no emptiness and form, there would be no sentient beings of the six paths or noble ones of the three vehicles. Because there are the two truths of form and emptiness, if one is confused about them, there are the six paths, and if one is awakened to them, there are the three vehicles. For this reason, [they hold that] in principle there is emptiness, in principle there is emptiness and in principle there is form. Since [they hold that] in principle there are emptiness and form, this is appropriation; and with appropriation, how could one resolve another's challenge? How could one challenge another's solution? Therefore, at the end of the 'Chapter on the Five Aggregates' in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, it says: "If questions and answers are not based on emptiness, a question does not constitute a question, and an answer does not constitute an answer." Emptiness is merely an alternative name for non-appropriation; because they are not based on non-appropriation, they can neither refute nor resolve. Furthermore, it is precisely because they hold that there is an ontological principle of emptiness and form that the previous refutations could be made. If you hold that form is emptiness, is it said that form is emptiness because emptiness and form arise at the same time when form exists? Or is it said that form is emptiness because emptiness already exists when form has not yet arisen? If emptiness arises together with form when form arises and this is taken as form being emptiness, then both are impermanent, and the ultimate truth is lost. If emptiness already exists when form has not yet arisen and this is taken as form being emptiness, then emptiness is fundamentally existent while form is newly born; emptiness and form being two different things, they cannot be mutually identical. If they arise together, the ultimate lapses into impermanence; if they do not arise together, they become different substances. Next is the refutation: When your form is identical to emptiness, are they delimited or undelimited? If they are undelimited, they blend into one substance, and both would be eternal or both impermanent. The analogous refutation proceeds as before. If they are delimited, they are different substances and cannot be mutually identical. If undelimited holds, identity is obtained but the two truths are lost; if delimited holds, the two truths are obtained but mutual identity is lost. One can neither advance nor retreat. How should this be resolved? If this refutation could be resolved [by their positions], then Āryadeva and Nāgārjuna would have spoken random words. If these two men had spoken random words, the Buddha would have spoken random words. The Buddha himself prophesied these two treatise authors; how could the two treatise authors have spoken random words? Since they are not random words, how should this be resolved? When Longguang challenged Kaishan, Kaishan said: "Only wait until my face turns yellow, and you will understand." Such is the actual reality. If not for the intent of the Three Treatises, it can never be understood. Therefore Master Rui said: "The texts of the two treatises, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and the Śataśāstra, had not yet reached this land, and there was no comprehensive insight; who could correct it?" The reason why the earlier masters ceased writing, sighed from afar, and thought to request a decision from Maitreya lies precisely in this. Once the two treatises, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and the Śataśāstra, reached China, he sighed: "In this land of China, Mount Gṛdhrakūṭa has suddenly been moved to serve as a guard; the crooked frontiers have received the lingering grace of radiating light. And from now on, the worthy who discourse on the Way can finally discuss reality with one another." Therefore, apart from the Three Treatises, a mind with appropriation will never understand this meaning.