能顯中邊慧日論 2.12.2

2.12.2

Here, if 'beneath citta, manas, and vijñāna' causes one to contemplate the principle of tathatā by relying on the paratantra, eliminating and severing defiled phenomena so that principle is revealed and wisdom is perfected, this is identical to the verse of the Madhyāntavibhāga: 'Unreal imagination exists; duality is entirely absent therein. In this there is only emptiness, and in that there is also this... Thus one accords with the Middle Way.' Without understanding this meaning, they cling to the realm of tathatā as possessing categories, manifesting internally and externally in a continuous stream. Furthermore, [the opponent] says: Chapter 8 of the Nirvāṇasūtra states, 'The buddhadhātu of sentient beings is not like this. Even though it is situated within the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas, it is not identical to the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas.' This differs from the previous text, where the Anuttarāśrayasūtra says, 'There are categories of superior characteristics of the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas, manifesting internally and externally in a continuous stream.' This resembles the characteristics of the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas, whereas the Nirvāṇa[sūtra] says it is not like the characteristics of the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas; hence principle and phenomena are distinct. Alternatively, in terms of the distinction between anāsrava and sāsrava, it is said not to be like that. Were it not so, how could it say 'even though it is situated within the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas'? Why is this? Tathatā is all-pervading; it cannot be spoken of as 'even though situated within the skandhas.' The term 'buddhadhātu' does not refer solely to principle; the practices of the six pāramitās and so forth are all called buddhadhātu. Furthermore, [the opponent] says: In the Pravaranṛpati[paripṛcchā], the earlier and later passages are distinct. The earlier states, 'The dharmatā of the Tathāgata resides within the skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas of sentient beings, continuing in succession from beginningless time, unstained by defilements.' This is also not proof, for this speaks of the gotra of practice. Practice is also a dharma, because the word dharma is general. If it were the gotra of principle, its essential nature would be permanently abiding; how could it be said to 'continue in succession'? 'In succession' does not mean permanently abiding. Next it states, 'Pure dharmatā is the basis of all dharmas, but its own nature is without a basis.' This speaks of tathatā giving rise to all dharmas as an adhipati-pratyaya, not that it produces all dharmas as a sākṣāt-hetupratyaya. However, tathatā does not produce; it produces [merely] as an adhipati-pratyaya. If a single tathatā produced myriad virtues, how could there be fixed, distinct causes? The Mahāyānasaṃgraha and Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra say, 'All virtues arise from mirror wisdom.' Since tathatā would directly produce [them], why rely on wisdom to produce them? Furthermore, [the opponent] says: The Buddhagotraśāstra states, 'The sunlight of the Buddha's wisdom causes the dharmakāya to generate the mind-made body and enhances the dharmakāya'; this corresponds to the primordial nature, identical to the Bodhisattvaśīlasūtra's 'dharmatā is naturally so.' This also is not proof. Since tathatā is called dharmatā, it is itself the dharmakāya; how could it cause production? Chapter 37 of the Nirvāṇasūtra says, 'The pāramitās and so forth are called jñāpaka-hetu.' One's own practice is still called a revealer; how could the Buddha's light directly be able to generate it? Moreover, previously you yourself said: although tathatā generates dharmas, tathatā does not produce. Furthermore, [the opponent] says: In the Awakening of Faith, the greatness of essence is the essence of tathatā; the greatness of characteristics is the characteristics of immeasurable intrinsic virtues; the greatness of function is that which can produce mundane and supramundane wholesome causes and effects. As for the greatness of function, because conditioned practices are the function of tathatā, they can produce all things. This too is not so. How could tathatā have active function? If it had active function, it would be identical to conditioned practices. If dharmas are able to arise through the adhipati function of tathatā, this principle is admissible, but it is not a generative function. The many passages below all intend to prove that tathatā and the essence of the eighth [consciousness] are called the prakṛtistha-gotra, meaning they are the pradhāna-hetu and janaka-hetu; whereas the remaining six pāramitās and so forth are the samudānīta-gotra, the pratyaya-hetu and jñāpaka-hetu. Only in the Buddhagotraśāstra is tathatā unproducing and lacking any other essence. In the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, the ālaya is not a supramundane cause. Fascicle 5 of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra says, 'Sixth is without difference and without arising, because true reality does not arise as a different substance.' If tathatā directly produced dharmas, there would be the arising of different substances. Fascicle 3 says, 'Sarvākārajñatā is said to be the Buddha's body.' It also says, 'Because transformed six pāramitās and all wholesome dharmas constitute the Buddha's body.' All treatises state that transforming the eight consciousnesses to accomplish the four wisdoms constitutes the Buddha's body; they do not say that tathatā produces it, nor is it merely the substance of the eighth. The remaining texts may be known accordingly. Extensive citations and tedious explanations should all be refuted. Another opinion holds: The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi's establishment of the five distinct gotras contradicts reason and teaching. Regarding contradiction with reason: All sentient beings equally possess the mind of principle. By what distinct cause should one portion of sentient beings lack anāsrava bījas? Even granting there are anāsrava [bījas], by what cause are there again the three gotra divisions? If there is a cause, it is not natural (dharmatā); nor is it admissible that without a cause they should differ. [We reply:] Since you cling to all sentient beings equally possessing the mind of principle as the pradhāna-hetu, and since you accept that the mind of principle is completely equal, how could there exist the gotras of defiled, pure, good, evil, the three realms, the six destinies, and the triyāna? If there are other causes, the mind of principle is not the root. If they arise without distinct causes, how could they differ? If you claim they depend on conditions, conditions arise from tathatā. Since the cause of tathatā is one, conditions would also be identical; from what then could manifold distinctions arise? If all beings equally possess tathatā and share a single pradhāna-hetu, this would be identical to the Sāṃkhya and others [claiming] that sentient and insentient beings arise from a single cause, whose substance is permanent while the mahat and so forth are impermanent. Furthermore, you yourself offer an analogy: principle is like empty space, and the mind is like the realm of the emptiness of dharmas; sāsrava is like darkness, and anāsrava is like light; the destruction of darkness and the arising of light are directly produced by empty space and by fire, etc.—how could there previously exist a nature of light within darkness acting as the direct cause of light? This too is not so. By your analogy you contradict yourself. If principle is like empty space and the mind is like the realm of emptiness, since you say that the mind of principle is the direct cause of things, it would naturally be able to illuminate; why would it need separate fire? If it depends on separate fire, the separate fire itself acts as the cause of light; how could empty space and the realm of emptiness directly produce light? The remaining analogies and texts likewise all contradict themselves; you should reflect on them yourself, for it would be too tedious to cite them all. Furthermore, [the opponent] says: Vijñaptimātrata contradicts the correct teaching, as the prakṛtistha-gotra in the Bodhisattvaśīlasūtra is principle, not phenomenal fact. If you say it is phenomenal fact, what textual evidence is there? This too is not correct. Their arbitrary citations of texts have been briefly pointed out above, and the textual evidence for the gotra of practice has already been clarified previously. Furthermore, [the opponent] says: If the primordial nature has superior, middling, and inferior measures, this contradicts the Upāsakaśīlasūtra which says, 'Having superior, middling, and inferior is not the primordial nature.' It also contradicts the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, the Mahāsaṃnipātasūtra, and others, [which show that] due to pratyaya-hetu, there is no triyāna gotra. If it were causeless and naturally obtained, it would contradict the Saṃdhinirmocana's having superior, middling, and inferior, not being causeless. This too is not so. If the primordial nature were not individually distinct, and the faculties and natures differed only due to conditions, how could superior, middling, and inferior lack their own pradhāna-hetu and have only condition-arisen causes? Since they themselves would have no seeds, what would conditions act upon? The Nirvāṇasūtra only states that nirvāṇa is attained from jñāpaka-hetu; it does not say that conditioned things are produced solely by pratyaya-hetu. That things are produced without seeds contradicts many sacred teachings.