能顯中邊慧日論 2.12.3

2.12.3

According to the "Chapter on the Nature of Wholesome Practice" in the Bodhisattva-śīla-sūtra, which says: "Regarding superior faculties: the fundamental nature of bodhisattva mahāsattvas is sharp and keen, while the nature of pratyekabuddhas is middling, and the nature of śrāvakas is dull." Since it says that their fundamental nature is sharp and keen, it is clear that this is not due to an adventitious nature. Furthermore, the first fascicle of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra says: "'Owing to the differentiation of dhātu': sentient beings have various dhātus, immeasurable dhātus, and many dhātus; sūtras say that owing to the differentiation of dhātu, one should know the differentiation of the gotras of the triyāna. Up to, 'Where there is no differentiation among the four fruits': the bodhi of sentient beings has inferior, middling, and superior [degrees], because the cause (bīja) and fruit resemble each other. If there were no difference in gotra, there would be no difference in fruit." This agrees with the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, which says that having superior, middling, and inferior [degrees] definitely depends on hetupratyaya. What the Mahāsaṃnipāta and other texts say regarding being due to pratyaya-hetu is stated in terms of the adhipatipratyaya, because there are four pratyayas, and thus it does not contradict the earlier teaching stating that it is not the fundamental nature. What is meant by "not by virtue of nature" is that it is not solely due to the nature, but also relies upon the adhipati[pratyaya]. Furthermore, conditioned arising is articulated with reference to what is not tathatā. The passages on the ālambanapratyaya-bīja of tathatā will be properly demonstrated below. If you say that the mind of principle is the pradhāna-hetu, how could the principle of tathatā become superior, middling, or inferior on account of pratyaya-hetu? Moreover, if the mind of principle is called the prakṛtistha-gotra, why can one not say that it is called a bodhisattva by virtue of this nature? Since, [in your view,] by saying "by virtue of nature" you do not accept that the active nature (samudānīta-gotra) is fundamentally existing, so too by saying "not by virtue of nature" you should attest that the mind of principle does not exist. Since this is not so, how could that be the case? Furthermore, you yourself say: "The defiled produces the undefiled." Why then do you not accept that the undefiled tathatā produces the undefiled? This also contradicts the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, as cited before. Furthermore, you say: "Because when milk lacks curd, it is granted that it produces curd, one can challenge: Since there is no milk in curd, curd should produce milk. And because curd does not produce milk, one should not allow milk to produce curd." This challenge is incorrect. Stating that milk without curd produces curd is the meaning of the Nirvāṇasūtra in challenging the doctrine that the effect exists within the cause; it is not refusing to grant that milk is the cause of curd. If you examine that text closely, you will naturally understand. Therefore, the first fascicle of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra says: "Furthermore, 'that exists' because the substance of the cause exists. 'Non-existence' because the substance of the fruit does not exist. Question: If so, why is it called 'gotra'? Answer: Because it signifies the substance of virtues; 'crossing over' signifies producing virtues. By this principle, it is therefore called 'gotra'." Moreover, you challenge: "An ārya does not have the principle of becoming an ordinary person; can you then not accept that an ordinary person lacks an ārya nature and yet becomes an ārya?" It is not so. Who says that an ordinary person lacks an ārya nature and yet becomes an ārya? According to our thesis: An ordinary person who lacks an ārya nature does not become an ārya. You hold that: An ordinary person who lacks an ārya nature can become an ārya. What principle could prevent an ārya, lacking the nature of an ordinary person, from becoming an ordinary person? Furthermore, you say: "If you challenge that the unconditioned, as their fundamental nature, produces the anāsrava, it would be identical to the non-Buddhists taking a permanent entity as cause." In the second fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra, Mahāmati asked, and the Buddha himself explained: "I teach the emptiness of dharmas as the tathāgatagarbha, which is not the same as the non-Buddhists." This defense refers to not being the same as the non-Buddhists who grasp a separate, real self and call it the Tathāgata. The World-Honoured One taught the emptiness of dharmas as the tathāgatagarbha, provisionally named the Tathāgata, not being the same as the non-Buddhists. You grasp the unconditioned as possessing an inherently existent, permanent substance capable of producing everything; how does that differ from the non-Buddhists' primordial matter (prakṛti) and so forth? If you grasp that an empty substance can produce everything, this is identical to the doctrine of causelessness (ahetuvāda). It is also the same as Zhuangzi and Laozi's "producing existence from non-existence". If you grasp a permanent dharma as arising dependently as a condition, this further contradicts the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā. In its fourth fascicle, clarifying the characteristics of conditioned arising, it says: "Conditioned arising is impermanent." The commentary explains: "'Because this arises, that arises' reveals the meaning of impermanent conditioned arising. It is not because an unarisen dharma serves as a cause that any arisen dharma can be established." Under the meaning of conditioned arising, it says: "Because the cause perishes in an instant and the fruit arises in an instant, and their duration is equal, this is the meaning of the uninterrupted succession of cause and fruit." Nor can you say that this is spoken in terms of sāsrava and adventitious nature. In that treatise's contemplation in direct and reverse order, it says: "One should contemplate the meaning of conditioned arising in this way: everything is conditioned arising, with the sole exception of a portion of unconditioned dharmas belonging to the realm of mental objects (dharmāyatana); it does not exclude the anāsrava." Furthermore, if tathatā could produce the anāsrava, this would also contradict that treatise's explanation of hetupratyaya. The treatise also says: "Hetupratyaya refers to the wholesome vāsanā of the ālayavijñāna serving respectively as hetupratyaya for sāsrava and anāsrava dharmas. It is not that the substance of the sāsrava eighth consciousness is the cause of the anāsrava." As for citing the Anantanirdeśasūtra's statement that all dharmas arise from one dharma, and that the one dharma is the signless, and the Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra's statement that "Although tathatā produces all dharmas, tathatā does not arise," this has already been analyzed above. Furthermore, you say: "How could the virtue of the Self in the sūtras be identical to the self of the non-Buddhists?" This defense is also incorrect. The Mahāyāna sūtras provisionally establish the names of the four virtues with respect to the meanings of permanence, bliss, self, and purity. Since non-Buddhists do not have an actual entity of a permanent self and yet conceive it with regard to what is impermanent and not-self, this can be different from non-Buddhists who conceive a permanent entity as a cause or arising without a cause. When you grasp a permanent entity as a cause, or arising without a cause, how is it any different? Nor can you take the Nirvāṇasūtra's statement, "Originally non-existent, now existent; having existed, returning to non-existence," as proof. The meaning of that passage is different: it does not speak of causelessness when saying "originally non-existent, now existent." It means: distinct from original non-existence, it arises from causes, hence it is called "originally non-existent, now existent"; having arisen, it immediately perishes, hence it is called "returning to non-existence." If you cling to the literal words and say that non-existence means causelessness and that having existed it returns to perishing, how could you grant and cling to the permanence of the saṃbhogabuddha? Furthermore, you ask yourself: "If a permanent dharma produces impermanent dharmas, why did the Buddha say to the non-Buddhists in the Nirvāṇasūtra: 'Your cause is permanent, but the fruit is impermanent. My cause is impermanent, but the fruit is permanent'?" Answer: Causes have remote causes and proximate causes; fruits have proximate fruits and remote fruits. Non-Buddhists have only a permanent cause, but lack a permanent fruit. In the Buddha's Dharma, the remote cause is permanent, while the proximate cause is impermanent; the remote fruit is permanent, while the proximate fruit is impermanent. This answer is utterly perverse. According to the thirty-third chapter of the Nirvāṇasūtra: "All wholesome karma is the cause of nirvāṇa. Causes are twofold: first, proximate; second, remote. The proximate is the three gates of liberation; the remote is the wholesome dharmas cultivated over immeasurable lifetimes." If the remote cause were permanent, it would be the truth of cessation; one could only speak of realization, not of cultivation. The twenty-seventh chapter says: "The cause of nirvāṇa is called the buddhadhātu. The name buddhadhātu is general: it is not only tathatā; the six pāramitās and other dharmas are all called buddhadhātu." The twenty-second chapter says: "Before attaining anuttarā bodhi, because the buddhadhātu is a cause, it belongs to the past, present, and future. The fruit is not like this: some belong to the three periods of time, and some do not belong to the three periods of time.