能顯中邊慧日論 2.7

2.7

There is an opinion: Tathatā of the dharmadhātu and the eighth consciousness are the pradhāna-hetu of Buddhahood. Because tathatā and the eighth consciousness are present in all sentient beings without exception, the teaching of a portion lacking the gotra is an expedient doctrine accommodated to capacity, not the definitive Mahāyāna teaching. Thus the Nirvāṇa, Laṅkāvatāra, and Ghanavyūha all teach both the storehouse consciousness and the tathāgatagarbha as the cause of all phenomena. The Nirvāṇa further says that the ultimate emptiness, capable of giving birth to wholesome phenomena, is the bīja. The Bodhisattvabhūmidhāra and others also speak of this original nature. That only the dharmatā and not the mind is spoken of is because the principle possesses merits as numerous as the sands of the Ganges; conforming to it results in purity, while opposing it results in defilement. Hence, what is acquired through cultivation is called the secret nature, whereas the mind is not like this. Furthermore, although the principle also serves as the support for defiled phenomena and can give birth to wholesome and unwholesome phenomena, it does not possess passions numerous as the sands of the Ganges. This is also not correct. Where in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi or other Mahāyāna texts is it not accepted that tathatā and the mind pervade sentient beings, such that one would say that the absence [of gotra] in a portion [of sentient beings] is an accommodated doctrine? Moreover, if principle and mind are taken as the pradhāna-hetu of Buddhahood—namely, the bodhisattva gotra—why do you yourself cite the Upāsakaśīlasūtra: "The bodhisattva gotra is likewise: through the condition of wholesome karma one generates the bodhicitta, which is called the bodhisattva nature"? Could that principle and mind be called the bodhisattva gotra only after bodhicitta has been generated? If it is said that it is only called the buddhadhātu and not the bodhisattva gotra: if it is not even the bodhisattva gotra, how could it be called the buddhadhātu? If it is said that generating bodhicitta is called the bodhisattva gotra on the basis of adventitious nature, could its original nature not be called the bodhisattva gotra? Furthermore, according to fascicle twenty-six of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra: "There are two kinds: first, the janaka-hetu; second, the jñāpaka-hetu. That which can give birth to phenomena is called the janaka-hetu; a lamp can reveal objects, hence it is called a jñāpaka-hetu. In relation to the arising of the fruit, the janaka-hetu is primary (pradhāna), while the jñāpaka-hetu is auxiliary (pratyaya)." Since principle is [held by you to be] the pradhāna-hetu as janaka-hetu, the subsequent text itself admits that it gives birth to things. When practitioners before the path of seeing cultivate the principle in conformity with tathatā, why does it not produce conditioned anāsrava [dharmas]? You then take sāsrava [dharmas] as anāsrava seeds. If tathatā cannot produce [them], how can it be called the pradhāna-hetu? Even if it were admitted to produce [them], what would be the use of the mind, since tathatā would already have produced [them]? Furthermore, if tathatā directly gives birth [to them] as a cause, this contradicts the Nirvāṇa and the Buddhagotraśāstra, as cited above and as shown in passages below. Even if in some places tathatā is spoken of as a seed, just as defilements are spoken of as the tathāgata seed, how could that word "seed" mean that it is the pradhāna-hetu for Buddhahood? Therefore we know it is a figurative expression based on tathatā. As the four great elements in relation to the matter derived from them, or the five seeds are called the true seeds. The seven characteristics in the Yogācārabhūmi exclude permanent dharmas from being causes; you do not realize that the meaning of vāsanā differs from that of bīja. Bringing in the meaning of vāsanā, although you understand the meaning of vāsanā in terms of the perfumer and the perfumed regarding seeds, you have not explained the seeds themselves. Furthermore, the second fascicle of the Buddhagotraśāstra asks: "Among these three natures, how many natures lack intrinsic nature yet can produce intrinsic nature? Answer: Only the imagined nature lacks intrinsic nature yet can produce intrinsic nature. Question: How many among these have intrinsic nature and can produce intrinsic nature? Answer: Only this single other-dependent nature. Question: How many among these three natures have intrinsic nature yet can produce non-existence? Answer: The true and actual nature alone can eliminate the other-dependent nature, making it non-existent." If tathatā were the pradhāna[-hetu] and the seed of all phenomena, why could it not produce, and why say it is only the other-dependent nature alone? Furthermore, if the substance of the eighth consciousness were the pradhāna-hetu of all phenomena, this would also contradict the meaning of seed in the Yogācārabhūmi, Mahāyānasaṃgraha, and so on. The substance of the mind is one; if admitted to directly produce, how could it be said to lead to its own distinct fruit and to have a determinate nature? Moreover, how could a single cause universally give birth to wholesome, unwholesome, and other phenomena? If that were accepted, a single cause would lead to an unequal [creation]. Fascicle twenty-two of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: "All phenomena have different causes and different fruits; neither does one cause produce all fruits, nor do all fruits arise from one cause." From this we know that cause and fruit have distinct designations. Because the ālayavijñāna possesses the three aspects, in its causal aspect it contains diverse dhātus; although not separate from the eighth consciousness, they are also not identical with the ālayavijñāna. By principle, substance and function, cause and fruit must be like this. Therefore the Abhidharmasūtra says: "All phenomena reside in the consciousness, and the consciousness likewise resides in phenomena; / they serve reciprocally as the nature of fruits, and are constantly called the nature of causes." It also says: "Because it gathers and stores all phenomena, it is the all-seed consciousness; / hence it is called ālayavijñāna; I have revealed it to the superior ones." From this we know that within the storehouse consciousness there are diverse dhātus, which are not identical with the eighth [consciousness] itself. As for the Avataṃsaka and Laṅkāvatāra speaking of the mind's defilement and purity being able to produce all things, this gathers function back into substance and subsumes the rest under consciousness, so there is no contradiction. Further, [they say]: "Although principle and mind are both janaka-hetus, principle is mostly spoken of because conforming to tathatā leads to purity, while opposing tathatā leads to defilement. The mind is not like this, hence it is not spoken of." This is also not correct. If the mind could not universally produce defilement and purity, it might be compared to tathatā and mind; since it universally produces them, why not speak of it? Moreover, awakening to consciousness results in purity, while being confused about consciousness results in defilement. How do their meanings differ, that one should speak mostly and one-sidedly of principle? Furthermore, if it is said that the mind does not give birth to merits resembling the sands of the Ganges, to what would tathatā serve as merits possessing the nature of the sands of the Ganges? Further, [they say] that it lacks passions possessing the nature of the sands of the Ganges. This is also not correct. Since there are eighty-four thousand gates of passion, conversely there are eighty-four thousand gates of merit. Since merits as numerous as the sands of the Ganges are spoken of, there are also faults as numerous as the sands of the Ganges. If tathatā is not all-pervading, it would lack passions possessing the nature of the sands of the Ganges; but if you accept that tathatā is all-pervading, why would it lack the nature of passions as numerous as the sands of the Ganges? Further, [they say]: "The nature of the tathāgatagarbha and the eighth consciousness are like a mani jewel, which yields [things] according to conditions. Thus the lower fascicle of the Ghanavyūhasūtra says: 'Just as a mani jewel placed in the light of the sun or moon rains down respective objects according to suitability, so too the ālayavijñāna, joining with karmic impressions, manifests resembling various colors and pervades the world; if associated with anāsrava, it rains down all phenomena of merit.'" Then your own position that the eighth storehouse consciousness is the pradhāna-hetu of Buddhahood collapses. Why? The sūtra says that associated with anāsrava it rains down merits, clarifying that the eighth consciousness is not the pradhāna-hetu, because association with another nature is not its own nature. Following this, we know that upon reaching the first stage, the eighth consciousness gives birth to anāsrava wisdom through association with anāsrava, rather than sāsrava directly producing anāsrava. According to this sūtra passage, anāsrava exists originally and does not depend on abhinava-vāsanā. How can you say that the eighth consciousness is the pradhāna? Moreover, these associated anāsrava dharmas are also merits rained down from the eighth; before the eighth is simultaneous with anāsrava, how could these arise? One cannot say they arise from anāsrava seeds, because you yourself do not accept that before the path of seeing of the triyāna there are anāsrava dharmas. Further, [they say]: "Possessing confusion, the ālaya is impermanent; awakening to principle, the eighth is permanent like tathatā. Thus in the Ghanavyūhasūtra: 'Why is the ālayavijñāna the support for the vāsanās of phenomena such as manas, disturbed and muddied by the discriminating mind? If separated from discrimination, it becomes anāsrava, and anāsrava is permanent just like empty space.' The Suvarṇaprabhāsasūtra says: 'The dharmakāya is permanent, while the nirmāṇakāya is impermanent.' The Nirvāṇa also says: 'When reaching the fruit of Buddhahood, it does not belong to the three times.' And further: 'The Buddha is not like conditioned formations which are saṃskṛta; nor can he be said to be asaṃskṛta on the grounds of not being made by karma and afflictions.' All anāsrava dharmas are unmade; why specifically say the Buddha's wisdom is not saṃskṛta? Therefore, when the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi cites three reasons to prove that the Buddha is impermanent, it is a false claim limited to one's own見聞." This is also not correct. If you say that the saṃbhogabuddha is permanent in continuum, what you have established already collapses. If it is immutable permanence, then there are four errors: First, the error of contradicting scriptural teachings. Now, is the bodhi of the saṃbhogabuddha originally existent or newly existent? If it is originally existent and not produced from causes, then both bodhi and nirvāṇa would only possess jñāpaka-hetus and not possess the name of janaka-hetus; why then does fascicle twenty-six of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra state: "There are further janaka-hetus, namely the six pāramitās, bodhi, and so forth"? Moreover, if it is permanent, how can it arise from causes? Fascicle thirteen of the Nirvāṇa says: "If there are dharmas that arise from conditions, know that they are impermanent." It also says: "For this reason, a dharma arising from a cause is not called permanent." A later passage says: "Good son! Space is neither produced nor emerged, neither done nor made, and not a saṃskṛta dharma. The Tathāgata is likewise: neither produced nor emerged, neither done nor made, not a saṃskṛta dharma. Just like the Tathāgata's nature, the buddhadhātu is likewise: neither produced nor emerged, not made, not a saṃskṛta dharma." This refers to the dharmakāya of tathatā, not the saṃbhogakāya. Otherwise, how could the saṃbhogabuddha be called acquired through cultivation? Moreover, the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa says "born from all merits," and so on. Furthermore, fascicle nineteen of the Nirvāṇa says: "Such light is called wisdom; wisdom is permanently abiding, and a permanently abiding dharma has no causes or conditions." There are multiple explanations that permanent dharmas have no causes. It also says: "The substance of nirvāṇa is not originally non-existent and now existent. If the substance of nirvāṇa were originally non-existent and now existent, it would not be an anāsrava, permanently abiding dharma." Moreover, Bodhisattva Gauravadatta says: "Whatever is accomplished through causal adornment is called impermanent. Since this great bodhi is accomplished through adornment and exists only through cultivation, it is called originally non-existent and now existent; how can it be permanent?" It also says: "The substance of nirvāṇa is not accomplished by these five causes." Since the six pāramitās and so forth are jñāpaka and not janaka, or because of the original cause, it is permanent. The substance of bodhi is obtained through the five causes; since the six pāramitās and so forth are janaka-hetus, it is impermanent.